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WILLIAM B. JOWEB. AVGUSTA, «EO., MOWMY EVEYI\G } SEFT. 11, 1837. [Sp.!ii-wcok?y.}--\ o|. 0 |. V.~N O ;-79*
jmSluftclJ
DAILY, SEMI-WEEKLY AM) WEEKL\
At iVo. 261 Broad Street.
TEI MS —TW3y papei, Ten’ Dollars por annum
in advance. Semi-wcelily pap?r, ni Fiv« Dollars
as herelol.ire li advance, or Six at tlie end »l ilii
year. Woskly pa oar, Three Dallurs in advance or
Four at the end of the year.
M— pwni'.i lot* yiw><.wjjivx>i ucj .-cr—rwi
CHIIONtCLiS AND SENTINEL.
aywiistaT
Fridmj- Kvoninsr. Sept. 8, 1837.
FOR GOVERNOR
GEOK«E R. «IIi»B2S.
FOR SENATK,
ANDREW J. MILLER.
FOR RFPRF.SENTATIVEK.
CHARLES J. JENKINS,
GEORGE W. CRAWFORD,
WILLIAM J. RHODES.
THE MESAGE.
Wc reserve our Comments upon this document
for another day. We prefer that our readers
should first judge of it for themselves, and after
ward.'* shall have our opinion, or rather transla
tion in it.
Wc cannot refiain from saying a word or two,
about the interest manifested hy all parties to see
this Message. It was received here in 47 hours
from WaahHigton City ! In four hours after the
Express Mad had arrived, it was all in type in
our cilice, and in one hour and a half afterwards
it was put to Press, some delay having occurred
in arranging the Form. From 150 to 200 copies
were then taken from the office by the anxious
and impatient crowd of citizens, as fast ns they
.could be thrown off from the Press. The copy,
forwarded by our Correspondent was the only
,» one received at this place, thus compelling every
body to wait until it could be re-printed. At a
few minutes before five o’clock, Messrs. Guicu &
Thomson of the Constitutionalist, received a co
py from our office, and before 12 o’clock at night
it was put to Press in theirs—the Message, long
as it is,having thus gone, through two separate edi
tions in this place, within two days r.ml a half
after the moment of its delivery to Congress in
Washington City.
A particular friend of ours, (and one who by
the way is a political opponent of H. V. Johnson )
Esq.,) has suggested to us that Mr. J. never was
a nullifier, and that Bob Short has consequently
done him injustice in ascribing to him a change
of principles. If this bo true, we have no doubt
but that Mr. Short will readily recant what he
has said in relation to that gentleman ; and wc
give him this hint now, before any complaints
have reached our cars, that ho may have an op
portunity of so doing. At the same time* we
must remark, that the mistake was a very natural
one On the part of Mr. Short. We had also ta
ken up his error, (we cannot say now from what
source,) or we would certainly have corrected
our friend Bob when his piece appeared. After all
however, there is enough in Mr. Shorts Commu
nication to show that ho looked with very great
indulgence up to Mr. J’s. supposed change of po
ll U-sJ rentimonts, for he hears testimony to the
“honesty” and cleverness of that gen'letnan, in
common with his colleagues. This much lor S.
| until he can speak for himself, —which will pro
[ bably be in two or three days.
FOB THE CHRONICLE AND SENTINEL.
I “Richmond,” in the Constitutionalist, replies
I to me as if he were the author of the letter to the
f Standard of Union, on which I remarked last
I week.
In that letter, ho said the Union party “eschew
I ed all compromise.” He now says the Slate
j Rights party, “violated the faith,” pledged last
[ year, in not continuing the compromise. Now,
( if there were any pledge of faith, jit was, of course,
I mutual. Either then, his party violated their
I faith, or his letter to the Standard was FALSE.
I Here is a simple dilemma, from which all his
i Van Buren squirming cannot extricate him.
ANTI-VAN.
From the New York Herald, Sept. 4.
I The packet slTip Ricliard-
I son, from Havre, sailed on the 4th ult., has arriv-
K ed.
Don Carlos remains, by last accounts, still in-
B disposed at Cantavicja. Esparleroand Oraa are
K directing their march towards the place to besiege
B it.
! , Taglioni had arrived in Paris from her triumph
al rtflt visit to England. She was to proceed imme-
I diatcly for St. Petersburg!!, where she wasexpec-
B led by the first of this month.
Princess Polignac and family have arrived at
I Dieppe.
B The Commerce says that matrimonial alliance
I is on the tapis, between the Princess Mary (the
■ king’s eldest unmarried daughter) and Prince Al-
B exander of Wurtemberg, cousin to the King of
B Wurtemberg. The Prince has been in Paris fur
I the last ten or twelve days.
The Duchess of Orleans, having read in the
■ journals thcaccounls of the conduct of the miller,
B near Saint Etienne, who, on his premises being
B inundated by the overflowing of the river Furet,
K displayed so much courage in saving his mother,
■ his wife, and his children, leaving his property to
K the merciless torrent, immediately sent him an or
■ der fur 200 trancs.
K Queen Christina of Spain shows great spirit
■ upon herbirthday. The Piesidcntof the Council
■ entered and demanded the dismissal of the Min
■ islcr qf War. Her Majesty became enraged, and
■ reproached Calatrava with wishing to drive from
■ her Council all those who had constantly proved
■ themselves attached to the interests of her diugh
■ for, adding, “It would have been much better to
■ have prepared an act of clemency in favor of those
■ whom you have lately caused to be arrested, and
■ among them, my own chaplain.’ Calatrava ro
■ plied. ‘Madam, that cannot be. On the con-
Birary, I lay before you today the names of several
■grandees, who must also be incarcerated. As to
displacing of Count Almodovar, I ask it only
Hbecause it is demanded by public opinion, to
Byhich you must submit.’ Upon this, the Queen
the conference by saying, ‘Well, I will
of it. You may retire.”
Messrs. Anselrao, Salomon, and James Ruths-
were at Paris. It is bleievod that a final
termination as to the loan so long solicited by
government of Queen Christina, is on the
■ Mr. Greely, who was lately released from im
jSbrisonment in Frcderiekton, New-Brunswick,
BA. left Bangor, on his return to the Madawaska
BKrrUory, to resume the taking of the census
■HKre.
WzA Wiiappbr !—The following from the
HfHa Boonvtlle, Missouri, Herald, a “ leetic”
■■■passes in the way of extravaganza even
||l tSI stories of Ilackelt’s Wildfire.
kI;S|V friend writes us from St. Charles, that
Kjßce the inundation of Chanvin’s bottom op-
IgKito that place, the musquetoes have been
■B very thick that the moon could’not rise
■foiigh them. We suppose this is the cans
moon rising so late for some i.’-glUs p <»’
tew » —son—rmi m ——r—torwta————
| MESSAGE
FROM THE
I PRESIDENT OF THE UNITE D STATES
'Vo the two Houses of Congress at the Com ■
moHcement of the first session of the 'Twenty
'fifth Congress.
Fellow Citizens of the Senate
ami House of Hepresenlalives.
The act of the 23d June, 1836, regulating
the depositee of the public money, and direct
ing the employment of State, District, and
Territorial banks fur that purpose, made it
the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to
discontinue the use of such of them, as should
at any time refuse to redeem their notes in
specie, and to substitute oihet banks; provi
ded a sufficient number cruld be obtained to
receive the public depnsitos, upon the terms
and conditions there n prescribed. The gen
eral and almost simultaneous suspension of
specie payment by the banks in May last, ren
dered the performance of this duty imperative
in respect to those which had been selected
under the act; and made it, at the same
time, impracticable to employ the requisite
number ot others, upon the prescribed condi
tions. Tito specific regulations established
by Congress, for the deposits and safe keep
ing of the public moneys, have thus unox
pe<’t»d!y become inoperative, 1 fell it tube my
du'y to afford you an early opportunity for
the exorcise of your supervisory powers o"?r
the subject.
I was also led to apprehend that the sUS
pension of specie payments, increasing the
embarrassments before existing, in the pecn.
niary affairs of the country, would so far di
minish tl e public revenue, that the accruing
receipts into the Treasury, would not, with the
reserved five millions, be sufficient to defray
the unavoidable expenses of the Government,
until the usual period for the meeting of Con
gress ; whilst the authority to call upon the
States, for a portion of the sums deposited
with them, was too restricted to enable the
Department to realize a sufficient amount
from that source. These apprehensions have
boon justifis.l by subsequent results, which
render it curtain that this deficiency will oc
cur, if additional means bo no! provided by
Congress.
Tito difficulties experienced by the mercan
tile interest, in meeting their engagements,
induced them to apply to me, previously to
• the actual suspension of specie payments, for
indulgence upon tlioir bonds for duties ; and
all the relief authorized by laA’, was promptly
and cheerfully granted. The dependence ot
the Treasury upon the avails of those bonds,
to enable it to make tbe deposites with the
States required by law, led me in the outset
to limit this indulgence to the Ist of Septem
ber, but it has since been extended to the Ist
of October, that the matter might be submit
ted to your further direction.
Questions were also expected to arise in
the recess in respect to the October instal
ment of those deposites, requiring the inter
position of Congress.
A provision ofanolher act, passed about the
same time, and intended to secure a faithful
compliance with the obligation of the United
States, to satisfy all demands upon them in
specie or its equivalent, prohibited the offer ol
any bank note, not convcrtable on the spot,
into gold or silver, at the will of the holder;
and the ability of the Government, with mil
lions on deposite, to meet its engagements in
the manner thus required by law, was render
ed very doubtful by the event to which I have
referred.
Sensible that adequate provisions for these
unexpected exigencies could only bo made by
Congress; convinced Uiat some of them
would be indispensably necessary to the pub
lic service, before the regular period ot your
meeting; and desirous also to enable you to
exercise at the earliest moment, your full con
i stilutional powers for the relief of the coun
, try, I could not, with propriety, avoid subject
ing you to the inconvenience of assembling
aUts earlv a day as the state of the popular
representation would permit. lam sure that
I have done but justice to your feelings, in
believing that this inconvenience will he
cheerfully encountered, in the hope of render
ing your meeting conducive to the good of
the country.
1 During the earliest stages of the revulsion
through which we have just passeJ, much ac
rimonious discussion arose, and great diver
i sity of opinion existed, as to its real causes.
This was not surprising. The operations
of credit are so diversified, and the influences
which affect them so numerous, and often so
subtle, that even impartial and well informed
tipwaimg nrp seldom found Iff agree in respect
to them. To inherent uirticiiTtios wore huso
added other tendencies, which were by ho
means favorable to the discovery of truth.
It was hardly to be expected, that those who
lisapproved the policy of the Government
in relation to the currency, would in the ex
cited state of public fooling produced by the
occasion, fail to attribute to that policy any
extensive embarrassment in the monetary
affairs of the country. The matter thus be
came connected with the passions and con
flicts of party ; opinions were more or less
affected by political considerations ; and dif
ferences were prolonged which might other
wise have been determined by an appeal to
, facts, by the exercise of reason, or by mutual
concession. It is, however, a cheering reflec
tion, that circumstances of this nature cannot
prevent a community so intelligent as ours,
from ultimately arriving at correct conclusions.
Encouraged by the firm belief of this truth,
I proceed to state my views, so far as may be
necessary to a clear understanding of the
remedies I feel it my duty to propose, and of
the reasons by which 1 have been led to re
commend them.
The history of trade in the United States,
for the last three or four years, affords the
most convincing evidence that our present
condition is chiefly to be attributed to over
action in all tlie departments of business ; an
over-action, deriving, perhaps, its first impul
ses from antecedent causes, but stimulated
to its destructive consequences by excessive
issues of bank paper, and by other facilities
for the acquisition and enlargement of credit.
At the commencement of the year 1834, the
banking capital of tbe United States, includ
ing that of the National Bank then existing,
amounted to about two hundred millions of
dollars ; the bank notes then in circulation
to about ninety-five millions ; and the loans
and discounts of the banks to three hundred
and twenty-four millions. Between that time
and the first of January 1833; being the lat
est period to which accurate accounts have
been received, our banking capital was in
creased to more than two hundred and fifty
one millions ; our paper circulation to more
than one hundred and forty millions, and the
loans and discounts to more th in four hundred
and fifty seven millions. To this vast increase
are to be added the many millions of credit,
acquired by means of foreign loans, contract,
ed by the States and State institutions, and,
above all, by the lavish accommodations ex
tended by foreign dealers to our merchants.
The consequence of this redundancy of
credit, and of the spirit of reckless specula
tion engendered by it, were a foreign debt
contracted by ourcitizons, estimated in March
last at more than thirty millions of dollars;
the extension to traders in the interior ot our
Country of credits for supplies, greatly beyond
the Wants of the people ; the investment of j
thirty-nine and a half million 0 .of dollars in
unproductive public lands, in the years 1835
and 1836, whilst proceeding year the
sales amounted to only four ami a half mill
ions ; the creation of debts to an almost
■ countless amount, for real estate in existing
or anticipated cities and villages, equally un
productive, and at prices now seen to have
been greatly disproportionate to their real
value; the expenditure of immense sums
in improvements which, in many cases,
have been found to be ruinously improvident;
the diversion to other pursuits of much of the
labor that should have been applied to agri.
culture, thereby contributing to the expendi
ture of largo sums in the importation of grain
from Europe ; an expenditure which, amount
ing in 1834, to about two hundred and filly
thousand dollars, was, in the first two quarters
of the present year, increased to more than
two millions of dollars; and finally, without
enumerating other injurious results, the rapid
growth among all classes, and especially in
our great commercial towns, of luxurious hab
its, founded too often on merely fancied
wealth, and detrimental alike to the industry,
the resources, and the morals of our people.
It was so in possible that such a slate of
things could long continue, that the prospect
ot revulsion was present to the minds of con
siderate men before it actually came. None
■ however, had correctly anticipated its eeveri
• ty. A concurrence of circumstances inadc
qn.if.e of themselves to produce such wide
spread and ca!am; , ‘' , ds emlv.tvasrnents, tend
ed so greatly to aggravate t hem, t!'"t they can
not be overlooked in considering their history.
Among these may be mentioned, most promi
nent, the great loss of capital sustained by our
commercial emporium in the fire ot Decem
ber, 1835—a loss the effects of which were
underrated at the time, because postponed
for a season by the great facilities of credit
then existing; the disturbing effects in
our cominon.ial cities, of the transfers of
the public moneys required by the depo
site law of June, 1536; and the measures
adopted by the foreign creditors of our mer
chants to reduce their debts, and to withdraw
from the United States a large portion of our
specie.
However unwilling any of our cilizons may
heretofore have been to assign to these causes
the chief instrumentality in producing the
present state of things, the developments sub
sequenlly made, and the actual condition of
other commercial countries, must, as it seems
to mo, dispel all remaining doubts upon the
subject. It has since appeared that evils,
similar to those suffered by ourselves, have
been experienced in Great Britain, on the
continent, and indeed, throughout the com
mercial world; and that in other countries, as
in our own, they have been uniformly preced
ed by an undue enlargement ot the bounda
ries of trade prompted, as with us, by unpre
cedented expansions of the systems of credit.
A reference to the amount of hanking capital,
and the issues of paper credits put in circula
tion in Great Britain, by banks, and in other
ways, during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836,
will show an augmentation of the paper cur
rency there, as much disproportioned to the
real wants ol trade as in the United States.
With this redundancy of the paper currency,
there arose in that country also a spirit of ad
venturous speculation, embracing the whole
range of human enterprise. Aid was profuse
ly given to projected improvements. Large in
vestments were made in foreign slocks and
loans, credits for goods were granteJ with
unbounded liberality to merchants in foreign
countries; and all the means of acquiring and
employing credit were pul in active opera
tion, and extended in thetr effec's to every de
partment of business, and to every quarter of
• the globe. The reaction was proportioned in
its violence to the extraordinary character of
events which preceded it. Tne commercial
community of Great Britain were subjected
to the greatest difficulties, and their debtors in
■ litis country were not only suddenly depriv
ed o accustomed and expected credits, but
called upon for payments, which, in the ac
tual posture of things here, could only be
made through a general pressure, and at the
most ruinous sacrifices.
In view of these facts, it would seem impossij
ble for sincere inquirers alter truth to resist the
conviction, that the causes of the revulsion in
both countries have been substantially the scan j
Two natons, the most commercial in the
world, enjoying but recently the highest tie.
gree of apparent prosperity, and maintaining
with each other the closest relatfbns, are sud
denly, in a time of profound peace,and without
any great national disaster, arrested in their
car er, and plunged jnlo a state of umbtrrass
im irt and -tva-Wr/tti Cmmtrirs tIITVC
witnessed the same redundancy of paper mo
ney, and other facilities of credit; the same
spirit of speculation ; the same partial succes
ses j the same difficulties and revorsnt; and,
at length, nearly the same ca
tastrophe. The most material difference be
tween the results in the two countries has on
ly been, that with us there has also occqred an
extensive derangement in the fiscal affairs of
the Federal and State Governments, occasion
ed by the suspension of specie payments by the
banks.
The history of these causes and effects, in
Qredt Britain and the United Stales, is sub
stantially the history of the revulsion in all
other Commercial countries.
The present and visible effects of these
circumstances ou the operations ot the Gov
ernment, and oh the industry ot the people,
point out the objects which cal! fur your im
mediate attention.
They are—to regulate by laws the safe keep
ing, transfer, and disbursement, of the public
moneys ; to designate the funds to he received
arid paid by the Government; to enable the
Treasury to meet promptly every demand up
on it; to proscribe the terms of indulgence,
and the mode of settlement to he adopted, as
well m colluding from individuals the reven
ue that has accrued, as in withdrawing it from
former depositories, and to devise and adopt
such further measures within the constitution
al competency of Congress, as will bo best cal
ciliated to revive the enterprise and to promote
the prosperity of the country.
For the deposite, transfer, and disburse
ment, of the revenue, National and State
Bunks have always, with temporary and lim
ited exceptions, been heretofore employed;
but, although advocates of each system are to
he found, it is apparent that the events of the
last few months have greatly augmented the
desire, long existing among the people of the
United States, to separate the fiscal concerns
of the Government from those of individual
or corporations.
Again, to create a National Bank, as a fis
cal agent, would bo to disregard the popular
will, twice solemnly and unequivocally ex
pressed. On no question of domestic
policy is there stronger evidence that the sen
timents of a large majoniy are deliberately
fixed ; and I cannot concur with those who
think they see, in recent events, a proof that
these sentiments are, or a reason, that they
should be, changed.
Events, similar in their origin and char
acler, have heretofore frequently occurred
without producing any such change; and the
lessons of experience must be forgotten, if
we suppose that the pr .rent overthrow of
credit would have been prevented by the exis
tence of a national bank. Proneoeuii to ex
-1 cccsive issues has ever been the vice of the
i bat king system; a vice as prominent m nation
i a! ns in State institutions. This propensity is as
i subservient to the advancement of private in
terests in the one as in the othar; and those
who direct them both, being principally guided
by the same views, ami influenced by the ~itir.a
motives, will be equally ready to stimulate ex
travaganee of enterprise by improvement ol
credit. How stikmgly is th's conclusion sus
tained by experience. The Bmk of the Uni
ted States, with the vast powers conferred on
it by Congress, did not or could not prevent
former and similar embarrassments, nor has
the still gre iter strength it has been said to
possess, under its present charter, enabled it,
m the existing emergency, to check other in
stitutions or even to save itself. Ingreal Britain
where it has boenscenffhesame causes havebeen
attended with the same effects, a national bank
possessingJpoWcrs far greater than are asked for
by the warmest advocates of such an icstitu
tion here, lias also proved unable to prevent an
undue expansion of credit, and the evils that
flow from it. Nor can I find any tenable ground
for the re-establishment of a national bank,
in the derangement alleged at present to exist
in the domestic exchanges of the country, or
in the facilities it may be capable of affording
them. Although advantages of this sort vvere
anticipated when the first Bank of the United
States was crested, they .were regarded an
incidental accommodation ; not one w!lie
Federal Government was botind, of e» , d be
called upon to furnish. This accentin'. lation
is now, indeed, after the lapse of tv ‘ ma
ny years, demanded from it as among it* first
duties; and an omision to aid and regulate
CußunetT'ol exchange, is treated as a ground
ofloud anti seriftUs complaint. Such results
only serve to exemplify the constant desire,
among some of our citizens, to enlarge the
powers of the GoveifimetiL and extend its
control to subjects with which ff should not
interfere. They can never justify the cream,,',
of an institution to promote such objects. On
the contrary, they justly excite among the corn
mun ty a more diligent inquiry into the char
acter of those operations of trade, towards
which it is desired to extend such peculiar fa
vors.
The various transactions which hoar the
name ot domestic exchanges, ditfer essential
ly in their nature, operation, and utility- One
class of them consists of bills of exchange,
drawn for the purpose of transferring actual -
captital from one part of the country to
another, or to anticipate the proceeds of prop
erty actually transmitted. Bdls of this de
scription are highly useful in the movements
of trade, and well deserve all the encourage
ment which can rightfully be given to them.
Another class is made up of bills of exchange,
nut drawn to transfer actual capital, nor on
the credit of properly transmitted, but to cre
ate fictitious capital; partaking at once of the
character of notes discounted in bank, and
of bank notes incirculation ; and swelling
tbe mass of paper ere fits to a vast extent in j
tiie most objectionable manner. These b 11s (
have formed, for the last lew years, a large |
pioportion of what are termed the domestic j
exchanges of the country, serving as the ,
moans of usurious profit, and constituting the
most unsafe and precarious p iper in circitla- ,
lion. Tills species of trafic, instead of being <
upheld, ought to be discountenanced by the t
Government and the people. ,
In transferring its funds from place to place, i
the Government is on the same footing with
the private citizens, and may resort to the
samo legal moans. do so through the
medium of bills drawn by itself, or purchased
from o'hers ; and in these operations it may,
in a manner undoubtedly constiluti 1 - .nd
legitimate, facilitate and assist exchanges of
individuals founded on real transactions of \
trade. The extent to which this may be done,
and the best means of effecting it, arc entitled 1
to the fullest consideration. This lias been 1
bestowed by the -Secretary of the Treasury, 1
and his views will he submitted to you in his '
■ report.
But it was not designed by the constitution \
that the government shou’d assu jtc the tnan
i agement of domestic or foreign exchange. \
j It is indeed authorised to regulate by law the ,
commerce between the States, and to provide ,
j a general standasd of value, nr medium of
I eqchange, in gold and silv r; but it is not its
t province to aid individuals in the transfer of
| their funds,otherwise than through the facili
i ties afforded by the Post Office Dnpar imint.
. As justly might it be called on to provide for
t the transportation ol their merchandise.—
• These are operations of trade. They plight
t to bo conducted by those who are interested
r in them, in the same manner that the iiicidou
. tal difficulties of other pursuits are cncuunt
i nved by other classes of citizens. Much aid 1
• has not been deemed necessary in other coun
i tries. Throughout Europe, the domestic as
■ well as the foreign exchanges are carried on
, by private houses, often, if not generally, with- '
■ out the assistance of banks. Yet they extend
throughout distinct sovereignties, and far ox
■ ceed in amount the real exchanges of the U.
i S'ates. There is no reason why our own
F may not bo conducted in the same manner,
• with equal cheapness and safely. Certainly
I this might be accomplished, if it were favored
by those most deeply interested ; and few can
i doubt that their own intercatj as well as the
• general welfare of the country, Would he pro
moted by leaving such a subject in the hands
of those to whom it properly belongs.
i A system founded on private interest, cnlcr
, prise and competition, without the aid of legisla
, live grants or regulations by law, would rapidly
prosper; it would be free from tbe influence of
political agitation, and extend the same exemp
, iidb to trade itself f and it would put an end to
. those complaints of neglect, partiality, injustice,
and oppression, which arc tlie unavoidable results
, of interference by the Government, in the proper
concerhs of individuals. All former attempts on '
lb« part of tbe Government to carry ks legisla
| lion, ill this respect, further than was designed
by the Yonstitution, have in the end proved in
jurious, and have served only to convince the
great body of the people, more and more, of tlie
certain dangers ofUlending private interests with
the operations of public business; and there is
no reason to supposs that a repetition of them
! now would be more successful.
It cannot be concealed that there exists, in our
community, opinions and feelings on ibis subject
! in direct opposition to each other. A large por
tion of them, combining great intelligence, activi
ty, and influence, are do doubt sincere in their be
lief that the operations of trade ought to bo assis
tod by such a connection; they regard a national
bank ns necessary for Ibis purpose, and they are
disinclined to every measure that docs not lend,
sooner or later, to the establishment of such an
institution. On the other hand, a majority of the
people are believed to be irreconcilably opposed to
that measure: they consider such a concentration ,
of power dangerous to their liberties; and many ,
of them regard H as a violation of the Constitu
tion. This collision of opinion has, doubtless, ,
caused much of the embarrassment to which Ilia ;
commercial transactions of the country have late- )
ly been exposed. Banking has become a political ,
topic of the highest interest, and trade has suffer
ed in the conflict of parties. A speedy termina
tion of Itiia elate of things, however desirable, is
scarcely to be expected. We have seen (or near
ly half a century, that those who advocate a na
tional bank, by whatever motive they mayjbo in
fluenced, constitute a portion of our community
too numerous to allow us to hope for an early
. abandonment of their favorite plan. On tbe other
hand, they must indeed form an erroneous esti
mate Os th« intelligence and temper of tbu Amen- '
j tan people, Who suppose that hi •• eontin- 1
—ii ■ !■>■—■—!■■■ ■■——!■ twnwKayr-Tr—vn
■-sat, on slighter insufficient grounds, tlTcir pers°-
vering opposition to such an institution ; or that
‘hey can bo induced by pecuniary preasuie or by
.ny other combination of circumstances, to sur
render principles they have so long and so inflex
ibly maintained.
My own views of the subject are unchanged.
They have been repeatedly and unreservedly an
nounced to my fellti v citizens; who, with full
knowledge of them, conferred upon me the two
highest offices of (lie Government. On tbe Inst
of these occasions, I felt it duo to the people to
apprize them •li ttnclly, that, in the event of my
election, I would not he able to co-operate in the ;
reestablishment of a national bank. To these
sentiments, I have now only to ad I the expression
of au increased conviction, that thg re-establish
merit of such a bank, in any form.wbilst it would
not accomplish the beneficial purpose promised by
its advocates, would impair the rightful suprema
cy of the popular will; injure the character and
diminish the influence of our political system; ami
tiring once more into existence a concentrated
moneyed power, hostile to tile spirit, and threat
ening the permanency, of our republican institu
tions,
Local banks have been employed for the depo
site and distribution of the revenue; at all limes
partially, and on three different occasions, exclu
sively; first, anleiior to the establishment of the
first bank of the United Sialcs; secondly, in the
Interval between lilt termination of that institu
tion and the charter of its successor; and thirdly,
during the limited period which has now so ab
ruptly closed. The connection thus repeatedly
attempted, proved unsatisfactory on each succes
sive occasion, notwithstanding tile various meas
ures which wore adopted to facilitate or insure its
success. On the last occasion, in the year 1833,
the employment of tile Stale banks Was guarded
especially in every way which experience and
caution could suggest. Personal security was
required for the safe-keeping and prompt pay
ment of the moneys to be received,and full returns
of their condition were, from time la tithe td be
ffio depositories. In the filet sieges the
measure was eminently successful, notwithstand
ing the violent opposition of the Bank of the U.
Stales, and the unceasing efforts made to over
throw it. The select banks performed with fidel
ity, & without any embarrassment to themselves I I
or the community, their engagements to the Go
vernment, and tins system promised to be perma- '
nently useful. But when it became necessary
under the net of June, 1836, to withdraw from 1
them the public money,for the purpose of placing ‘
it in additional institution, or of transferring it to ‘
the States, they found it, in many cases, incon- 1
venient to comply with the demands of the Trea- j
sury, and numerous and pressing applications
were were made for indulgence or relief. As the f
instalments under the deposite law became paya
ble, their own embarrassments, and the neeessi- J
ty under which they lay of curtailing their dis
counts and Calling in tlioir debts, increased the f
general distress, and contributed, with other cau- 1
sea, to hasten the revulsion in which, at length, 1
they, in common with the ether banks, were fa- 1
tally involved.
Under these circumstance's, It becomes our so
lemn duty to inquire whether there are not, in *
any connection between the Government and 1
banks of Issue, evils of great magnitude, iiilioron- 1
in its very nature, and against which no precau- r
tions can effectually guard. J;
Unforeseen in the organization of the Govern- “
ment, and forced on the Treasury by early tie- •*
ccasitics, the practice of employing banks, was in '
truth, from tbe beginning, more a measure of
emergency than of sound policy. When we '■
started into existence as a nation, in addition to 1
the burdens of the now Government, we ussum- 1
od all the large but honorable load of debt which 1
was the price of our liberty; Imt wc hesitated to ‘
weigh down the inlant industry of tbe country '
by resorting to adequate taxation for the noeessn- *
ry revenue, The facilities of banks, in return fur ‘
the privileges they acquired, Were promptly offer
ed, and perhaps too readily received, by an ornj ’
barrasse 1 Treasury. During the long conliu- 1
nance of a National debt, and the intervening dis- 1
Acuities of a foreign war, the connection was con
tinned from motives of convenience; but those 11
causes have long since passed away. Wo have c
no emergencies that make banks necessary to 1
aid the wants of the Treasury ; we havd no load *
of national debt to provide for, and we have on r
actual deposite a largo surplus: No public in- I
lerost, therefor.-,, now requires the renewal of a c
connection, circumstances have dissolved. The
complete organization of our Government, the *
abundance ol our resources, the general liaimoiiy f
which prevails between the different Slates, and '
with foreign Powers, all enable ns now to select '
the system most consistent with tlie Constitution, 1
and most conducive, to tbe public welfare. Should '
wc then, connect the Treasury for a fourth time
with the local banks, it can only be under a eon- p
viction that past failures have arisen from acd- 1
dental, not inherent, defects. *
A danger, difficult, if nut impossible, to hd aw 1
oided in such an arrangement, is made strikingly 1
evident in the very event by which it has been now
defeated. A sudden act of the banks intrusted '
with the funds of the people, deprives the Tri as- 1
ury, without fault or agency of the government, '
ol the ability to pay i s creditors in the currency '
they have by law a tight to demand. This cir- 1
cuinstance no fluctuation of com merce could have *
produced, if tbe public revenue bad been collect- 1
led in the legal currency, and kept in that form '
by the officers of the Treasury. The citizen f
whose money was in bank receives it back, since (
the suspension, at a sacrifice in its amount; ‘
wliilst ho who kept it in the legal currency of the 1
country, and in his own possession, pursues, t
without loss, the current of his business. The
Government, placed in the situation of the former *
is involved in embarrassments it could not have t
suffered bad it pursued the course of the latter, s
These embarrassments arc, moreover, augmented I
by those salutary and just laws which foibid it to i
use a depreciated currency, and, by so doing, n
take from the Government the ability which indi- I
viduals have of accommodating their transactions I
to such a catastrophe. a
A system which can, in a lime of profound <
pence, when there is a largo revenue laid by, thus 1
suddenly prevent the application and toe use of I
the money of the people, in the manner and for 1
the objects they have directed, cannot be wise ; 1
but who.can think, without painful reflection, 1
that, under it, the same unforeseen events might £
have befallen us in the midst of a war, and taken 1
from us, at the moment when most wanted, the 1
use of those very means which were treasured up 1
to promote the national wrllarc and guard our •
national tights 1 To such embarrassments 1
and to such dangers will this Government be >
always exposed, whilst it lakes the moneys '
raised for, and n es-isary to, the puqlio ser- I
vice, out of the hands of its own officers, and <
converts them Into a mere right of action agairist 1
corporations entrusted witli the possession of 1
them. Nor can such results he effectually 1
guarded against in such a system, without hives- 1
ting the Executive with a control over the banks l I
themselves, whether State or National, that | 1
might with reason be objected to. Ours is, pro- :
bably, the only Government in the world that is
liable, in the management of its fiscal concerns,
to occurrences like these. But this imminent
risk is not the only dange: attenffnal on the snr- 1
render of the public money to the custody and
control of local corporations. Though the ob
ject is aid to tbe Treasury, Us effect may lie to in- 1
troduce into the operations of the Government,
(influences tlie most subtle, founded on interests
he most selfish.
Tbe use by the banks, for their own benefit, of 1
the money deposited with them, has received the 1
sanction of the Govern ment from the commence
ment of this connection. The money received i
from the people, instead of l*eing kept till it is i
needed for theft use, is, in consequence of this au- 1
thority, a fund,on which discounts are nude for I
the profit of those who happen to be owners of I
i stock in the banks selected as depositories The
’ supposed and often exsggs.*s..'*-J -i&'s; sges of
Bjoii 5 hr-** - il* '■i'.’.' a'S csnf.e :to lie & ignt for .
with avidity. I nil) not stop lo consider on whom
the patronage incident lo it, is to he conferred;
whether the selection and control he trusted to
Congress or to the Executive, cither will ho sub
jected lo appeals made in every form which the
sagacity of interest can suggest. The hunks,
under such a system, are stimulated lo make the
most of their fortunate acquisition; the depositee
arc treated as an increase of capital; loans arm
circulation are rashly augmented, and, when the
public exigencies require a return, it is attended
with embarraassinenis not provided for, ho? fore
seen. Thus hanliuhat thought themselves hnwi
fortunate when the public funds.worn received,
• n, 1 themselves most embarrassed when the sea
j con ol payment suddenly arrives.
Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system ate
nit limited to the hunks. It stimulates u general
rashness of enterprise, and aggravates the fluctua
tions of commerce and the currency. This result
was strikingly exhibited during the operations of
the late deposite system; and especially in the
purchases of pubic lands. The ordhr which ul
Innately directed the payment of gold and silver
in such purchases, greatly checked, hut could not
altogether prevent, the evil. Specie was indeed
more dillicuit to bo procured than the notes which
the hanks could themselves create at pleasure; but
still, being obtained from them as a loan, and re
turned as a deposite, which they were again at
liberty lo use, it only passed round the circle with
diminished This Operation could not
have been had the funds of the Go
vernment gone Treasury, lo be rogu'arly
disbursed, and not into hanks, to bo loaned out
for their own profit, while they were permitted to
siihsliiuln for it a credit in account.
In expressing these sentiments, 1 desire not lo
undervalue (he benefits of o salutary credit to
any hrttritli efenterprise. The credit bestowed
on probity and industry is the just reward of me
rit, and an honoralm- incentive to tiulher acqui
sition. None oppose it who love theft country
and understand its welfare. Hut when it is un
duly encouraged—when it is made to inflame
tho public mind with the temptations of sudden
ami unsubstantial wealth—when it turns indus
try into paths that load sooner or inter to disap
pointment and distress—it becomes liable lo cen
sure, and needs correction. Ear from helping
probity anj ifiuUslry, tho ruin to which it leads
tails most severely on the groat laboring classes,
whoarcllnown suddenly out ofemployment, and
by the failure of magnificent schemes never in
tended lo enrich them, are deprived in a moment
of their only resource. Abuses of credit and ex- 1
cesses in speculation will happen in despite of
the must salutary laws ; no Government perhaps
can altogether prevent them; but surely every
Government can ro 'rnin from con ributing the 1
stimulus that calls them into life-
Since, therefore, experience has shown, dial
to lend the public money lo the local banks, is i
hazardous to tho operations of the Government, '
at least of doubtful benefit to the institutions '
themselves; and productive of disastrous de
rangement in the business and currency of the
country, is it the part of wisdom again lo renew
the connection ?
It is true that such an agency is in nniiy ro
spools convenient to tho Treusurp, hut it is no
indispeniable. A limitation of the expenses of
the Government to its actual wants, and of tho i
revenue to those expenses, with convenient |
means fur it prompt application to the purposes i
for which it was raised, are tho objects which wo i
should seek to accomplish, 'file collection, safe
keeping, transfer and disbursement of the public
money, can, it is believed, be well managed by
olftcers of the Government, its collection, and,
to u great extent, its disbursement also, have in
deed been hitherto conducted solely by them ;
neither National nor •’Stale flanks when employ
ed, being required lo do more Ilian keep it solely
while in their cusloily, and transfer and pay it in
such portion at such times us the Treasury shall
direct,
Wuruly banks ore not more, able than the Go
vernment to secure the money in their possession
against accident, violence, or fraud. The asser
tion that they arc so, must assume lii.it « vault in
a bank is stronger than a vault in the Treasury ; i
and that directors, cashiers, and clerks, nol select- i
cd by the Government, nor under ils control, are I
more worthy of confidence than officers selected ,
from the people and responsible to tho Govern- i
mcnl; officers bound by oificial oaths and bands 1
for a faithful | eiformanee of their duties, and
constantly subject to the supervision of Congress.
Tlie difficulties of transfer, and the aid hereto
fore rendered by bonks, have been less than is u
sunlly supposed. The actual accounts show that
by far the larger portion of payment is made
within short or convenient distances from tho
places of collection; and tho whole number of
warrants issued at the Tieasury in the year 1831
—a year, tho results of which will, it is believed,
afford a safe test for the future—fell short of five ,
thousand,.or nn average ol less Ilian one daily
for each' State; in the city of New York they did I
not averago more than two a day, and at the city ,
Os Washington only four, ,
The dilficullics herelbTdre cxistiiifi Are, moreo
ver, daily lessened l>y an increase in the cheap
ness and facility of communication ; and it may
bo asserted witli confidence, that the necessary
transfers, as well as the safe-keeping and disburse
ments of the public moneys, can be with safety
and convenience accomplished through the agon- |
cy of Treasury officers. This opinion lias been ,
in some degree, confirmed by actual experience ,
since the discontinuance of the banks as fiscal a- ,
gents, in May lasi ; a period, which, from the cm
barr i,.;m ills in comtneicial intercourse, present
ed obstacles ms great as any that may be hereafter
apprehended.
The manner of keeping the public money
since that period, is fully slated in the report of
tho Secretary of the Treasury. That officer also
suggests the propriety of assigning, hy law, cer
tain additional duties to existing establishments
ami officers, which, with the modifications and
safeguards referred lo hy him, will, he thinks ena
ble the Department to continue to perform this
branch qf the public service, without any materi
al addition either lo I heir number or to the pres
ent expense. Tile extent of the business to be
transacted lias already been staled ; and in res
pect to tlie amount of money with which the offi
cers employed would he entrusted at any one
time, it appears that, assuming a balance of five
millions to be at all limes kej t in llio Treasury,
and the whole of it left in the hands of the collec
tors and receivers, the propotliott of each would
not exceed an average of thirty thousand dollars ;
hut that, deducting one million for the use of the
mint, and assuming the remaining four millions
to he in the hands of one-half of the present num
ber of officer*—a suppositldri dt'omcd more likely
to correspond with the fact—the rum in the
hands of each would still he less than tho amount
of most of the bonus now taken from thp receiv
ers of public money. Every apprehension, how
ever, on the subject, either in respect to the safely
of the money, or the faithful dis barge ol these
fiscal transactions, may, it appears to rnc, lie ef
fectually removed by adding to tho present uiemp
of the Treasury, the establishment uy law, at a
few important points, of offices for the deposite
and disbursement of such portions of the public
revenue as cannot, with obvious safety and con- !
vcnience, be left in tlie possession of tlie collecting 1
officers until paid over by them to the public cfcJ- j
itors. Neither tlie amounts retained in their J
hands, nor those deposited in tlie offices, would.'
in an ordinary condition of the revenue, be larger
iq mo,t cases than those o ten under the control
of disbursing olficers of the Army and Navy; and
might be made entirely safe, by requiring such sc
curilios, and excrci drig such controlling supnrvi
sion, as Congress may by law proscribe, Tho
principal officers whnraap, ointments would be
come necessary under this plan, taking the largest
number suggested by tho Secretary of the Treas
ury, would not exceed ten ; nor the additional ex
penses, at the same estimate, sixty thousand dob
I >re a year.
The-e can be noddnb* of the "W .ra tten of those.
■Vito are entrusted with tire affaire rf-Government,'
.o cbftdtf* 'item •With as iitue cy i.o hr-
• '* i* consistent tfiih the public interest; and it it
> .. Go "ff r f”. and ultimately for the people, to de
cide whether the benefits (6 be derived f ru m kerp
. Ins our liscnl concerns apart, and severina illo
connection which has hitherto existed between
I the government and banks, offer sufficient «V
vantages to justify tlie necessary expenses. If
i c object to bo accomplished is deemed important
lo Uic future welfare of tho country I cannot allow
myself to believe that tlie addition to the public
expenditure of comparatively so small an amount
as will he necessary to otibcl it, will be obieclsd id
by (be people.
fl Will be seen by the repor,’ of the Postmaster
Genciul, herewith communicated, that the fiscal
allairs of that Department have been successfully
C'Uc uclcd since May last upon the nrimyptn of
dealing only in the l<- s i| currency /St tlfe United
i.ales, nn, l |fi at <t needs no legislation to main-’
turn its credit, and facilitate the management rs
its concerns; the exisiing laws being, in the opin
lon ol ihut efficrr, ample for those objects.
Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for a
season, and increased services renuired from lbs
public functii naries; auch arc usually incident lo
the commencement 0 f every system, but they
will be greatly lessened in Hie progress of its ope
rations. r
I he power and influence supposed to connec
ted witli the custody and disbursement of the
Pi'l'l 0 money, are topics on which the public mind
is naturally, Andyciilh great propriety, peculiarly
sensitive. Much has been said on [them in rele."
rence lo tlie proposed separation of the Govern
ment from tlie banking institutiors; and surely
no one can object to any appeals or animadver
sions on Ihe subject, which are consi-tent with
facts, and evince a proper respect for the intelli
gence ul the p ople, It a chief Magistrate mayi
be allowed lo speak for himself, on such a point,'
1 can truly say, that lo mo me nothing would be
more acceptable, than (lie withdrawal from the
Executive, to the greatest practicable extent, of
all concern in the custody and tli .bursement of
Hie public revenue; nol that 1 would shrink from
any responsibility cast upon me by the duties of
my office, but because it is my firm belief, that tUi
capacity for usefulness is in no degree promoted
by tho possession of any patronage not actually
necesssay to tho performance of those dutic .'
Hut under our present form of Government, the
interve ition of Executive officers in the custody
and disbursement of Hie public money seems to
be unavoidable and before it can lie admitted Hint
the influence and power of the Executive would
be ii.crea cd by dispensing with the agency of
hanks, the nature of that intervention in such an
agency must bo carefully regarded, and a compar
ison must bo instituted between its extent in tlie
two cases.
The revenue can only lie collected by officers
appointed by Hie President, with the advice and
connenl ol ihe Senate. The public moneys, in
Hie first instance, mutt, therefore, in all casus,
pass through hands selected by the Executive.—
Other officers appointed in tlm same way, or, as
in some cases, by Hie President idone, must also
be entrusted witli them when drawn (or the pur
pose of disbursement, li is thus seen that, oven
when banks are employed, the public funds must
twice puss through the hands of executive offi
cers. Besides this, (he he id of (he Treasury D -
parlment, who also holds Ids office at the pleasure
of the President, and some oilier officers of the
sumo department, must necessarily bo invested
with more or less power in the selection, contin
ounce, and supervision, of the hunks that may
lie employed. The question is then narrowej'
lo tlie single point, whether, in the intermediate
slago between the collection and disbursement of
the public money, the agency of banks is neces
sury to avoid a dangerous extension of Hie patro
nage dud influence of the Executi e? But is it
elcsi Hint Hiu connection of the Executive with
powerful moneyed institutions, capable of minis
taring to Hie interest* of men in points where they
arc most aceossulilc to corruption, is le-s liable to
abuse than Ills constitutional agency in Hie ap
pointment and control of the few public officers
required by the proposed plan? Will tho public
money, when in iheir hands, bo necessarily expo
sed to any improper interference on the part oi
llio Executive'! May it not ho hoped that a pru
dent fear of public jealousy and disapprobation,!!!
a matter so peculiarly exposed to them, will deter
him item any shell interference, oven if higher
motives bo found inoperative? May nol Congress
so regulate, by law, the duty of thore officers, and
subject it lo such supervision and publicity, ns to
prevent Hie possibility of any serious abuse on Hut
part of Hie Executive? and is there equal room for
such supervision and publicity in a conncciion
with hunks, acting under Hie shield of corporate
immunities, and conducted by persons irresponsi
ble to tho government and Hie people? It is be
lieved (Itat a considerate and candid investigation
of these questions will result in the conviction,
that llio proposed plan is fur less liable to olrjec.
lion, on Hie score of Executive patronage and
control, than any bank agency that has been, or
can bo, devised.
With these views', I leave to Congress the mea
sures necessary to regulate, in the present emery
gency, Hir safe-keeping and transfer of the publis
moneys. In the pcrlortnaneo of constitutional
duly, I have staled to them, without reserve, the
jyrsult of my own reflections. The subject is of
great importance; and one on which we can
scarcely expect to bo as united in sentiment ns we
are in interest, it deserves a full and free dis
trust lon, and cannot fall lo be henefittrd by a dis
passionate comparison of opinions. Well awnro
myself of the duty of reciprocal concession among
the co-ordinate branches of the Government, 1
ran promise reasonable spirit of co-operation, so
far as it can bo indulged in without the surrender
of constitutional objections, which 1 liclicve lo Ini
well founded. Any system that may lie adopted
should He subjected lo tiro fullest legal provision,
so us to leave nothing In the Executive but wlnit
is necessary lo the discharge of the duties imposed
on him: mid whatever plan may be ultimately
established, my own part shall be so discharged
us to give lo it a (air trial, und the best prospect
of success.
The character of die funds to be received and
disbursed in lire transact ions of the Government,
f kewiso demands your most careful consideration.
There car, be no doubt that those o ho framed
and adopted the Constitution, having in immedi
ate view the depreciated paper of the Gonfidenry
—of which five hundred iollars in paper were,
at limes, only equal to one dollar in coin—irilcu
ded to prevent the rccuircnce of similar evils, so
far at least as related lo the transactions of tho
new Government. They gave to Congress ex
press powsis to coin money, and to regulate Hie
value thereof, and of foreign coin; they refused to
gve it power to establish eor|»orulions —tlie
agents, then as now, chiefly employed lo create a
paper currency; they prohibited lire States from
making any thing but gold and silver a legal ten
der in payment of debts; and tlie first Congress
diverted, by positive law, that the revenue should
be receded in nothing but gold and silver
Public exigency at the. outset of the Govern
ment. without direct legislative authority, led to
the use of hanks ns li-vat aids to the Treasury.
In admitted deviation fiorrj Hie law, al the same
period, and under the same exigency, \hc Secre-ag
lary of the Treasury received Iheir
riiout of Julies. The sole ground on wnfcli tho
I practice, thus commenced, was then, or has' ?
since, been justified, is lire certain, immediate,
und convenient exchange of such notes for specie.
The Government did indeed receive Hie incon
vertible notes ot Stale banks during the difficul
ties of war; and the community submitted with
out a murmur to the unequal taxation and multi
plied evils of which such a course was productive:
With Ho* war. this indulgence ceased, and .the
banks wore obliged again to redeem their antes
in gold and silver, 'lire Treasury, in accordance
with previous practice, continued lo dispense
wi'h the currency required by the set of 178!f,
and took tho notes of banks'll: ftp! r • J
t .• : > pt'd fit spun - ■ I ■ ’ -
ore;.. i.o gnaw? sligUffc.* viojv/oii of
»*t»tfit* ! ni &<■ fnr