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PAGE 16 —Sept. 3, 1954 — SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS
Text of The
Brown v. Board
of Education
(Opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, May 17, 1954)
Warren, C. J.: These cases come to
' us from the States of Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Dela
ware. They are premised on different
facts and different local conditions,
but a common legal question justifies
their consideration together in this
consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the
Negro race, through their legal rep
resentatives, seek the aid of the courts
in obtaining admission to the public
schools of their community on a non-
segregated basis. In each instance,
they had been denied admission to
schools attended by white children
under laws requiring or permitting
segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive
the plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In each of the cases
other than the Delaware case, a three-
judge federal district court denied
relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called
“separate but equal” doctrine an
nounced by this Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that
doctrine, equality of treatment is
accorded when the races are provided
substantially equal facilities, even
though these facilities be separate.
In the Delaware case, the Supreme
Court of Delaware adhered to that
doctrine, but ordered that the plain
tiffs be admitted to the white schools
because of their superiority to the
Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segre
gated public schools are not “equal”
and cannot be made “equal,” and that
hence they are deprived of the equal
protection of the laws . . . Because of
the obvious importance of the ques
tion presented, the Court took juris
diction. Argument was heard in the
1952 Term, and reargument was heard
this Term on certain questions pro
pounded by the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to
the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amend
ment in 1868. It covered exhaustively
consideration of the Amendment in
Congress, ratification by the states,
then existing practices in racial seg
regation, and the views of proponents
and opponents of the Amendment.
This discussion and our own inves
tigation convince us that, although
these sources cast some light, it is not
enough to resolve the problem with
which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive. The most avid propo
nents of the post-war Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to re
move all legal distinctions among “all
persons born or naturalized in the
United States.” Their opponents, just
as certainly, were antagonistic to both
the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments and wished them to
have the most limited effect. What
others in Congress and the state leg
islatures had in mind cannot be
determined with any degree of cer
tainty.
SCHOOL SYSTEM THEN
An additional reason for the in
conclusive nature of the Amend
ment’s history, with respect to segre
gated schools, is the status of public
education at that time. In the South,
the movement toward free common
schools, supported by general taxa
tion, had not yet taken hold. Educa
tion of white children was largely in
the hands of private groups. Educa
tion of Negroes was almost non
existent, and practically all of the
race were illiterate. In fact, any ed
ucation of Negroes was forbidden by
law in some states. Today, in con
trast, many Negroes have achieved
outstanding success in the arts and
sciences as well as in the business and
professional world. It is true that
public education had already ad
vanced further in the North, but the
effect of the Amendment on North
ern States was generally ignored in
the congressional debates. Even in
the North, the conditions of public
education did not approximate those
existing today. The curriculum was
usually rudimentary; ungraded
Supreme Court Opinion
schools were common in rural areas;
the school term was but three months
a year in many states; and compul
sory school attendance was virtually
unknown. As a consequence, it is not
surprising that there should be so
little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment relating to its intended
effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court con
struing the Fourteenth Amendment,
decided shortly after its adoption, the
Court interpreted it as proscribing all
state-imposed discriminations against
the Negro race. The doctrine of “sep
arate but equal” did not make its
appearance in this Court until 1896
in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,
supra, involving not education but
transportation. American courts have
since labored with the doctrine for
over half a century. In this Court,
there have been six cases involving
the “separate but equal” doctrine in
the field of public education. In Cam
ming v. County Board of Education,
175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice,
275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine
itself was not challenged. In more
recent cases, all on the graduate
school level, inequality was found in
that specific benefits enjoyed by
white students were denied to Negro
students of the same educational
qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v.
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637. In none of these cases was it
necessary to reexamine the doctrine
to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff.
And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the
Court expressly reserved decision on
the question whether Plessy v. Fer
guson should be held inapplicable to
public education.
In the instant cases, that question
is directly presented. Here, unlike
Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings
below that the Negro and white
schools involved have been equalized,
or are being equalized, with respect
to buildings, curricula, qualifications
and salaries of teachers, and other
“tangible” factors. Our decision,
therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors
in the Negro and white schools in
volved in each of the cases. We must
look instead to the effect of segrega
tion itself on public education.
MODERN EDUCATION
In approaching this problem, we
cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted,
or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Fergu-
son was written. We must consider
public education in the light of its
full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Na
tion. Only in this way can it be deter
mined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both dem
onstrate our recognition of the im
portance of education to our demo
cratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basis public
responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very founda
tion of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in pre
paring him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question pre
sented: Does segregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis
of race, even though the physical
facilities and other “tangible” factors
may be equal, deprive the children
of the minority group of equal ed
ucation opportunities? We believe
that it does.
In Sewatt v. Painter, supra, in find
ing that a segregated law school for
Negroes could not provide them equal
educational opportunities, this Court
relied in large part on “those qualities
which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school.” In Mc
Laurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
supra, the Court, in requiring that a
Negro admitted to a white graduate
school be treated like all other stu
dents, again resorted to intangible
considerations: . . his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students,
and, in general, to learn his profes
sion.” Such considerations apply with
added force to children in grade and
high schools. To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifica
tions solely because of their race gen
erates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone.
The effect of this separation on their
educational opportunities was well
stated by a finding in the Kansas case
by a court which nevertheless felt
compelled to rule against the Negro
plaintiffs:
“Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when
it has the sanction of the law; for
the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the Negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motiva
tion of a child to learn. Segregation
with the sanction of the law, there
fore, has a tendency to retard the
educational and mental development
of Negro children and to deprive
them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racially integrated
school system.”
Whatever may have been the ex
tent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected.
DOCTRINE REJECTED
We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of
“separate but equal” has no place.
Separate educational facilities are in
herently unequal. Therefore, we hold
that the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated for whom the actions have
been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived
of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This disposition makes
unnecessary any discussion whether
such segregation also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Because these are class actions, be
cause of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great
variety of local conditions, the for
mulation of decrees in these cases pre
sents problems of considerable com
plexity. On reargument, the consider
ation of appropriate relief was neces
sarily subordinated to the primary
q u e s t i o n—the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We
have now announced that such seg
regation is a denial of the equal pro
tection of the laws. In order that we
may have the full assistance of the
parties in formulating decrees, the
cases will be restored to the docket,
and the parties are requested to pre
sent further argument on Questions 4
and 5 previously propounded by the
Court for the reargument this Term.
The Attorney General of the United
States is again invited to participate.
The Attorneys General of the states
requiring or permitting segregation
in public education will also be per
mitted to appear as amici curiae upon
request to do so by September 15,
1954, and submission of briefs by
October 1, 1954.
Bolling v. Sharpe
(Opinion of the United States
Supreme Court May 17, 1954)
W?ahren, C. J.: This case challenges
the validity of segregation in the
public schools of the District of
Coumbia. The petitioners, minors of
the Negro race, allege that such seg
regation deprives them of due process
of law under the Fifth Amendment.
They were refused admission to a
public school attended by white chil
dren solely because of their race.
They sought the aid of the District
Court for the District of Columbia in
obtaining admission. That court dis
missed their complaint. We granted
a writ of certiorari before judgment
in the Court of Appeals because of
the importance of the constitutional
question presented.
We have this day held that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment prohibits the
states from maintaining racially seg
regated public schools. The legal
problem in the District of Columbia
is somewhat different, however. The
Fifth Amendment, which is applic
able in the District of Columbia, does
not contain an equal protection clause
as does the Fourteenth Amendment
which applies only to the states. But
the concepts of equal protection and
due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive. The “equal pro
tection of the laws” is a more explicit
safeguard of prohibited unfairness
than “due process of law,” and, there
fore, we do not imply that the two
are always interchangeable phrases.
But, as this Court has recognized,
discrimination may be so unjustifi
able as to be violative of due process.
Classifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with parti
cular care, since they are contrary to
our traditions and hence constitu
tionally suspect. As long ago as 1896,
this Court declared the principle
“that the Constitution of the United
States, in its present form, forbids,
so far as civil and political rights are
concerned, discrimination by the
General Government, or by the
States, against any citizen because of
his race.” And in Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, the Court held that a
statute which limited the right of a
property owner to convey his proper
ty to a person of another race was,
as an unreasonable discrimination, a
denial of due process of law.
Although the Court has not as
sumed to define “liberty” with any
great precision, that term is not con
fined to mere freedom from bodily
restraint. Liberty under law extends
to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue, and
it cannot be restricted except for a
proper governmental objective. Seg
regation in public education is not
reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, and thus it
imposes on Negro children of the
District of Columbia a burden that
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation
of their liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause.
In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated
public schools, it would be unthink
able that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. We hold that racial seg
regation in the public schools of the
District of Columbia is a denial of
the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the Con
stitution.
For the reasons set out in Brown
v. Board of Education, this case will
be restored to the docket for reargu
ment on Question 4 and 5 previously
propounded by the Court.
Mississippi
Continued from Page 8
of white students of 238,977 (in 1950-
51 it was 247,306) out of an enroll
ment of 272,549 (in 1950-51 it was
281,510), and 225,399 Negroes (in
1950-51 it was 247,306), out of an en
rollment of 271,856 (in 50-51 it was
274,605).
The school census of 1952 of edu-
cable children, those between 6 and
21 years of age, listed 398,866 whites
and 496,913 Negroes. Hence, 55 per
cent of the educable Negroes were
enrolled in 1952-53, and 68 per cent
of the whites.
In the 1952-53 term, the State De
partment of Education reported an
expenditure of $4,476,753 for trans
porting white children to school, and
$1,179,826 for Negroes. A total of
146,066 whites and 58,090 Negroes
rode to school.
That same term, Mississippi sent
$23,536,022 on instruction of its white
children, and $8,816,670 on Negroes.
The total cost of instruction in 1952-
53 compares with $10,394,244 in 1942-
43.
In the 1952-53 session, the average
white classroom teacher salary was
$2,109 against $1,153 for Negroes.
Under the new salary equalization
these disparities are to be eliminated.
In the 1950-51 session, the averages
were $1,865 and $918.
District
Continued from Page 4
of $1,500,000 over present spending
money.
Because of school integration,
Coming said that for the first time
in a decade funds were not request
ed for additional regular classroom
teachers to solve a perennial in
structor shortage in Negro schools.
The requested operating increase, he
said, was sought to provide “extra
services” for all children.
For example, the school board
asked for money to hire traveling
music, art and science grade school
teachers; instructors for classes for
emotionally disturbed children and
remedial reading experts.
At the budget meeting, Paul
Cooke, spokesman for the District’s
integrated teachers’ union, urged the
school board to spell out in the
budget request the new functions of
school administrators under integra
tion. He said Congress would com
plain about duplication if money was
requested for the former twin sets of
Negro and white officers.
Coming explained that the officers
filling dual jobs now and in Septem
ber will be needed during the imme
diate transition into an integrated
school system. As time goes on,
Coming said, new jobs may be cre
ated for these officials as the school
system expands its services to chil
dren.
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