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“The ferment of a free, is preferable to the torpor of a despotic. Govern
UlCUt.”
VOL. II.
ATHENS, GEORGIA, MAY 4, 1833.
NO. 7.
The Southern Banner,
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j;r Not ice of tilt sale of Land and Negroes by Ad.
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lished sixty dai/s previous to the day of sale.
The sale of Personal Property, in like manner,
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*!*!■;ax:as or jib. wf.bster,
or MASSACIU’SETTS. .
[Concluded.)
Such is the language, sir, addressed to the
people, while they vet had the constitution un-
der consider ation. Tfce powers conferred
on the new government wore perfectly well
understood to be conferred not by any state j ents ^ nd blending in one indh
or ti.e people of any state, but_ by the people \ J J |hdr , , or tUe lut ure.
of the United States. V irgmi. is more expli. I • Ril , A A iit S in ; ust . no | itica l nr inci
How can she absolve her citizens from
their obedience to the laws of the U. S ?
ilovv can she aimul their obligations and
oaths ? How can the members of her Legisla
ture renounce their own oaths ? Sir, secession
as a revolutionary right, is intelligible ; as a
ri'jfht to be proclaimed in the mi 1st of civil
commotions, and asserted at the head of ar
mies, I can understand it. But as a practical
right, existing under the constitution, ‘and in
conformity with its provisions, it seems to me
to be nothing but a plain absurdity ; for it
supposes resistance to government, under the
authority of the government itself; it supposes
dismemberment, without violating the princi
ples of union ; it supposes opposition to law,
without crime; it supposes the violation of
oaths, without responsibility it supposes the
tot:d overthrow of Government without revo
lution.
The constitution, sir, regards itself as per
petual and immortal. It seeks to establish
a union among the people of the states, which
shidl last through all time. Or, if the com
mon fate of things human must be expected
at some period, to happen to it, yet that ca
tastrophe is not anticipated.
The instrument contains ample provisions
lor its amendment, at all times : none for its
abandonment at any time. It declares that
new states may come into the union, but it
does not declare that the old states may go
out. The union is not a temporary partner
ship of states. It is the association of the
people, under a consitution of Government:
uniting their power, joining together their
highest interests, cementing their present en-
divisiblemass,
Whatsoever
is steadfast in just, political principles—wliat-
pancuiar, man any outer soever permanent in the structure of ltu-
:ipa assembled to ratify society—whatsoever there is which can
cit, p •rlinps, 11 this particular, than any oilier
state. Her eo iven
the constitution “in the name and behalf of
the people of Vir ini i, duel urc and make
known, that tiie powers granted under the
Const itti! ion being thrived from the people of the
F. . tutes, m iv be resumed by thorn whenev
er the same shall be perverted to their injury
or opprossio ..”
Is this language which describes the forma
tion of a compact between states, or laiguage
deseri' i i >; tin grind o r powers to a new Gov
er numf by the whole people of the United
Stales?
Among all the other ratifications there is
man society—whalso
derive an enduring character from being
founded on deep laid pr.nciplos of constitution
al liberty, and on the broad foundations of the
public will, all these unite to entitle tins in
strumeut to be regarded as a permanent con
sul mion of Government.
In the next place, Mr. President, I contend
that there is a supreme law or' the laud, con
sisting of the constitution, acts of Congress
passed in pursuance of it, and the public
treaties. This will not be denied, because,
such are the very words of the constitution.
But I contend further, that it rightfully be-
not one whici. speaks of the constitution as a i ... , , - - „ .
compact between states. Those of Massa- j \ on ^ t0 'Congress, anl to the courts ol the
chusctts and New Hampshire express the I Ualtfcd States, to settle>the constitution of this
transaction, in my opinion with suilicient aceu- I su P* eme *aw, in OB . 1 u < ^ ases " - s iS . e ‘,
raev. They recognize the Divine goodness, j med \ and bcre ans?8 the r i r “ at P raCt,CiJi
“in affording'.-he i*eopi.e of the United 1 T«est.on, Who ts to construe firudlythc con it.
States an opportunity of entering into an ex- M!on 0 the United Mites ? We all agree mat
plint and sol mu compact with each oilier,by the constitution is the supreme law,but who
assenting to and ratifying a new constitution” , shall interpret that law? In our system ot the
You will observe, sir, that it is the people, and | division of powers between diffi rent Govern,
not i he states, who have entered into this 1 meat3 , controversies will necessarily some-
compact, audit is the people of all the United times anse ’ respecting the extent ol the pow.
State,is a question which the state Legislature
or the state Judiciaiy must determine. We
all know that these questions arise daily in
the state Governments, and are decided by
those Governments; and I know no govern
ment which does not exercise a similar power.
Upon general principles, then, the Govern
ment of the United States possessesthis author
ity ; and this would hardly be denied were it
not that there are other Governments. But
since there are state Govcmra -nts and since
these like other Governments, ordinarily con
strue their own powers, if the Government
of the United States construes its own powers
also, which construction is to prevail, in the
case of opposite constructions ? And again,
as in the case now actually before us, the
State Governments may undertake not only
to construe their own powers, but to decide
directly on the extent of the powers of Con
gress. Congress has passed a law as being
within its just powers ; South Carolina denies
that this law is within its just |>owers, and in-
sists that she has the right so to decide this
point, and that her decision is final. How
are these questions to be settled ?
In uiv opinion, sir, even if the constitution
of the United States had made no express
provisions for such cases, it would yet bo diffi
cult to maintain that, in a constitution existing
over four and twenty States, with equal au
thority over all, one could claim a right of
construing it for the whole. This would
seem a manifest impropriety—indeed, an ub
surdity. If the Constitution is a government
existing over all the States, though with limi
ted powers, it necessarily follows that, to the
extent of those powers, it must be supreme.
If it be not superior to the authority of a par
ticular state, it is not a national Government.
But as it is a Government, as it has a legisla
tive power of its own, and a judicial power
co-extensivc with the legislative, the inference
is irresistible, that this Government, thus cre
ated by tiie whole, .uid for the whole, must
_ j have an authority superior to that of the : ar
ticular Government of tiny one part. Con
gress is the legislature of all the people of the
United States ; the Judiciary of the General
Government, is the judiciary of all the people
of the United States. To hold therefore,
that this legislature and this judiciary are sub
ordinate in authority to the legislature and
judiciary of a single state, is doing violence
to all common sense, and overturning all es
tablished principles. Congress must judge
of the extent of its own powers so often as it
is called on to exercise them, or it cannot act
at all ; and it must also act independent of
state control, or it cannot act at all.
The right of state interposition strikes at
the very foundation of the legislative power
of Congress. It possesses no effective legis-
States extend to it. It reaches the case ; the
question ; it attaches the power of the nation,
ai judicature to the case itself in whatever
court it may arise or exist; and in this case
the Supreme Court has appelate jurisdiction
over all courts whatever. No language could
provide with more effect and precision than
is here done, for subjecting constitutional
questions to the ultimate decision of the Su-
preme Court. And, Sir, this is exactly what
the Convention found it necessary to provide
for, and intended, to provide for. It is, too,
exactly what the people were universally told
was done when they adopted the Constitution.
One of the first resolutions adopted by the
Convention was in these words, viz: “ that
the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall
extend to cases which respect the collection of
the national fevenue, and questions which in
volve the national peace and harmony.”—
Now, Sir, this either had no sensible mean
ing at all, or else it meant that the jurisdic
tion of the national judiciary should extend
to these questions with a paramount authority.
It is not to be supposed that the convention
intended that the power of the national judi-
ciary should extend to these questions, and
that the ju(licatures of the states should also
extend to them, with equal power of final dccis.
ion. This would be to defeat the whole ob-
ject of Ate provision. There were thirteen
judicatures already in existence. The evil
complained olj or the danger to be guarded
against, was contradiction and repugnance in
the decision of these judicatures. If the fra
mers of the Constitution meant to create i
fourteenth, and yet not to give it power to re
vise and control the decisions of the existing
thirteen, then they only intended to augment
the existing evil; and the apprehended danger,
by increasing, still further, the chances of
discordant judgments. Why, Sir, has it be
come a settled axiom in politics, that every
Government must have a judicial power co
extensive with its legislative power? Cer
taiuly, there is only this reasoji, viz: that the
laws may receive a uniform interpretation
and a uniform execution. This object can
be no otherwise attained. A statute is what
it is judicial by interpreted to be; and if it be
construed one way in New Hampshire, and
another way in Georgia, there is no uniform
law. One Supreme Court with appellate
and final jurisdiction, is the natural and only
adequate mcuus, in any Government, to se
3 cure this uniformity. The convention saw
all this clearly, and the resolution which I
have quoted, never afterwards rescinded,
powers. But will they view the question i n
its other aspect; will they show us how it is
possible for a Government to get along with
four and twenty interpreters of its laws and
powers? Gentlemen argue, too, as if, in
these cases, the state* would be always rig!it,‘
and the General Government always wrong.
But, suppose the reverse; suppose the state
wrong, and, since they differ, some of them
must be wrong, are the most important and
essential operations of the Government to be
embarrassed and arrested, because one state
holds a contrary opinion. Mr. President,
every argument which refers the constitution
ality of acts of Congresss to state decision,
appeals from the majority to the minority;
it appeals from the common interest to a par
ticular interest; from the councils of all to
the council of c-ne ; and endeavors to super
cede the judgment of the whole by the judg
ment of a part.
I think it is clear, Sir, that the Constitu
tion, by express provision, by definite and un
equivocal words, as well us by necessary im.
plication, has constituted the Supreme Court
of the United States the appellate tribunal in
all cases, of a constitutional nature, which as
sume the shape of s suit, in law or equity.—
And I think I cannot dt> better than to leave
this part of the subject by reading the remarks
made upon it by Mr. Ellsworth, in the Con
vention of Connecticut; a gentleman Sir,
who has left behind him, on the records of
the Government of his country, proofs of the
clearest intelligence and of the deepest saga
city, as well as of the utmost purity and integ
rity of character. « This Constitution,” says
he, “ defines the extent of the powers of the
General Government. If the General Legis
lature should at any time, overleap their lim
its, the judicial department is a constitution
al check. If the United States go beyond
their powers, if they make a law which the
Constitution does not authorise, it is void ;—
and the judiciary power, the national judges,
who, to secure their impartiality, are to be
made independent, will declare it to be voiu
On the other hand, if the states go beyond
their limits; if they make a law which is
usurpation upon the General Government,
the law is void; and upright, independent
judges, will declare it to be so.
And let me now only add,Sir,that in the very
first session of the first Congress, with all
these well known objects, both of the conven
lion and the people, full and fresh iu his mind
Mr. Ellsworth reported the bill, as is gener
ally understood, for the organization of the
passed through various modifications, till it judicial department, and in that bill, made
provision tor the exercise of this appellate
finally received the form which the article now
wears in the Conditution. It is undeniably
true, then, that the framers of the Constitu
tion intended to create a national judicial
1 live power, if such right of state interposi- power, which should be paramount, on na
tion exists, because it can pass no law not tional subjects. And after the Constitution
subject to abrogation. It cannot make was framed, and wtile the country was en-
laws for the Union, if any part of the Union gaged in discussingits merits, one of its most
may pronounce its enactme .ts void and of no i distinguished advocates (Mr. Madison) told
effect. Its forms of legislation would be an | the people that it was true that, in controver-
, f idle ceremony, if after all, any one of four and sics relating Jo the jpundary between the tux>
the! twent y might bid defiance to its autlior- jurisilidions, the tribunal which is ultimately to other legislatures, it' must be trusted with this
_ . „ . . . • ... _ - itv. Without express provision in the Con - decide, is to be established under the General t power. The members ofCongressarecho-
This consent of the i . enera oyernmen , c aim isngi o u- sldudoi therefore, sir, this whole question is Government. Mr. Martin, who had been a sen by the people,and they are answerable
timate decision ? The practical result of th«, ... I
ers of each. Who shall decide these contro
versies ? Does it rest with the General Gov
ernment, in all or any of its departments, to ;
exercise the office of final interpreter ? t
Or may each of the states, as well as
Stales. These conventions, by this form of
expression, meant merely to say, that the
people of the United States had,-by the bles
sing of Providence, enjoyed the opportunity
jof establishing anew constitution, founded in
I the consent of the people,
I people has been called by European writers. . „„
Ithe Social compel ; and, in conformity to tliis who,e dcbate tarn8 on th ‘ s »*° ,ut * 1 he . g c,N
common mode of expression, these convcn- fie 1 ™ 10 contends that each state may judge ef< jp t ij ese exist, in a government intended
tions speak of that assent, on which the new i for ltselt ^ aa y a * eg ® d ™ da * loa ol the const*, j p or t | lc . w j l0 ] e t he inevitable consequence is,
"constitution was to rest, as an explicit and ^on, and may finally deci ie for itself, and . thut t[ie lilW8 of ^ locative power, and
solemn comp; ct, nol which the states had en-' ma y execute ,ts own decisions by its own
[ered into with each other, but which the pco-1 P awc1 / ^11 the recent procec lings i., Soutn
pic of the Uni cd States had entered into. j Carolina are founded on tins cl.uin ot right.
Finally sir, how can any man. get over the J* cr convention has pronou..ce< the revenue
Lords of the constitution itself ?_“ we, the ,aWsof tbe Un,ted Slates unconstitutional; and
Worm or the United Status do okdain this decision she does not allow any authori-
Ind establis h this CONSTITUTION’.” These ty °f the United States to overrule or reverse,
fi ords must ct .se to be a part of the consti- ° f course she F e J ccta thc authority of Con-
ition
parchment
power of the Supreme Court, in all the pro
per cases, in whatsoever court arising; and
that this appellate power has now been exer
cised for more than forty years, without inter,
ruption, and without doubt.
As to thc cases, Sir, which do not come be
fore the courts, those political questions which
terminate with the enactments of Congress,
it is of necessity that these should be. ulti
mutely decided by Congress itself. Like
nust ct .se to be a p irt of the consti-
-thev nust be obliterated from the i & ess > because tne ver >’ ob J ect ° fdie ordl -
ent on which they are written, before naace ‘store verse the decision of Congress;
Hiy human ingenuity or human r-.ument can
E?moYC thc po pular basis on which that con-
titutio.. rests, and turn the instrument into a
lore compact between sovereign states.
Thc second proposition, sir, which I pro-
dsc to maintain is, that no state authority
in dissolve ill; relations subsisting between
ie Government of the United States, and
ulividuals ; that nothing cun dissolve these
Nations but revolution ; and that therefore,
Jcrt can be no such thing as secession with-
it revolution. All this follows ; as it seems
} me, as a just consequence, if it be first j
toe decision of this judicial power, must be
binding ou and over the whole. No man
can form the conception of a Government ex
isting over four and twenty slates, with a
regular legislative and judicial power, and of
the existence at the same time, of an authori
ty, residing elsewhere, to resist, at pleasure
or discretion,the enactments and the decisions
of such a government. I maintain, therefore
sir, that from the nature of the case and as
necessarily decided by those provisions which member of the Convention, asserted the same
j create a legislative power and a judicial pow- j thing to the Legislature of Maryland, and ur
ged it as a reason !br rejecting the Constitu
tion. Mr. Pinckaky, himself also a leading
member of the convention, declared it to the
people of South Carolina. Every where, it
was admitted, by friends and foes, that this
power was in the Constitution. By some it
was thought dangerous, by most it was
to
the people; like other public agents, they are
bound by oath to support the Constitution.—
These are the securities that they will not
violate their duty, nor transcend their powers.
They are the same securities as prevail in
other popular governments; nor is it easy
to see how grants of power can be more safe
ly guarded, without rendering them nugatory.
before the
If the case cannot come belore the courts,
thought necessary, but by all, it was agreed ; and if Congress be not trusted with its dccis-
to be a power actually contained in the in- ion, who shall decide it? The gentleman
and she rejects, too,the authority of the courts ., ,, A . „ .
. ,, . J , c’ . , an inference wholly unavoidable, the acts of
ot the U ated States, because she expressly i > „ , , • . ’ , . *
.... „ , ’ .. . / . / Congress, and the decisions ol tic national
prohibits all appeal to those courts. It is in • ° r . .
v , . . . ... „ — , • .. * K • ; courts, must be of higher authority than state
order to sustain this asserted right ot being : . , . .° ..... .
. . . , . . . ° .. °, laws and state decisions. It this be not so,
her own judge, that she pronounces the con- 1 • .. . « . ’
.. .• r.u IT *. ia. . . . there is, taero can be, no General Govem-
stnution of the United aiati s to be but a com
pact, to which she is a party and a sovereign
party. If this be established, then the infer
ence is supposed to follow, that being sover
eign, there is no power to control her decis-
ion, and her own judge ment on her own com
pact is and must be conclusive.
I have already endeavored, sir, to point
ved that the constitution of the United S. out the practical consequences of this doc
a Government proper, owing protection to trine, and to shew how utterly inconsistent it
“viduals, uni entitled to their obedience. » 3 , with all ideas of regular government, and
The people, sir, in every state, live under how soon »t 3 adoption would iuvolve the whole
o Gover..meuts. country in revolution and absolute anarchy.
They ow. chedicnce to both. These Gov. I bo P e ‘t ‘ 3 easy now to shew sir, that a doc.
mhents, though distinct, are not adverae. trine bringing such consequences with it, is
ach has its separate sphere, and its peculiar 1 a °t 'veil founded; that it has nothing to stand
were aiid duties. It is not a contest be- on but theory, and assumption : and that it
i-een two sovereigns lor* the same power
like the ware of thc rival Houses in England;
lor is it a dispute between a government de
icto, and a government de jure. It is the
base of a division of powers between two gov-
prinvents, m ule by the people, to which both
ire responsible. Neither can dispense with
[die duty which individuals owe to the other;
^either can call itself roaster of the other: the
people are masters ofboth. This division of
powvr, it is true, is in a great measure un.
ino<v.: in Europe. It is the peculiar system
bf America ; und though new and singular,
n is uot incomprehensible. The State con-
■titu tions are established by the people of the
"?>atD8. This Constitution is established by
r e p'topic of all the Stiites. How then
fcan a state secede? How can a state
what the whole people have done ?
is refuted by plain and express constitutional
provisions. I think the government of the U.
States does possess, in its appropriate depart-
ments, the authority of final decision on ques
tions of disputed power.' I think it possesses
this authority both by necessary implication,
and by express grant.
It is not to be denied, sir, that this authori
ty naturally belongs to all Governments.
They all exercise it from necessity, and as a
consequence of the exercise of other powers,
The state Governments themselves possess it
except in that class of questions which may
arise between them and the General Govern
ment, and in regard to which they have sur
rendered it, as well by the nature of the case,
as by clear constitutional provisions. In oth
er, -and ordinary coses, whether a particular
law be in conformity to the constitution of the
taero
ment.
But, Mr. President, the constitution has
not left this cardinal point without full and
explicit provisions. First, as to the authori-
ty of Congress. Having enumerated the spe-
cific powers conferred on Congr ess, the con-
stitutiou adds, as a distinct and substantive
clause, the following, viz: “To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for car
rying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers, vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof.”
If this means any thing, it means that C on
gress may judge of the true extent and just
interpretation of the specific powers granted to
it; and may judge also of what is necessary
and proper for executing those powers. If
Congress is to judge of what is necessary for
the execution of its powers, it must, of neces-
sity, judge of the extent and interpretation of
those powers.
And in regard, Sir, to the judiciary, the Con,
stitution is still more express and emphatic.
It declares that the judicial power shall ex
tend to all cases in law or equity arising un
der the Constitution, laws of the United S.
and treaties; that there sdiall be one Su
preme Court, and that this Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction of all these
cases, subject to such exceptions as Congress
may make. It is impossible to escape. from
the generality of these words. If a case ar
ise under the Constitution, that is, if a case ar-
ise dependingon the construction of the Con
stitution, thfc judicial power of the United
strument. The convention saw thc absolute
necessity of some control in t!ie National Gov-
eminent over St.ite laws. Different modes
of establishing this control were suggested
and considered. 'At onetime it was propos
ed that thc laws of the states should, from time
to time, be laid before Congress, and that
Congress should posses a negative over them.
But this was thought inexpedient and inadmis-,
sible ; and iu its place, and expressly as a
substitute for it, the existing provision was
introduced; that is to say, a provision by
which the federal Courts should have authori
ty to overrule such state laws as might be in
manifest contravention of the Constitution.—
Thc writers of the Federalist in explaining
thc Constitution, while it was yet pending
before the people, and still unadopted, give
this account of the matter in terms, and as
sign this reason for the article as it now stands.
By this provision Congress escaped from the
necessity of any revision of state laws, left
the whole sphere of state legislation quite un
touched, and yet obtained security against
any infringement of the constitutional power
of the General Government. Indeed, Sir,
allow me to ask again, if the national judicia-
ry was not to exercise a power of revision,
on constitutional questions, over the judica
tures of the states, why was any national ju
dicature erected at all. Can any man give a
sensible a reason for having a judicial power
in this Government, unless it be for the sake
of maintaining a uniformity of decision, on
questions arising under the Constitution and
laws of Congress, and ensuring its execution?
And does not this very idea of uniformity ne
cessarily imply that the construction given by
the national courts is to be the .prevailing con
struction? How else, Sir, is it possible that
uniformity can be preserved.
Gentlemen appear to me, Sir, to look at
but one side of the question. They regard
only the supposed danger t>f trusting a Gov.
eminent with thc interpretation of its own
savs each state is to decide for herself. If
so, then, as I have already urged, what is
law in one state is not law in thc other. Or, if
the resistance of one state compels an entire
repeal of thc law, then a minority, and that a
small one, governs the whole country.
Sir,those who espouse the doctrines of nul
lification, reject, as it set ms to me, the first
great principle of all republican liberty; that
is, that the majority must govern. In mat
tors of common concern, the judgment of a
m ijority must stand as the judgment of the
whole. This is a law imposed on us by the
absolute necessity of the case; and if we do
not act upon it there is no possibility of main
taining any Government but despotism. We
hear loud and repeated denunciations against
what is called majority government. It is de
clared with much warmth, that a majority
government cannot be maintained in the United
States. What then, do gentlemen wish?—
Do they wish to establish a minority Govern
ment ? Do they wish to subj *ct the will of
the many to the will of the few ? The hon-
orable gentleman from South Carolina has
spoken of absolute majorities, and majorities
concurrent; language wholly, unknown to
our Constitution, and to which it ii| not easy
to affix definite ideas. As far as I under
stand it, it would teach us. that the absolute
majority may be found in Congress, but the
majority concurrent must be looked for in the
states. That in to say, Sir, stripping the
matter of this novelty of phrase, that the dis
sent of one or more states as states, renders
void the decision of a majority of Congress,
so far as that state is concerned. . And, so
this doctrine, running but a short career, like
other dogmas of the day, terminates in. nulli
fication.
If this vehement invective against majorities
meant no more than that, in the construe-ion
of government, it is wise to provide checks
and balances, so that there should be various
limitations on the power of the mere majority,
would only mean what the Constitution of
the United States has already abundantly pro
vided. It ia full of such checks and balan
ces. In its very organization, it adopts , a
broad and most effectual principle in restraint
of the power of mere majorities. A majori
ty of the people elects the House of Repre
sentatives, but it does uot elect the Senate.
The Senate is elected by the states, each
state having, in this respect, an equal power.
No law, therefore, cau pass without the as
sent of a majority of the Representatives of the
people,and a majority of the rcprsestiuaiveaof
the states also. A majority of the Ituprc-
sentatives of the people must concur, and a
majority of the states must concur, in every
act of Congress; and the President is elected
on a plan compounded ofboth these principles.
But, having comjiosed one House of Repre
sentatives chosen by the people in each state
according to its numbers, and the other of an
equal number of members from every state ;
whether larger or smaller, the Constitution
gives to majorities in these Houses, thus con- •
stituted, the full and entire power of passing
laws, subject always to the constitutional res
trictions aud to the approval of the President.
To subject them to any other power is clear
usurpation. The majority of one house may
be controlled by the majority of the other;
and both may be restrained by the President’s
negative. These are checks and balances
provided by the Constitution, existing in the
Government itself, and wisely intended to se
cure deliberation and caution in legislative
proceedings. But to resist the will ol* the ma
jority in both Houses, thus constitutionally
exercised ; to insist on Jhc lawfulness of in
terposition by an extraneous power ; to claim
the right of defeating the will of Congress, bv
setting up against itr the will of a single state, in
neither more nor less, ;is it strikes me, than a
plain attempt to overthrow the Government.
The constituted authorities of the United S.
are no longer a Government, if they be not
masters of their own will; they are no longer
a Government, if an external power may ar
rest their proceedings; they are no longer a
Govemnent, if acts pass by both Houses, and
approved by the President may be nullified
by state vetoes or state ordinances.. Does
any one suppose it could make any difference
as to the binding authority of an act of Con-
gress, and of the duty of astute t > respect it,
whether it passed by a mere majority of both
Houses, or by three-fourths of each, or tho
unanimous vote of each ? Within the limits
and restrictions of tho Constitution, the Gov
ernment of the United States, like all other
popular Governments, acts by majorities. It
can act no otherwise. Whoever therefore,
denounces the Government of majorities,.dc- *
, nounces thc Government of his own country,
and denounces all free Governments. And
whoever would restrain these majorities,
while acting within their constitutional limits,
by an external power,whatever he may intend,
asserts principles which, if adopted, can lead
to nothing else than the destruction of the
Government itself.
Does not the gentleman perceive, Sir, hoy*
his ..rgument against majorities might here be
retorted upon ? Does he not see how cogent
ly he might be asked, whether it be the char
acter of nullification to practise what it
preaches? Look to South Carolina, at the
present moment. How far are tho rights of
minorities there respected ? I confess sir, I
have not known, inpoaceable times, the power
of thc majority carried with a higher band or
upheld with more relentless disregard of the
rights, feelings, and principles of the minority, a
minority embracing, as the gentleman himself
will admit, a large portion of the worth and re3-
hending in its numbers, men who have been
associated with him, and with us, in these
halls of legislation; men who have served
their country at home, and honored it abroad;
men who would cheerfully lay down their
lives for their native state, in any cause which
they could regard as the cause of honor and du
ty; men above fear and above reproach; whose
deepest grief and distress spring from the
conviction that the present proceedings of
the state must ultimately reflect discredit up.
on her: how is this minority—how are these
men regarded ? They are enthralled ,and dis
franchised by ordinance,and actsof legislations
subjected to tests and oaths, incompatible, as
they conscientiously think, without oaths al-
ready taken, and obligations already assumed;
they are proscribed and denounced os recre
ants to duty and patriotism, and slaves to a
foreign power ; both the spirit which pursues
them, apd the positive measures which ema
nate from that spirit, are harsh aud proscrip
tive beyond all precedent within my knowl
edge, except in periods of professed revolu
tion.
It is not, sir, one would think, for those
who approve these proceedings,to complain of
the power of majorities. ♦ ;
Mr. President, all popular governments rest
on two principles, or two assumptions :
First, That there is, so far a common in
terest among those over whom the Govern
ment extends, ns that it may provide for the
defence,protection,and ;ood government of tho
whole, without injustice or oppression to parts.
' Second, That the representatives of the
people, and especially the people thems dves, .
are secure against general corruption, and
may be trusted, therefore, with the exercise
of power. Whoever argues against these
principles, argues against the practicability of
all free governments. And whoever admits
these, must admit, or cannot deny, that pow
er is as safe in the hands of Congress, as in.
those of other representative bodies.^—
