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the actual condition of other commercial
countries, must, as it seems to me, dispel
. all remaining dotibtsjipon the subject. Ii
has since appeared that evils, similar t<
those suffered by ourselves, have been ex
perienced in Great Britain, on the eontin
ent, and indeed, throughout the commer
cial world ; and that in other countries, as
in our own, they have been uniformly
preceded by an undue enlargement of the
boundaries of trade prompted, as with us,
by unprecedented expansions of the sys
tems of credit. A reference to the amount
of banking capital, and the issues of pa
per credits put in circulation in Great
Britain by banks, and in other ways, dur
ing the years f<l4, 1 and ISJ<>, will
show an augmentation of the paper cur
rency there, as much disproportioned to
the real wants of trade as in the United
States. With this redundancy of the pa
per currency, there arose in that country
also a spirit of adventurous speculation,
embracing the whole range of human -en
terprise. Aid was profusely given to pro
jected improvements. Large investments
were made in -foreign stocks and loans,
credits for goods were granted with un
bounded liberality to merchants in foreign
countries; and all the means of acquiring
and employing credit were put in active
operation, and extended in their effects to
every department of business, and to every
quarter of the globe. The reaction was
proportioned in its violence to the extra
ordinary character of events which pre
ceded it. The commercial community of
Great Britain were subjected to the great
est difficulties, and their debtors in this
country were not only suddenly deprived
of accustomed and expected credits, but
called upon for payments, which, in the
actual posture of things here, could only
be made through a general pressure, and
at the most ruinous sacrifices.
In view of these facts, it would seem
impossible for sincere inquirers after trutli
to resist the conviction, that the causes of
the revulsion in both countries have been
substantially the same. Two nations, the
most commercial in the world, enjoying
hut recently the highest degree of appar
ent prosperity, and maintaining with eacli
other the closest relations, are suddenly,
in a time pf profound peace, and without
any great national disaster, arrested in
their career, and plunged into a state of
embarrassment and distress. In both
countries we have witnessed the same Re
dundancy of paper money, and other facil
ities of credit; the same spirit of specula
tion; the same partial successes; the
same difficulties and reverses; and, at
length, nearly the same overwhelming ca
tastrophe. The most material difference
between the results in the two countries
has only beenfthat with us there has also
occurred an extensive derangement in the
fiscal affairs of the Federal and State Gov
ernments, occasioned by the suspension
of specie payments by the banks.
The history of these causes and effects,
in Great Britain and the United States, is
substantially the history of the revulsion in
all other commercial countries.
•The present and visible effects of these
circumstances on the operations of the
Government, and on the industry of the
people, point out the objects which call
for your immediate attention.
They are—to regulate by laws the safe,
keeping, transfer, and disbursement, ofthe:
public moneys; to designate the funds to
be received and paid by the Government;
to enable the Treasury to meet promptly
every demand upon it; to prescribe the
terms of indulgence, and the mode of set
tlement to he adopted, as well in collect
ing from individuals the revenue that has
accrued, as in withdrawing it from former
depositories, and to devise and adopt such
further measures within the constitutional
competency of Congress, as will behest
calculated to revive the enterprise and to
promote the prosperity of the country.
For the deposite, transfer, nml disburse
ment, ol the revenue, National and State
Banks have always, with temporary and
limited exceptions, been heretofore em
ployed ; but, although advocates of each
system are to be found, it is apparent that
the events ol the last few mouths have
greatly augmented the desire, long exist- i
mg among the people of the United States,
to separate the fiscal concerns of the gov
ernment from those of individuals or cor
porations.
Again, to create a National Bank, as a
fiscal agent, would be to disregard the pop
ular will, twice solemnly and unequivocally
expressed. On no question of domestic
policy is there stronger evidence tlint the
sentiments of a large majority are delib
erately fixed; and I cannot concur with
those who think they see, in recent events,
a proof that these sentiments are. or a rea
son, that they should he changed
Events, similar iu their origin and
character have heretofore frequently oc
curred without producing any such
change ; and the lessons of experience
must he forgotten, if we suppose that the
present overthrow of credit would have
been prevented by the existence of a trt
tional hank. Proneness to excessive is
sues has ever been the vice of the hank
ing system, a vice as prominent in nation
al as in State institutions. This propen
sity is as subservient to the advancement
of private interests in the one as in the
other ; and those who direct them both,
being principally guided by the same
views, and influenced by the samp mo
tives, will he equally ready to stimulate
extravagance of enterprise by improve
ment of credit. How strikingly is this
conclusion sustained bv experience. The
Bank of the United States, with the vast
powers conferred on it by Congress, did
not or could not prevent former ami sim
ilar embarrassment, nor has the still grea
ter strength it has been said to possess,
under its present charter, enabled it, in
the t-xi-tin_r emergency, to check other
institutions or even to save itself' In Great
Britain where it lias been seen, the
same causes have been attended with the
same effects, a national bank possessing
powers far greater than are asked for
by the warmest advocates of such an in
stitution here, has also proved unable to
prevent ail undue expansion of credit,
and the evils that flow from it. Nor can
I find any tenable ground for the re-es
lablishniciit of a national bank, in tin*
derangement alleged at present to exist
in the domestic exchanges of the country,
or in tliq facilities it may be capable of af
fording them. Although advantages of this
sort were anticipated when the first Bank
of the United States was created, they
were regarded as an incidental accommo
dation : not one which the Federal Gov
ernment was bound, or could be called
upon to furnish. This accommodation
is now, indeed, after the lapse of not
many years, demanded from it as among
its first duties ; and an omission to aid
and regulate commercial exchange, is
treated as a ground of loud and serious
complaint. Such results only serve to
exemplify the constant desire, among
sonic of our citizens, to enlarge the pow
ers of the Government, and extend its
control to subjects with which it should
not interfere. They can never justify
the creation of an institution to promote
such objects. On the contrary, they just
ly excite among the community a more
diligent inquiry into the character of those
operations of trade, toward which it is
desired to extend such peculiar favors. j
The various transactions which bear
the name of domestic exchanges, differ i
essentially in their nature, operation, and
utility. One class of them consists of
bills of exchange, drawn for the pffrpose 1
of transferring actual capital from one
part of the country to another, or to an
ticipate the proceeds of property actually
transmitted. Bills of this description
are highly useful in the movements of,
trade, and well deserve all the encourage-i
nient which can rightfully be given toj
them. Another class is made up of bills
of exchange, not drawn to transfer actual j
capital, nor on the credit of property
transmitted, but to create fictitious capi
tal ; partaking at once of the character
of notes discounted in bank, and of buuk
notes in circulation; and swelling the
mass of paper credits to a vast extent m
the most objectionable manner. These [
bills leave formed, for the last few years, I
a large proportion of wliat-are termed the
domestic exchanges of the country,serving l
as the means of usurious profit, and con-!
stituting the most unsafe and precarious I
paper in circulation. This species of!
traffic, instead of being upheld, ought to {
to be discountenanced by the Government 1
and the people.
In transferring its funds from place to
place, the Government is on the same
footing with the private citizens, and
may resort to the same legal means. It
may do so through the medium of bills
drawn by itself, or purchased from others;
and in these operations it may, iu a man
ner undoubtedly constitutional and legit
imate, facilitate and assist exchanges of
individuals founded on real transactions
of trade.—The extent to which this may
be done, and the best means of affecting
it, are entitled to the fullest considera
tion. This lias been bestowed by the
Secretary of the Treasury, and his views
will be submitted to you in his report.
But it was not designed by the consti
tution that 11 io government should assume
the management of domestic or foreign
exchange. It is indeed authorized to reg
ulate .by law the commerce between the
States, and to provide a general standard
of value, or medium of exchange, iu gold
and silver ; but it is not its province to
aid individuals in the transfer of their
funds, otherwise than through the facili
ties afforded by the i’ost Office Depart
! meut. As justly might it be called on to
provide for the transportation of their
merchandise.—These are operations of
trade. They ought to be conducted b\
those who are interested in them, 111 the
same maimer that the incidental difficul
ties of other pursuits are encountered by
other classes of citizens. Such aid has
not been deemed necessary iu other coun
tries. Throughout Europe, the domestic
as well as the foreign exchanges arc car
ried on by private houses, often, if not
generally, without the assistance of banks.
Yet they extend throughout distinct sown
eignites, and far exceed in amount the
real exchanges of tlte United States.
There is no reason why our own may not
he conducted in the same manner, with
equal cheapness and safety. Certainly
this might he accomplished, if it were fa
vored by those most deeply interested ;
and few can doubt that their own inter
est, as well as the general welfare of the
i country, would be promoted, by leaving
such a subject iu tile hands of those to
i whom it properly belongs.
A system founded on private interest,
enterprise and competition, without the
aid of legislative grants or regulations by
law, would rapidly prosper; it would be
• free from the influence of political agita
tion, and extend the same exemption to
trade itself; and it would put an end to
i j those complaints of neglect, partiality, in
justice, and oppression, winch arc the un
BRUNSWICK ADVOCATE.
avoidable results of interference by the
Government, in the proper concerns of
individuals. All former attempts on the
part of the Government to carry its legis
lation, in this respect, further than was
designed, by the Constitution, have in the
end proved injurious, and have served on
ly to convince the great body of the people,
more and more, of the certain dangers of
blending private interests with the opera
tions of public business; and there is no
reason to suppose that a repetition of them
now would be more successful.
It cannot be concealed that there exists,
iu our community .opinions and feclingson
this subject in direct opposition to eacli
other. A large*portion of them, combin
ing great intelligence, activity, and influ
ence, are no doubt sincere in their belief
that the operations of trade ought to be as
sisted bwsucli a connection; they regard
a national bank as necessary for this pur
pose, and they are disinclined to every
measure that does not tend, sooner or la
ter, to the establishment of such an insti
tution. On tiie other hand, a majority
of the people are believed to be irrecon
cilably opposed to that measure : they con
sider such a concentration of power dan
gerous to their liberties ; and many ofthem
regard it as a violation of the Constitu
tion. This collision of opinion has,doubt
less, caused much of the embarrassment
to wjkich the commercial transactions of
the country have lately been exposed.
Banking has become a political topic of
the highest interest, and trade has suffered
in the conflict of parties. A speedy ter
mination of this state of things, however
desirable, is scarcely to be expected. We
have seen for nearly half a century, that
those who advocate a national bank, by
whatever motive they may be influenced,
constitute a portion of our community too
j numerous to allow us to hope for an early
abandonment of their favorite plan.
A)u the other hand, they must indeed form
an erroneous estimate of the intelligence
ami temper of the American people, who
suppose that they have continued on slight
or insufficient grounds, their persevering
opposition to such an institution; or that
they can be induced by pecuniary pressure
or any other combination of circumstun-,
ces, to surrender principles, they have
so long and so inflexibly maintained.
My own views of the subject arc uu-!
changed. They have repeatedly and un
reservedly announced to my fellow cit
izens ; w ho, with full knowledge of them,
conferred upon me the two highest offices
of the Government. On the last of these i
occasions, 1 felt it due to the people to tip- j
prize them distinctly, that, in the event
of my election, 1 would not be able to co-J
opperate in the re-establishment of a]
national bank. To these sentiments, 1
have now only to add the expression of an
increased conviction, that the re-estab
lishment of such a bank, in any form, j
w hilst it would not accomplish, the bene
ficial purpose promised by its advocates:
I would impair the rightful supremacy of
: the popular will; injure the character and
! diminish the influence of our political
system; and bring once more into exis
tence a concentrated moneyed power, hos
; tile to the spirit, and threatening the per- 1
{ manency, of our republican institutions. \
i Local banks have been employed for
j the deposite and distribution of the rev
enue, at all times partially, and on three
different occasions, exclusively: first, ante
rior to the establishment of the first bank
|of the United States ; secondly, in the
: interval between the termination of that
[ institution and the charter of rt sueees
i sor ; and thirdly, during the limited peri
od which lias now so abruptly closed. The
connection tints repeatedly attempted, pro-
veil unsatisfactory on each successive
occasion, notwithstanding the various
measures which were adopted to facilitate
or insure it success. On the last occasion,
in the year ISM, the employment of the
State hanks was guarded especially in
every way which experience and caution
could suggest. Personal security was
required for the safe-keeping and prompt
payment of the moneys to he received, and
full returns of their condition were, from
time to time to he made by the deposito
ries. In the first stages the measures was
eminently successful, notwithstanding the
violent opposition of the Bank of
the 1 iiited States, and the unceas
ing efforts made to overthrow it. The
select h inks performed with fidelity, and
without any embarrassment to themselves
or the community, their engagements to
the Government, and the svstein promis
ed to he perm niently usi fill But when
it became necesary, undi - the act of
June, IShi, to withdraw from them the
public money, for the purpose of placing
it in additional institutions, or of trans
ferring it to the States, they found it,
m many cases, inconvenient to comply
with tlte demands of tiie Treasury, and
numerous and pressing applications were
made for indulgence* of relief. As the
instalments under the deposite law be
came payable, their own embarrassments,
and thS necessity, under which they lay
jof curtailing their discounts and calling
in their debts, increased the general dis
tress, and contributed, with other causes,
to hasten the revulsion in which, at length,
they in common with the other banks,
were fatally involved.
Under these circumstances it becomes our
solemn duty to inquire whether there are not,
in any connection between the Government
and banks of issue, evils of .great magnitude,
inherent in its very nature, and against which
no precautions can effectually guard.
I Unforeseen in the organization of the Gov
rfcrmnent, and forced on the Treasury by early
necessities, the practise of employing banks,
was in truth, from the beginning, more a meas
ure of emergency than of sound policy. When
we started into existence as a nation, in ad
dition to the burdens of the new Government,
we assumed all the large hut honorable load
of debt, which was the price of our liberty ;
but we hesitated to weigh down the infant in
dustry of the country by resorting to adequate
taxation for the necessary revenue. The fa
cilities of banks,in return for the privileges they
acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps
too readily received, by an embarrassed Treas
ury. During the long continuance of a Na
tional debt, and the intervening difficulties <>t
a foreign war, the connection was continued
from motives of convenience ; but these cau
ses have long since passed away. We have
no emergencies that make banks necessary
to aid the wants of the Treasury ; we have no
load of national debt to provide for, and we
have on actual deposite a large surplus : No
public interest, therefore, now requires the re
newal of a connection, circumstances have t
dissolved. The complete organization of our
Government, the abundance of our resources,
the general harmony which prevails between
the different States, and with foreign Powers,
all enable us now to select the system most
consistent with the Constitution, and most
conducive to the public welfare. Should we
then, connect the Treasury for a fourth time
with the local banks, it can only be under a
conviction that past failures have arisen from
accidental, not inherent defects.
A danger, difficult, if not impossible, to be
avoided in such an arrangement, is made strik
ingly evident in the very event by which it has
been now defeated. A sudden act of the banks
intrusted with the funds of the people, deprives
the Treasury, without fault or agency of the
government, of the ability to pay its creditors
in the currency they have by law a right to
demand. This circumstance no fluctuation of
commerce could have produced, if the public
revenue had been collected in the legal cur
rency, and kept in that form by the officers of
the Treasury. The citizen whose money was
in bank receives il back, since the suspension,
at a sacrifice in its amount; whilst he who kepi
it in the legal currency of the country, and in
his own possession, jmrsues, without loss, the
current of his business. The Government,
placed in the situation of the former is involv
ed in embarrassments it could not have suffer
ed had it pursued the course of the latter.—
These embarrassments are, moreover, aug
mented by those salutary and just laws which
forbid it to use a depreciated currency, and, by
so a- ing, take from the Government the abili
ty which individuals have of accommodating
their transactions to such a catastrophe.
A system which can, in a time of profound
peace, when there is a large revenue laid by,
thus suddenly prevent the application and the
use of the money of the people, in the manner
and for the objects they have directed, cannot
be wise ; but who can think, without painful
reflection, that, under it, the same unforeseen
events might have befallen us in the midst of
u war, and taken from us, at the moment when
1 most wanted, the use of those very means
which were treasured up to promote the nation
al warfare and guard our national rights ? To
j such embarrassments and to such dangers will
j this Government be always exposed, whilst it
takes tlic moneys raised for, and necessary to,
the public service, out of the hands of its own
' officers, and converts them into a mere right of
| action against corporations entrusted with the
• possession of them. Nor can such results be
i effectually guarded against in such a system,
j without investing the Executive with a control
over the hanks themselves, whether State or
National; that might with reason be objected
, to. Ours is, probably, the only Government
! in the world that is liable, in the management
■ of its fiscal concerns, to occurrences like these.
But this imminent risk is not the only danger
| attendant on the surrender if the public mon
| ey to the custody and control of local corpora
tions. Though the object is aid to the Treas
ury, its effects may he to introduce into the
operations of the Government, influences the
most subtle, founded on interests the most
selfish.
The use by the banks, for their own benefit,
of the money deposited with them, lias receiv
ed the sanction of the Government from the
commencement of this connection. The mon
ey received front the people, instead of being
kept till it is needed for tiioir use, is, in conse
quence of this authority, a fund, on which dis
counts are made for the profit of those who
happen to be owners of stock in the hanks se
lected as depositories. The supposed an 1 of
ten exaggerated advantages of such *i boon
will always cause it ff be sought for with avid
ity. I will not stop to consider on whom the pat
ronage incident to it, is to be conferred;
whether the selecth n and control be trusted to
Congress or to the Executive,either will be sub
jected to appeals made in every form which the
sagacity of interest can suggest The banks,
under such a system, are stimulated to make the
most of their fortunate acquisition; the dejms
ltes are treated as an incre:ise of capital;
loans and circulation are rashly augmented,
and, when the public exigencies require a re
turn, it is attended with embarrassments not
provided for, nor foreseen. Thus banks that
! thought themselves most fortunate when the
public funds were received, find themselves
most embarrassed when tiie season of payment
suddenly arrives.
Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system
are not limited tu the banks. It stimulates a
i general rashness of enterprise, and aggravates
the fluctuations of commerce and the curren
cy. This result was strikingly exhibited dur
ing the operations of the late deposite system,
and especially in the purchases of public lands.
The order which ultimately directed the pay
ment of gold and silver in sucli purchases,
greatly checked, but could not altogether pre
vent, flic evil. Specie was indeed more diffi
cult to be procured than the notes which the
banks could themselves create at pleasure; but
stiff, being obtained from them as a loan, and
returned as a deposite, which they were again
at liberty to use, it only passed round the cir
! cle with diminished speed. This operation
could not have been performed, had the funds
of the Government gone into the Treasury, to
be regularly disbursed, and not into banks, to
be loaned out for their own profit, while they
were permitted to substitute for it a credit in
account
In expressing these sentiments, I desire not
: to undervalue the benefits of a salutary credit
to any branch of enterprise. The credit be
, stowed on probity and industry is the just re-
I ward of merit, and an honorable incentive to
’ further acquisition None oppose it who love
their country ariflunderstand it - welfare. But
when it is unduly encouraged—when it is
! made to inflame the public mind with the temp
tations of sudden and unsubstantial wealth—
when it turns industry into paths that lead
sooner or later to disappointment arid distress
it becomes liable to censure, and needs cor
rection. Far from helping probity and indus
try, the ruin to which it leads falls most se
verely on the great laboring classes, who are
thrown suddenly out of employment, and by
the failure of magnificent schemes never in
tended to enrich them, are deprived in a mo
ment of their only resource. Abuses of credit
and excesses in speculations will happen in
despite of the most salutary laws; no Govern
ment perhajis can altogether prevent them;
but surely every Government can refrain from
contributing the stimulus that calls them into
life.
Since, therefore, experience has shown, that
to lend the public money to local banks, is
hazardous to the operations of the Government,
at least of doubtful benefit to the institutions
themselves ; and productive of disastrous de
rangement in the business and currency of the
country, is it the part of wisdom again to re
new the connection?
It is true that such an agency is in many re
spects convenient to the Treasury, but it is not
indispensable. A limitation of the expenses
of the Government to its actual wants, and of
the revenue to those expenses, with convenient
means for its prompt application to the pur
poses for which it was raised, are the objects
which we should seek to accomplish. The
collection, safe-keeping, transfer and disburse
ment of the public money, can, it is believed,
bo well managed by officers of the Govern
ment. Its collection, and to a great extent,
its disbursement also, have indeed been hither
to conducted solely by them; neither National
nor State Banks when employed being requir
ed to do more than keep it safely while in their
custody, and transfer and pay it in such por
tion at such times as the Treasury shall direct.
Surely banks are not more able than the
Government to secure the money in their pos
session against accident, violence, or fraud.—
The assertion that they are so, must assume
that a vault in a ban!; is stronger than a vault
in the Treasury ; and that directors, cashiers,
and clerks, not selected by the Government,
nor under its control, are much more worthy
of confidence than officers selected from the
people and responsible to the-Governmcnt;
officers bound by official oaths and bonds lbr a
faithful performance of their duties, and con
stantly subject to the supervision of Congress.
The difficulties of transfer, and the aid here
tofore rendered by banks, have been less than
is usually supposed. The actual accounts
show that by far the larger portion ol’ payment
is made within short or convenient distances
from the places of collection; and the whole
number of warrants issued at the Treasury in
the year lt>s4—a year, the results of whidji
will, it is believed, afford a safe test for tKe
future—fell short of live thousand, of an aver
age of less than one daily for each State; iu
the city of New York they did not average
more than two a day, and at the city of Wash
ington only four.
The difficulties heretofore existing are, more
over, daily lessened by an increase in the
cheapness and facility of Communication; and
it may he asserted with confidence; that the
necessary transfers, as well as the safe keeping
and disbursement of the public moneys, can
be with safety and convenience accomplished
through the agency of Treasury officers. This
opinion has been in 'some degree continued, by
actual experience since the discontinuance of
the banks as fiscal agents iu May last; a peri
od, which, from the embarrassments in com
mercial intercourse, presented obstacles as
great as any that may be hereafter apprehend
ed.
The manner of keeping the public money
since that period, is fully stated in the report
.nfthe Secretary of the Treasury. That officer
I also suggestsviiie propriety of assigning, by
law, certain additional duties to existing estab
lishments an 1 officSfs,which with the modifica
tions and safeguards referred to by him, will
he thinks enable the Department to continue to
perform this branch of the public service, with
out any material addition either to their num
ber or to the present expense. The extent of
the business to be transacted has already been
stated ; an 1 in respect to the amount of money
with which the officers employed would be
entrusted at any one time it appears that, as
suming a balance of five millions to berat all
times kept in the Treasury, and the whole of
it left in tiie hands of the collectors and re
ceivers—the proportion of each would not ex -
coed an average of thirty thousand dollars; but
that deducting one million for the use of the
mint, and assuming the remaining four millions
to he in the hands of one half of the present
number of officers—a supposition deemed more
likely to correspond with the facfc£-the sum in
the hands of each would be still less than tiie
amount of most of the bonds now taken from
! the receivers of the public money. Every ap
-1 prehension, however on the subject, either m
respect to the s tlety of the money, or the faith
ful discharge of these fiscal transactions, may,
it appears to me, lie effectually removed by
adding to the present means of the Treasury,
the establishment by law, at a few important
points, of offices for the deposite and disburse
ment of such portions of the public revenue as
cannot with obvious safety and convenience,
be left in the possession of the collecting offi
cers until paid over by thtgn to the public cred
itors. Neither the amounts retained in their
hands, nor those deposited in the offices, would,
in an ordinary condition of the revenue, die
larger in most cases than those often under
the control of disbursing officers of the Army j
and Navy; and might be made entirely safe,
by requiring such securities, and exercising
such controlling supervision, as Congress may
by law prescribe. The principal officers whose
appointments would become necessary under
this plan, taking the largest number suggested
by- the Secretary of the Treasury, would not
exceed ten; nor the additional expenses, at tiie
same estimate, sixty thousand dollars a year, j
There'can be no doubt of the obligation of
i those who are entrusted with the affairs of
Government, to conduct them with as little cost
to the nation as is consistent with tiie public
interest; and it is for Congress, and ultimately
for the people, to decide w hether, the benefits
to be derived from keeping our fiscal concerns 1
apart, and severing the connection which has
hitherto existed between the government and
banks offer sufficient advantages to justify the
necessary expenses. If the object to lie ac
complished is deemed import int to the future
welfare of the country, 1 cannot allow- myself
to believe that the addition to the public ex
penditure of comparatively so small an amount;
i as will be necessary to effect it, will he object- !
ed to by the people.
# It will be seen by the report of the Postmas
ter General, herewith communicated, that tiie
fiscal affairs of that Department have been i
successfully conducted since May lastptpon the j
principle of dealing only in the legal currency
of the United States, and that it needs no leg
islation to maintain its credit, and facilitate the
management of its concerns; the existing laws
being, in the opinion of that officer, ample for
those objects.
Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for
a season, and increased services required from
the public functionaries; such are usually
incident to tiie commencement of every system,
but they will be greatly lessened in tiie pro
gress of its operations.
"I he power and influence supposed to be con
nected with tiie custody and disbursement of
tiie public money are topics on which tiie
public mind, is naturally, ami, with great pro
priety, peculiarly sensitive. Much has been
said of them m reference to the proposed sep
aration of the Government from banking in
stitutions ; and surely no one can object to
any appeals or animadversions on the subject,
which are consistent with facts, and evince
a proper respect for tiie intelligence of tiie
people. If a Chief Magistrate may be allowed
lio speak for himself on such a point, I can
truly say, that to me nothing would be more
acceptable, than the withdrawal from the Ex
ecutive to tlis greatest practicable extent, of all
concerned in the custody and disbursement of
the public revenue ; not that I would shrink
from any responsibility cast upon me by the
duties of my office, but because it is my
firm belief that its capacity for usefulness is in
no degree promoted by the possessions of any
patronage not actually necessary to the per
| formance of those duties. But under our
, present form of Government, the intervention
of Executive officei-3 in the custody and dis
bursement of the public money seems to be
unavoidable, and before it can be admitted
that the influence and [lower of the Executive
would be increased by dispensing with the a
> gency ol banks, the nature of that intervention
m such an agency must be carefully regarded,
and a comparison must be instituted between
its extent in the two ca es;
The revenue can only be collected by offi
! cers appointed by the President, with the ad
! vice and consent of the Senate. The public
moneys, in the first instance, must therefore,
i m all cases, pass through hands selected by
the Executive—other officers appointed in
the same way, or, as iu some cases, by the
President alone, must also be entrusted with
them When drawn for the purpose of disburse
ment It is thus seen that, even when banks
are employed, tiie public funds must twice pass
through tiie hands of executive officers. Be
: sides this, the head of the Treasury Depart
! meat, who aiso holds his office at the pleas
ure of the President, and some other officers
of the same depart neat, must necessarily be
invested with more or less power in the selec
tion, continuance, and supervision, of the
banks that may he employed. The question
is then narrowed to the single [joint, whether,
in the intermediate stage between the collec
tion and disbursment of the public money, the
agency ol banks is necessary to avoid a dan
gerous extension, of the patronage and influ
ence of the Executive ? But is it clear that
the connection of the Executive with power
j lul moneyed institutions, capable of minister
ing to the interests of men in points where
they are most accessable to corruption, is less
liable to abuse than his constitutional agency
in the appointment and control of the few
public officers required by the proposed plan ?
Will the public money, when in their hands, be
necessarily exposed to any improper interfer
ence on the part of the Executive ? May
it not be hoped that a prudent fear of public
jealousy and disapprobation, in a matter so pe
culiarly exposed to them, will deter him fromany
such interference, even if higher motives be
found inoperative ? May not Congress so reg
ulate, by law, the duty of those officers, and
j subject it to such supervision and publicity, as
i to prevent the possibility of any serious abuse
i on the part of the Executive ? and is there e
■ qual room for such supervision, and publicity
in a connection with banks, acting under the
| shield of corporate immunities, and conducted
by persons irresponsible to the government and
the people ? It is believed that a considerate
; and candid investigation of these questions
will result in the conviction, that the proposed
plan is far less liable to objection, on the
; score of Executive patronage and control, than
I any bunk agency that has been, or can be,
devised.
With these views, I leave to Congress the
measuros necessary to regulate, in the present
emergency, the safe-keeping and transfer of
the public moneys. In the performance of
constitutional, duty, I have staff'd to them,
without reserve, the result of my own reflec
tions. The subject is of great importance;
and one on which we can scarcely expect to
be as united in sentiment as we are in inter
est It deserves a full and free discussion,
and cannot fail to be benefitted by a dispassion
ate comparison of opinions. Well aware my
self of the duty of reciprocal concession a
mong the co-ordinate branches of the Gov
ernment, 1 can promise reasonable spirit of co
operation, so far as it can be indulged in with
ont the surrender of constitutional objections,
which l believe to be well founded. Any sys
tem that may be adopted should be subjected to
the fullest legal provision, so as to leave noth
ing to the Executive but what is necessary
to the discharge of tiie duties imposed on him ;
and whatever plan may he ultimately estab
lished, my own part shall be so discharged as
to give to it. a fair trial, and the best prospect
of success.
The character of the funds to he received
and disbursed hi the transactions of tiie Gov
ernment., likewise demands your most careful
consideration.
There can be no doubt that those who fra
med and adopted the Constitution, having in
immediate view the depreciated paper of the
<Confederacy—of which five hundred dollars in
paper were, at times, only equal to one dollar
in coin—intended to prevent the recurrence of
similar evil, so far at least as related to the
transactions of the new Government, They
gave to Congress express powers to coin mon
ey, and to regulate the value thereof, and of
foreign coin ; they refused tu give it power to
establish corporations—-the agents, then as
now, chiefly employed to create a paper cur
rency ; they prohibited the States from making
any.thing but gold and silver a legal tender in
payment of debts ; and the first Congress di
rected, by postive law, thft the revenue should
be received in nothing but gold and silver.
Public exigency at the outset of tiie Gov
ernment, without direct legislative authority,led
to the use of banks as fiscal aids to the Treas
ury. In admitted deviation from the law, at
the same period, and under the same exigency,
the Secretary of the Treasury received their
notes in payment of duties. The sole groUHd
on which the practice, thus commenced, wa9
then, or has since, been justified, is the cef-