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Georgia fli Statesman.
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BY BURRITT & MEACIIAM.
THE GEORGIA STATESMAN
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ment, opposite the State-House Square, at
Three Dollars per ann. in advance, or Four
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Notice of the sale of personal property
must be given in like manner, FORTY days
previous to the day of salt.
Notice to the debtors and creditors of an
estate must be published for FORTY days.
Notice that application will be made to
the Court of Ordinary for leave to sell land,
must be published for NINE MONTHS.
All L etterS must ue POST PAID.
In senate of the U. States
January 19, 1826.
Air. Benton, from tlie Select Com
mittee, to which was referred the
several Resolutions proposing
amendments to the Constitution
of the United States,
Reported, in part •
That, in considering these various
propositions, the Committee could
not be insensible to an objection, of
ten repeated, against the expediency
of making any alterations in the fun
damental principles of our Govern
ment. Giving to this objection its
due weight, and admitting the im
policy of making sudden and hasty
changes, the Committee would yet
deem it an unwise surrender of an
undoubted right, in the existing gen
eration, to refuse to make any reform
in the Federal Constitution, which
time and experience has proved to be
necessary. _ Founded in the rights of
man, this right to improve our social
condition has been acknowledged
and guaranteed in the Constitution
itself: and that it was not intended
to be a barren privilege, nor its ex
ercise construed into a mark of ir
reverence towards our ancestors,
was sufficiently shown by the Con
stitution itself, in the double means
which it provided for effecting its
own amendment. By these means,
the right of amendment is secured
to the Congress and the States, con
jointly, and to the States themselves
independent of Congress. This
double capacity to receive amend
ment, was considered by its ablest
supporters, about the time of its
adoption, as one, of the best features
in the Constitution. The privilege
secured to the States to demand
from Congress the convocation of a
national convention, and to originate
and perfect amendments, indepen
dent of the will of any branch of the
Federal Government, was particu
larly relied upon, and carefully point
ed out as the proper resort of the
States, whenever Congress should
neglect or refuse to propose the
amendments which the people de
sired. A reference to the proceed
ings of the ratifying conventions,
will show the stress which was laid
by the friends of the Constitution,
on this double capacity of that in
strument, to receive amendment;
and the further fact, that, but for
the existence of this capacity, and a
belief in the greater facility of pro
curing subsequent, than previous
amendments, that constitution, which
is now deemed, hv some, too perfect
to he touched, would never have ob
tained the ratification of a sufficient
numbor of States to put it into op
eration
Equally rejecting, on one hand,
that attachment to old institutions,
which rejects every idea of improve
ment, and, on the other, that spirit
of innovation which would leave
nothing stable in the Constitution,
the Committee have carefully con
sidered the several poprositions of
amendment referred to them by tlie
order of the Senate, and after corn
paring them with the existing pro
visions of the Constitution, qji
same points, they have come to the
conclusion, that the plan of that in
strument has failed in the execution,
in that most difficult part of all elec
tive Governments—the choice of
the Chief Magistrates ; and that it
is no less a right than a duty, in the
existing generation, to provide
another plan, more capable of a
steady, equal and uniform operation.
Besides a want of uniformity under
the present plan, to such a degree as
to exhibit three different modes of
election in operation at once, and
a want of stability so great as to ad
mit all these to be changed when
ever the State Legislatures please,
the Commute would indicate two
great leading features in which the
intention of the Constitution has
wholly failed ; the institution of
EfECTORS ; and thr ultimate election
by states in the House of Represen
tatives. Considering that the effects
of these failures, the want of uni
formity, and the instability of the
present modes of election, have
nearly left us without Constitutional
rules for the choice of the two first
officers of the Federal Government;
and believing that an amendment
w hich would combine the advanta
ges of uniformity, stability and equali
ty, would he acceptable to the peo
ple, and favorable to the cause of
liberty, the Committe have resolved
to propose:
First. That a uniform mode of
election, by districts, shall he estab
lished.
Secondly. That the institution of
electors shall he abolished, and the
President and Vice-President here
after elected by a direct vote of the
people.
Thirdly. That a second election to
he conducted in the same manner as
the first, shall take place between
the persons having the two highest
numbers for the same office, when
no one has received a majority of the
whole number of votes first given.
The details of this plan of election
are given at length, in the resolution
herewith submitted ; and, in bringing
forward a plan so essentially differing
from that ot the present Constitution,
the Committee believe it to be their
duty to the Senate, to submit, at the
same time, a brief exposition of the
reasons which have influenced their
determination.
The first feature which presents
itself in the Committee’s plan of elec
tion, is the uniformity of the system
which is proposed to he substituted
for the discordant and varying modes
of election, which now prevail in
different States, and even in the
same State, at different times. To
enumerate these various modes, is a
task alike impracticable and unprofit
able ; for they change with a sudden
ness which defies classification : To
point out the evils of such discord
ant and mutable pratices,is unneces
sary; for the whole continent has just
seen and deprecated their pernicious
effects : To argue in favor of some
uniform mode of election, is deemed
superfluous; for its necessity is uni
versally admitted; the demand for
uniformity is heard in all directions;
and public expectation must suffer a
deep disappointment, if earnest and
persevering exertions are not made
at the present session to accomplish
an object of such pervading inter
est.
The plan of uniformity, which has
received the approbation of the Con;
mittee, is that of the district system.
It is believed to he the plan which,
in an addition to perfect uniformity,
will give to every State, and to the
several sections of the State, arid, as
far as possible, to every individual
citizen of the whole Union, their le
gitimate share and due weight in the
election ot the chief officers of their
country. The formation of the dis
tricts, the qualifications of the vo
ters and the manner of conducting
the elections, being left to the State
Legislatures, these important powers
are placed in the safe ami unexcep
tionable hands which have a right to
hold them. The time of holding the
elections, being necessary to the uni
formity of the system, is fixed in the
plan of amendment. The number
of the districts is made to depend
upon the same principle which now
determines the number of electors ;
and, by assigning to each district one
vote for President, and one for Vice-
President, the relative weight of the
States, in this important election, re
mains precisely as fixed in the pre
sent Constitution. The uniformity
of this system of election is perfect,
and, therefore, one of the main ob
jects of amendment will be accom-
plished by its adoption. That it is
the best system which can he adopt
ed, is confidently believed. No other
plan could be proposed, but that of
choosing electors by general ticket
or Legislative ballot; the first ot
which enables the majority to im
press the minority into their service,
puts it into the power of a few to
govern the election, and enables the
populous States to consolidate their
vote, and to overwhelm the small
ones ; the second takes the election
almost entirely out of the hands of
the people, leaves it to a pre-exist
ing body, elected for a different pur
pose, and enables the dominant party
in the Legislature, to bestow the vote
of the State according to their own
sense of public duty or private inter
est. Both these systems are liable
to the gravest objections, and arc
justly condemned by the public voice;
even some ot the States which retain
them, make a plea of the necessity
which compels them to counteract
the same system in some other State;
while the district system, which the
Committee recommend, possesses
not only the advantage of being in
itself tlie best, but of being, also, the
one which is now in force in a ma
jority of the States, and lim one
which many others would adopt, if
all others could be made to do so at
the same time. It is, besides, the
mode of election in which, either,
electors may be used, or a direct vote
•riven bv the people : while the gen
Ha? tibi erunt artes, pacisque imponere morem, parcere subjects et debellnre supeibos. Virgil.
MILLEDGEVILLE, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1826.
eral ticket and the Legislative ballot
necesssarily exclude the direct vote - ,
and require the agency of those in
termediate electors, which it is a part
of the object of (his report lo prove
to be both useless and dangerous to
the rights of the people.
The second leading feature in tlie
[Committee’s plan of amendment, is
the substitution of a direct vote, for
the indirect one in which tho people
now give in the elect ion of President
and Vice-President. It is in this part
of the Constitution, that the inten
tion of this instrument has most com
pletely failed. Every advantage ex
pected to have been derived from
the institution of electors has failed
in practice and a multitude of evils
not foreseen, have sprung up in place
of the anticipated good. It was the
intention of the Constitution that
these electors should he an indepen
dent body of men, chos n by the
people liom among themselves, on
accoant of their superior disc rn
ment, virtue and information; and
that this select body should he left
to make the election according to
their own will, without the slightest
control from the body of the people.
That this intention has failed of its
object in every election, is a fact of
such universal notoriety that no one
can dispute it. That it ought to
have failed, is equally incontestable;
for such independence in the electors
was wholly incompatible with the
safety of the people. That it was,
in fact, a chimerical and impractica
ble idea in any community, except
among a people sui k in that apathy
which precedes the death of liberty,
is a proposition too clear to need il
lustration. The failure, then, was
as it ought to have been, and was
obliged to be, complete from the very
first institution of electors. In the
first election, held under (lie Con
stitution, the people looked beyond
these agents, fixed upon their own
candidates for President and Vice-
President, and took pledges from the
electoral candidates to obey their
will. In every subsequent election,
the same thing has been done Elec
tors therefore, have not answered
the design of their institution. They
are not the independent body and
superior characters which they were
intended to bo. They are not left
to the exercise of their own judg
ment ; on the contrary, they give
their vote, or bind-themselves to give
it, according to the will of their con
stituents. They have degenerated
into mere agents, in a case which re
quires no agency, and where the
agent must be useless; if he is faith
ful, and dangerous, if he is not. In
stead of being chosen for the noble
qualities set iorth in the “Federal
ist,” candidates for electors are now
most usually selected for their devo
tion to a party, their popular man
ners, and a supposed talent at elec
tioneering, which the framers of the
Constitution would have been asham
ed to possess. In the election by
general ticket, the candidates are pre
sented to the pcopU in masses equal
to the whole number of votes which
tlie State has a right to give. The
ticket, hearing their immos, is com
posed by some unseen and irrespon
sible power, printed and sent forth to
the people to be voted for by many
who know them not, hut who arc
required to yield implicit confidence
both in the ticket itself, and the un
seen body which prepared it. Dis
cipline and management most usually
ensures success to this ticket; and
thus a string of electors become pos
sessed of the votes of a State, with
out being sufficiently known to most
of the voters to merit their confi
dence in the smallest particular; and
often less known to them than the
presidential candidates themselves.
When chosen by Legislative ballot,
these titular electors are still further
removed from all knowledge and
control of tho people, and act a part
still more subdued to the purposes
of a party. Even in the district mode
of election, where electors arc at
least dangerous, they are still suffi
ciently so, to merit rejection from a
scrvice which every individual voter
is competent to perform in his own
person. In the first place, wherever
the evil of the general ticket is avoid
ed, another evil, of an opposite char
acter, is encountered, in the multi
tude of electoral candidates which
offer themselves on the part of the
same person; those who offer first,
are frequently the most unfit in the
district; but, having put forth their
names, they consider themselves as
vested with a sort o f preemption right
to the place, and refuse to surrender
their self-created pretensions. The
spirit of intrigue and artifice takes
advantage of this state of things,
and, working upon the unity and
obstinancy of various candidates,
contrives to perplex,distract, divide
and disgust the people with their ir
reconcilable pretentions. At last,
when reduced to the proper number,
and one for each presidential candid*
ate is fairly put before the people, it
may happen that the confidence of
many voters will he destroyed in the
candidate of their own party, by in
skluous or hold attacks upon the in
tegrity of his intentions. But sup
posing this danger to ho avoided,
and a faithful candidate believed to
ho found, his sincerity placed above
suspicion, and himself fairly pitted
against a rival candidate in (lie op
posite ranks; even then he does an
injury to tho purity of the election,
by bringing his own exertions, and
the weight of his own character,
good or had, to mix in the presiden
tial canvass, and to influence its re
sult. If elected, the people who
voted for bun, have no power to
control him. He may give or sell
hi vote to the adverse candidate, in
violation of all the pledges which
had been taken from him. The crime
is easily committed, for he votes by
ballot ■ detection difficult, because he
does not sign it; prevention is im
possihe, tor he cannot he coerced;
the injury irreparable, for the vote
cannot be vacated; legal punishment
is unknown, and would be inadequate;
and thus, the defrauded voters, after
all their rare and toil, remain with
out redress for the past, or security
for the future. That these mischiefs
have not yet happened, is no answer
to an objection that they may hap
pen. 'Phi* infancy and consequent
purity of the Republic, is not the
age to expect them. They belong
to that riper period, to w hich the in
creasing wealth and population of
the country is rapidly carrying us—
to an age, not far distant, in which
the lust of power in our own citizens,
and the criminal designs of foreign
nations, will give hundreds of offices
and millions of money for as many
votes ns would turn the scale in a
presidential election. Then why
preserve an institution which no lon
ger answers the purpose for which it
was rreated, and whose tendency to
inflict irreparable mischief, is not
counterbalanced by the slightest ca
pacity to do good ! An institution
which must impose upon tho people
a string of unknown candidates at
the commencement of the canvass,
or distract their attention by a mul
titude of pretenders, which necessa
rily brings extraneous influences to
govern the election ; and, alter it is
over, subjects the whole body of the
voters to he defrauded of their rights.
Upon v.hat principle of human action
can the people ho required to incur
the hazards of an irresponsible and
uncontrolable agency, in a case which
requires no agent 1 Why have re
course to an agent whose treachery
may ruin, and whose fidelity cannot
aid you 1 Why employ another to do
a thing which every citizen can do as
easily for himseTv? In the general
ticket and Legislative modes of elec
tion, the body of electors may be
made lo act a part. They become,
in such cases, mdispcnsabl • machine
ry, to enable the dominant party to
effect their views,; but, in the dis
trict system, they are even incapa
ble of Heins; used for this purpose ;
and, if kept up. can he seen in no
other light than as the reserved in
struments of future and contingent
mischief.
That the qualified voters of the
States ought to possess the real, as
well as the nominal right, to elect
the President and Vice-President of
the United States, is a proposi ion
deduciblc from the rights ot man,
the nature of the Federal Govern
ment, and the proper distribution ot
all its powers. The nature of this
Government is free and representa
tive. It is a Government of the peo
ple, managing their own affairs in
iheir own way, through the agency
of their own servants. It rests upon
election, in opposition to heredi
tary succession ; and unless the
people make these elections, the pe
culiar feature which distinguishes
this Government from a limited mon
archy, must rapidly disappear. In
the distribution of the powers of the
Federal Government, the faculty ot
election was the only one which ap
propriately fell to the mass of the
people. It is the only one which
they can exercise. All others arc
necessarily assigned to a lew select
hands. The people in mass, cannot
command armies and fleets, preside
over public affairs at home, and treat
with foreign nations abroad: these
powers must be left to the executive
office. They cannot assemble in a
body and enact laws ; this power of
Legislation must be left to represen
tatives. Still less can they sit in
mass upon the rights ot persons and
property, administer justice, and ex
pound the laws; all this must be con
fided to a small number of judges,
placed, by the tenure of their office,
far above the immediate control and
intluerrfe of the people. Vi hat part,
then, remains for the body of the
pcoph/to act in the adminstration of
the Is^deralGovernment 1 Elections;
and but elections remains for
them ; and in the original distribu
tion of power, this part was the one
assigned to them. Representatives
in Congress were to be chosen by
them : in the election of Senators,
they were to have an indirect vote;
and in that of President and Vice-
President, they were to choose,
through their immediate representa
tives, such os they believed to he
most capable of making a good
choice for them. Thus, the power
of electing the executive and Le
gislative members of (he Federal
Gove rmnent, was the only attribute
of sovereignty left in the hands of
(lie people, by the Federal Consti
tution; and if this attribute is lost
or destroyed in the most important
election of all, that of the chief ma
gistrates, then tin.* appelation of
•overeign, with hich the people are
so often greeted, becomes a title of
derision, nly srr\ ing to remind them
ot what they ought to he, and of
what they arc uot.
That this great privilege of ( lec
tion was intended to he a real, and
not a barren power in the hands of
the people, was asserted and admit
ted by the ablest advocates of the
Constitution,at the time of its adop
tion. The jealous friends of liberty
were alarmed at the first appearance
oft hat instrument, at seeing the accu
mulation of almost kingly power,
which it placed in the hands of the
President. They saiv him vested
with authority to nominate the offi
cers of the army and to command
them ; to nominate and command
the officers oftbe navy ; to nominate
and dismiss, at pleasure, nil the col
lectors and disbursers of the public
revenue ;»to nominate the judges
who administer the laws, and the
ambassadors who treat with foreign
powers ; to exercise, by his qualified
veto a direct part in legislation, and,
by liis character, station, and vast
patronage, to possess a great influ
ence over both branches of the Fed
eral legislature : And from this ac
cumulation of all efficient power in
the hands of the first Magistrate,'
they saw, or thought the* saw
ground of real apprehension for
the safety of the public liberty.
But they were answered, that
all these apprehensions were with
out foundation ; that there was one
single consideration, which would
show them to he groundless; and
that consideration was this : that
the Pro.-i lent himselt was to he noth
ing more than the creature of the
people, elected by the best and wis
est among th m-elves ; such as they
themselves would agree could make
a better choice than themselves ;
and that, thus issuing from t lie bos
om of the people dependent upon
them for his first election, and sub
sequent re-appointment, he would,
in fact, he nothing but an instrument
in their hands, by means of which,
they could direct all this formidable
array of power to the protection ol
their own liberties, and to the aug
mentation of their own happiness.
By this answer, enough were sooth
ed into acquiescence, to permit the
C listitnfion, by lean majorities, in
several States, to get info operation.
And now, if by any vicious practice,
which shall grow up under this Con
stitution. the people shall lose the
power of electing the President and
Vice-President, then they lose the
only attribute of sovereignty which,
as a body, they arc capable ot exercis
ing in the administration of the Fed
eral Government ; they lose the attri
bute, and the only one, which was as
signed to them in the first distribution
of power in the organization of this
Government ; the identical one
which they were flattered into the.
belief of possessing, when they con
sented to the establishment of the
Constitution; and the one which
cannot he lost, without rendering the
remaining privilege of voting indi
rectly for Senators, and direct!}' for
Representatives, ot too little consc
cpionee to be worth preserving.
The laws operate upon the peo
ple : therefore,the theory of our gov
ernment requires, that the mass op
erated upon by the laws, should elect
those who make the laws. The
same principle applies, with still
greater force, to officer
who ex.■cub's who,
ruling tlit in. by
iirmv, :l f I bost
of revenue ofiiccfs, their
appointments front himself, i o se
cure to the people the influence
over this eminent officer, which the
theory of our Government admits,
and which their own safety demands,
it is indispensable that they should
lie brought, as nearly as possible, in
to the presence of each other. No
intervening bodies should stand be
tween them. The President should
be nothing but an emanation of their
| will. His powers are two great to
he independent of the People, with
out danger to their liberties. To
I them be should, therefore, look for
'all his honors—the brilliant distinc-
[OR IF NOT PAID IN SIX MONTHS.
[NO. X.—VOL. I.
tion of a first election, and the crown
ing reward of a second one.
Holding it to he a proposition demon
strated, that, in this confederation
of republics, the choice of the chief
magistrates should he left to the
whole body of the qualified voters ;
it is not lo he dissembled, that sever
al objections, and some of them spe
cious, and even plausible, have been
urged against it. That there should
he objections to this plan of election,
founded in conviction and urged with
sincerity, could not he unexpected
by the Committee. They very well
know that there docs exist, always
lias existed, and forever will exist,
in every free government, two very
opposite classes of politicians ; one
dreading that the people will over
turn the Government; and the oth
er dreading that (he Government will
seize upon the liberties of the peo
ple : the firsl* class having the fear
of second of monarchy,
constantly before their oyc«. That
the apprehensions of each arc very
sincerely felt, is readily admitted:
hut on which side lies the ground for
apprehension, is not to he decided
by argument, hut by reference to
the historical fact, that of the
hundred republics which have
flourished in the other hemisphere,
in the course of the thirty centu
ries, not one is now surviving. All
have slided into the kingly system,
while not a single kingdom has ta
ken and retained the republican
form.
Convinced of the impossibility of
removing apprehensions which have
their foundation in nature, it is yet*
due to the cause of popular rights
and of free governments, to answer
the objections which have been urg
ed against the election of our Presi
dent and Vice-President by a direct
vote of the people. Analysing these
several objections, for the purpose
of exposing their futility, they
are found to resolve themselves in
to several distinct classes ; the first,
of which springs from the supposed
corruption, ignorance, and violence
of the American people. The com
mittee would remark* that ill a peri
od oft wo thousand years, t lie friend ■
of the hereditary principle have got
no further than to vary phrases upon
those three ideas. The address ot
the Roman Senate to Octavius, be
seeching him to accept the Imperial
dignity, and that of the French Con-,
servativc Senate to the First Consul,
begging of him the same favor, are
eac.ii composed of nothing hut diver
sifications of these three ideas, sup
ported by an infinity of examples
drawn from the conduct of elective
Governments. Neither these ideas
themselves, nor the examples which
support them, have any analogy or
applicability to the state ol tho
people, the nature of the gov
ernment, or the condition of the
country in which we live. The
charge of ignorance can have no foun
dation among a people with whom
the talent of reading and writing is
nearly universal; whose intelligence
is kept up to the progress of the ago,
by the multiplication and diffusion
of Newspapers ; whose daily oc
cupations, as citizens. is a daily im
provement of their mental faculties ;
.villi whom t lie institution of schools
and colleges is a maxim of primary
policy, and the education of their
children considered as an endow
ment more precious than the richest
inheritance. Upon such a people
the imputation of ignorance is an
unfounded aspersion, and will be an
aspersion still more unfounded in its
application to (heir posterity. But
the imputation is not only unfounded,
but is even contradictory in the
mouths of those who utter it ; for
even these admit that the people are
sufficiently intelligent to choose elec
tors, and that these electors are
hound to vote as the people direct
them. Here, then, the theory of
the popular election is admitted—
and to deny the practice while ad
mitting the theory, to refuse a vote
to the people in person, and to allow
it to them in the person of an elec
tor involves a contradiction which
defeats the objection, and exposes
the elector to the suspicion of being
wanted for a purpose which has not
bcen red. After all, admit
ting of the people may
«I )0n
r and more " i- ci
ij^^^advanuige
gridljpr disint
condition, and their sJnWrtT desire,
growing out of their obvious interest,
to get the best man for President.
The mass of the people always go
for their country ; politicians, too of
ten for themselves and their party ;
and it is believed rhat there is Ic.-s
danger to be apprehended from the
honest the people, than
from the des, g ns of amb “
tious politicians,
i (Conchohd in our next