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SOUTHERN RECORDER. VOL. I. MILLEDGEVILLE, TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1320. No. 12. PUBLISHED WEEKLY, (ON TUESDAYS) BY S. QRJUYTLAM'D V R. M. ORME, AT THREE DOLLARS, IN ADVANCE, OR FOUR DOLLARS AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE YEAR. Advertisements conspicuously inser ted at the customary rates. DEBATE ON THE SPANISH TREATY. m THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- Monday, April 3, 1820. The House having resolved itself into a committee of the whole, on the State of the Union ; and the following resolu tions, submitted some days ago by Mr. Clay, (Speaker,) being under conside ration : 1st. Resolved, That the constitution of the United States vests in Congress the power to dispose of the territory be longing to them, and that no treaty, pur porting to alienate any portion thereof, is valid without the concurrence ofCon- gress. 2. Resolved, That the equivalent pro posed to be given by Spain, to the Unit ed States, in the treaty concluded be tween them, on the 22d day of February 1819, for that part of Louisiana lying west of the Sabine, was inadequate ; and that it would be inexpedient to make a transfer thereof to any foreign power, or to renew the aforesaid treaty. Mr. Clay said, that, whilst he felt ve ry grateful to the House for the prompt and respectful manner in which they had allowed him to enter upon the dis cussion of the resolutions which he had the honor ol submitting to their notice, he must at the same time frankly say, that he thought their character and con sideration, in the councils of this coun try, were concerned in not letting the present session pass off without delibera ting upon our affairs with Spain. In coming to the present session of Con gress, it had been his anxious wish to be able tocoucur with the Executive branch of the government in the measures which it might conceive itself called on to re commend on that subject, for two re i- •ons, of which the first, relating person ally to himself, he would not trouble the committee with further noticing. The ather was,that it appeared to him to be always desirable, in respect to the fo reign action of this government, that there should be a perfect coincidence in opinion between its several co-ordinate branches. In time, however, of peace it might be allowable to those w ho are charged with the public interests to en tertain & express their respective views, although there might be some discor dance between them. In a season of war, there should be no division in the public councils; but an united and vigo rous exertion to bring the war to an ho norable conclusion. For his part, when ever that calamity may befal his country, he would entertain but one wish, and that is, that success might crown our struggle, and the war be gloriously and honorably terminated. He would never refuse to share iu the joys incident to the victory of our arms, nor to partici pate in the griefs of defeat and discomfi ture. He coincided entirely in the sen timent once expressed by that illustri ous hero, whose recent melancholy fall we all so sincerely deplore, that fortune may attend our country in whatever war it may be involved. There were two systems of policy, he said, of which our government had had the choice. The first was, by appeal ing to the justice and affections of Spain, to employ all those persuasives which could arise out of our abstinence from any direct countenance to the cause of South America and the observance of a strict neutrality. The other was, by ap- ^ pealing to her justice aiul also to her fears, to prevail upon her to redress the injuries of which we complain—her fears, by a recognition of the indepen dent governments of South America, and leaving her in a state of uncertainty as to the further step we might take in re spect to those governments. The unra tified treaty was the result of the first system. It could not be positively af firmed what effect the other system would have produced; but he verily be lieved that, whilst it rendered justice to those governments, and would have bet ter comported with that magnanimous policy which ought to have characteriz ed our own, it would have more success fully tended to an amicable and satisfac tory arrangement of our differences with Spain. The first system has so far failed. At the commencement of the session, the President recommended an enforcement °fthe provisions of the treaty. After three months deliberation, the commit tee of foreign affairs, not being .able to concur with him, has made us a report recommending the seizure of Florida, in the nature of a reprisal. Now, the Pre sident recommends our postponement of the subject until the next session. It had "een his (Mr. C’s) intention, whenever the committee of foreign affairs should engage the house to act upon their bill, to offer, as a substitute for it, the sys tem which he thought it became this country to adopt, of which the occupa tion of Texas, as our own, would have been a part, and the recognition of the independent governments of South Ame rica another. If fie did not now bring forward this system, it was because the committee proposed to withdraw their bill, and because he knew too much of the temper of the House and of the Ex ecutive, to think that it was advisable to bring it forward. He hoped that some suitable opportunity might occur, during the session, for considering the proprie ty of recognizing the independent gov ernments of South America. Whatever Mr. C. might think of the discretion which was evinced in recom mending the postponement of the bill of the committee of foreign relations, he could not think that the reasons, assign ed by the President for that recommen dation, were entitled to the weight which lie had given them. Mr. C. thought that the house was called upon, by a high sense of duty, seriously to animadvert upon some of these reasons. He believ ed it was the first example, in the annals of the country, in which a course of po licy, respecting one foreign power, which we must suppose had been deliberately considered, has been recommended to be abandoned, in a domestic communication from one to another co-ordinate branch of the government, upon the avowed ground of the interposition of other fo reign powers. And what was the nature of this interposition ? It was evidenced by a cargo of scraps gathered up from this Charge d’Affaires and that—of loose conversations held with this foreign mi nister and that—perhaps mere levee conversations, without a commitment in writing, in a solitary iustance, of any of the foreign parties concerned, except only in the case of his Imperial Majesty ; and what was the character of his com mitment we shall presently see. But, Mr. C. said, he must enter his solemn protest against this and every other spe cies of foreign interference in our mat ters with Spain. What have they to do with them '! Would they not repel, as officious and insulting intrusion, any in terference on our part in their concerns with other foreign state* ? Would his Imperial M jesty have listened, with complacency to our remonstrances a- gainslthe vast acquisitions which he has recently made? He ha« lately crammed his enormous maw with Finland and with the spoils of Poland, and, whilst the dif ficult process of digestion is going on, he throws himself upon a conch, ami cries out—don't, don’t disturb my repose! Ht charges his Minister here to plead the cause of peace and concord ! The American ‘'government is too enlight ened’ ’ (ah! sir how sweet this unction is, which is poured down our backs) to take hasty steps. And his imperial ma jesty’:! Minister here is required to en gage (’Mr. C. said he had hoped that the origin il expression was less strong, but lie be ieved that the French word en gage 1 ore the same meaning) the Ame rican government, &c.” Nevertheless, the Enperor does r ot interpose in this (Discussion.” No ! rot lie. He, makes above all “ no prete ision to exercise an influence in the councils of a foreign power.” Not the slightest. And yet, at the very instant when he is protest ing against the imputation of this influ ence, his interposition is proving effec tual ! His imperial Majesty has at least inanifested so far, in this particular, his capacity to gov ern his empire, by the se lection of a sagacious Minister. For if Count Nesselrode hsd never written n- nother paragraph, the extract from his dispatch to Mr. Politics, which has been transmitted to this House, would demon strate that he merited the confidence of his master. It was quite refreshing to read such state papers after perusing those (he was sorry to say it; he wish ed there was a veil broad and thick e- nough to conceal them forever) which this treaty had produced on the part of our own government. Conversations between my Lord Cas- tlereagh and our Minister at London had also been communicated to this House. Nothing from the hand of his lordship is produced ; no ! he does not commit him self in that way. The sense in which our Minister understood him, and the purport of certain parts of despatches from the British government to its Min- isterat Madrid, which he deigned to read to our Minister, are alone communicated to ns. Now we know very well how di plomatists, when it is their pleasure to do so, can wrap themselves up in myste ry. No man more than my Lord Cas- tlereagh, who is also an able Minister, possessing much greater talents than are allowed to him generally in this country, can successfully express himself in am biguous language, when he chooses to employ it. Mr. C. recollected himself once to have witnessed this facility, on the part, of bis lordship. The case was this. When Bonaparte made his escape from Elba and invaded France, a great part of Europe believed that it was with the connivance of the British Ministry. The opposition charged them, in Parlia ment with .it, and they were interrogated to know what measures of precaution they had taken against such an event.— Lord Castlereagh replied by stating that there was an understanding with a cer* tain naval officer ofltigli rank, command ing in the adjacent seas, that he was to act on certain contingencies. Now, Mr. Chairman, if you can make any thing in telligible out of this reply you will have much more success thau the English op position had. The allowance of interference by for eign powers in the affairs of our govern ment, not pertaining to themselves, is against the counsels of all our wises! politicians—those of Washington, Jef ferson, and, he would add also, those of the present Chief Magistrate ; for, pending this very Spanish negotiation, the offer of the mediation of foreign states was declined, upon the true ground that Europe had her system, and we ours ; and that it was not compatible with our policy to entangle ourselves in the labyrinths of hers. But a media tion is far preferable to the species of interference on which it had been his reluctant duty to comment. The medi ator is a judge, placed on high, his con science liis guide, the world his specta tors, and posterity his judge. His posi tion is one, therefore, of the greatest responsibility. But what responsibility is there attached to this sort of irregu lar, drawingroom, intriguing interposi tion ? He could see no motive for go verning or influencing our policy, in re gard to Spain, furnished in any of the communications vv liich respected the dis position of foreign powers. He regret ted, for his part, that they had been at all consulted. There was nothing in the character of the power of Spain ; nothing in the beneficial nature of the stipulations of the treaty to us, which warranted us in seeking the aid of for eign powers, if in any case whatever that aid were desiralile. He was far from saying that, in the foreign action of this government, il: might not be pru dent to keep a watchful eye upon the probable conduct of foreign powers.— That might be a material circumstance to be taken into consideration. But he never would avow to our own people— never promulgate to foreign powers, that their wishes and interference were the controling cause of our policy.— Such promulgation would lead to the most alarming consequences. It was to invite further interposition. It migh . in process of time, create in the bosom of our country a Russian faction, n Brit ish faction, a French fiction. Every nation ought to be jealous of this specie* of interference, whatever was its form of government. But of all forms of go vernment, the united testimony of all history admonished a Republic to he most guarded against it. From (lie mo ment that Philip intermeddled in the af fairs of Greece, the liberty of Greece was doomed to inevitable destruction. Suppose, said .Mr. C. we could see the communications which have pissed between Mis’ Imperial Majesty and the British government, respectively, and Spain, in regard to the United Slates ; what do you imagine would he their character ? Do yon suppose that the same language has been held to Spain and to us ? Do you not, on the contra ry, believe, that sentiments have been expressed to her, consoling to her pride ? That we have been represented, per haps, as an ambitious Republic, seeking to aggrandize ourselves at her expence ? In the other ground taken by the Pre sident, the present distressed condition of Spain, for his recommendation of for bearance to act during the present ses sion Mr. C. was sorry also to say that it did not appear to him to be solid. He could well conceive bow the weakness of your aggressor ipight when he was withholding form you justice, from a mo tive for your pressing your equitably demands upon him ; but he could not accord in the wisdom of that policy which would wait his recovery of strength, so as to enable him successfully to resist those demands. Nor would it comport with the practice of our own govern ment heretofore. Did we not, in lull, when the present monarch of Spain was an ignoble captive, and (lie people of the Peninsula were contending for thdMnes- timable privilege of self-government, seize and occupy that part of Louisiana which is situated between the Mississip pi and the Perdido ? What must the people of Spain think of that policy which would not spare them ami whicli com miserates alone an unworthy prince, who ignominiously surrendered himself to his enemy ; a vile despot, of whom I.cannot speak in appropriate language without departing from the respect due to this house or to myself? What must the people of South America think of this sympathy for Ferdinand, at a mo ment when they, as well as the people of the Peninsula themselves, (if we are to believe the late accounts, and God send they may be true) are struggling for liberty ? Again : When we declared our late just war against Great Britain, did we wait for a moment when, she was free from embarrassment arid distress ; or did e not rather wisely select a period hen there was the greatest probability of giving success to our arms ? What was the complaint in England, what the language of faction here l Was it not that we had cruelly proclaimed the war at a time when she was struggling for the liberties of the world ? How truly, let the sequel and the voice of impartial his tory tell. Whilst he could net, therefore, Mr. C. said, persuade himself that the reasons assigned by the President for postponing the subject of our Spanish affairs until a- nother session, were entitled to all the weight which he seemed to think belong ed to them, he did not nevertheless re gret that the particular project recom mended by the committee ot foreign re lations was thus to be disposed of, for it was war—war, attempted to be disguised. And if we Went to war, he thought it should have no other limit than indemni ty for the past, and security for the fu ture. He had no idea of the wisdom of that measure of hostility which would bind u«, whilst the other party is left free. Before he proceeded to consider the particular propositions which the reso lutions contained which he had had the honor ot submitting, it was material to determine the actual posture of our re lations to Spain. He considered it too, clear to need discussion, that the treaty was at aa end ; that it contained in its pre sent state, no obligation whatever upon us, and no obligation whatever on the part of Spain. It was as il it had never been. We are remitted back to the state ofour rights and our demands which existed prior to the conclusion of the treaty, with this only difference, that, in stead of being merged in, or weakened by the treaty, they have acquired all the additional force which the intervening lime and the faithlessness of Spain can communicate to them. Standing on this position, he should not deem it necessary lo interfere with the treaty-making pow er, if a fixed and persevering posture h ■ 1 not been indicated by it, to obtain the revival of the treaty. Now he thought it a bad treaty. The interest of the country, as it appeared to him, forbade its renewal. Being gone, it was perfect ly incomprehensible to him why so much solicitude was manifested to restore it. Vet it is ciung to with the same sort of frantic affection with which the bereav ed mother hugs her dead infant in the vain hope of bringing it back to life. Has the House of Representatives a right to express its opinion upon the ar rangement made iu that treaty ? The President, by asking Congress to carry it into effect, has given us jurisdiction of the subject, if we had it not before. We derive from that circumstance the right to consider, 1st. if there be a treaty ; 2dly, if we ought to carry it into effect ; and 3dly, if there be no treaty, whether it be expedient to assert our rights, in dependent of the treaty. It will not be contended that we are restricted to that specific mode of redress which the Pre sident intimated in his opening message. The first resolution which he had pre sented, asserted that the Constitution vesta in the Congress of the United States the power to dispose of the territory be longing to them ; and that no treaty, pur porting to alienate any portion thereof, is valid, without the concurrence of Con gress.* It was far from his wish to re new at large a discussion of the treaty making power. The Constitution of the United States had not defined the pre cise limits oil that power, because, from the nature of it, they could not be pre scribed. It appeared to him, however, that no safe American statesman would assign to it a boundless scope. He pre sumed, for example, that it would not be contended that in a government which was itself limited, there was a functiona ry without limit. The first great bound to the power in question, he apprehend ed, was, that no treaty could constitution ally transcend the very objects and pur poses of the government itself. He thought, also, that wherever there were specific grants of power to Congress, they limited and controlled, or, lie would rather say, modified the exercise of the general grant of the treaty-making pow er, upon the principle u hich was familiar to every one. He did not insist that the treaty making power could not act upon the subjects committed to the charge of Congress ; lie merely contended that the concurrence ot Congress in its action up on those subjects, was necessary. Nor would he insist that the concurrence should precede that action. »t would be always most desirable that it should pre cede it, if convenient, to guard against the commitment of Congress, on,the one hand, by the Executive, or on the other, what might seem to be a violation of the faith of the country, pledged for th(> rati fication of the treaty. But he was per fectly aware, that it would be very often highly inconvenient to deliberate, in a body so numerous as Congress, on the » • Tlie proposition which it a-rerts was, he thought, sufficiently maintained by barely read ing the clause in the constitution on which it rests: “The Congress shall hate power to dis pose of be. the territory or other property be longing to the I'nitod States.'’ nature of those terms on which it might be proper to treat with foreign powers. In the view of the subject which he had been taking, there was a much higher degree of security to the interests of this country. For, with nil his respect for the President and Senate, it could not disparage the wisdom of their councils, to add to it that of this House also. But, if the concurrence of this House be not necessary in the cases asserted ; if there be no restriction upon the power he w as considering, it might draw to itself and absorb the whole of the powers of go vernment. 'To contract alliances ; to stipulate for raising troops to be employ ed in a common war about to be waged ; to grant subsidies ; even to introduce fo reign troops within the bosom of the country, were not unfrequeut instances of the exercise of this power ; and if in all such cases the honor and faith of the nation were committed, by the exclusive act of the President and Senate, the me lancholy duty alone might be left to Con gress of recording the ruin of the repub lic.* Supposing, however, that no treaty which undertakes to dispose of the terri tory of the United States is valid, with out the concurrence of Congress, it may be contended that such treaty may con stitutionally fix the limits of the territo ries of the United States, where they ore disputed, without the co-operation ot’ Congress. He admitted it, when the fix ation of the limits simply was the object. As in the case of the river St. Croix, or the more recent stipulation in the treaty of Ghent, cr in that of the treaty with Spain of 1795. In all these cases, the treaty, making power merely reduces to certainty that which was before unas certained. It announces the fact; it proclaims, in a tangible form, the exist ence of the boundary. It does not make a new boundary ; it asserts only where the old boundary was. But it cannot, under color of-fixing a boundary previ ously existing, though not in fact mark ed, undertake to cede away, without the concurrence of Congress, whole provin ces. If the subject be one of a mixed character, if it consists partly of cession, and partly of the fixation of a prior limit, he contended that the President must come here for the consent of Congress. But in the Florida treaty it was not pre tended that the object was simply a de claration of where the western limit of Louisiana was. It was, on the contrary, the case of an avowed cession of terri tory from the United States to Spain.— The whole of the correspondence mani fested that the respective parlies to the negociation were not engaged so much in an enquiry where the limit of Louisiana was, as that they were exchanging over tures as to where it should be. Hence, we find various limits proposed and dis cussed. At one time the Mississippi is proposed ; then the Missouri ; then a ri ver discharging itself into the Gulf east of the Sabine. A vast desert is propos ed to separate the territories of the two powers; and finally the Sabine, which neither of the parties had ever contend ed was the ancient limit of Louisiana, is adopted, and the boundary is extended from its source by a line perfectly new and arbitrary ; and the treaty itself pro claims its purpose to be a cession from the United States to Spain. The second resolution comprehended three propositions : the first of which was, that the equivalent granted by Spain to the United States for the prov ince of Texas was inadequate. To de termine this it was necessary to estimate the value of what we gave and of what we received. This involved an enquiry into our claim to Texas. It was not his purpose lo enter at large into this sub ject. lie presumed the spectacle would not be presented of questioning, in this branch of the government, our title to Texas, which had been constantly main tained by the Executive for more than fifteen years past, under three several administrations. He was at the same time ready and prepared to make cut our title, if any one in this House were fearless enough to controvert it. He would, for the present, briefly state, that the man vVlio is most familiar with the transactions of this government, who largely participated in the formation of the Constitution, and in all that h*s been done under it, who, besides the eminent services that he has rendered his coun try, principally contributed to the acqui sition of Louisiana, and who must he supposed, from his various opportuni ties, best to know its limits, declared, 15 years ago, that our title to the Rio del Norte was as well founded as it was to * The House of Representatives has uniform ly maintained its rights to deliberate upon those treaties in which their co-operation was asked by the Executive. In the first case thfit occur red in the progress of our government, that of the treaty, commonly called Mr. Jay’s treaty, after general Washington refused to communi cate his instructions to that minister, the House asserted its right by 60 odd votes to 80 odd. In the last cu.m that occurred, th« Convention of 1815 with Great Britain, although it passed off upon what was called a compromise, this house substantially obtained its object; for, if that Convention operated as a repeal of the laws with which it was incompatible, the act which passed was altogether unnecessary. the island of New-Orleans. [Here Mr. C. read an extract from a memoir pre* •ented in 1806, by Mr. Monroe and Mr. rinckney, to Mr. Cevnllos, proving that the boundary of Louisiana extended east* ward to the Perdido, and westward to the Rio del Norte, in which they say, “ The facta and principles which justify this conclusion, are so satisfactory to their government ns to convince it that the United States have not a better right to the island of New-Orlenns, under the cession referred to, than they have to the whole district of territory thus de scribed.’?] The title to the Perdido on the one side, and to the Rio del Norto on the other, rested on the same princi* pie— the priority of discovery and of oc cupation by France. Spain had first dis covered nnd made an establishment at Pensacola : France at Dauphin island in the Bay of Mobile. The intermediate space was unoccupied ; and the princi ple observed among European nations having contiguous settlements, being that the unoccupied space between them should be equally divided, was applied to it, nnd the Perdido thus became the com mon boundary. So, west of the Missis sippi, La Salle, acting under France, in 16C2 or 3, first discovered that river.— In JG85j he made an establishment on the Bay of St. Bernard, west of the Co lorado, emptying into it. The nearest Spanish settlement was Pnnuco, and the Rio del Norte, about the midway line, became the common boundary- All accounts concurred in represent ing Texas to be extremely valuable, its superficial extent was three or four times greater than that of Florida. The cli mate was delicious ; the soil fertile ; the margins of the rivers abounding in live oak ; and the country admitting of easy settlement. It possessed, moreover, if he were not misinformed, one of the fin est ports in the Gulf of Mexico. The productions of which it was capable, were suited to our wants. The unfortu nate captive of St. Helena wished for ships, commerce, nnd colonies. We have all, if we do not wantonly throw them away. The colonies of other countries are separated from them by vast seas, requiring great expense to protect them, and are held subject to a constant risk of their being lorn from their grasp. Our colonies, on the contrary, are united to and form a part of our continent ; and the same Mississippi, from whose rich deposit, the best of them (Louisiana) hue been formed, will transport on her bo som the brave and patriotic men from iier tributary streams, lo defend and pre serve the next most valuable, the pro- v inco of Texas, We wanted Florida, or rather we shall want it, or, to speak yet more correctly, we want no body else to have it. We do not oesire it for immediate use. It fills a space in our imagination, and we wish it to complete the arrondisement of our territory. It must certainly come to us. The ripened fruit, will riot more surely full. Florida is enclosed in between Al abama and Georgia, and cannot escape. Texas may. Whether we get Florida now or some five or ten years hence, is of no consequence, provided no other (lower gets it; and if any other power should attempt to take it, an existing act ofCongress authorizes the President to prevent it. He was not disposed to dis parage Florida, but its intrinsic value was incomparably less than that of Tex as. Almost its sole value was militarv. The possession of it would umloubtediv communicate some additional security to Louisiana nnd to the American commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. But it was not very essential to have it for protection to Georgia and Alabama. There could be no attack upon either of them, by a foreign power, on the side of Florida.—- It now covered those states. Annexed to the United States, and we should have to extend our line of defence so ns to em brace Florida. Far from being, there fore, a source of immediate profit, it would be the occasion of considerable immediate expence. The acquisition of it was certainly a fair object of cur poli cy ; and ought never to be lost sight o£ It was even a laudable ambition in any chief magistrate to endeavor to illustrate the epoch of his administration, by such an acquisition. It was less necessary, however, to fill the measure of the ho nors of the (.resent chief magistrate than that of any other man . in consequance of the large share which he had in obtain ing all Louisiana. But, whoeve r may de serve the renown which may attend the incorporation of Florida into our confe deracy, it is our business, as the repre sentatives of that people, who are to pay the price of it, to take care, as far as we constitutionally can, that too much is not given. He would not give Texas for Florida in a naked exchange. We were bound by the treaty to give not merely Texas, but five millions of dollars, also, and the excess beyond that sum of all our claims upon Spain, which have been va riously estimated al. from fifteen to twen ty millions of dollars! The public is not generally apprized of another large consideration which passed from us to Spain, if an interpre tation which he had heard given to the.