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AMERICAN DSMOdUT. ihe most perfect Government would be that which, emanating directly from the People, Governs least —Costs least —Dispenses Justice to all, and confers Privileges on None.—-BENTHAM, VOL. I.| DU. VIL GREEK-EDITOR. democrat, PUBLISHED WEEKLY, IN THE REAR OF J. BARNES 1 BOOKSTORE. COTTON AVENUE, MACON, GA. AT TWO DOLLARS PER ANNUM. IN ADVANCE. -G3 Rates of Advertising, Ac« One square, of 100 words, or leas, in small type, 73 cent* for the first insertion, aud 00 cents for each subsequent inser i; oa» Alt Advertisements conlainiitg more than 100 and less than 209 words, will be charged as two squares. To Yearly Advertisers, a liberal deduction will be made. N. B Sales of LAND, by Administrators, Executors. *r Guardians, arc required, by law, to be held on the first Tuesday in the mouth, between the hours of 10 iu the fore •toon, and 9 in the afternoon, at the Court-House in the Coun ty in which the property is situated. Notice of these must be "iven in a public Gazette, SIXTY DAYS, previous to the day of sale. Sales of PERSONAL PROPERTY, must bo advertised in fUe saint* in inner, FORTY DAYS previous to the day of sale. Notice to Debtors aud Creditors of an Estate, must be pub lished FORTY Days. Notice that application will be made to the Court of Ordi tary, for leave to sell LAND, must be published FOUR MONTHS. Sales of NEGROES, must be made at public auction, on the first Tuesday of the month, between the legal hours Os gale, at the place of public sales in the county where the let ters testamentary, of Administration or Guardianship, shall have been granted, SIXTY DAYS notice being previously given m one of the public gazettes of this Slate, and at the door of the Court-llousc, where such sales are to be held. Notice lor leave to sell NEGROES, must be published for FOUR MONTHS, before any order absolute shall be made thereon by the Court. All business of iliis nature, will receive prompt attention, at the Office of the AMERICAN DEMOCRAT. REMITTANCES IIY MAIL. —“ A Postmaster may en close money in a letter to the publisher of a uewspaper, to pay the subscription of a third person, and frank the letter, if written by himselC” Amu* Kendall , l*. M. (J. COMMUNICATIONS addressed to the Eoiron Post Paid. 11. & J. CO WLES, HAVE nowon hand at die Store formerly occupi ed by Messrs. J. U. ROSS ifc Cos. a general as sortment of planters’ supplies, —consisting or — Gi 'occries, STAPLE PRY GOODS, S.L&DWAI&3, SSO33, Macon, Nov. 2*2, 1913. 27 WILLIAM L. CLARK, WHOLESALE DEALER IN STAPLE AM) FANCY DRV GOODS, NO. 37 I.IBERTV STREET, (.Vear -Nassau.) NEW-YORK. Oct. 18, 1813. 22 ts. sri &w v/ i/rr j. n.i 1* .v ru. VRE receiving and opening a large and desirable assortment of seasonable FOREIGN and A NIEUIGAN F mey and Staple Ui*t> <£ooUsf. The entire sto k is m-w and very complete, and wi' be sold at Wholesale or Retail, at the very lowest pri' ees. Purchasers are invited to call and examine for themselves Nov 8. 45 •Yctr iPry Hoods, iff.'tt and SfiOM 2 STOKE. at Baldwin’s corner, cotton avenue, macon, ga. rgMlB subseribets are now receiving a general stock A of new staple and fancy Dry Goods, Shoes, Hoots and Hilts, Also Calf Skins, Sole Leather, Hog Skins, Boot Mo r.icco. Boot and Saddle Linings, Stioe Thread, Peggs and Lasts. Superior Anchor Brand Bolting Cloths. Paper Hangings and Bordering. Crockery-ware. PAINTS AND OILS. Pure White Lead ground in Oil, Extra and No. 1 and 2 ground in Oil, Colored Paints, Best quality Linseed, Tannets and Lamp Oil, Glass, Putty, fee All of which will be sold low for Cash A. J. tit D. W. ORlt. Oct. 23, 1843 23 3m. BONNETS. THE nubscriber has just received a fresh supply of fine and fashionable Florence, Tuscan, and Straw Bonnets. .Mao, a few DRESS PATTERNS, rich Mouslin de Lane; an assortment of Elastic and Halftone Milts; Rich and Fashionable Dress Silks at reduced prices; Also one piece Turkey Satin. G. L. WARREN, One d«»or above Goo. A. Kimberly's Hat Store. Macon, Nov. 1, 1843. 24-ts KIMBERLY’S 83* Hat Store: «£}) CONSISTING OF GENTLEMENS’ LEGHORN PANAMA, MANILLA. AND PALM LEAF HATS; All of which, will he sold as low as tlie lowest. May 24. 2 Bagging and Rope. 5 BALES Gunny Cloth, 45 incli wide,. 100 Pieces Kentucky Hemp Basrging, 50 Coil Manilla Bale Rope. For sale by CHARLF.S DAY & CO. Macon, Nov. 15, 1843. 26 ts Bagging and liope. QfV'V PIECES heavy Gunnv Bagging, *7VAJ 100 •• Kentucky, <f» 50 “ Rnvia, do 200 “ Coils Manilla Rope, 500 lbs. Bagging Twine. For sale on reasonable terms, hv CHAS. CAMPBELL &. CO. Aug. 23, 1843. 15 GROCERIES* r PHE subscribers continue to keep on hand at the old stand, opposite the Washington Hall, a good ‘wtortnientofGrureries, Bagging, Salt, Iron, dec., which they will sell low for cash. a CAMPBELL At. Cf). j Macon, June 7, IM3. 4 ts DEMOCRATIC BANNER FREE TRADE; DOW DUTIES; NO DEBT; SEPARATION FROM BANKS; ECONOMY; RETRENCHMENT; AND A STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE C. C.ILUOU.Y. The Address of Mr, falhoun To his Political Friends and Snpporteis. I have left it to you, my friends and supporters, through whose favorable es timate of my qualifications, my name has been presented to the people of the Uni ted States, for the office of Chief Magis trate to conduct the canvass on such principles, and in such manner, as you might think best. But, in so doing, I did not waive my right to determine'on my individual responsibility, what course my duty might compel me to pursue ultimately, nor have I been an inatten tive observerof the canvass and the course you have taken. It affords me pleasure to be enabled to say, that on all leading questions, grow ing out of the canvass, I heartily concur red with you, in the grounds you took, and especially in those relating to the mode, in which the Delegates to the pro posed Convention to beheld in Baltimore, should be appointed, and how they should vote. You have, in my opinion, conclusively shown, that they should be appointed by Districts and vote per cap ita; but your reasons, as conclusive as they are, have proved in vain. Already New York and some other States have appointed Delegates en masse by State Conventions, and one State (Virginia) has resolved that the votes of her Dele gates should be given by the majority, and be counted per capita. Their course would necessarily overrule that which you haveso ably supported, should you go into Convention, and would leave you no alternative, but to yield yours and adopt theirs, however much you may be opposed to it on principle, or to meet them on the most unequal terms, with divided against united and concentrated forces. The question then is, what course, under such circumstances, should be adopted t And that question, you will be compelled speedily to decide. The uear approach of the time forthe meeting ofthe proposed Convention will not admit of much longer delay. But as your course may depend in somedegree on that which I have decided to take, I deem it due to the relation subsisting between us, to make mine known to you without fur ther delay. 1, then, after the most careful and de liberate survey ofthe wholeground, have decided, that I cannot permit my name to go before the proposed Convention, constituted as it must now be, consistent ly with the principles, which have ever guided my public conduct. My objec tions arc insuperable. As it must be constituted, it is repugnant to all the principles, on which, in my opinion, such a Convention should be formed. VVhat those principles are, I shall now proceed briefly to state. 1 hold, then, with you, that the Con vention should be so constituted, as to utter fully and clearly the voice of the people and not that of political managers or office holders and office seekers ; and for that purpose, I hold it indispensable, that the Delegates should be appointed directly by the people, or to use the lan guage of Gen. Jackson, should be “fresh from the people.” I also hold, that the only possible mode to effect this, is for the people to choose the Delegates by Districts, and that they should vote per capita. Every other mode of appointing would be controlled by political machin ery, and place the appointments in the hands of the few, who work it. 1 object then, to the proposed Conven tion, because it will not be constituted in conformity with this fundamental article of the Republican creed. The Delegates to it will be appointed from some of the States, not by the people in Districts, but, as has been stated, by State Conventions en masse, composed of Delegates, appoin ted in all cases, as far as I am informed, by County or District Conventions, and in some cases, if not misinformed, these again composed of Delegates appointed by still smaller divisions, or a few in terested individuals. Instead then of be ing directly, or fresh from the people, the Delegates to the Baltimore Conven tion will be the Delegates of Delegates; and of course, removed, in all cases, at least three, if not four degrees from the people. At each successive remove, the voice ofthe people will become less full and distinct, until at last, it will be so faint and imperfect, as not t. be audible. To drop metaphor, I hold it impossible to form a scheme more perfectly calcula ted to annihilate the control of the people over tlie Presidential election, and vest it in those, who make politics a trade, and who live or expect to live on the govern ment. In this connexion, I object not less strongly to the mode in which Virginia has resolved her Delegates shall vote. — With all due respect, I must say, I can imagine nothing more directly in con flict with the principles of our federal system oi government, or to use a broad er expression, the principles on which all confederated communities have ever been united. I hazard nothing in saying that there is not an instance in our po litical history, from the meeting of the first Revolutionary Congress to the pres ent day, of the Delegates of any State voting by majority and counting per mpita j nor do I believe an instance of MACON, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1844. the kind can be found in the history of any confederated community. There is indeed something monstrous in the idea of giving the majority the right of im pressing the vote of the minority into its service, and counting them as its own. The plain rule—that which has ever prevailed, and which conforms to the i dictates of common sense, is, that where a State votes as a State, by a majority of its Delegates, the votes count one, be they few or many, or the State large or small. On the contrary, where the votes of all the Delegates are counted, they vote in dividually and independently, each for himself counting one. And it is to be noted, that wherever this latter mode of voting exists among confederated States, it is in all cases founded on compact, to which the consent of each State is re quired. In the absence of compact, the invariable mode of voting, in such States, is, in all cases, by the majority, their vote counting one. The course which Virginia has resolved to take, is in vio lation of this plain and fundamental rule and ifit should become a settled practice would be destructive af the found ition on which the whole structure of the State Right doctrine is reared. I hold, in the next place, to be an in dispensable principle, that the Conven tion should be so constituted, as to give to each State, in the nomination of a can didate, the same relative weight, which the Constitution secures to it in the elec tion of the President, making due allow once for its relative party strength. By the election, I mean the whole—the evontual choice when it goes into the House of Representative as well as the p.imary vote in the electoralcollege The one is as much a part of the election as the other. The two make the whole. The adoption of the one, in the Convention, which framed the Constitution, depended on the adop tion of the other Neither could be possibly .adopted alone. The two were the result of compromise between the larger and smaller States, after a long and doubtful struggle which threatened the loss of the Constitution itself. The object of givingto the smaller States an equality with the larger, in the eventual choice by the House, was to counterpoise the preponderance of the larger in the electoral college. Without this, the smaller- would have voted against tlie whole provision, and its rejection would have been the consequence. Even as it stands, Delaware voted against it. In confirmation of what I state, I refer to Mr. Mrdison’s report on the proceedings of the Convention. Having stated what I mean by the election, it will require hut a few words to explain my reasons for the principles I have laid down. They are few and simple, and rest on ihe ground, that the nomination is in reality the election, if! concurred in, as far as the party is con cerned. It is so intended to be. The leading reason assigned for making it, is to prevent a division of the party, and thereby prevent the election from going into the House, where the smaller States would have the advantage intended to be secured to them by the Constitution, by being placed on an equality with the larger. Such being the intended object and effect, I now submit to every candid mind, whether the Convention ought not to he so constituted, as to compensate in the nomination for the important advan tage in the election, which the smaller States surrender by going into a Conven tion. Would it not be unfair—a palpa ble want of good faith and subversive of the compromise of the Constitution to withhold it ? Can it be thought, that the smaller States are so debased and absorb ed in the party politics of theday, as to permit themselves to be thus indirectly stripped of a right, which their high minded and patriotic ancestors held so dear, as even to prefer the loss of the Constitution itself, rather than surrender it. I object, then, to the proposed Conven tion, in this connection, because it makes no compensation to the smaller States for the surrender of this unquestionable and important constitutional right. In stead of that, its advocates peremptorily and indignantly refuse any, ana treat with scorn every attempt to secure it.— Some have even gone so far, as to deny, that the eventual choice of the Houee constitutes any portion of the election, and to manifest open hostility against the provision of the constitution, which con tains it. If there was no other objection, the one under consideration would be in superable with me. I differ utterly from the advocates of the proposed Conven tion, in reference to this provision. I re gard it as one of the first importance, not because I desire the election to go into the House, but because I believe it to be an indispensable means, in the hands of the smaller States, of preserving their just and constitutional weight in the Presi dential election, and through that, in the Executive Department and the Govern ment itself, which I believe to be essen tial to the preservation of our sublime federal system. I regard the adjustment of the relative weijght of the States in the Government to he the fundamental com promise of the Constitution, and that on which our whole political system de pends. Its adjustment constituted the great difficulty in forming the Constitu tion. The principle ou which it was finally effected was, that, while due con cession should be made to population, a provision should be also made, in some form, to preserve the original equality of the States in every department of the Government. The principle was easily carried out in constituting the legislative department, by preserving the equality of the States in one branch, (the Senate) and conceding to population its full pre ponderance in the other. But the great anddifficult task of reducing it to practice was, in the Executive Department, at the head of which there is but a single officer. So great was it, that it occupied the attentiou of the Convention, from time to time, during the whole session, end was very near causing a failure at lass It wouid have been an easy task to constitute that department, either on the principle of the equality of the Slates In the government, or that of population.— To combine the two, in the election of a single officer, was quite a different affair; but however difficult, it had to lie per formed, at tlie hazard of losing the Con stitution. It was finally accomplished, by giving to the larger States nearly the same pre ponderance in the electorial college, as they have in the House, and to the smal ler, in the event of a choice by the House the same equality they possess in the Senato; thus following closely the ana logy ofthe Legislative Department. To make it as close as possible, it was at first proposed to give the eventual choice to the Seriate, instead of the House, but it was altered and the present provision adopted, for reasons which did not affect the principle. It was believed by the framers, the practical operationof the provision would be, that tlie electoral college, in which the influence ofthe larger States prepon derates, would nominate, and that the House voting by States, where their equality is preserved, would elect who should be the President. To give it that operation in practice, the provision, as it originally stood in the Constitution, was that each elector should vote for two in dividuals, without discriminating which should be President, or Vice President, and if no one had a majority of the whole votes, then out of the five highest, the House voting by States, should elect one, and the person not elected, having the highest number of votes, should be the Vice President It has been since alter ed, so that the electors should designate which should be President, and which Vice President, and the election of the House was limited to the three highest. It is manifest, that if this provision ofthe Constitution had been left to operate by itself, without the intervention of caucus ses, or party conventions between the people and the election that the practical operation would have been such as I Itßve stated, and such ns was clearly in tended by the framers of the Constitu tion. The object intended is Important.— The preservation of the relative weight ofthe States, as established by the Con stitution in all the Departments, is neces sary to the success and duration of our system of Government ; but it may be doubted, whether the provision adopted to effect it in tlie Executive Department, is not too refined for the strong, and I may add, corrupt passions, which the Presidential election will ever excite.— Certain it is, that if the practice of nomi nating Candidates for the Presidency, by Conventions constituted as the proposed shall become the established usage, it will utterly defeat the intention of theframers of the Constitution, and would be fol lowed by aradical aud dangerous change not only in the Executive Department, but in the Government itself. This danger was early foreseen, and to avoid it, some of the wisest and most experienced statesmen of former days so strongly objected to Congressional cau cuses to nominate candidates for the Presidency, that they never could be in duced to attend them; among these it will be sufficient to name Mr. Macon and Mr. Lowndes. Others, believing that this provision of the Constitution was too refined for practice, were solicitous to amend it, but without impairing the influence of the smaller States in the election. Among these, I rank myself. With that object, resolutions were intro duced in 1828, in the senate, by Col. Benton, and in the House by Mr. Mc- Duffie, providing for districting the States, and for referring the election back to the people, in case there should be no choice to elect one from the two highest candidates. The principle which gov erned in the amendment proposed, was to give a fair compensation to the small er States for the surrender of their advan tage in the eventual choice by the House and at the same time to make the mode of electing the President more strictly in conformity with the principles of our popular institutions, and to be less liable to corruption than the existing provision. They received the general support of the party, but were objected to by a few, as not being a full equivalent to the smaller States. The principle embraced is iden tical with that on which you proposed to constitute the Baltimore Convention, but which has been so dictatorially objected to by some, who then took so prominent a part in its favor. If you have not suc ceeded, there is at least some consolation in reflecting that if others have since changed, you now stand where you then did, in the purer and better days of the party. I was in favor of it then, as lam now, not because I consider the resolu tions as perfect theoretically, as the ex isting provisions ofthe Constitution, but because 1 believe it would in practice more certainly accomplish what the fra mers ot the Constitution intended. But while the provision stands as it does, I would regard myself as little short of a traitor to that sacred instrument, should I give my consent directly or indirectly to any practice, which would have the effect of divesting the smaller States of the due weight of which it secures to them in the Presidential election, wheth er designed or not. And here let me add, that as objectionable as I think a Congressional caucus for nominating a President, it is in my opinion far less so, than a Convention constituted as is pro posed. The former had indeed many things to recommend it. Jts members consisting of Senators and Representa tives, were the immediate organs of the State Legislature, or the people, were re sponsible to them, respectively, and were for the most part, of high character, stan ding and talents. They voted per capi ta, and what is very important, they rep resented fairly the relative strength of the party in their respective States. In all these important particulars, it was all that could be desired for a nominating j body, aud formed a striking contrast to the proposed Convention; and yet, it, could not be borne by the people in the i then purer days of the Republic. I, act- 1 ing.with Gen. Jackson and most of the : leaders of the party at the time, contribu- i ted to put it down, because we believed i it liable to be acted on and influenced by the patronage of the Government—an objection far more applicable to a Con vention constituted as the one proposed, than to a Congressional caucus. Far however was it from my intention, in aid ing to put that down, to substitute in its place what 1 regard as a hundred times more objectionable in every point of view. Indeed, if there must be an inter mediate body between the people and the election, unknown to the Constitution, it may be well questioned whether a better than the old plan of a Congressional cau cus Can be devised. In taking the ground I have, in favor of maintaining the right secured to the smaller States by the compromise of the Constitution, I am actuated by no parti san feeling or desire to conciliate their good opinion. If the case was reversed, and the rights ofthe larger, instead ofthe smaller, were invaded, I would with equal readiness and firmness, stand up in their defence. lam the partisan of nei ther one, nor the other, but simply a sup porter of the Constitution, and what I believe to be just and fair. I regard the Constitution, as the only ark of safety for all, and I believe that in defending' if, I defend the interest and safety of each and all—the greater as well ns the small er. Tlie States invading the right of the others, ns well as the States whose rights are invaded. I have laid down the principle on which I rest the objection in question, with the limitation, that the relative j weight of the States should be maintain ed, making due allowance for their rela tive party strength. The propriety of the limitation is so apparent, that but a few words, in illustration, will be requi red. The Convention is a party Con vention, and professedly intended to take the sense ot the party, which cannot be done fairly, if States having but little party strength, are put on an equality j with those which have much. If that were done, the result might be, that a small portion of the party from States the least sound, politically, and which could give but little support in Congress, might select the candidate, and make the Presi dent against a great majority of the soundest and on which the President and his administration would have to rely for support. All this is clearly too unfair and improper to be denied. There may a great difficulty iu applying a remedy in a Convention, but 1 do not feel myself called upon to say how it can be done, or by what standard the relative strength of the respective States should be determi ned ; perhaps the best would be their relative strength in Congress at the time. In laying down the principle, I added the limitation for the suke of accuracy, and to show how imperfectly the party must be represented, when it is overlook ed. I see no provision in the proposed Convention to meet it. But, in order to realise how the Con- j vention will operate, it will be necessary J to view the combined effects of the objec- j tions which I have made. Thus view-1 ed, it will be found, that a Convention so I constituted, tends irresistibly to centrali zation—centralization of the control over the Presidential election in the hands of a few of the central, large States, at first, and finally, in political managers, office holders arid office-seekers ; or to express l NO. 38. it differently, in that portion of the com munity, who live, or expect to Jive on the Government, in contradiction to the great mass, who expect to live on their own means, or their honest industry: and who maintain the Government, and politically speaking, emphatically the people. That such would be the case, may be inferred from the fact, that it would aft ford the means to some six or seven States lying contiguous and not far from the centre of the Union, to control the nomination, and through that the elec tion, by concentrating their united vote* in the Convention. Give them the pow er of doing so, and it would not long lie dormant. W hat may be done by combi nation, where the temptation is so great, will be sure ere long to be done.. To combine and conquer, is not less true as a maxim, where power is concerned, than to “ Divide and conquer.” Nothing is better established, than that the desire for power can bring together and unite the most discordant materials. But the tendency to centralization wilt not stop there. The appointment of del egates en masse by State Convention, would tend, at the same time and even with greater force, to centralize this con trol in the hands of the few, who make politics a trade. The farther the Con vention is removed from the people, the more certainly the control over it will be placed in the hands of the interested few, and when removed th ree or four degree?, as has been shown it will be, where the appointment is by State conventions, the power of the people will cease, anti the j seekers of Executive favour will become j supreme. At that stage, n:i active, train ed and combined corps will be formed in the party’ whose whole time and atten ■ bon will be directed to politics. It will ihe their sole business. Into their hands the appointments of delegates in nil the 1 stages will fail, and they will take spe cial care that none hut themselves or their humble and obedient dependants shall be appointed. 'l'he central and State Conventions will be filled by the most experienced and cunning, and after nominating the President, they will take good care to divide the patronage and of fices, both ofthe General and State Gov ernments among themselves and their dependants. But why say will ? Is it not already the capo? liar c there nut been many instances of State Conven tions being filled by office holders and office seekers, who, after making the nomination, have div ided the offices in the State among themselves and their partisans, and joined in recommending to the candidate whom they have just nom inated to appoint them to the offices to which they have beer, respectively allot ted. If such be the case in the infancy of the system, it must end, if such conven tions should become the established usage, in the President nominating his successor. When it comes to that it will not be long before the sword will take the place of the Constitution. Such are my objections to the mode hi which the proposed Convention is to be constituted, and my reasons for enter taining them. They are such, that I cannot refuse to obey them without re nouncing the principles which I have often avowed in public and private, and which have guidedmethrough the whole course of my public life. In coming to this conclusion, I have not passed over, without careful exomi- - nation, the reasons assigned by its advo cates for constituting the Convention as they propose. They have not diminish ed the force of rny objections. I pro pose to notice the most prominent. That which they have urged with the greatest confidence, is, that each State has a right to appoint Delegates as 6he pleases. I meet if, by utterly deuying that there is any such right. That each State has the right to act as it plases, in whatever relates to itself exclusively, no one will deny ; but it is a perfectly novel doctrine, that any State has such a right when she comes to act in concert with others in reference to what concerns the whole. In such cases it is the plainest dictate of common sense, that whatever affects the whole should be regulated by the mutual consent of all, and not by the discretion of each. That the appoint ment of Delegates to the proposed con vention is a case of this description, I trust I have conclusivelyshown. I have, I also trust shown more; that the sup posed right is perfectly deceptive, for while it claims for each State the right to appoint Delegates as it pleases, it in reality gives the larger States the right to dictate how the others shall appoint— If, for example, the Empire State, as it is called, adopts the mode of appointing (as she has)which willconcentrate her whole! strength, what direction would she leave to others, if they go into Convention, but to appoint as she has appointed, or to Ec ruled by her. It is then, neithet more nor less than a claim to dictate, under the garb of a right, and such its exercise j has proved in the present case. It has left no option, but to conform to | course, or be overruled, or refuse to go ! into the Convention. I regret this, because! sincerely desire ito preserve the harmony ofthe party. I | had strong hope that the rally after the