American Democrat. (Macon, Ga.) 1843-1844, February 07, 1844, Image 1
AMERICAN DSMOdUT.
ihe most perfect Government would be that which, emanating directly from the People, Governs least —Costs least —Dispenses Justice to all, and confers Privileges on None.—-BENTHAM,
VOL. I.| DU. VIL GREEK-EDITOR.
democrat,
PUBLISHED WEEKLY,
IN THE REAR OF J. BARNES 1 BOOKSTORE.
COTTON AVENUE, MACON, GA.
AT TWO DOLLARS PER ANNUM.
IN ADVANCE. -G3
Rates of Advertising, Ac«
One square, of 100 words, or leas, in small type, 73 cent*
for the first insertion, aud 00 cents for each subsequent inser
i; oa»
Alt Advertisements conlainiitg more than 100 and less than
209 words, will be charged as two squares.
To Yearly Advertisers, a liberal deduction will be made.
N. B Sales of LAND, by Administrators, Executors.
*r Guardians, arc required, by law, to be held on the first
Tuesday in the mouth, between the hours of 10 iu the fore
•toon, and 9 in the afternoon, at the Court-House in the Coun
ty in which the property is situated. Notice of these must
be "iven in a public Gazette, SIXTY DAYS, previous to the
day of sale.
Sales of PERSONAL PROPERTY, must bo advertised in
fUe saint* in inner, FORTY DAYS previous to the day of sale.
Notice to Debtors aud Creditors of an Estate, must be pub
lished FORTY Days.
Notice that application will be made to the Court of Ordi
tary, for leave to sell LAND, must be published FOUR
MONTHS.
Sales of NEGROES, must be made at public auction, on
the first Tuesday of the month, between the legal hours Os
gale, at the place of public sales in the county where the let
ters testamentary, of Administration or Guardianship, shall
have been granted, SIXTY DAYS notice being previously
given m one of the public gazettes of this Slate, and at the door
of the Court-llousc, where such sales are to be held.
Notice lor leave to sell NEGROES, must be published for
FOUR MONTHS, before any order absolute shall be made
thereon by the Court.
All business of iliis nature, will receive prompt attention, at
the Office of the AMERICAN DEMOCRAT.
REMITTANCES IIY MAIL. —“ A Postmaster may en
close money in a letter to the publisher of a uewspaper, to
pay the subscription of a third person, and frank the letter, if
written by himselC” Amu* Kendall , l*. M. (J.
COMMUNICATIONS addressed to the Eoiron Post
Paid.
11. & J. CO WLES,
HAVE nowon hand at die Store formerly occupi
ed by Messrs. J. U. ROSS ifc Cos. a general as
sortment of planters’ supplies,
—consisting or —
Gi 'occries,
STAPLE PRY GOODS,
S.L&DWAI&3, SSO33,
Macon, Nov. 2*2, 1913. 27
WILLIAM L. CLARK,
WHOLESALE DEALER IN
STAPLE AM) FANCY
DRV GOODS,
NO. 37 I.IBERTV STREET,
(.Vear -Nassau.)
NEW-YORK.
Oct. 18, 1813. 22 ts.
sri &w
v/ i/rr j. n.i 1* .v ru.
VRE receiving and opening a large and desirable
assortment of seasonable FOREIGN and A
NIEUIGAN F mey and Staple
Ui*t> <£ooUsf.
The entire sto k is m-w and very complete, and wi'
be sold at Wholesale or Retail, at the very lowest pri'
ees. Purchasers are invited to call and examine for
themselves Nov 8. 45
•Yctr iPry Hoods, iff.'tt and
SfiOM 2 STOKE.
at Baldwin’s corner, cotton avenue, macon, ga.
rgMlB subseribets are now receiving a general stock
A of new staple and fancy
Dry Goods, Shoes, Hoots and Hilts,
Also Calf Skins, Sole Leather, Hog Skins, Boot Mo
r.icco. Boot and Saddle Linings, Stioe Thread, Peggs
and Lasts.
Superior Anchor Brand Bolting Cloths.
Paper Hangings and Bordering.
Crockery-ware.
PAINTS AND OILS.
Pure White Lead ground in Oil,
Extra and No. 1 and 2 ground in Oil,
Colored Paints,
Best quality Linseed, Tannets and Lamp Oil,
Glass, Putty, fee
All of which will be sold low for Cash
A. J. tit D. W. ORlt.
Oct. 23, 1843 23 3m.
BONNETS.
THE nubscriber has just received a fresh supply
of fine and fashionable
Florence, Tuscan, and Straw Bonnets.
.Mao, a few DRESS PATTERNS, rich Mouslin de
Lane; an assortment of Elastic and Halftone Milts;
Rich and Fashionable Dress Silks at reduced prices;
Also one piece Turkey Satin.
G. L. WARREN,
One d«»or above Goo. A. Kimberly's Hat Store.
Macon, Nov. 1, 1843. 24-ts
KIMBERLY’S
83* Hat Store: «£})
CONSISTING OF GENTLEMENS’ LEGHORN
PANAMA, MANILLA. AND PALM
LEAF HATS;
All of which, will he sold as low as tlie lowest.
May 24. 2
Bagging and Rope.
5 BALES Gunny Cloth, 45 incli wide,.
100 Pieces Kentucky Hemp Basrging,
50 Coil Manilla Bale Rope.
For sale by CHARLF.S DAY & CO.
Macon, Nov. 15, 1843. 26 ts
Bagging and liope.
QfV'V PIECES heavy Gunnv Bagging,
*7VAJ 100 •• Kentucky, <f»
50 “ Rnvia, do
200 “ Coils Manilla Rope,
500 lbs. Bagging Twine.
For sale on reasonable terms, hv
CHAS. CAMPBELL &. CO.
Aug. 23, 1843. 15
GROCERIES*
r PHE subscribers continue to keep on hand at the
old stand, opposite the Washington Hall, a good
‘wtortnientofGrureries, Bagging, Salt, Iron, dec., which
they will sell low for cash.
a CAMPBELL At. Cf).
j Macon, June 7, IM3. 4 ts
DEMOCRATIC BANNER FREE TRADE; DOW DUTIES; NO DEBT; SEPARATION FROM BANKS; ECONOMY; RETRENCHMENT;
AND A STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE C. C.ILUOU.Y.
The Address of Mr, falhoun
To his Political Friends and Snpporteis.
I have left it to you, my friends and
supporters, through whose favorable es
timate of my qualifications, my name has
been presented to the people of the Uni
ted States, for the office of Chief Magis
trate to conduct the canvass on such
principles, and in such manner, as you
might think best. But, in so doing, I
did not waive my right to determine'on
my individual responsibility, what course
my duty might compel me to pursue
ultimately, nor have I been an inatten
tive observerof the canvass and the course
you have taken.
It affords me pleasure to be enabled to
say, that on all leading questions, grow
ing out of the canvass, I heartily concur
red with you, in the grounds you took,
and especially in those relating to the
mode, in which the Delegates to the pro
posed Convention to beheld in Baltimore,
should be appointed, and how they
should vote. You have, in my opinion,
conclusively shown, that they should be
appointed by Districts and vote per cap
ita; but your reasons, as conclusive as
they are, have proved in vain. Already
New York and some other States have
appointed Delegates en masse by State
Conventions, and one State (Virginia)
has resolved that the votes of her Dele
gates should be given by the majority,
and be counted per capita. Their
course would necessarily overrule that
which you haveso ably supported, should
you go into Convention, and would leave
you no alternative, but to yield yours and
adopt theirs, however much you may
be opposed to it on principle, or to meet
them on the most unequal terms, with
divided against united and concentrated
forces.
The question then is, what course,
under such circumstances, should be
adopted t And that question, you will
be compelled speedily to decide. The
uear approach of the time forthe meeting
ofthe proposed Convention will not admit
of much longer delay. But as your
course may depend in somedegree on that
which I have decided to take, I deem it
due to the relation subsisting between us,
to make mine known to you without fur
ther delay.
1, then, after the most careful and de
liberate survey ofthe wholeground, have
decided, that I cannot permit my name
to go before the proposed Convention,
constituted as it must now be, consistent
ly with the principles, which have ever
guided my public conduct. My objec
tions arc insuperable. As it must be
constituted, it is repugnant to all the
principles, on which, in my opinion, such
a Convention should be formed. VVhat
those principles are, I shall now proceed
briefly to state.
1 hold, then, with you, that the Con
vention should be so constituted, as to
utter fully and clearly the voice of the
people and not that of political managers
or office holders and office seekers ; and
for that purpose, I hold it indispensable,
that the Delegates should be appointed
directly by the people, or to use the lan
guage of Gen. Jackson, should be “fresh
from the people.” I also hold, that the
only possible mode to effect this, is for
the people to choose the Delegates by
Districts, and that they should vote per
capita. Every other mode of appointing
would be controlled by political machin
ery, and place the appointments in the
hands of the few, who work it.
1 object then, to the proposed Conven
tion, because it will not be constituted in
conformity with this fundamental article
of the Republican creed. The Delegates
to it will be appointed from some of the
States, not by the people in Districts, but,
as has been stated, by State Conventions
en masse, composed of Delegates, appoin
ted in all cases, as far as I am informed,
by County or District Conventions, and
in some cases, if not misinformed, these
again composed of Delegates appointed
by still smaller divisions, or a few in
terested individuals. Instead then of be
ing directly, or fresh from the people,
the Delegates to the Baltimore Conven
tion will be the Delegates of Delegates;
and of course, removed, in all cases, at
least three, if not four degrees from the
people. At each successive remove, the
voice ofthe people will become less full
and distinct, until at last, it will be so
faint and imperfect, as not t. be audible.
To drop metaphor, I hold it impossible
to form a scheme more perfectly calcula
ted to annihilate the control of the people
over tlie Presidential election, and vest it
in those, who make politics a trade, and
who live or expect to live on the govern
ment.
In this connexion, I object not less
strongly to the mode in which Virginia
has resolved her Delegates shall vote. —
With all due respect, I must say, I can
imagine nothing more directly in con
flict with the principles of our federal
system oi government, or to use a broad
er expression, the principles on which
all confederated communities have ever
been united. I hazard nothing in saying
that there is not an instance in our po
litical history, from the meeting of the
first Revolutionary Congress to the pres
ent day, of the Delegates of any State
voting by majority and counting per
mpita j nor do I believe an instance of
MACON, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1844.
the kind can be found in the history of
any confederated community. There is
indeed something monstrous in the idea
of giving the majority the right of im
pressing the vote of the minority into its
service, and counting them as its own.
The plain rule—that which has ever
prevailed, and which conforms to the i
dictates of common sense, is, that where
a State votes as a State, by a majority of
its Delegates, the votes count one, be they
few or many, or the State large or small.
On the contrary, where the votes of all
the Delegates are counted, they vote in
dividually and independently, each for
himself counting one. And it is to be
noted, that wherever this latter mode of
voting exists among confederated States,
it is in all cases founded on compact, to
which the consent of each State is re
quired. In the absence of compact, the
invariable mode of voting, in such States,
is, in all cases, by the majority, their
vote counting one. The course which
Virginia has resolved to take, is in vio
lation of this plain and fundamental rule
and ifit should become a settled practice
would be destructive af the found ition
on which the whole structure of the State
Right doctrine is reared.
I hold, in the next place, to be an in
dispensable principle, that the Conven
tion should be so constituted, as to give
to each State, in the nomination of a can
didate, the same relative weight, which
the Constitution secures to it in the elec
tion of the President, making due allow
once for its relative party strength. By
the election, I mean the whole—the
evontual choice when it goes into the
House of Representative as well as the
p.imary vote in the electoralcollege
The one is as much a part of the
election as the other. The two make
the whole. The adoption of the one,
in the Convention, which framed the
Constitution, depended on the adop
tion of the other Neither could be
possibly .adopted alone. The two were
the result of compromise between the
larger and smaller States, after a long
and doubtful struggle which threatened
the loss of the Constitution itself. The
object of givingto the smaller States an
equality with the larger, in the eventual
choice by the House, was to counterpoise
the preponderance of the larger in the
electoral college. Without this, the
smaller- would have voted against tlie
whole provision, and its rejection would
have been the consequence. Even as it
stands, Delaware voted against it. In
confirmation of what I state, I refer to
Mr. Mrdison’s report on the proceedings
of the Convention.
Having stated what I mean by the
election, it will require hut a few words
to explain my reasons for the principles
I have laid down. They are few and
simple, and rest on ihe ground, that the
nomination is in reality the election, if!
concurred in, as far as the party is con
cerned. It is so intended to be. The
leading reason assigned for making it, is
to prevent a division of the party, and
thereby prevent the election from going
into the House, where the smaller States
would have the advantage intended to
be secured to them by the Constitution,
by being placed on an equality with the
larger.
Such being the intended object and
effect, I now submit to every candid
mind, whether the Convention ought not
to he so constituted, as to compensate in
the nomination for the important advan
tage in the election, which the smaller
States surrender by going into a Conven
tion. Would it not be unfair—a palpa
ble want of good faith and subversive of
the compromise of the Constitution to
withhold it ? Can it be thought, that the
smaller States are so debased and absorb
ed in the party politics of theday, as to
permit themselves to be thus indirectly
stripped of a right, which their high
minded and patriotic ancestors held so
dear, as even to prefer the loss of the
Constitution itself, rather than surrender
it.
I object, then, to the proposed Conven
tion, in this connection, because it makes
no compensation to the smaller States
for the surrender of this unquestionable
and important constitutional right. In
stead of that, its advocates peremptorily
and indignantly refuse any, ana treat
with scorn every attempt to secure it.—
Some have even gone so far, as to deny,
that the eventual choice of the Houee
constitutes any portion of the election,
and to manifest open hostility against the
provision of the constitution, which con
tains it.
If there was no other objection, the
one under consideration would be in
superable with me. I differ utterly from
the advocates of the proposed Conven
tion, in reference to this provision. I re
gard it as one of the first importance, not
because I desire the election to go into
the House, but because I believe it to be
an indispensable means, in the hands of
the smaller States, of preserving their just
and constitutional weight in the Presi
dential election, and through that, in the
Executive Department and the Govern
ment itself, which I believe to be essen
tial to the preservation of our sublime
federal system. I regard the adjustment
of the relative weijght of the States in the
Government to he the fundamental com
promise of the Constitution, and that on
which our whole political system de
pends. Its adjustment constituted the
great difficulty in forming the Constitu
tion. The principle ou which it was
finally effected was, that, while due con
cession should be made to population, a
provision should be also made, in some
form, to preserve the original equality of
the States in every department of the
Government. The principle was easily
carried out in constituting the legislative
department, by preserving the equality of
the States in one branch, (the Senate)
and conceding to population its full pre
ponderance in the other. But the great
anddifficult task of reducing it to practice
was, in the Executive Department, at
the head of which there is but a single
officer. So great was it, that it occupied
the attentiou of the Convention, from
time to time, during the whole session,
end was very near causing a failure at
lass It wouid have been an easy task to
constitute that department, either on the
principle of the equality of the Slates In
the government, or that of population.—
To combine the two, in the election of a
single officer, was quite a different affair;
but however difficult, it had to lie per
formed, at tlie hazard of losing the Con
stitution.
It was finally accomplished, by giving
to the larger States nearly the same pre
ponderance in the electorial college, as
they have in the House, and to the smal
ler, in the event of a choice by the House
the same equality they possess in the
Senato; thus following closely the ana
logy ofthe Legislative Department. To
make it as close as possible, it was at
first proposed to give the eventual choice
to the Seriate, instead of the House, but
it was altered and the present provision
adopted, for reasons which did not affect
the principle.
It was believed by the framers, the
practical operationof the provision would
be, that tlie electoral college, in which
the influence ofthe larger States prepon
derates, would nominate, and that the
House voting by States, where their
equality is preserved, would elect who
should be the President. To give it that
operation in practice, the provision, as it
originally stood in the Constitution, was
that each elector should vote for two in
dividuals, without discriminating which
should be President, or Vice President,
and if no one had a majority of the whole
votes, then out of the five highest, the
House voting by States, should elect one,
and the person not elected, having the
highest number of votes, should be the
Vice President It has been since alter
ed, so that the electors should designate
which should be President, and which
Vice President, and the election of the
House was limited to the three highest.
It is manifest, that if this provision ofthe
Constitution had been left to operate by
itself, without the intervention of caucus
ses, or party conventions between the
people and the election that the practical
operation would have been such as I
Itßve stated, and such ns was clearly in
tended by the framers of the Constitu
tion.
The object intended is Important.—
The preservation of the relative weight
ofthe States, as established by the Con
stitution in all the Departments, is neces
sary to the success and duration of our
system of Government ; but it may be
doubted, whether the provision adopted
to effect it in tlie Executive Department,
is not too refined for the strong, and I
may add, corrupt passions, which the
Presidential election will ever excite.—
Certain it is, that if the practice of nomi
nating Candidates for the Presidency, by
Conventions constituted as the proposed
shall become the established usage, it will
utterly defeat the intention of theframers
of the Constitution, and would be fol
lowed by aradical aud dangerous change
not only in the Executive Department,
but in the Government itself.
This danger was early foreseen, and
to avoid it, some of the wisest and most
experienced statesmen of former days so
strongly objected to Congressional cau
cuses to nominate candidates for the
Presidency, that they never could be in
duced to attend them; among these it
will be sufficient to name Mr. Macon and
Mr. Lowndes. Others, believing that
this provision of the Constitution was
too refined for practice, were solicitous
to amend it, but without impairing the
influence of the smaller States in the
election. Among these, I rank myself.
With that object, resolutions were intro
duced in 1828, in the senate, by Col.
Benton, and in the House by Mr. Mc-
Duffie, providing for districting the
States, and for referring the election back
to the people, in case there should be no
choice to elect one from the two highest
candidates. The principle which gov
erned in the amendment proposed, was
to give a fair compensation to the small
er States for the surrender of their advan
tage in the eventual choice by the House
and at the same time to make the mode
of electing the President more strictly in
conformity with the principles of our
popular institutions, and to be less liable
to corruption than the existing provision.
They received the general support of the
party, but were objected to by a few, as
not being a full equivalent to the smaller
States. The principle embraced is iden
tical with that on which you proposed to
constitute the Baltimore Convention, but
which has been so dictatorially objected
to by some, who then took so prominent
a part in its favor. If you have not suc
ceeded, there is at least some consolation
in reflecting that if others have since
changed, you now stand where you then
did, in the purer and better days of the
party. I was in favor of it then, as lam
now, not because I consider the resolu
tions as perfect theoretically, as the ex
isting provisions ofthe Constitution, but
because 1 believe it would in practice
more certainly accomplish what the fra
mers ot the Constitution intended. But
while the provision stands as it does, I
would regard myself as little short of a
traitor to that sacred instrument, should
I give my consent directly or indirectly
to any practice, which would have the
effect of divesting the smaller States of
the due weight of which it secures to
them in the Presidential election, wheth
er designed or not. And here let me
add, that as objectionable as I think a
Congressional caucus for nominating a
President, it is in my opinion far less so,
than a Convention constituted as is pro
posed. The former had indeed many
things to recommend it. Jts members
consisting of Senators and Representa
tives, were the immediate organs of the
State Legislature, or the people, were re
sponsible to them, respectively, and were
for the most part, of high character, stan
ding and talents. They voted per capi
ta, and what is very important, they rep
resented fairly the relative strength of
the party in their respective States. In
all these important particulars, it was all
that could be desired for a nominating j
body, aud formed a striking contrast to
the proposed Convention; and yet, it,
could not be borne by the people in the i
then purer days of the Republic. I, act- 1
ing.with Gen. Jackson and most of the :
leaders of the party at the time, contribu- i
ted to put it down, because we believed i
it liable to be acted on and influenced by
the patronage of the Government—an
objection far more applicable to a Con
vention constituted as the one proposed,
than to a Congressional caucus. Far
however was it from my intention, in aid
ing to put that down, to substitute in its
place what 1 regard as a hundred times
more objectionable in every point of
view. Indeed, if there must be an inter
mediate body between the people and the
election, unknown to the Constitution, it
may be well questioned whether a better
than the old plan of a Congressional cau
cus Can be devised.
In taking the ground I have, in favor
of maintaining the right secured to the
smaller States by the compromise of the
Constitution, I am actuated by no parti
san feeling or desire to conciliate their
good opinion. If the case was reversed,
and the rights ofthe larger, instead ofthe
smaller, were invaded, I would with
equal readiness and firmness, stand up in
their defence. lam the partisan of nei
ther one, nor the other, but simply a sup
porter of the Constitution, and what I
believe to be just and fair. I regard the
Constitution, as the only ark of safety for
all, and I believe that in defending' if, I
defend the interest and safety of each
and all—the greater as well ns the small
er. Tlie States invading the right of the
others, ns well as the States whose rights
are invaded.
I have laid down the principle on
which I rest the objection in question,
with the limitation, that the relative j
weight of the States should be maintain
ed, making due allowance for their rela
tive party strength. The propriety of
the limitation is so apparent, that but a
few words, in illustration, will be requi
red. The Convention is a party Con
vention, and professedly intended to take
the sense ot the party, which cannot be
done fairly, if States having but little
party strength, are put on an equality j
with those which have much. If that
were done, the result might be, that a
small portion of the party from States the
least sound, politically, and which could
give but little support in Congress, might
select the candidate, and make the Presi
dent against a great majority of the
soundest and on which the President and
his administration would have to rely for
support. All this is clearly too unfair
and improper to be denied. There may
a great difficulty iu applying a remedy
in a Convention, but 1 do not feel myself
called upon to say how it can be done, or
by what standard the relative strength of
the respective States should be determi
ned ; perhaps the best would be their
relative strength in Congress at the time.
In laying down the principle, I added
the limitation for the suke of accuracy,
and to show how imperfectly the party
must be represented, when it is overlook
ed. I see no provision in the proposed
Convention to meet it.
But, in order to realise how the Con- j
vention will operate, it will be necessary J
to view the combined effects of the objec- j
tions which I have made. Thus view-1
ed, it will be found, that a Convention so I
constituted, tends irresistibly to centrali
zation—centralization of the control over
the Presidential election in the hands of
a few of the central, large States, at first,
and finally, in political managers, office
holders arid office-seekers ; or to express
l NO. 38.
it differently, in that portion of the com
munity, who live, or expect to Jive on the
Government, in contradiction to the
great mass, who expect to live on their
own means, or their honest industry:
and who maintain the Government, and
politically speaking, emphatically the
people.
That such would be the case, may be
inferred from the fact, that it would aft
ford the means to some six or seven
States lying contiguous and not far from
the centre of the Union, to control the
nomination, and through that the elec
tion, by concentrating their united vote*
in the Convention. Give them the pow
er of doing so, and it would not long lie
dormant. W hat may be done by combi
nation, where the temptation is so great,
will be sure ere long to be done.. To
combine and conquer, is not less true as
a maxim, where power is concerned,
than to “ Divide and conquer.” Nothing
is better established, than that the desire
for power can bring together and unite
the most discordant materials.
But the tendency to centralization wilt
not stop there. The appointment of del
egates en masse by State Convention,
would tend, at the same time and even
with greater force, to centralize this con
trol in the hands of the few, who make
politics a trade. The farther the Con
vention is removed from the people, the
more certainly the control over it will be
placed in the hands of the interested few,
and when removed th ree or four degree?,
as has been shown it will be, where the
appointment is by State conventions, the
power of the people will cease, anti the
j seekers of Executive favour will become
j supreme. At that stage, n:i active, train
ed and combined corps will be formed in
the party’ whose whole time and atten
■ bon will be directed to politics. It will
ihe their sole business. Into their hands
the appointments of delegates in nil the
1 stages will fail, and they will take spe
cial care that none hut themselves or
their humble and obedient dependants
shall be appointed. 'l'he central and
State Conventions will be filled by the
most experienced and cunning, and after
nominating the President, they will take
good care to divide the patronage and of
fices, both ofthe General and State Gov
ernments among themselves and their
dependants. But why say will ? Is it
not already the capo? liar c there nut
been many instances of State Conven
tions being filled by office holders and
office seekers, who, after making the
nomination, have div ided the offices in
the State among themselves and their
partisans, and joined in recommending to
the candidate whom they have just nom
inated to appoint them to the offices to
which they have beer, respectively allot
ted. If such be the case in the infancy of
the system, it must end, if such conven
tions should become the established
usage, in the President nominating his
successor. When it comes to that it will
not be long before the sword will take the
place of the Constitution.
Such are my objections to the mode hi
which the proposed Convention is to be
constituted, and my reasons for enter
taining them. They are such, that I
cannot refuse to obey them without re
nouncing the principles which I have
often avowed in public and private, and
which have guidedmethrough the whole
course of my public life.
In coming to this conclusion, I have
not passed over, without careful exomi- -
nation, the reasons assigned by its advo
cates for constituting the Convention as
they propose. They have not diminish
ed the force of rny objections. I pro
pose to notice the most prominent.
That which they have urged with the
greatest confidence, is, that each State
has a right to appoint Delegates as 6he
pleases. I meet if, by utterly deuying
that there is any such right. That each
State has the right to act as it plases, in
whatever relates to itself exclusively, no
one will deny ; but it is a perfectly novel
doctrine, that any State has such a right
when she comes to act in concert with
others in reference to what concerns the
whole. In such cases it is the plainest
dictate of common sense, that whatever
affects the whole should be regulated by
the mutual consent of all, and not by the
discretion of each. That the appoint
ment of Delegates to the proposed con
vention is a case of this description, I
trust I have conclusivelyshown. I have,
I also trust shown more; that the sup
posed right is perfectly deceptive, for
while it claims for each State the right
to appoint Delegates as it pleases, it in
reality gives the larger States the right to
dictate how the others shall appoint—
If, for example, the Empire State, as it is
called, adopts the mode of appointing (as
she has)which willconcentrate her whole!
strength, what direction would she leave
to others, if they go into Convention, but
to appoint as she has appointed, or to Ec
ruled by her. It is then, neithet more
nor less than a claim to dictate, under
the garb of a right, and such its exercise
j has proved in the present case. It has
left no option, but to conform to
| course, or be overruled, or refuse to go
! into the Convention.
I regret this, because! sincerely desire
ito preserve the harmony ofthe party. I
| had strong hope that the rally after the