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AMflllilK iiMOCllf, 'Hie most perfect Government would be that which, emanating directly from the People. Governs le ist — 1 osts least—Dispenses Justice to all. and confers Privileges on None.—BENTHAM. VOL. I.f DR. WM. GREEN-EDITOR. AMERICAN DEMOCRAT, PUBLISHED WEEKLY, IN THE REAR OF J. BARNES' BOOKSTORE. cotton Avenue, macon, ga. AT WO DOLLARS PER ANNUM. tr>- in advance. -cu Rates of Advertising, Ac. "One square, of 100 words, or less, in small type, 75 cents Tor the first insertion, and 50 cents for each subsequent inser’ l ion. All Advertisements containing more than 100 and less than 200 words, will be charged as two squares. To Yearly Advertisers, a liberal deduction will be made. EQr- N. B. Sales of LAND, by Administrators, Executors- Guardians, are required, by law, to be held on the first 'Tuesday in the month, between the hours of 10 in the fore noon, and 3 in the afternoon, at the Court-House in the Coun ty in which the property is situated. Notice of these must be given in a public Gazette, SIXTY DAYS, previous to the •day of sale. .Sales of PERSONA!. PROPERTY, must be advertised in the same manner, FORTY DAYS previous to the day of sale* Notice to Debtors and Creditors of an Estate, must be pub lished FORTY Days. Notice that application will be made to the Court of Ordi tary, for leave to sell LAND, must be published FOUR months. Sales of NEGROES, must be made at public auction, on the firat Tuesday of the month, between the legal hours of pale, at the place of public sales in the county where the let ters testamentary, of Administration or Guardianship, shall have been granted, SIXTY DAYS notice being previously given in one of the public gazettes of this State, and at the door of the Court-House, where such sales ore to be hckl. Notice lor leave to sell NEGROES, must be published for FOUR MONTHS, before any order absolute shall be made thereon by the Court. All business of this nature, will receive prompt attention, at t he Office of the AMERICAN DEMOCRAT. REMITTANCES BY MAIL.—“A Postmaster may en close money in a letter to the publisher of a newspaper, to pay the subscription of a third person, and frank the letter, if written by hitTMelf.” Amoa Kendall< P. MO. COMMUNICATIONS addressed to the EniTon Post Paul Speech of Mr. Stiles, of Georgia. In the House of Representatives, Jan uary 28, and 3D, 1 844. [continued from no. 40.] The course proposed to be pursued by the opponents of the rule, viz: that of; receiving all petitions, is not sustained ; by parliamentary practice; but as we | are referred by the gentleman from New j York, [Mr. B.J ; ‘for instruction to Eng land”—(instruction in humanity and lib- j erty, I suppose,)—let us look iieyond the acts to the motives of Parliament. Lot us see how the resoningof theopponents of this rule corresponds with that ot Par-! liarnent in the rejection of petitions. Hatsell, p. 206, after laying down the ; rule by which petitions were rejected, states : “ The principles upon which tliis rule was adopted appears to be this : that a tax extending in its effect, over every part of the kingdom, and more or less affecting every individual, and in its nature necessarily and intentionally im posing a burden upon the people it can answer no end or purpose whatever, for any set of petitioners to state these cir cumstances as a grievance to the House.” Now, how do the opponents of this rule reason? An institution (slavery) “ex tending in its effect” not beyond the slaveholding Suites, “effecting” no one ont of those limits, and in its nature “im posing no “burdens upon the people,’’yet it may “ answer” an “end” and a “ pur pose” for “a set of petitioners to state” the institution “ asa grievance to the House.” Again, in the next sentence, “the Houce of Commons, before they come to a reso lution which imposes a tax, cannot but know that it may sensibly effect the com merce or manufacture on which the duty is laid ; but they cannot permit the in convenience that maypossiblybe brought upon a particular branch of trade, to weigh with them when put in the bal ance with those advantages which are intended to result to the whole, and which the public necessities of the State demand from them." How, in this re gard, do the advocatesof reception reason here i That Congress cannot but know that slavery, which does not “ affect commerce or manufactures,” nor impair uny “ particular branch of trade,” yet will )>ermit the fanaticism which alone opposes it “ to weigh with them when put in the balance with those ad vantages whirl) are,intended to result to the whole and which the public necessities of the State demand of them. ” In other words, the opponents of this rule reason that, in England, although the petitioners are burdened with taxa tion even to poverty and want their peti tions must be ejected ; while in Ameri ca, where petitioners are but burdened with nothing but their own sickly sensi bilities, their petitions must be rejected , notwithstanding they pray for the dis stretion of a constitution from which they derive unparalleled liberty and happiness. And what is still more strange, the rejec tion of the former (according to the posi tion of the gentleman fiom Massachusetts) is no infringement of the right of petition, while a rejection of the latter is a total annihilation ot this great “inherent and inalienable right.” The most objectsionable feature of this “odious rule,” (as lie is pleased to term it,) the gentleman from Massachusetts thinks ls that which undertakes “to prescribe the subjects upon which the people may or may not petition.” This feature he denounces a§ being “atwar with tire constitution and in opposition to all par liamentary rule.’ The rule contended for only prescribes DEMORATIC BANNCER FREE TRADE; LOW DUTIES; NO DEBT; SEPARATION FROM BANKS; ECONOMY; RETRENCHMENT; AND A STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION.—./. C. C.tLiiOUJW that petitions aimed against the constitu tion shall not be received. That such a feature is not at war with the constitu tion, I will soon attempt to show ; but at present while upon parliamentary prac tice, I would inquire whether such a fea ture, even to the extent for which the gentleman contends, is “ in opposition to all parliamentary rule.” Not to proceed farther, the very parliamentary rule to which I have had occasion to refer pro vides that petition against duties shall not be received. Now, I ask the gentle man from Massachusetts, whether that is not an undertaking, on the part of Parliament, “to prescribe the subject upon which the people may or may not petition.” [Here the Speaker announced that the morning hour had expired.] JANUARY 30. The Report of the Select Committee on the Rules again coming up— Mr. Stiles resumed and concluded his remarks as follows : When I last addressed the House, be fore concluding, I had shown, by refer ence to Ilatsell’s parliamentary Prece dents that petitions against taxes were rejected by Parliament. Now, sir, as we are referred to England for the rule of our conduct, upon what principle was it that petitions against taxes were always rejected in England ? It was that taxes were necessary for the support of govern ment. But 1 ask, sir, if nothing besides taxes are neeessary for the support of government? Are not national faith and national honor necessary for the sup port of government. Can any govern ment in the world last a moment without them. Caw dollars and cents be placed in the scale against faith and honor.— Are not the faith and honor of the nation pledged upon the subject of slavery.— Won'd the slavebolding States ever have entered the Union—would our southern i father ever have the constitution, unless their rights had been secured by that in strument shall, instead of protecting, plunder them of their property. Yes, sir, slavery and the constitution have flour ished together; their existence is the same, and inseparable; and if folly and madness shall destroy the one, the other j will follow it to the tomb. But to return to the argument from which I have de viated, to reply to the gentleman from Massachusetts. Parliament lhaveshown were in the constant practice of rejecting \ petitions. The intelligent framers of the constitution were familliar with this fact; and in guarding our country against the evils of such legislation as the riot acts, in protecting the great right of petition, their omission to provide that petitions should be received, tsevidence irresistible and conclusive, that the reception of pe titions was never intended to be embraced in the amendment, or comprehended un der the right of petition. According to the letter of the constitution, this rule is not a violation of that instrument, be cause no law is passed or contemplated. According to its spirit, it is not violated, because (lie object of the amendment was simply to prevent the passage of such acts as those of George, Ist, and Charles ! the 2d; and because the practice of re jectingpetitions was common in England familiar to the authors of the amendment, ; and not provided against by them. It is not a violation of the constitution, then. It is a violation of the right of petition. But instead of searching the constitution, in order to ascertain what are the rights of petition, strange to tell, we must, as the gentleman from New York, says, throw- the constitution aside, and go back to England, to the British Parliament, to the bill of rights, which grew out of the revolution of 1688. A citizen of America the freest country in the world, (ns the gentleman from North Carolinaobserved) run away from his own country, and ilee to England for his freedom ! I leave the gentleman from New York to reeon cile himself with the gentleman from North Carolina, his associate in feeling on the subject. 1 leave him to explain to that member how it is that a citizen of the freest country in the world can throw aside the constitution of his country, can seek a cover for his rights, a shelter for his liberties, behind the acts of a British Parliament. But why should we go back for in struction to England 1 as the gentleman from New York said. Is there any analogy between either the government or the people of England and our own l In England all power is in the govern ment. Hero it is in the people. There ; the Parliament, humanly speaking, isom-' uipotent. Here, our Congress is limited in its powers to a few specified subjects, marked out and defined by a written constitution. In Great Britain, the so vereign holds his office independent of the people; and so do the members of the House of Lords. If arbitrary and unjust laws are instituted by the govern ment, the people, however unanimous against them, have no remedy but in an humble petition for theirubolition. Here the members of the government are di rectly responsible to the people,. hold their offices subject to the popular will, and, if unfaithful to their trusts, they are turned out, and more faithiul servants chosen in their places. It results, there fore, that whilst, in monarchical govern ments. the right to petition the rulers is MACON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1844. the highest, or ultimate right of the sub ject iu securing him from molestation at the hands of his government, here the right dwindles into comparative insignifi cance ; being only a right to petition our own servants to do that which we may command them to do, or discharge them for not doing. In short, in England the people are listened to only when they speak in the humble tone of petition. In America they will be heard, through the authoritive voice of instruction. • What does this right of petition em brace 7 What would they have ? The right peaceably to assemble. Do we pro pose to disturb that right? No. The right to prepare a petition. Do we pro pose to prevent them ? No. The right to present that petition to this Ixidy. l)o we oppose that right ? No, sir, the ques tion has not been fairly met. Gentlemen argue as though we denied the right of petition. We make ne such denial.— We are as warm advocates of the right of petition as any persons on this floor. We know the importance of that right, and would not touch it. We are willing that gentlemen shall exercise the right to as full an extent, at least, as it is en joyed in England/ (for th.a seems to be the summit of their ambition ;) but we come to issue with them as to limits and extent of that right ? What are the limits and extent of that .light ? There must be some point at which the right of petition ends, and that of legislating by this body commences. Where does the right of petition end ? Just where that of legislation commences. Legislation cannot go backand interfere with petition; nor can petition extend forward and in terfere with legislation. The right of legislation commences the moment the House is informed of the petition. It they have a right to go one step farther, and say we shall receive, they have just as much right to say we shall refer, and we shall grant. Theaction of the I louse —the right of legislation—commences with the presentation of the peiitiou , and the refusal to accept is no interference with that assembling ; we do not dictate the manner in which they shall prepare a petition ; or how they shall present it to this body, But, when they have as sembled ; when they hare prepared the petition ; when they have presented it to this House, when, in short, their right has been fully exercised and completely exhausted, —theriitis that our right com mences ; and as, we have not interfered with them, we should not permit them to interfere with us to usurp the legisla tive powers of the country, and dictate to us the mode and manner in which our duties shall be performed. But, (says the gentleman from North Carolina,) the petition should be received, “ in order to know what it is the petition ers want.” We undertake, (says the member from Maine,) by the refusal of the petition, “to prejudge the case and “ condemn them unheard.” Here is another step where gentlemen reason unfairly. They assume, as a starting point upon 'which to found an argument, that we have never seen, rend, or heard the petition. Now, sir, if this be reasoning, gentlemen have forgotten the very first rule in logic. They have failed to prove their promises. It is true, in point of fact, that we are unacquainted with the objects of the petition ? Is there a member here who can rise in his place and say that lie does “ not know what the petitioners want ?” Have they not been presented beyond number for years past ? Has not Congress beard, considered, discussed, and determined, that they cannot entertain jurisdiction of the subject? And yet it impairs the o-reat right of petition, it treats the ap plicant disrespectfully, for Congress, by this rule, to assert that they have heard and determined that they have no juris diction over the subject. Will gentle- j men inform me upon what principles such an answer—the judgment of the House as to its jurisdiction (for that is the whole sum and substance of the rule) —can be construed into disrespect to wards the petitioners? Let gentlemen consider such conduct, if it had occurred in private instead of public life. An individual presents you j with* a petition to-day, and you inform him that you have no power to grant his prayer ; to-morrow he renews his appli cation, and receives the same answer, but not satisfied with refusal after refusal, he continues to harms* you with his ap plications, until at length, worn out by his importunities, yoti adopt a rule that you will not, in future, receive his ap j plications; will any one, the most fas tidious sav that the adoption- of such a rule is treating the petitioner with disre spect ? But step übove the walks of pri vate life, and enter the places of power ; and is the prinoiple of action changed ? Visit your courts of law ; you find a plaintiff has brought an action for an a mount, or of a nature, beyond or out of the jurisdiction of the court. A plea is filed ; what is the reply of the judge ? The court has no jurisdiction of the case. Has such an answer ever been consider ed as disrespectful ? Go still higher; enter the courts of chancery. A com plainant has filed a bill which, taking every word of it to be true, presents no cast' for relief; a demurrer is offered by tjicdefendnot.whiyli, admitting all that the bill alleges, denies his right to come into court; and the chancellor sustaining the demurrer, dismisses the complainant without proof or inquiry. Has such a course ever been deemed as wanting in respect? and is the legislative power of the country to be stripped of a like au thority ? This rule is in the nature of a simple plea to the jurisdiction or demur rer in chancery; and can no more be coupled with disrespect than either of those modes of judicial proceeding. But “we prejudge the case.” “We condemn them unheard.” - What do gen tlemeti mean ? Am Ito understand that the petitions have never been read ? They have been read over and cfver again whilst before the Question of reception is put, the petition can always be read upon the call of any member of the House. It is meant, by not being heard, that these petitions have never been discussed ? They have been discussed in this hall to the fullest extent for weeks, and even months, whilst the question of reception not only admits discussion, but admits it in the most ample manner. Gentlemen argtte nfc tliofigh we had no right, for any cause, or under any cir cumstances, to reject a petition. Is the right limitahle? Arc there no bounds to its exercise ? If so, we might as well stop btrsiness. If the undefltiable griev ances of every man, woman and child ! white, black,or parti-colored, throughout our widely extended country, whose di gestive organs may have become impair ed, and who has therefore ‘Men thousand ills that flesh is heir to,” to complain of. if the conceits of every fanatic oV fool, when embodied in the form of a petition, are entitled, on that account alone, to con sideration and respect—we might devote our whole time of legislation to petitions alone ; we remain here from one years end to another ; we might sit from morn to night, and right to morn, and our la bors would never know an end. The right illimitable! Is every petition, however disrespectful to this body to be received 1 Is there any one who, in his zeal for the freedom of petition, goes that far? 1 presume not. There is then, some limit to that right. We have the power to reject; the right to refuse is Conceded. And is not this rejection an abridgement of the great right of petition? Oh no ! And why? Because it would be an interference with the dignity of our honorable selves, and be perhaps an interruption of the business of tins House. This great inherent and inalienable right cannot stand, then, when brought into contact with ourdignity or otW business. These are to'be rejected: but all others are to be received. These petitions may be as disrespectful as their authors please to our constituents or our States ; but so as they do not touch our noble selves, they are to be revived. They may treat with contempt the constitution of the country, and trample oh ift chartered rights : hut so as they do not impede ottr business here, they are to be received.— From whence did we obtain our dignity? Are we in a monarchial government and was it born with us? No sir. It was derived from the people, yet we would reject a petition here, disrespectful to ourselves, who are the servant : but re ceive one insulting to, and defamatory of, the people who are the masters. Whence do we derive our powers of legislation ? From the constitution : and we would reject a petition impeding our legislation, and yet receive one violative of the con stitution, from whence all our powers of legislation are derived, and upon which the welfare of the country depends.— The right illimitable? Then where the necessity of that ruleof this House which : makes it incumbent on the introducer ot give a statement of the contents of the petition? Where the necessity of a statement,unless its object be to determine whether or not Congress has jurisdiction over the subject. If there be no discre tion, where the necessity of that other i rule which requires the question of recep tion to be put. Where the necessity of a question at all, if we are prohibited from | voting, or answering in the negative? The right of petition involves two con siderations : Ist. The right of the citizen aggrieved to petition : 2d. The powerof the government over the subject of the jietition. 1. Then the citizen must be aggriev- ; ed before he can petition. The only petitions excluded by ibis rule are those upon the subject of slavery. Is a majority of this House prepared to pronounce slavery a grievance? Can an institution recognived and secured by the constitution be a grievance ? Arc they prepared to pronounce the cotistitu- , tion(foritis the. constitution) a grievance? 1 Was it the intention of the constitution or the people? The same constitution which guaranties the right ot petition j guaranties the existence of slavery.— Cun one portion of the constitution be used to destroy another? Could the framers of the constitution have been guilty of such an absurdity as to have given the people a right to jietition against The instrument which they had formed for their welfare and happiness ? Can they be chargeable with the folly of creat ing and sanctioning a grievance, when they have conferred tl»e right of* petition ing against such eviis ? In ’short, can anything iu the constitution be consider ed such a g.ievance as the people are al lowed to petition against? No, sir ; by no sane and unprejudiced man can the existence of slavery lie considered a grievance in the contemplation of the constitution. But again. 11 hose grievances does the constitution contemplate should be the subject of the (icliticfti? Certainly those of the petitioners—the grievances of the pelitioneis themselves, and not those of any other body or person. Will any gentleman on this floor attempt to show how slavery at the South is a grie vance to those ot the North. How can thzy ask us to consider as a grievance that which those who are alone concern ed neither know nor acknowledge?— There aie those, doubtless, at the North, if not in this hall, who look upon slave ry in the abstract as an evil f but is it therefore a grievance ? I call upon anv constitutional lawyer on this floor, and more especially the strict constructionist, to say that it is such a grievance as was contemplated by the authors of the Ist amendment of the constitution. 2. 'Fbe power of the government over the subject of the petition. What is the object which petitioners profess to have m view in the presenta tion of petitions ? What is the end to be attained, and upon which Congress can alone recognise their right of application. It is redress. And a grievance which Congress has no right to redress, they have no right to petition against; be cause grievances which Congress Can redress, are the grievances, and the only grievances, contemplated in the amend ment. Now, if there is a single constitutional principle which, more than any other, may be considered as settled beyond the possibility of dispute, it is that tire insti tution of slavery is municipal, not nation al. It belongs exclusively to the Spates, and can only be effected by State legis lation. This domestic institution of the South is her own. It was brought into the Union with her; secured by the compact which makes us one people; and he who looks upon it as a grievance is an enemy to the constitution, and opposed to the peace and prosperity of our com mon country. I have thus attempted to show that slavery is not a grievance. If it were a grievance at all, it is not one effecting the people of the North ; and that il it were a grievance affecting the people of tlie North, it is not one wliidh cun be re dressed by the government; and there fore no one has a constitutional right to petition for its abolition. A petition to any person or authority presupposes the power of relief A right of petition can not exist where there is no ditty to hear the complaint; and the duty to hear can not exist without a commensurate power to redress. There is. then, no duty to receive a petition upon which Congress lias indisputably no power to act; and the refusal to receive such petition cannot be tortured'" into a violation of the right to send it, which never existed'. Many points have been made on this question which I could have desired an opportunity to have met, but which, tfh dbr the operation of the hour rule, 1 ain reluctantly constrained to omit. Were it not for this abridgement of mv great inherent and inalienable right “freedom of speech” and of debate, I should have made it my duty to have replied to every suggestion which has been advanced: for there is not one which I have heard, which could not, in my opinion, have 1 tecn easily and triumphantly answered. But although deprived of this great right, I shall not, like some gentlemen on this floor, flee to England for my right ; or like others, speak of dissolving the Un ion. I will not even waste my important time in the indulgence of complaint, but with all possible despatch proceed to an swer such as I conceive the most impor tant suggestions. It is said on this floor, “ let thd peti tions be received, and they will vote with us for their rejection immediately'after reception.” To such I say, there is one point in which we agree; and that the most important oi the whole matter. It is in the refusal or denial of the - prayer of the petitioner. Reception is all that di vides us. But I ask, does not reception carry with it jurisdiction over the sub ject-matter of the petition ? Docs not re ception carry the implication, inevitably, that the petition may or may not be gran ted ? Reception either carries the impli cation, or it does not. The proposition must be answered affirmatively or nega tively. If it be answered affirmatively, it the reception carries jurisdiction over the subject of slavery, if it carries the impli cation that tike prayer for its aliolition j may or may not be grauted, are they wil ling to stand forth as the advocates of re ; ception? Clearly not ; because, in the outset, they agree that the prayer could not lie granted, because, if Congress ! would, she has not the power to grant it. ! If then, reception carries jurisdiction, they arc opposed to it. II on the other hand, the proposition lie answered nega tively, if reception does not carry juris ! diction, and the implication that the pray- I er may or may not be granted, where is 1 the use of it ? Where the difference be- J NO. 44; tween reception, and instant rejection al ter it is received ? What is to be gained by reception? Is it any advantngp.lq the petitioner, that his prayer is fejectcd immediate!y after, instead of immediate ly before , reception. llow does the sim ple, naked vote of reception benefit him? The prayer of a petition is its vital pajt ; lake away the prayer, and you deprive it of all vitality—make it a dead letter. If, therefore, we reject the prayer, do We not reject the petition ? The distinction is too refined and abstract for a question of such universal and vital importance. It is but a dispute about terms, and whol ly overlooks the substance. It is at first and at last a rejection of the prayer of the petition ; but a refusal of the petition' is a rejection in a mode to save time and money, put an end to such applications, and prevent discussions dangerous to fho Union. , m The gentleman from New York has admitted, that when petitions asked Con gress to interfere between master and slave in the States, they stood on ground prohibited by the Constitution : but went on to argue that petitions should Ix3 re ceived when they asked an abolition .of slavery in the District, because “Con gress had full power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.” “ They may pay the master or not, but they can take the slave compulsorily from him.” 1 have not the time, if I possessed the,.in clination, to argue this point. It does not necessarily arise in meeting the dis cussion upon which gentlemen have laid most stress in the debate—viz: an abridg ment of the petition ; hut, as the opinion; is asserted with so much confidence, and in jsuch wild terms, 1 will throw out a few difficulties in the way, which have occurred to my mind, and which 1 think are calculated to stagger any reflecting man. “ Congress may pay the master or not, but it can take compulsorily the slave from him;” and the only author' ty lor this sweeping and despotic decla ration is simply that clause which gives to Congress “ exclusive legislation” over the District. Sir, did the cessions by Virginia and Maryland of portions ol their respective territory to Congress to constitute the District, remove the inhab itants of those portions beyond the guar anties of the constitution ? Clearly nos. How, then, does the gentleman propose to get rid of that portion of the sth amendment of the constitution, which provides that “ no person shall he depri ved of life, or jtrnper/i/, without due pro cess of litre ami tli.rt private property shall not l«3 taken' for public use without due compensation ?” That the legisla tion of this I lul l is not a “ process of law” will not be disputed, and it is equally clear that slaves are “property;” they are recognised as property by the consti tution, claimed as property by our irea > ties with foreign powers, and considered as property by onr acts of legislation.— Again “ private property shall not beta j I?bn (except) for public use.” It would he somewhat difficult, 1 apprehend, to es tablish, that the emancipation of the slaves of this District would be for the “public use” and benefit; and should they be so considered, could they lie ta ken “ compulsorily” from the master “ wish or without paying” him, as the 1 gentleman from New York says? No, sir, not “ without due compensation.”— And when the member has disposed of these difficulties, under what clause of the constitution will tie derive funds to be appropriated to such nil object ? We are told that “ Congress has exclusive le gislation over” the “ District;” but does “ exclusive ” mean unlimited—“ abso lute 7” as the gentleman from Massachu setts, [Mr. Hudson] says? From what dictionary or other source did he learn that “ exclusive ” meant ‘ absolute V’ — And yet it must not only signify abso lute, but also despotic power, or the posi tion of the gentleman from New York falls to the ground. Hut how will any reasonable man (not to take a constitu tional lawyer) construe that clause? It means, and can be made to signify no thing more than a grant of legislative power over the District to the exclusion, “in all cases whatsoever,” of any concnr renfjurisdiction If this most palpable construction needed support, the history of the clause would amply furnish it.— That clause qf the Ssh section of the Ist article was not comprised in the original draft of the constitution, but it was after wards supplied, when its necessity be came apparent, from the circumstances which occurred during the latter part of the revolutionary war, when the procee dings of Congress were disturbed by a turbulent mob, which the police ot Phil adelphia being unable to sul due, compel led that body to remove its sittings to Trenton, New Jersey. That power was conferred for. the single purpose of bling Congress to protect its members from insult and violence, and to conduct without interruption, the deliberations of this country. From whence did Con gress derive its powers of legislation over this District? From the Constitution, together with the “cessions of particular States.” Could th cessions of territory by particular States have enlarged the powers of Congre s under the Constitu tion 7 Sure not How then cun she now prv ume to abo isii slavery ! Ihe ’power ot Congress over the subject ol