About Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920 | View Entire Issue (Feb. 22, 1918)
4 THE. SEMI-WEEKLY JOURNAL ATLANTA. GA.. 5 NORTH FX»KSYTH ST.-- "'I Entered at the Atlanta Post office as Mail Matt* •of the Second Class. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE Twelve months “*”*4nc Six months „r,*. ! Three months • • • ’ ‘ | The Semi-Weekly Journal is published Tuesday and Frida?, and is mailed by the s or est routes for early delivery. It contains news from all over the brousht bv special leased wires into our o 1 It has a staff of distinguished contributors. strong departments of special value to the o »- and the farm. Agents wanted at every postoffice. commission allowed. Outfit free. " rite BRADLEY. Circulation Manager. The onlv traveling representatives y e are R F. Bolton. C. C. Coyle. Charles H. Wood liff. J. M. Patten. W. H. Reinhardt, M. H. Be »i and John Mac Jennings. We will be responsible i onl? for money paid to the above named tra>ei | ing representatives. • . k NOTICE TO SUBSCRIBE RS. Tlw label naed for add-ins yoor fcj! jmit aubwrtptMß erptrea. By renewing at Iraat two for tbo date < a tbU la I*l. you insure re « ui * r „,’^ i s*’ r o In on -rtrg par*r <-Mnc<M. be sure to mention your old. well a« your «-w ‘ “we -annet enter »üb«-rtpttom to begin with hart K-mittanee. ,bouM be sent by ?-«! ™ THK sddww' all orders and notice* for .this Department to SEMI WVEKI.Y JOVRSAL. Atlanta. Ga. B ♦ SB The Journal’s Service Hag In Honor of the Sixty Atlanta Journal Men •in the Service of Their Country. The Peril and the H rong of Waste. The Athens Herald observes that while it is hard for Americans to learn to save, it is still harder for them to learn not to waste. It is be cause of habitual wastefulness, not in money alone but in food also and in necessaries of all kinds, that so many persons find their first steps toward saving awkward and difficult. Wastefulness is bad enough of itself, but even more deplorable than the material ills to which it leads is the men tal and moral inertia of which it is a symptom. The man who wastes money in these times is either ex ceedingly stupid or is guilty of downright indif ference to his family's and his country’s welfare. The woman who wastes food materials is sorely lacking either in sense or patriotism. Right minded and right-hearted people will no more waste the nation’s sinews of war than a true sol dier would sleep on sentry duty. Once supplant the mental and moral careless ness. which is the real cause of wastefulness, with alertness to self-interest and to duty, and there will be no difficulty in acquiring the savings habit. None but the hopelessly dense-minded will fail to realize, if they pause to think at all. that saving is now imperative both as a matter of patriotism and of individual security. Unless the rank and file of the American people save money for buying Thrift stamps and Liberty bonds, the Government will not have sufficient funds for winning the waF, and unless they conserve the food supply so that there will be a surplus of grain and meat to send our Allies, we may find ourselves reduced to a single handed fight against the Huns. However times may be after the war, whether prosperous or ad verse. the man who has Liberty bonds or War Sav ings certificates will have a valuable protection against misfortune and a valuable aid to oppor tunity. Every man. every woman and every child in America should save, if only a dime or a penny a week. The important thing is to get the habit. Then the results both in material benefit and in character-building will follow, unfailingly and with surprising speed. Our One Great Task. ’ “The task for us,’’ said Secretary Baker, in speaking of bow profitless it is to speculate on the nearness or remoteness of. peace, “the task ror us is to put forth every effort for a successful conduct of the war; our thoughts should be cen tered on this purpose, and the' other things will take care of themselves.’’ This is a peculiarly seasonable and wholesome truth. We are now at a stage of the war where all predictions save those of a general and ulti mate nature are little better than mere guesses. With firm and reasonable faith we can say that in the end the Allies will win; and in the very uncertainty and tenseness of the present we feel the oncoming of decisive events. But as for the outcome of the Russian perplexity or the likeli hood of a separate peace with Austria or the < hances of a -revolution in Germany or the prob able day of Hindenburg's expected drive in the West or any other of the numerous riddles that flit like will-o’-the-wisps on the future’s dark verge, one man’s conjecture is about as good as another's. It is certain, however, that we can not afford for one moment to depend on Russian or Austrian contingencies to bring German militarism to the point where it can be crushed, nor upon discon tent and disaffection among the Kaiser’s subjects. True, there are signs of divergence between the Teuton allies, and it appears at this juncture that Germany is little better off in the Russian situa tion than before the Brest-Litovsk parleys—if in deed she is not considerably worse off. It will not be surprising if developments in these directions aggravate the political and social unrest already mamrest among the German people. But no com petent observers see more than a possibility of Austria's breaking from the Hohenzollerns any time soon or of internal conditions in Germany becoming actually revolutionary before the ordeal of another winter sets in. There is just one way by which we can make these possibilities more definite and hasten their maturing. That is by continuing to hammer the Huns with all the strength we can muster. It is well enough to maintain an offensive in diplomacy "as well as in arms; each of President Wilson’s trenchant statements of our war aims has strengthened the Allied cause and weakened the enemyßut from the most dependable accounts ’ we can gather, it is evident lhat the majority of the people of Germany, war-wearied though they . are, still believe stanchly in the Kaiser and still ■ cling to their faith in ultimate victory for Prus aianism. Not until that faith is crushed at the battle front will the way be clear for a powerful emergence of the latent and subdued liberalism of the German masses. Heretofore they have found the policy of lheir militarists materially ! profitable, as in 1870, when France was robbed | of Alsace-Lorraine, in the present instance the j militarists point convincingly to their conquest I and possession ot.the richest portions of Europe. I That argument must be shattered before either i the German Government or the German people will be in a mood to accept such terms as justice and enduring peace demand. So, then, the one groat truth and the one. I great task for America today is, as Secretarv Baker declares, “to put forth every effort for a successful conduct of the war.” This applies no less to the rank and file of our people than to the army and navy. Indeed, it is upon the mil lions in the homes, in the fields and factories and in all provinces of industry and business that the task of the successful conduct of the war now rests most urgently. For it is to these that the Government looks for that material and moral support without which the utmost valor and sac rifice of our soldiers would be unavailing. By conserving food, by saving money for Thrift stamps and Liberty bonds, by supporting the divers agencies that are working for the soldiers’ and sailors’ welfare, by living each day's life in active and cheerful loyalty to the nation's cause, the men and women at home will be striking for victory. That is the best thing they can do to hasten the coming of peace, and the only thing. ——————— - Where is the old-time weather prophet who predicted a ripsnorter in February? The Lesson From Russia. i • The world has learned to be very chary of all predictions, however seemingly well-founded, con cerning kaleidoscopic Russia. What a day or an hour may bring forth in that betrayed and bewil dered country, none can tell —least of all, we im agine, those who are in the thick of the crowding action. Messrs. Lenine and Trotzky may or may not be surprised at the upshot of their yellow ad venture. Whether or not there has been method in their madness (German method, that Is to say), they and their deluded followers now witness the result of forsaking good friends and dallying with an unscrupulous enemy. The Lenine-Trotzky plan of overcoming Prus sianism was to denounce England, and America as ’’capitalistic,” repudiate Russia’s national debts, embark upon a course of property confiscation, demobilize the army and enter into a conference with German autocracy for a separate peace. A wondrously cunning plan, their admirers said, which soon would bring the Kaiser to terms by be stirring the Teuton Socialists to make common cause with the Russian Bolsheviki. Happily for Russia’s future if not for her dark present, the Bolsheviki are, not her only people and their obsessions not her only ideas. If. as official reports indicate, the Lenine-Trotzky Gov ernment has signed or purposes to sign peace on terms of complete and slavish surrender, it will not be surprising if Russia sweeps into revolution far redder than that which engulfed the Czar. Cer tainly it is unthinkable that a people with any sense of rfational honor or any love of justice and freedom will submit without, a protest to the shame which Bolsheviki folly and German craft have brought upon them. Regardless of what happens in uncertain Rus sia, however, the effect has been discounted as far as the military interests of the Allies on the Western front are concerned. Even if the Ger mans have things entirely their own way from Petrograd to the Ukraine, they will not be able to transfer to the West an appreciably larger number of troops than the Allies already have calculated upon meeting and are prepared to counter. But there is one palpable lesson and warning that we should note well. The Russians ventured into a peace conference with the German militarists upon assurances that the latter would negotiate upon the principle of no annexation and no indem nities. Kaiser Wilhelm’s envoys and Emperor Karl’s envoys gave the Russian delegates a solemn promise to that effect before the Brest-Litovsk parleys were fairly under way. But no sooner had proceedings reached a critical stage thar the Germans dropped all pretense of conciliation and flung their tyrannous demands brutally in the Rus sians' face. A surrender of all her Baltic prov inces and ports and the payment of four billion dollars of indemnity—that is what Russia gets from peace parleys with a still victorious Ger many. America and her Allies, as they value their , freedom and their honor, dare not enter into a discussion of peace with their enemy until Prus sianism’s death blow has been dealt. Increasing Georgia Land Values. There are cheering evidences of fresh activity and advancing values in the sale of agricultural lands in Georgia. The Wiregrass Farmer cites from its territory a number of instances of land prices having doubled since last autumn. Sixty and eighty dollars an acre are now considered cheap for farm sites which would have fetched only thirty dollars an acre a few seasons ago, while purchases at upwards of a hundred dollars an acre are growing continually more frequent. These increases are attributable partly, of course, to the soaring prices of foodstuffs and other farm products. With a worldwide shortage of these necessities and a likelihood of its con tinuing for some years to come regardless of how soon the w-ar ends, there is naturally a keener interest in farm investments. But there is an older and deeper cause for the enhancing value of rural lauds In this State: it is the far-reaching systematic improvement in agricultural methods which has been going forward for years past. If there had been no breaking away from the tyranny of the one-crop plan, no advance in diver sification. no adoption of scientific methods w-hich make for soil-building, there would have come no such increase in values as we now witness. An equally potent factor has been the extension and improvement of highways, the development of the common school system and the enrichment of the domestic and social side of rural life. All these’ agencies and influences are prosperity-mak ers. It is by fostering them that we shall assure a continued advance in the value and develop ment of farm lands and in the general business activity which that bestirs. THE ATLANTA SEMI-WEEKLY JOURNAL, ATLANTA, GA. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 2'2, 1918. SENATOR SMITH DISCUSSES COTTON PRICE FIXING To the Editor of The Semi-Weekly Journal: I i have received so many letters from my friends | throughout the state, inquiring about the effort to I fix a maximum price on cotton, asking my opinion as to whether any such legislation would pass, and what would be its effect, that I wish to answer through your columns. 1 have always believed that the price at which cotton sold largely determined, the prosperity of all classes of people in Georgia, and I have studied the problems involving the marketing of cotton and the influences helping or hindering a good price, with a view of being prepared to render such service to my fellow citizens as this knowledge might make possible. You are aware that one of the great influences which for a long time depressed the price of cotton was the New York cotton exchange. The price lists of the New York cotton ex change. running over almost the entire year, .are published all over the world where cotton is bought and sold, and these price lists have largely been accepted as the correct estimate of what would be the market value of lint cotton. They have had a tremendous effect for many years upon the price at which the farmer sold his cotton. I found that the system of selling cotton on the New York exchange allowed the seller to deliver* a very inferior character of cotton, although he had sold upon the exchange middling cotton, and with this inferior cotton the seller was allowed to pay a difference way below the actual market differ ence, thus enabling him to force down the price upon the exchange without any fear of being called upon for a genuine delivery. As soon as 1 came to the senate I began an effort to force the New York cotton exchange to do a legitimate business. We succeeded in passing a bill which since the spring of 1915 has compelled sellers of cotton upon exchanges to make a contract by* - which they forced to deliver cotton practical ly equal to middling cotton, and to pay the actual market difference between what they did deliver and middling cotton. This has removed one of the most, injurious influences by which the price of cot ton in former years has been depressed, and is worth one hundred million dollars annually to our southern cotton growers. THEN CAME THE WAR When the war came upon us in 1914 we were just ready to market the biggest crop we have ever raised. We were selling over sixty per cent of our cotton across the water. These markets were cut off by the lack of American ships, by German raid ers attacking English ships, and by other influences which interfered with the transportation of the cot ton to places where it was needed. I began on October 22d. and from that time on have sought to open up and keep open all foreign markets, that the demand for cotton might be brought to bear and cause it to bring the highest price which demand applied to supply would causa. In the fall of 1914 I urged the passage of a bill, not to validate the price of cotton, but to permit the government to buy five million of bales up to ten cents a pound, and hold it until such time as it could be sold for more than ten cents, together with the cost to the government of buying and sell ing It. I was unable to pass this bill, receiving the support of only three men outside of the cotton growing states. If this bill had passed you would have received over ten cents a pound for cotton in 1914 and our government would have made mil lions of dollars on what it bought. Finally, however, in the spring of 1915, we got the markets of the world pretty well opened, and by further agitation of the subject during 1915 What the World Expects of Us. The important part played by the United States in the war plans and operations of the Al lies is interestingly attested by Premier Lloyd George’s statement iVi the House of Commons that the policy finally agreed upon by the council at Versailles was determined largely by “the strong logical representations which the American dele gates submitted.” That policy, it should be noted, calls for *a larger measure of military co-ordina tion among the Allied forces than heretofore has been considered feasible; it looks to a welding of the British, the French, the Italian and the American swords into a single gigantic blade, wielded as if by a single will against the common foe. Each army, of course, will keep its national distinctiveness, and there will be no supreme com mand vested in one General. But there w ill be an Allied council fully and constantly advised con cerning conditions in all armies, on all fronts, and empowered to make speedy decisions on military problems of a far-reaching and urgent nature. This plan, which bids fair to remedy what has been the chief weakness in Allied strategy, had aroused much controversy and though frequently urged during the last two years had always been compromised or deferred. It was finally, as the British Prime Minister declares, the weight of American influence that settled the issue and settled it right. The people of the United States should be proud of the potent part which their Government and their leaders are playing in the world war and should realize at the same time the vast re sponsibility which they themselves are called upon to bear. No tinge of vainglory or boastfulness should ever creep into their attitude, for much is rightly expected of a country whose sinews are fresh for the fight, whose material wealth is al most measureless and whose own interests are as vitally at stake as those of Belgium or France or Italy or England. Strange, indeed, would America be, and false to all her ideals, if she did not pour into this struggle between civilization and the Huns all the power of her immense re sources and all the earnestness of her freedom loving soul. It is important, however, that we understand how much depends on our resources and our effort. Not only must American soldiers furnish the man-power that will swing the waver ing balance to victory on the Western front, but American farmers must produce and American housewives conserve the food stores that are so imperatively needed to keep the wolf from the door of our Allies. Further. American workmen must turn out the ships without which our three thousand-mile line of communication will break down. American savings must buy the Liberty bonds and Thrift stamps without which the up keep of our army and fleet would be impossible. It is by American bayonets that the war’s final, victory-bringing blow must be struck; and it is by American loyalty and sacrifice that our fight ing arm must be sinewed and nerved for that heroic task. Our Allies look confidently to us for decisive aid. They accept the judgment of our leaders on questions of supreme moment, as is evidenced by the Versailles war council. This is a tremendously responsible as well as a tremendously inspiring role for our conntry. Let us see to it that the part is played well, not simply in the larger scenes where a few great figures stand forth, but in the daily spirit and conduct of the people through which, after all, the nation’s character is most truly revealed. One flock of robins doesn’t make spring, but it brings it several days closer. we were able during the fall of 1915 to get prices equal to those at which cotton sold before the war. Sincp the war the world has consumed two million more bales of cotton than the world has produced and the crop raised last year went upon the market with the further fact well known that last year's production was between one and two million bales less than the consumption of the year previous. BEARS IN THE MARKET. We were confronted all through last year with efforts to s'trike potton down. Parties interested so buy it tried to put cotton in the first embargo list, believing thereby to stop its rise and force it down. I, among others, succeeded in preventing cotton from being put in the first embargo list. Later on northeastern spinners issued an address to the war trades board, claiming that cotton was being shipped in large quantities to Germany, and being used to make powder to kill our American soldiers. They demanded that an embargo be put on cotton shipments to prevent its reaching Ger many. They claimed in their publication that over four million of bales had gone to Germany, and the inference of their publication was that this amount was going yearly. In view of the wide publicity of these claims I did not deem it advisable to resist the effort to put an embargo on cotton when the second embargo list was announced. I believed that, we would be prejudiced by appearing to act selfishly, and that it would be difficult under such circumstances to meet the claim that we were furnishing the powder to Germany to kill our own boys, although I knew’ as a matter of truth that Germany was getting none of our <*otton. and that Germany had abandoned using cotton to make powder at least two years before that. time. So cotton was put uj the second embargo list, and at once these same interested parties who wished to depress the price of cotton to twelve cents a pound began circulating a report that an immense market had been cut off by the embargo, and that, therefore, the supply would exceed the demand. A number of us exposed upon the floor of the senate this false claim, and I. among others, showed that no .cotton had been going to Germany since the winter of 1914-1915, and that the embargo would not reduce the price of cotton. 1 have sent a copy of this speech to many of you, and will send a copy to any one who drops me a postal card. When the food bill was agitated in the first copy it applied to cotton, but this was cut out in the house of representatives. When it came to the senate a motion was mdde to add cotton. The friends of cotton deemed it advisable to let. this motion pass, but then to add a provision subject ing to control the prices of the manufactured prod ucts of cotton; wool, and all manufactured prod ucts of wool; iron, steel, copper and lumber, and all manufactured products of the four. Having put all these in the bill we rallied the friends of all and struck all, including cotton. THE PRESENT STATUS Now as to the present status. There has been for sixty days past an active agitation of a move ment to fix the price of cotton. The purpose of those originating it undoubtedly having been to force down the price. This agitation was more active thirty days ago than it is today. At once those of us who were seeking to protect cotton let it be understood that if cotton was subjected to price fixing, the manufactured products of cotton must be subject to price fixing also, and that the profits of the manufacturer would disappear. There was also at that time a fear that cotton might jump to a figure so high that it would be impossible to use it practically for manufacturing purposes. It was believed by some manufacturers that the price of cotton would rise so high that the mills would all be compelled to close down, and this fact influenced some of them thirty days ago to advocate price fixing. They now realize the folly of such a course. From what I can learn, the sentiment of cotton manufacturers today is against fixing the price of lint cotton. I am intensely opposed to any interference with the cotton market by the government. No one knows what it will cost to raise this year’s cotton crop. No one knows what the size of the crop will be. The farmer does his work, cultivates his land, buys his fertilizer, incurs the expense of producing his crop. The cost this year certainly will be high, even though the production per acre is good. Now if the production per acre should prove small, then all this labor would go into the cost of the crop, and the cost per pound of raising cotton might be much higher than ever before. If the size of the crop is small then the farmer must have a high price to give him a just return for his labor. If the crop is large, then this fact will prevent a very high price and certainly render unnecessary, even in war, governmental interference. I think any danger of interfering with last year's crop has past. I believe we will have a fight over the effort to in some way control the price of this year’s crop. It will probably come in the shape of endeavoring to license all buyers of cotton and thereby control their conduct. I am intensely opposed to anything that will interfere with your receiving for your cotton whatever the demand justifies, and I wish to assure you that there are those of us in the senate, and in the house, who will exhaust our efforts to serve you. In some way we will succeed. This is the message I wish to carry to you. But let me say further that I do not mean by this to encourage you too much to depend upon a big price. The world is in a condition where no one can prop erly judge of the future. The money market may be so depressed by next winter that the demand for cotton manufactured products will be very small, and the supply of resources may be so lim ited that it will affect the price. The demand for men to manufacture implements of war and ships may be so great that cotton mills will be forced to run on short time. All these elements create a state of doubt about the value of the crop this next fall and no man can safely give an opinion. URGES ECONOMY 1 wish to urge you to economize in every way possible. Do not waste a dollar that you have re ceived from last year’s crop. Prepare for hard times. Raise foodstuffs. If you only raise what you need to eat and have all you and yours need to eat then you ought to be well fixed. Your cotton brought enough last fall to pay your debts, or most of them. Raise all the foodstuffs that the people of your county and of the whole state can eat and have more to sell.. This is the safe course. In giv ing you'lhis advice I know I am making no mistake. Let your cotton be a surplus crop. If it brings in the fall a price which satisfies you. then you can sell it. If the price is too low, and you have raised your own foodstuffs, you can keep your cotton, or at least part of it. until the price brings you a profit. It is to say this as mpeh as anything else I am writ ing to you. Now. in conclusion, I wish to say another thing. The war will take sacrifices. I voted for the war because Germany had announced her purpose to sink the vessels of our citizens and our citizens themselves, if they undertook to sail across to Europe. Germany not only announced this purpose but actually began sinking them and drowning our people. Were we to abandon the ocean and the markets of the world in fear of this lawless, heart less nation? What would have become of you, the farmers of Georgia, if you had been cut off from all the markets of the world for the sale of your cotton, your naval stores and your other products that must be sold across the ocean? A nation that under such circumstances would not fight to protect her people would be a coward, and unworthy to accept the loyalty of her sons. Besides, the fight had taken shape in Europe, where Germany, after crushing France, would have been a menace to this country, and I believed it was bet ter to fight at once than to wait to be forced to fight later on. i I am kept here so constantly that I am writing you this letter because I want you to know that al though away from home the chief thought upon my mind and in my heart, is how can I serve the people of Georgia, and our country. HOKE SMITH. THE ITALIAN RETREAT—VI BY’ HERBERT COREY’ PARTS, Dec. 17.—(8y Mail.) —There is a ten dency growing in the press to treat Italy with a certain condescension, as though she , were but a weakling which the allies—and the United States—must help in har time of need She needs help; she must have help; but it is important that it be also realized that Italy is a tremendous and almost untouched potential asset. Time will show whether that asset can be real ized upon. It certainly cannot if the susceptibili ties of proud people are injured at every turn by sheer tactlessness. Already there ha?je been col lisions between individual Italians and individual French und British soldiers at the front. The Italians resented the patronizing assurance that; ‘‘We have come down here to win the war for Italy.” Perhaps the Italians are tt»o touchy. Perhaps, smarting under defeat and a tardy realization of the causes that brought about that defeat, they are apt to take offense at blundering friendship. But it is worth while recognizing that state of mind and bearing ourselves accordingly. I was assured by an American in close touch that some thing of the good the American Red Cross has done was rubbed off by the comment of a Red Cross insp°ction party which had examined an Italian hospital of which the surgeons were justly proud. • “We have few better hospitals in tjie United States,” was the kindly assurance. Then, in an effort to be* quite accurate, the heavy handed in spector added: “Os course, ye are somewhat dis organized at home just now—” Italy’s potential value lies in two directions: First, in the matter of man power. She has not called her men above the age of thirty-six. Great Britain is hovering about the forty-five-year old line. France has sent men of forty-five and fifty years of age to the Italian front. She has by no means tapped the man power even under that age. Her towns are dripping with young men of military age. Only the rural popu lation has been taken to anywhere near the con script possibilities. The importance of this reservoir of male force need not be insisted upon at this time, when the central empires have certainly stripped themselves of every valid man to carry on the war. In the pessimism of the moment it must not be forgotten that Germany and Austria, in spite of their recent military successes, have reached the stage of moral and material decay at home. Second, the Italian frontier offers an opportun ity to thrust straight at the heart of Austria, and the Austrian heart is notably not as sound in war, for a variety of reasons ranging pom political to racial, as that of Germany. A great offensive into the Austrian plain was only prevented prior to the October collapse by Cadorna’s confession that his army could not make another. The recognition of the vulnerability of the Austrian line —from a political rather than from a purely military view—was reached rather late by • the allies. But now that it has been recognized, it may be hoped that some time during 1918 the offensive will be uttered, even though it may seem to be a year late. But before this can be done Italy as an asset must be realized. It must be admitted at the outset that there are difficulties in the way. There are half a dozen ele ments in Italy antagonistic to the war. But for one vital fact to be set forth later those elements would certainly prove themselves in control of the situation. Office-hungry statesmen will assuredly try to cater to the official Socialists and other pro peace and defeatist factions. It may be that a Clemenceau, a Lloyd George— a Hindenburg, If you will—must be found to get out of the situation all its possibilties. The allies cannot Prussianize their ally—let me be frank and say unfortunately. But there is a stern means of applying pressure so that Italy shall reorganize herself. It may be put in the words of Signor Nitti, a member of the Italian cabinet: “Why did Italy enter the war?” he was once asked. “Italy had to fight—or starve,’’ said he. Nitti was rebuked by most of the papers ana statesmen of Italy for talking plain common sense instead of the rainbow platitudes which politicians —and editors —love. Since then the same statesmen and editors have recognized that he told the truth. Today some one may airse in Italy to tell his coun trymen that the formula may be added to: “Italy must fight—and organize—or starve.” Shortly before the military collapse of October Gene, al Cadorna, in a despairing effort to bring the Rome government to a realization of the truth, is said to have written to Signor Sonino a concise summary of the political and military chaos which his coutnry was approaching: “Our great need,” he said then, “is of national discipline.” That national discipline implies entering upon the war in the wholly new national spirit, born of resentment of the invasion, and which only needs to be properly directed to make Italy a great force in the war. Her man-force should be mobilized; her fields’next year should be tilled; her army should be trained along the modern methods of warfare. These three suggestions arc the result of no flash of inspiration on my part. ITALY HAS BEEN WARNED OF THIS TRIPLE NEED BY THE MEN OF THE ALLIES WHO HAVE THE RIGHT TO WARN. This war has passed beyond the stage when too much consideration may be shown for the feeling of the man who does not do his part. Every ounce of support the allies have is needed for the fight ing line. Not an ounce may be safely diverted. The situation may be restated in Signor Nitti’s blunt, crude, repellent but everlastingly truthful words: a a “Italy must fight—or .starve. Italy is today on the verge of starvation be cause a government that forever catered to politi cal elements —and it was no doubt compelled to do so, because if it had fallen those political ele ments each had “stop the war” in their mouths — has failed to make full use of its agricultural potentialities. The eaters were almost left un touched in town. The producers, the peasants, were taken for the army. The Italian aristocracy, which owns the farming land, was permitted to leave It in grass. It should have been broken up and seeded to wheat. 1 In normal times Italy produces vastly less food than she consumes. This is not a consumption of luxuries that I refer to, for the Italian is a frugal spender and the Italian wife a careful and eco nomical cook. Nor is the sort of food she needs at all expensive. Above all, she must have flour and corn meal and rice. The Italian is a greater eater of “paste.” Given a pleasant feeling of ful ness, he is satisfied, and he is best satisfied to get that feeling by a combination of flour and cheese. But he must have it. “There is only one possibility of revolution in Italy.” said an observer of years of diplomatic training. “That is if the flour fails.” The need for food is intensified now, of course, bv the flood of refugees filling Italian towns from the invaded districts. France and the United States supply that needed difference between the food Italy produces and what she consumes. Great Britain supplies the coal. No reader of the news papers need be told with v. hat difficulty both voids are being filled just nor. that ever? ounce of food saved and every ounce of coal un shipped would lessen the burdens of the allies. Italy has it within her power to become a tre mendous aid to the allies in this hour of greatest need. She cannot change sides —even if that dis honorable expedient were to be considered by a people thrilling with a magnificent new national spirit—because Germany and Austria have no food to give her. and because the allies couid blockade her ports. Nor would any one who knows the pride of the Italians suggest that they would be content to lie a mere dead burden on the allied arms. But the world is being gradually forced to that point at which generous sentiment must give way to practicalities. Signor Nitti. a member of the Italian cabinet, stated the case most accurate!?- when he told his people that: “Italy must fight—or starve.”
