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[Wtltten for The Sunny South.]
BATTLES
AND
CAMPAIGNS
OF THE ARMY OF
TBITlSrESSBiB.
PERSONAL REMINISCENCES.
BY (OL. B. W. FROBEL.
The Causes of the Failure of the Western Cumpaiiin, wiut
an Outline of Oporationsin this Section, from the Battle
of Belmont to the Fall of Island No. 10—The Failure
of Brad's Movement in Kentucky, and the Cause—Out
line of the Military Situation at the Close of 1862—Why
the Confederates could not Prevent the Overrunning by
the Federals of the Trans Mississippi—the Second Coil
of the Anaconda—The Battle of Murfreesboro—Retreat
of Bragg—Fall of Vicksburg—Battle of Chickamauga—
Mission Ridge—Sherman's Mississippi Expedition,
what it Meant and why it Failed—Sherman in Command
of the Army—Why Dalton was Abandoned—The Re
treat from Dalton Across the Chattahoochee—Why Mr.
Davis Removed General Johnston—Operations Around
Atlanta—Why Wheeler’s Movement upon Sherman's
Rear for the Purpose of Interrupting his Communi
cations Failed—Why Atlanta was Abandoned—Wliat
Sherman's Occupation of Atlanta Meant—Rood's Cam
paign into„Tennessee—What was Proposed by this
Movement and why it Failed—Sherman forced by Hood’s
Movement to Leave Atlanta—He Determines to March
to the Sea —Battle of Griswoldville—Defense of Macon—
March to Savannah—Siege of that Ci ty—Battle oi Honey
Hill—Confederates forced to Abandon Savannah—The
Retreat into South Carolina —Defense of Augusta—Sher
man Marches Across South Carolina—Burning of Colum
bia—Campaign into North Carolina—Surrender of Gen
eral Lee—Surrender of General Johnston—Wilson’s
Raid into Georgia—Fight at Columbus—Marches on
Macon—Terror of the People—News Received of the
Armistice—Flag Sent with it to Meet Wilson—Surren
der of Macon—Its Occupation by the Federals—News of
Lincoln’s Death—End of the War.
CHAPTER IV.
A REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Before proceeding, it will be necessary to a clear
understanding of the subject to go back and take
a brief view of the condition of affairs in what was
known as the military department of the West,prior
to the investment of Atlanta. For this purpose
we must revert to the commencement of the war
i K 1801, and follow the army, at that time operat
ing in Kentucky, in its gradual retreat into Geor-
gia.
If the reader will turn to the map he will see
that the States of the Confederacy are separated
from those which in 1861, held allegiance to the
Federal Governments by the following great geo
graphical barriers. On (he east the Potomac, with
its sources in the mountains, and its outlet through
the Chesapeake into the Atlantic, forms what may
be termed the first section of this great natural
barrier. This is a very broad stream, capable of
bearing upon its bosom the navies of the world,
with depth sufficient to float any ordinary sea
going craft, and at that time enjoying the honor,
and suffering the inconvenience of liaving on its
banks the Capitol of the Northern Confederation.
Along the sources of this, river, and crossing tl.ie
country in a North-east and South-west diriSfion
is the great Apeiachian chain of mountains which
divides the waters of the east that flow into the
Atlmtic ocean from those of the west which find
their way into the Gulf of Mexico, through the
Mississippi. On this great ridge the Ohio river
also has its source, and flowing west between the
Confederate States of Virginia and Kentucky, and
the Federal States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois,
empties into the iMississippi. These rivers afford,
at nearly all seasons of the year, an uninterrupted
inland navigation from the Gulf of Mexico to the
western portion of Pennsylvania and within two
hundred miles of that great chatn of lakes which
forms, in part, the northern boundary of the
United States. That these rivers, with this rug
ged mountain ridge, filling the intervening space
be'ween their sources, and presenting an uninter-
r i line of natural obstruction, would attract
i -ration of the scientific soldier and engineer
i apparent to any thinking mind. And
,t the very outsetjthey were looked upon as
•. upon the whole, defensive features supe-
ay other portion of the Confederacy,
is in war no truer axiom than that which
“an army, like a serpent, moves upon its
tou may organize a million of men if you
drill them until their evolutions are with
out fault, arm them with the most destructive
engines of modern warfare, place them under
skiilful and experienced generals, have each equip
ment perfect and every department complete in
all its detai's, and then leave them without rations,
and in a very short time the organization will go to
pieces and cease to exist, and that without even the
presence of a foe. Hence the importance of keep-
ing open “lines of communication,” as the they
are called. And just here I will say for the bene
fit of those of my readers who are not military men
that “lines of communication” mean the channels
by which provisions, amunition, forage and the
thousand et celerasineeded in war are taken from
the place cf production to the forces operating in
the field whether these channels are by railroad,
wagon-road, or river. But as an army moves for-
wrrd such lines of communication become indefi
nitely extended, and hence to insure dispatch and
certainty in the supply, points lire selected as near
to the line of operations as it is safe to place
them, and here stores of all kinds are gathered
and kept ready for distribution at a moment’s no
tice. These depots are called “bases ot supply,
and they are usually moved forward as otteu as
necesssity demands, and safety permits. lor ex
ample* “the base supply” for the western array
was at Cincinnati during the early stages of the
war. Then it was moved forward to Nashville,
and as the army penetrated further South, and the
retreat of the Confederates assured the safety of
these points to Chattanooga, and so on. keeping
as near the invading army as circumstances would
permit.
The material of modern warfare has become so
cumbrous that it is impossible to transport it in
wagons over great distances as was done in times
gone by, Navagable rivers and railroads have
become absolutely essential for this purpose, and
experience teaches that it is neither safe nor prac
ticable to conduct military operations on a large
scale, or at any great distance from “the base of
supply” without the aid of the one or the other.
This is the reason why the great campaigns of the
late war were confined to the banks of rivers or to
those lines of railroad, which beginning at the
North, penetrated southward into the Confederacy.
It was evident at the commencement of hos|ili-
ties that Virginia would become the principal
theater of operations east of the Alleghani.es, and
this for seveaal reasons. First, because of its
proximity to the Federal Capital, and secondly, its
great territorial importance to the Confederacy.
But above these weighty considerations was the
still more important feet that the only railroads,
leading South, along the great Atlantic slopes
passed directly across her territory. To insure a
successful invasion from this direction the posses
sion of these roads became essential, and their lo
cation consequently marked out the line which
would be followed by the invader if successful in
forcing the Confederates away from the Potomac.
This could best be done by the capture of Rich
mond, and the establishment of a base at that
point because with the aid of a navy, a line of com
munication, by water, could be kept open here
without drawing heavily upon the invading force.
The occupation of Richmond would not only in
sure the possession of Virginia, but would serve
as the best “base” from which to push the inva
sion further South. Hence Virginia became, so to
speak, the front door of the Confederacy, and to
keep that door closed one of the principal objects
of all subsequent campaigns. To make the im
portance of their position still more obvious, the
Capital of the Confederacy was removed to Rich
mond and a powerful army organized for its pro
tection.
During the entire war the naval superiority of
the Federals gave them a very decided advagtage.
In fact the South had no navy at all if we except a
few iron-clads designed for harbor defense, and a
light cruiser or two, while on the other hand, so
soon as hostilities commenced the Federal Govern
ment set about strengthening that arm of their
service by every means possible, As a temporary
expedient, they fitted out a great number of steam
boats, such as are used in the coast-wise carrying
trade, and with this improvised navy, succeeded
in closing up every sea-port, from the Chesapeake
to the Rio Grande. The effectiveness of this block,
ade is unparalleled, and the wonder excited by it
increases when the material with which it was ac
complished is brought into view. In fact a half-
dozen well-armed steam frigates could at any time
hare driven the whole of them off the ocean, and
yet these miserable concerns were suffered to iso
section is exceedingly rugged, and presents many
defensive features, but could never be used as the
great highway for the invasion of the South, be
cause it is intersected neit her by railroads or rivers
leading in the proper direction. At the beginning
of the war the Federal Government believed that a
majority of the people in this mountainous region
were loyal to the Union, and hence, at a very early
period, efforts were made to possess themselves
of it. The struggle was maintained for several
months, but the Confederate Government believing
that its importance was in no wise commensurate
with the cost of holding it., finally abandoned the en
tire section, and suffered it to become a State in the
Union under the title of West Virginia. It might,
however, have played an important part in the
contest had a different policy in the conduct of the
war been adopted. As it was, iis occupation by
the Federals served to develop the Union senti
ment that existed there, and they continued to the
close of the war to maintain their supremacy with
but little trouble.
Having taken a rapid glauee at the situation in
the east and along the seaboard, we will now turn
to the third and last great section of this line,
which will be found between the mountains of
West Virginia and the Mississippi, and it was very
evident that soiiie portion of this section would
become the theatre of active operations west of the
Alleghanies. Along this line, as we have already
said, the Ohio flows, separating the Confederate
State of Kentucky from the Federal States of Ohio,
Indiana and Illinois, and affording a very strong
natural barrier, but at the same time presenting
the only door by which the Western States of the
Confederacy could be entered, if the Mississippi
was closed up.
Now, looking again nt the map, we see that the
country west of tie Mississippi is not penetrated
by any navigable streams except such as empty into
that river below the mouth of the Ohio. Hence,
if the Mississippi at this point was effectually
late us completely from the rest of the world, and 1 closed against Federal gunboats they would be
thereby inflict an amount of damage upon the Con
federate cause that cannot be easily conceived.
But while they could close our sea-ports they were
inadequate for their capture, and the waters in
most of these harbors bearing shoal vessels of a
belter class would neither enter nor operate effec
tively against them.
It is true that some of these places fell into the
hands of the enemy through incompetency or
shut out from all these rivers, and there being no
railroads in any [ ?.ri of it leading south, an inva
sion conld not be suscessfully conducted from this
direction except upon the banks of the Missis
sippi itself, and then only so far as the gunboats
were able to penetrate. Hence an effectual block
ade at the mouth of the Ohio was not only the
surest protection that, could be afforded the Trans-
Mississippi, but would enable all that country to
m.
he
Qc /ih
belly.’
please,
neglect, and others were capture 1 by tue co.
operation of land and naval forces. But these
were never made the base of any important expe
dition into the interior, and the only service
sought for or rendered, besides closing a Confed
erate port to the out-side world, was in furnishing
places of refuge during storms, for their blockad
ing fleet.
It was very evident that so long as the “ army
of the Potomac” was held at bay, and Washington
threatened by Lee and his gallant band, there was
really no danger that important expeditions would
be undertaken against points further South, un
less the object was the opening of the Mississippi.
Vet the terror that these gunboats inspired in
duced the Government to maintain large gar
risons in many of these little unimportant places,
reducing thereby the effectiveness of the armies
in the field, and invitiug the very result which it
was designed to prevent. The knowledge that
all this might have been prevented, our ports kept
open and the sea-coast protected, had we posses
sed even a moderately effective navy, may be the
source of no consolation now, but it is neverthe
less true, and some future historian may yet tell
us where the blame properly belongs.
At the beginning of the war—before the ports
were closed—it was urged upon the Confederate
authorities to buy up all the cotton remaining on
hand and ship it at once to England. The people,
it was said, were eager to sell, the cotton could be
bought at reasonable rates and paid for in Confed
erate bonds, and, when stored in England, it
would not only have supplied the means of secur
ing an effective navy, but would hare served as a
solid basis upon which our credit, both at home
and abroad, could securely rest. The suggestion,
however, was not adopted. Few believed the
blockade possible, while a great many thought that
the war would be of short duration, and nobody
soemed fully to realize the magnitude of that
which was surely coming: The cotton was not
shipped, but remained - wasting and comparatively
worthless upon the hands of the producer. Credit,
private and public, failed, This was followed by
the decay of our military strength and final dis
solution ; and all this the result of a neglect to
utilize the vast resources with which Providence
had so bountifully supplied us. The lesson is an
impressive one, and should teach us the folly of
pursuing still in peace a policy which has already
resulted in loss and disaster.
The intelligent reader will readily perceive that
the country described would naturally form the
first grand division in the proposed line of de
fences, and that active operations must of neces
sity be begun in Virginia, and confined to that sec
tion so long as the army covering Richmond was
able to command the railroads leading South and
at the same time serve as a threat to Washington.
The more active, therefore, the operations in front
of that city the more secure would be the other
portions of the Confederacy, because, while their
own territory was in danger it would place the
Federals on the defensive, and force them to concen
trate the major portion of their strength here.
The second section of this defensive line is em
braced in that portion of country between the
head waters of the Potomac and the Ohio. This
concentrate their wh&e available force here and
at New Orleans. It is true that some unimportant
raids might have been undertaken from Missouri,
but a small force, assisted by the militia, would in
most cases have sufficed to guard against such con
tingencies, and, at any rate, the damage from such I
raids would have been of little consequence, owing j
to the fact that they could not have penetrated |
very far beyond the Federal frontier.
Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. It flows
west across East Tennessee to Chattanooga, where
it touches the northern boundary of Georgia, and
then bending south enters Alabama, passing along
the greater portion of its northern boundary, then
turning almost due north it traverses bora Ten-
nesseee and Kentucky, emptying into the Ohio
near Paducah and but a short distance from the
Cumberland. This river is navigable as high as
Florence, Alabama, at all seasons, and at high
water as far up as Knoxville. From Tuscumbia,
Alabama, to Knoxville the great line of railroad
between Richmond aud Memphis passes within a
short distance of this stream, and for the greater
portion ofthe way follows directly along its course.
Whoever, therefore, held possession of the river
would control the railroad— a consideration of vast
importance, as will be seen when we remember
that it would break the direct communication be
tween the capital of the Confederacy and the
West. The possession of these rivers by the
enemy, with his vast naval superiority, would
give him undisputed possession of Kentucky and
the greater portion of Teunessee, and the Missis
sippi river as low down as Memphis, and at the
same time would supply a valuable base from
which to invade the cotton States. It, therefore,
became absolutely necessary that they should be
closed up, and for this purpose Forts Henry aud
Doualdson were erected near the point where they
pass from Tennessee into Kentucky. The two
rivers here are not a great way apart, and the se
lection was in a measure due to the belief that the
same covering force would answer for both. Two
railroads also penetrated, from the Ohio, into
Kentucky—one from Henderson and the other
from Louisville—and both united at Bowling
Green, a small railroad town near the southern
boundary of the State. From Bowling Green the
road then passes south to Nashville, on the Cum
berland, thence to Stephenson on the Tennessee,
thence up the Tennessee to Chattanooga, and
from that point, connecting at Atlanta, with the
whole railroad system of the South. These
two rivers and this road being the only great
lines of communication leading South (the Mis
sissippi being closed) it was very evident that an
invading army must follow the one or the other,
and that they would become ihe first object of
attention to the enemy. It was therefore neces
sary to occupy some position on the road as well
as on the rivers north of Nashville, for should the
enemy succeed in occupying that place it would
compel the Confederates to evacuate Donaldson
and open the Cumberland. This would enable
them to strike the Tennessee, also, above Fort
Henry, and if successful in one great battle, to
destroy the communications between Memphis and
Richmond, seize the former city and compel the
forts on the Mississippi above that point to sur
render.
Along the eastern boundary of Kentucky, and
running across the State of Tennessee in a south
west direction is a lofty range called the Cumber
land mountain. This range separates east and
west Tennessee, and is inaccessable to an army
with trains of wagons and artillery, except per
haps at Cumberland Gap. This is a strong point,
easily defended and of great importance, as it not
only covered the Richmond and Memphis railroad,
but was in fact the only door by which the upper
valley of the Tennessee could be entered from the
direction of Kentucky. The Cumberland being
closed and there being no railroad lines penetrating
this section from thedirectionof the Ohio, nothing
more formidable than, a raid could reach it, and to
guard against this a small force was all that was
needed, so long as the Confederates were able to
maintain these positions in front of Nashville, at
Fort Donaldson and at Island No. 10. The reader
will no doubt see that so long as these points were
held, that it was impossible for any invading force
to penetrate south of them, andAlie vallev of the
? i^Mississi^i, wai Safir'fi.vAn 1 luf‘Aresen^* i 'S r a foe.
The holding of the Mississippi then was the /
great point at issue, and it is equally clear and a
fact that cannot be controverted that its loss was
not only fatal to the campaign, but the death
blow to.the Confederacy. Whether this disaster
was the result of the incompetency of one or all
of the commanding Generals of this unfortunate
department, or of neglect on the part of the Gov
ernment in providing the means for its defence,
or whether it arose from causes over which neither
Government or Generals had control, history, per
haps will tell. In the meantime we will take a
glance at facts and let the reader judge for him
self.
Having taken a cursory view of the geography of
the country that we may be enabled to compre
hend more fully the nature of the campaigns be
fore us, we will now turn without further delay
to active operations in the field.
(TO HE CONTINUED.)
secreted. All the blood which circulates in and
aronnd the bowels, from one end to the other,
is collected into a large vein which rnns up to
the liver, and then branches oat through all its
substance like an artery, and from this vein, in
its ramifications, the bile is secreted. Now, it
is manifest that if the flaids of the blood, con
taining both the elements for the formation of
bile, and for the nourishment of the whole sys
tem, are drained off by the action of purgatives,
the supply of blood to the liver must be dimin
ished, thus interfering with the secretion of
bile which is necessary for the conversion of the
food into chyle, by which the body is nourished
and sustained. It is plain, then, that the use of
cathartics, and especially of liver medicines,
tends ultimately to diminish the qnantity of
bile secreted, and thus to prevent proper chyli-
fication, which is essential as a means of pre
paring the food for the uses of the system. The
consequence is, that those who follow this prac
tice damage their digestion, impoverish their
blood, and invite all forms of disease arising
from debility and want of that nutrition which
cannot be had without a sufficient supply of
rich blood.
And while these effects follow more remotely
from the action of such medicines on the liver,
the immediate and direct effect of all cathartics
is to irritate the stomach and bowels, to depress
all the vital powers, and to
WASH AWAY
the nutritive elements which should go to the
support of the system.
Let us see how these cathartics act: A liver
pill, or some other purgative, is taken; the liver
is stimulated inordinately, and for a time poors
out an excessive qnantity of bile. This flows
into the bowels, where it mingles with the half-
digested food, with the drug, and with the flood
of water which has been drawn from the blood,
and the whole passing liken torrent downwards,
sweeps away the thick protective muens which
naturally coats the lining membrane of the
bowels, leaving the vast net-work of vessels and
nerves exposed. No wonder that the bowels,
when thus treated, writhe and twist like
For ilie benefit jf tJ
military matters, it ijw
those not conversant with
well to state here that an in
vasion and raid differ from each other in these
essential particulars. An invasion involves the
gradual advance an army from established
bases and with Inies of communication well
guarded—such au organization as would be pre
pared not only to overrun the enemy’s territory,
but to hold it as well. A raid, ou the other hand,
is a rapid moveme^I of any body of troops, large
or small, into the enemy’s country, who, taking
with them supplies sufficient for their object, dis
regard lines of communication, make no attempt
to hold any part’of the country, overrun and
hastily retreat to some more secure position so
soon as the object in view is accomplished. In
vasions are organized for conquest. Raids are un
dertaken for minor objects, such as destroying
lines of communication, depots of supplies, or
something else whose loss will inflict damage upon
the foe. 1
The closing o- the Mississippi would not only
secure the States west of that river from invasion,
but all that country on the east bank also, and
compel the Federal army to operate in front of
such lines as might be adopted in Kentucky or
Tennessee, instead of having it in their power, by
means of the river, to strike the Confederates in
the rear.
It would alsp have served as the cheapest and
best line off communication between the forces
operating in this department. Have made it, in
fact, a Confederate lake, upon whose banks vast
magazines of supplies might be collected and
moved witn ease and certainty to the points where
they were needed.
It was evident to the Federal Government that
the only way to regain or hold possession of this
country was to open the river; and to this end,
for a time, their whole energies were directed.
The plan adopted was comprehensive. First, to
operate a combined military and naval force di
rectly against the blockade, and at the same time
march an amy across the country, occupy a posi
tion ou thc'lriver below the forts, and by this
means destroy the Confederate communications
and thus force their evacuation or surrender. To
prevent this it would be necessary to occupy Ken
tucky. The reader will see by again looking at
the map that two navigable rivers empty into the
Ohio near JPaducab, and not very far from its
mouth. One of these rivers, the Cumberland,
rises in eastern Kentucky, and flowing south en
ters Tennessee many miles to the eastward of
Nashville. From this point it flows west through
the heart of the State, and then turning north, re
enters Kentucky, traversing that State to the
Ohio. This stream is navigable for many miles
above Nashville. The other river, the Tennessee,
has its sources in the mountains of Southwestern
HEALTH DEPARTMENT.
BX JNO STAINBACK WILSON, M. D.,
Physician in charge Hygienic Institute and Turkish Bath,
Atlanta, Ga. Formerly Editor “Health Depart
ment” Godey’s Lady's Book; Author of
Woman’s Home Book of Health.
PURGATIVES AND LIVER MEDICINES
—FAINTING AND APOPLEXY-
CONCUSSION OF THE BRAIN.
A London physician, Dr. Inman, says:
“Many have heard of a parody by a celebra
ted doctor of Cromwell’s dictum: ‘Fear God,
my boys, but keep your powder dry.’ The med
ical leader, adapting it to his hearers, put the
whole duty of man thns: ‘Worship the Lord—
that will do for the next-world; and keep your
bowels open—that will do for. this.
Now, there are thousands who never heard of
Cromwell nor his doctor, but who obtain their
medical knowledge from men who find it to
their interest to inculcate such ideas as this by
their false theories.
Many people, if we may judge from their
conduct, regard the above inj unction as a reli
gions obligation—as the first, the great, the only
thing necessary to health. If they are well,
they take a purge to keep so; if sick, of course
the liver or bowels must be at fault, and the
remedy is the same.
True, the condition of the bowels has much to
do with health, and the direction to give them
due attention is correct in principle; but the
question is, What are the best means for regu
lating them ? Are they to be kept open by pur
gatives and liver medicines ? Let us answer
this in the light of science and common sense.
The bile duct from the liver opens into the
upper bowel or small intestine very near the
stomach, and tnen—in the bowel just below the
stomach—the bile mingles with the partially
digested food from the stomach, and changes
this food into the yellow, creamy substance
called chyle. This chyle, thus emitted with
and changed by the bile, is then absorbed by
the mucous membrane lining the upper bowels,
and passes into the blood to replenish it with
the elements of nutrition. The bile then, as
bile, does not pass through the bowels, bnt is
decomposed into its various elements and min
gled with the food, forming a new nutritive
substance, which is neither bile nor food. Hence,
we see that the bile, in a natural state of things,
does not pass down through the intestines and
act as a cathartic, as many seem to think. When
the liver is stimulated to inordinate action by
the use of cathartics and “liver pills,” this is
the case; but such action is nnnatnral and inju
rious, as I will now show. To understand how
such means of moving the bowels are injurious,
let ns consider for a moment how the bile is
A SNAKE IN THE FIKE.
No wonder that they close spasmodically and
strive to arrest the progress of the destructive
iuvader. No wonder that the poor patient looks
wan and feels faint and feeble after such an un
natural commotion. No wonder that for several
days his bowels fall into a state of inactivity,
demanding rest, and obstinately refnsing to act.
Every one who lias had much experience in the
use of cathartics will testify to the trnth of the
ab >vo description of their effects. But there is
one point that all can understand, and to which
I would call special attention. It has been said
above that the use of liver medicines will in
crease the secretion of bile for a time, though
the ultimate result is diminished secretion by
draining off the blood which should go to make
the bile. There is, however, a more direct, im
mediate, and more easily understood way in
which the action of such medicines lessens the
quantity of bile.
We all know that over-work will exhaust any
part of the body; and this is more true of our
delicate and sensitive internal organism than
of our grosser exterior muscular structure which
is daily brought in contact with the outer world.
The exceedingly tender and sensitive membrane
lining the bowels, stimulated to excessive action
by cathartics, soon falls into a state of torper
after having been thus excited; and conse
quently inaction and constipation follow the
use of a purgative, as every one who has tried
it knows. It is also well known that the use of
one cathartic causes a demand for another; and
thus the medicine has to be repeated from time
to time iu increased doses, until in many cases,
the bowels refuse to act except under the un
natural and health-destroying stimulus of some
irritating drug. The condition of such people
well 1>A compared io that of j. *
N LAZY HORSE BIDDEN WITH SrUItS.
He becomes more and more accustomed to
the gentle reminder of his rider's heel, until at
last the spur may be plunged into him to its
full depth, and he will scarcely quicken his
gait. And yet, in the face of such facts as these,
which are patsnt to all who will reason and ob
serve, our drug-loving and quack- idden people
swallow countless bushels of liver pills and
other purgatives, never for a moment dreaming
that these same pills and purges, instead of re
storing health, are, in many instances, the very
cause of the derangements which seem to de
mand their repeated use. While such medi
cines give temporary relief sometimes, they
should be used only in cases of extreme neces
sity, and as a choice of evils after all other
means of relief have been exhausted, never for
getting that the result of their frequent employ-
mant is chronic invalidism, and life-long
repetition in larger and larger doses, and the
use of more and more active drugs, until the
stomach becomes a
VERITABLE APOTHECARY SHOP.
The best and only safe and proper remedies for
constipation are exercise, kneading the bowels,
drinking cold water before breakfast, laxative
fruits, vegetables and syrups, jGraham or corn
bread ; and above all, a habit of regularity as to
the time of attending to the natural calls. If
these fail, which they will seldom do, an injec
tion of cold or warm water may be resorted to
occasionally. Fox torpid liver and the'attendant
constipation and secretions I have found the
Turkish bath to be a most effective remedy.
This opens all the secreting organs, cleanses
from all impunities, external and internal, and
gives a healthful action to all the functions.
FAINTING AND APOPLEXY.
When a person faints the air should be let in
freely, all tight clothing should be loosened,
water should be sprinkled in the face, warmth
should be applied to the feet; and most impor
tant of all, the head should be lower than the
body. In apoplexy or rash of blood to the head,
the head and shoulders should be elevated,
taking care not to have the head higher than
the shoulders with the chin on the breast.
Attention to these simple directions may often
save life.
CONCUSSION OF THE BRAIN.
When a sudden blow is given about the head
it causes confusion of the mind, or total loss of
consciousness, attended with sick stomach or
faintness and a feeble, flattering pulse. The
treatment of such cases is very much the same
as in fainting; that is, absolute rest and
quietude, with gentle friction of the whole sur
face of the body. No bleedimj. This has been
the death of many in such cases, it being a com
mon practice a few years ago.
Singular Feeding Habits of Wood-Ants.—
Mr. McCook, of the Academy of Natural Sci
ences of Philadelphia, has published in the
“ proceedings” of that body some highly inter
esting observations on the habits of Formic a
rufa, from which it sppears that these ants have
in their separate communities regular provision
made whereby the workers are fed without hav
ing to quit the scene of their labors. The for
agers of a community, as they come down the
tree-paths, their abdomens swollen with honey-
dew—in which condition they are called by the
author repletes— are arrested near the foot by
workers from the bill seeking food. The replete
rears upon her hind-legs, and places her month
to the mouth of the hungry worker, or “pen
sioner,” as the author calls him, who assumes
the same posture. Otten two, sometimes three
pensioners are thus fed at once by one repleto.
The latter commonly yields the honey-dew com
placently, bat sometimes she is seized and ar
rested by the pensioner, occasionally with great
vigor.
