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[Wtltten for The Sunny South.] BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF TBITlSrESSBiB. PERSONAL REMINISCENCES. BY (OL. B. W. FROBEL. The Causes of the Failure of the Western Cumpaiiin, wiut an Outline of Oporationsin this Section, from the Battle of Belmont to the Fall of Island No. 10—The Failure of Brad's Movement in Kentucky, and the Cause—Out line of the Military Situation at the Close of 1862—Why the Confederates could not Prevent the Overrunning by the Federals of the Trans Mississippi—the Second Coil of the Anaconda—The Battle of Murfreesboro—Retreat of Bragg—Fall of Vicksburg—Battle of Chickamauga— Mission Ridge—Sherman's Mississippi Expedition, what it Meant and why it Failed—Sherman in Command of the Army—Why Dalton was Abandoned—The Re treat from Dalton Across the Chattahoochee—Why Mr. Davis Removed General Johnston—Operations Around Atlanta—Why Wheeler’s Movement upon Sherman's Rear for the Purpose of Interrupting his Communi cations Failed—Why Atlanta was Abandoned—Wliat Sherman's Occupation of Atlanta Meant—Rood's Cam paign into„Tennessee—What was Proposed by this Movement and why it Failed—Sherman forced by Hood’s Movement to Leave Atlanta—He Determines to March to the Sea —Battle of Griswoldville—Defense of Macon— March to Savannah—Siege of that Ci ty—Battle oi Honey Hill—Confederates forced to Abandon Savannah—The Retreat into South Carolina —Defense of Augusta—Sher man Marches Across South Carolina—Burning of Colum bia—Campaign into North Carolina—Surrender of Gen eral Lee—Surrender of General Johnston—Wilson’s Raid into Georgia—Fight at Columbus—Marches on Macon—Terror of the People—News Received of the Armistice—Flag Sent with it to Meet Wilson—Surren der of Macon—Its Occupation by the Federals—News of Lincoln’s Death—End of the War. CHAPTER IV. A REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN. Before proceeding, it will be necessary to a clear understanding of the subject to go back and take a brief view of the condition of affairs in what was known as the military department of the West,prior to the investment of Atlanta. For this purpose we must revert to the commencement of the war i K 1801, and follow the army, at that time operat ing in Kentucky, in its gradual retreat into Geor- gia. If the reader will turn to the map he will see that the States of the Confederacy are separated from those which in 1861, held allegiance to the Federal Governments by the following great geo graphical barriers. On (he east the Potomac, with its sources in the mountains, and its outlet through the Chesapeake into the Atlantic, forms what may be termed the first section of this great natural barrier. This is a very broad stream, capable of bearing upon its bosom the navies of the world, with depth sufficient to float any ordinary sea going craft, and at that time enjoying the honor, and suffering the inconvenience of liaving on its banks the Capitol of the Northern Confederation. Along the sources of this, river, and crossing tl.ie country in a North-east and South-west diriSfion is the great Apeiachian chain of mountains which divides the waters of the east that flow into the Atlmtic ocean from those of the west which find their way into the Gulf of Mexico, through the Mississippi. On this great ridge the Ohio river also has its source, and flowing west between the Confederate States of Virginia and Kentucky, and the Federal States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, empties into the iMississippi. These rivers afford, at nearly all seasons of the year, an uninterrupted inland navigation from the Gulf of Mexico to the western portion of Pennsylvania and within two hundred miles of that great chatn of lakes which forms, in part, the northern boundary of the United States. That these rivers, with this rug ged mountain ridge, filling the intervening space be'ween their sources, and presenting an uninter- r i line of natural obstruction, would attract i -ration of the scientific soldier and engineer i apparent to any thinking mind. And ,t the very outsetjthey were looked upon as •. upon the whole, defensive features supe- ay other portion of the Confederacy, is in war no truer axiom than that which “an army, like a serpent, moves upon its tou may organize a million of men if you drill them until their evolutions are with out fault, arm them with the most destructive engines of modern warfare, place them under skiilful and experienced generals, have each equip ment perfect and every department complete in all its detai's, and then leave them without rations, and in a very short time the organization will go to pieces and cease to exist, and that without even the presence of a foe. Hence the importance of keep- ing open “lines of communication,” as the they are called. And just here I will say for the bene fit of those of my readers who are not military men that “lines of communication” mean the channels by which provisions, amunition, forage and the thousand et celerasineeded in war are taken from the place cf production to the forces operating in the field whether these channels are by railroad, wagon-road, or river. But as an army moves for- wrrd such lines of communication become indefi nitely extended, and hence to insure dispatch and certainty in the supply, points lire selected as near to the line of operations as it is safe to place them, and here stores of all kinds are gathered and kept ready for distribution at a moment’s no tice. These depots are called “bases ot supply, and they are usually moved forward as otteu as necesssity demands, and safety permits. lor ex ample* “the base supply” for the western array was at Cincinnati during the early stages of the war. Then it was moved forward to Nashville, and as the army penetrated further South, and the retreat of the Confederates assured the safety of these points to Chattanooga, and so on. keeping as near the invading army as circumstances would permit. The material of modern warfare has become so cumbrous that it is impossible to transport it in wagons over great distances as was done in times gone by, Navagable rivers and railroads have become absolutely essential for this purpose, and experience teaches that it is neither safe nor prac ticable to conduct military operations on a large scale, or at any great distance from “the base of supply” without the aid of the one or the other. This is the reason why the great campaigns of the late war were confined to the banks of rivers or to those lines of railroad, which beginning at the North, penetrated southward into the Confederacy. It was evident at the commencement of hos|ili- ties that Virginia would become the principal theater of operations east of the Alleghani.es, and this for seveaal reasons. First, because of its proximity to the Federal Capital, and secondly, its great territorial importance to the Confederacy. But above these weighty considerations was the still more important feet that the only railroads, leading South, along the great Atlantic slopes passed directly across her territory. To insure a successful invasion from this direction the posses sion of these roads became essential, and their lo cation consequently marked out the line which would be followed by the invader if successful in forcing the Confederates away from the Potomac. This could best be done by the capture of Rich mond, and the establishment of a base at that point because with the aid of a navy, a line of com munication, by water, could be kept open here without drawing heavily upon the invading force. The occupation of Richmond would not only in sure the possession of Virginia, but would serve as the best “base” from which to push the inva sion further South. Hence Virginia became, so to speak, the front door of the Confederacy, and to keep that door closed one of the principal objects of all subsequent campaigns. To make the im portance of their position still more obvious, the Capital of the Confederacy was removed to Rich mond and a powerful army organized for its pro tection. During the entire war the naval superiority of the Federals gave them a very decided advagtage. In fact the South had no navy at all if we except a few iron-clads designed for harbor defense, and a light cruiser or two, while on the other hand, so soon as hostilities commenced the Federal Govern ment set about strengthening that arm of their service by every means possible, As a temporary expedient, they fitted out a great number of steam boats, such as are used in the coast-wise carrying trade, and with this improvised navy, succeeded in closing up every sea-port, from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande. The effectiveness of this block, ade is unparalleled, and the wonder excited by it increases when the material with which it was ac complished is brought into view. In fact a half- dozen well-armed steam frigates could at any time hare driven the whole of them off the ocean, and yet these miserable concerns were suffered to iso section is exceedingly rugged, and presents many defensive features, but could never be used as the great highway for the invasion of the South, be cause it is intersected neit her by railroads or rivers leading in the proper direction. At the beginning of the war the Federal Government believed that a majority of the people in this mountainous region were loyal to the Union, and hence, at a very early period, efforts were made to possess themselves of it. The struggle was maintained for several months, but the Confederate Government believing that its importance was in no wise commensurate with the cost of holding it., finally abandoned the en tire section, and suffered it to become a State in the Union under the title of West Virginia. It might, however, have played an important part in the contest had a different policy in the conduct of the war been adopted. As it was, iis occupation by the Federals served to develop the Union senti ment that existed there, and they continued to the close of the war to maintain their supremacy with but little trouble. Having taken a rapid glauee at the situation in the east and along the seaboard, we will now turn to the third and last great section of this line, which will be found between the mountains of West Virginia and the Mississippi, and it was very evident that soiiie portion of this section would become the theatre of active operations west of the Alleghanies. Along this line, as we have already said, the Ohio flows, separating the Confederate State of Kentucky from the Federal States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, and affording a very strong natural barrier, but at the same time presenting the only door by which the Western States of the Confederacy could be entered, if the Mississippi was closed up. Now, looking again nt the map, we see that the country west of tie Mississippi is not penetrated by any navigable streams except such as empty into that river below the mouth of the Ohio. Hence, if the Mississippi at this point was effectually late us completely from the rest of the world, and 1 closed against Federal gunboats they would be thereby inflict an amount of damage upon the Con federate cause that cannot be easily conceived. But while they could close our sea-ports they were inadequate for their capture, and the waters in most of these harbors bearing shoal vessels of a belter class would neither enter nor operate effec tively against them. It is true that some of these places fell into the hands of the enemy through incompetency or shut out from all these rivers, and there being no railroads in any [ ?.ri of it leading south, an inva sion conld not be suscessfully conducted from this direction except upon the banks of the Missis sippi itself, and then only so far as the gunboats were able to penetrate. Hence an effectual block ade at the mouth of the Ohio was not only the surest protection that, could be afforded the Trans- Mississippi, but would enable all that country to m. he Qc /ih belly.’ please, neglect, and others were capture 1 by tue co. operation of land and naval forces. But these were never made the base of any important expe dition into the interior, and the only service sought for or rendered, besides closing a Confed erate port to the out-side world, was in furnishing places of refuge during storms, for their blockad ing fleet. It was very evident that so long as the “ army of the Potomac” was held at bay, and Washington threatened by Lee and his gallant band, there was really no danger that important expeditions would be undertaken against points further South, un less the object was the opening of the Mississippi. Vet the terror that these gunboats inspired in duced the Government to maintain large gar risons in many of these little unimportant places, reducing thereby the effectiveness of the armies in the field, and invitiug the very result which it was designed to prevent. The knowledge that all this might have been prevented, our ports kept open and the sea-coast protected, had we posses sed even a moderately effective navy, may be the source of no consolation now, but it is neverthe less true, and some future historian may yet tell us where the blame properly belongs. At the beginning of the war—before the ports were closed—it was urged upon the Confederate authorities to buy up all the cotton remaining on hand and ship it at once to England. The people, it was said, were eager to sell, the cotton could be bought at reasonable rates and paid for in Confed erate bonds, and, when stored in England, it would not only have supplied the means of secur ing an effective navy, but would hare served as a solid basis upon which our credit, both at home and abroad, could securely rest. The suggestion, however, was not adopted. Few believed the blockade possible, while a great many thought that the war would be of short duration, and nobody soemed fully to realize the magnitude of that which was surely coming: The cotton was not shipped, but remained - wasting and comparatively worthless upon the hands of the producer. Credit, private and public, failed, This was followed by the decay of our military strength and final dis solution ; and all this the result of a neglect to utilize the vast resources with which Providence had so bountifully supplied us. The lesson is an impressive one, and should teach us the folly of pursuing still in peace a policy which has already resulted in loss and disaster. The intelligent reader will readily perceive that the country described would naturally form the first grand division in the proposed line of de fences, and that active operations must of neces sity be begun in Virginia, and confined to that sec tion so long as the army covering Richmond was able to command the railroads leading South and at the same time serve as a threat to Washington. The more active, therefore, the operations in front of that city the more secure would be the other portions of the Confederacy, because, while their own territory was in danger it would place the Federals on the defensive, and force them to concen trate the major portion of their strength here. The second section of this defensive line is em braced in that portion of country between the head waters of the Potomac and the Ohio. This concentrate their wh&e available force here and at New Orleans. It is true that some unimportant raids might have been undertaken from Missouri, but a small force, assisted by the militia, would in most cases have sufficed to guard against such con tingencies, and, at any rate, the damage from such I raids would have been of little consequence, owing j to the fact that they could not have penetrated | very far beyond the Federal frontier. Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. It flows west across East Tennessee to Chattanooga, where it touches the northern boundary of Georgia, and then bending south enters Alabama, passing along the greater portion of its northern boundary, then turning almost due north it traverses bora Ten- nesseee and Kentucky, emptying into the Ohio near Paducah and but a short distance from the Cumberland. This river is navigable as high as Florence, Alabama, at all seasons, and at high water as far up as Knoxville. From Tuscumbia, Alabama, to Knoxville the great line of railroad between Richmond aud Memphis passes within a short distance of this stream, and for the greater portion ofthe way follows directly along its course. Whoever, therefore, held possession of the river would control the railroad— a consideration of vast importance, as will be seen when we remember that it would break the direct communication be tween the capital of the Confederacy and the West. The possession of these rivers by the enemy, with his vast naval superiority, would give him undisputed possession of Kentucky and the greater portion of Teunessee, and the Missis sippi river as low down as Memphis, and at the same time would supply a valuable base from which to invade the cotton States. It, therefore, became absolutely necessary that they should be closed up, and for this purpose Forts Henry aud Doualdson were erected near the point where they pass from Tennessee into Kentucky. The two rivers here are not a great way apart, and the se lection was in a measure due to the belief that the same covering force would answer for both. Two railroads also penetrated, from the Ohio, into Kentucky—one from Henderson and the other from Louisville—and both united at Bowling Green, a small railroad town near the southern boundary of the State. From Bowling Green the road then passes south to Nashville, on the Cum berland, thence to Stephenson on the Tennessee, thence up the Tennessee to Chattanooga, and from that point, connecting at Atlanta, with the whole railroad system of the South. These two rivers and this road being the only great lines of communication leading South (the Mis sissippi being closed) it was very evident that an invading army must follow the one or the other, and that they would become ihe first object of attention to the enemy. It was therefore neces sary to occupy some position on the road as well as on the rivers north of Nashville, for should the enemy succeed in occupying that place it would compel the Confederates to evacuate Donaldson and open the Cumberland. This would enable them to strike the Tennessee, also, above Fort Henry, and if successful in one great battle, to destroy the communications between Memphis and Richmond, seize the former city and compel the forts on the Mississippi above that point to sur render. Along the eastern boundary of Kentucky, and running across the State of Tennessee in a south west direction is a lofty range called the Cumber land mountain. This range separates east and west Tennessee, and is inaccessable to an army with trains of wagons and artillery, except per haps at Cumberland Gap. This is a strong point, easily defended and of great importance, as it not only covered the Richmond and Memphis railroad, but was in fact the only door by which the upper valley of the Tennessee could be entered from the direction of Kentucky. The Cumberland being closed and there being no railroad lines penetrating this section from thedirectionof the Ohio, nothing more formidable than, a raid could reach it, and to guard against this a small force was all that was needed, so long as the Confederates were able to maintain these positions in front of Nashville, at Fort Donaldson and at Island No. 10. The reader will no doubt see that so long as these points were held, that it was impossible for any invading force to penetrate south of them, andAlie vallev of the ? i^Mississi^i, wai Safir'fi.vAn 1 luf‘Aresen^* i 'S r a foe. The holding of the Mississippi then was the / great point at issue, and it is equally clear and a fact that cannot be controverted that its loss was not only fatal to the campaign, but the death blow to.the Confederacy. Whether this disaster was the result of the incompetency of one or all of the commanding Generals of this unfortunate department, or of neglect on the part of the Gov ernment in providing the means for its defence, or whether it arose from causes over which neither Government or Generals had control, history, per haps will tell. In the meantime we will take a glance at facts and let the reader judge for him self. Having taken a cursory view of the geography of the country that we may be enabled to compre hend more fully the nature of the campaigns be fore us, we will now turn without further delay to active operations in the field. (TO HE CONTINUED.) secreted. All the blood which circulates in and aronnd the bowels, from one end to the other, is collected into a large vein which rnns up to the liver, and then branches oat through all its substance like an artery, and from this vein, in its ramifications, the bile is secreted. Now, it is manifest that if the flaids of the blood, con taining both the elements for the formation of bile, and for the nourishment of the whole sys tem, are drained off by the action of purgatives, the supply of blood to the liver must be dimin ished, thus interfering with the secretion of bile which is necessary for the conversion of the food into chyle, by which the body is nourished and sustained. It is plain, then, that the use of cathartics, and especially of liver medicines, tends ultimately to diminish the qnantity of bile secreted, and thus to prevent proper chyli- fication, which is essential as a means of pre paring the food for the uses of the system. The consequence is, that those who follow this prac tice damage their digestion, impoverish their blood, and invite all forms of disease arising from debility and want of that nutrition which cannot be had without a sufficient supply of rich blood. And while these effects follow more remotely from the action of such medicines on the liver, the immediate and direct effect of all cathartics is to irritate the stomach and bowels, to depress all the vital powers, and to WASH AWAY the nutritive elements which should go to the support of the system. Let us see how these cathartics act: A liver pill, or some other purgative, is taken; the liver is stimulated inordinately, and for a time poors out an excessive qnantity of bile. This flows into the bowels, where it mingles with the half- digested food, with the drug, and with the flood of water which has been drawn from the blood, and the whole passing liken torrent downwards, sweeps away the thick protective muens which naturally coats the lining membrane of the bowels, leaving the vast net-work of vessels and nerves exposed. No wonder that the bowels, when thus treated, writhe and twist like For ilie benefit jf tJ military matters, it ijw those not conversant with well to state here that an in vasion and raid differ from each other in these essential particulars. An invasion involves the gradual advance an army from established bases and with Inies of communication well guarded—such au organization as would be pre pared not only to overrun the enemy’s territory, but to hold it as well. A raid, ou the other hand, is a rapid moveme^I of any body of troops, large or small, into the enemy’s country, who, taking with them supplies sufficient for their object, dis regard lines of communication, make no attempt to hold any part’of the country, overrun and hastily retreat to some more secure position so soon as the object in view is accomplished. In vasions are organized for conquest. Raids are un dertaken for minor objects, such as destroying lines of communication, depots of supplies, or something else whose loss will inflict damage upon the foe. 1 The closing o- the Mississippi would not only secure the States west of that river from invasion, but all that country on the east bank also, and compel the Federal army to operate in front of such lines as might be adopted in Kentucky or Tennessee, instead of having it in their power, by means of the river, to strike the Confederates in the rear. It would alsp have served as the cheapest and best line off communication between the forces operating in this department. Have made it, in fact, a Confederate lake, upon whose banks vast magazines of supplies might be collected and moved witn ease and certainty to the points where they were needed. It was evident to the Federal Government that the only way to regain or hold possession of this country was to open the river; and to this end, for a time, their whole energies were directed. The plan adopted was comprehensive. First, to operate a combined military and naval force di rectly against the blockade, and at the same time march an amy across the country, occupy a posi tion ou thc'lriver below the forts, and by this means destroy the Confederate communications and thus force their evacuation or surrender. To prevent this it would be necessary to occupy Ken tucky. The reader will see by again looking at the map that two navigable rivers empty into the Ohio near JPaducab, and not very far from its mouth. One of these rivers, the Cumberland, rises in eastern Kentucky, and flowing south en ters Tennessee many miles to the eastward of Nashville. From this point it flows west through the heart of the State, and then turning north, re enters Kentucky, traversing that State to the Ohio. This stream is navigable for many miles above Nashville. The other river, the Tennessee, has its sources in the mountains of Southwestern HEALTH DEPARTMENT. BX JNO STAINBACK WILSON, M. D., Physician in charge Hygienic Institute and Turkish Bath, Atlanta, Ga. Formerly Editor “Health Depart ment” Godey’s Lady's Book; Author of Woman’s Home Book of Health. PURGATIVES AND LIVER MEDICINES —FAINTING AND APOPLEXY- CONCUSSION OF THE BRAIN. A London physician, Dr. Inman, says: “Many have heard of a parody by a celebra ted doctor of Cromwell’s dictum: ‘Fear God, my boys, but keep your powder dry.’ The med ical leader, adapting it to his hearers, put the whole duty of man thns: ‘Worship the Lord— that will do for the next-world; and keep your bowels open—that will do for. this. Now, there are thousands who never heard of Cromwell nor his doctor, but who obtain their medical knowledge from men who find it to their interest to inculcate such ideas as this by their false theories. Many people, if we may judge from their conduct, regard the above inj unction as a reli gions obligation—as the first, the great, the only thing necessary to health. If they are well, they take a purge to keep so; if sick, of course the liver or bowels must be at fault, and the remedy is the same. True, the condition of the bowels has much to do with health, and the direction to give them due attention is correct in principle; but the question is, What are the best means for regu lating them ? Are they to be kept open by pur gatives and liver medicines ? Let us answer this in the light of science and common sense. The bile duct from the liver opens into the upper bowel or small intestine very near the stomach, and tnen—in the bowel just below the stomach—the bile mingles with the partially digested food from the stomach, and changes this food into the yellow, creamy substance called chyle. This chyle, thus emitted with and changed by the bile, is then absorbed by the mucous membrane lining the upper bowels, and passes into the blood to replenish it with the elements of nutrition. The bile then, as bile, does not pass through the bowels, bnt is decomposed into its various elements and min gled with the food, forming a new nutritive substance, which is neither bile nor food. Hence, we see that the bile, in a natural state of things, does not pass down through the intestines and act as a cathartic, as many seem to think. When the liver is stimulated to inordinate action by the use of cathartics and “liver pills,” this is the case; but such action is nnnatnral and inju rious, as I will now show. To understand how such means of moving the bowels are injurious, let ns consider for a moment how the bile is A SNAKE IN THE FIKE. No wonder that they close spasmodically and strive to arrest the progress of the destructive iuvader. No wonder that the poor patient looks wan and feels faint and feeble after such an un natural commotion. No wonder that for several days his bowels fall into a state of inactivity, demanding rest, and obstinately refnsing to act. Every one who lias had much experience in the use of cathartics will testify to the trnth of the ab >vo description of their effects. But there is one point that all can understand, and to which I would call special attention. It has been said above that the use of liver medicines will in crease the secretion of bile for a time, though the ultimate result is diminished secretion by draining off the blood which should go to make the bile. There is, however, a more direct, im mediate, and more easily understood way in which the action of such medicines lessens the quantity of bile. We all know that over-work will exhaust any part of the body; and this is more true of our delicate and sensitive internal organism than of our grosser exterior muscular structure which is daily brought in contact with the outer world. The exceedingly tender and sensitive membrane lining the bowels, stimulated to excessive action by cathartics, soon falls into a state of torper after having been thus excited; and conse quently inaction and constipation follow the use of a purgative, as every one who has tried it knows. It is also well known that the use of one cathartic causes a demand for another; and thus the medicine has to be repeated from time to time iu increased doses, until in many cases, the bowels refuse to act except under the un natural and health-destroying stimulus of some irritating drug. The condition of such people well 1>A compared io that of j. * N LAZY HORSE BIDDEN WITH SrUItS. He becomes more and more accustomed to the gentle reminder of his rider's heel, until at last the spur may be plunged into him to its full depth, and he will scarcely quicken his gait. And yet, in the face of such facts as these, which are patsnt to all who will reason and ob serve, our drug-loving and quack- idden people swallow countless bushels of liver pills and other purgatives, never for a moment dreaming that these same pills and purges, instead of re storing health, are, in many instances, the very cause of the derangements which seem to de mand their repeated use. While such medi cines give temporary relief sometimes, they should be used only in cases of extreme neces sity, and as a choice of evils after all other means of relief have been exhausted, never for getting that the result of their frequent employ- mant is chronic invalidism, and life-long repetition in larger and larger doses, and the use of more and more active drugs, until the stomach becomes a VERITABLE APOTHECARY SHOP. The best and only safe and proper remedies for constipation are exercise, kneading the bowels, drinking cold water before breakfast, laxative fruits, vegetables and syrups, jGraham or corn bread ; and above all, a habit of regularity as to the time of attending to the natural calls. If these fail, which they will seldom do, an injec tion of cold or warm water may be resorted to occasionally. Fox torpid liver and the'attendant constipation and secretions I have found the Turkish bath to be a most effective remedy. This opens all the secreting organs, cleanses from all impunities, external and internal, and gives a healthful action to all the functions. FAINTING AND APOPLEXY. When a person faints the air should be let in freely, all tight clothing should be loosened, water should be sprinkled in the face, warmth should be applied to the feet; and most impor tant of all, the head should be lower than the body. In apoplexy or rash of blood to the head, the head and shoulders should be elevated, taking care not to have the head higher than the shoulders with the chin on the breast. Attention to these simple directions may often save life. CONCUSSION OF THE BRAIN. When a sudden blow is given about the head it causes confusion of the mind, or total loss of consciousness, attended with sick stomach or faintness and a feeble, flattering pulse. The treatment of such cases is very much the same as in fainting; that is, absolute rest and quietude, with gentle friction of the whole sur face of the body. No bleedimj. This has been the death of many in such cases, it being a com mon practice a few years ago. Singular Feeding Habits of Wood-Ants.— Mr. McCook, of the Academy of Natural Sci ences of Philadelphia, has published in the “ proceedings” of that body some highly inter esting observations on the habits of Formic a rufa, from which it sppears that these ants have in their separate communities regular provision made whereby the workers are fed without hav ing to quit the scene of their labors. The for agers of a community, as they come down the tree-paths, their abdomens swollen with honey- dew—in which condition they are called by the author repletes— are arrested near the foot by workers from the bill seeking food. The replete rears upon her hind-legs, and places her month to the mouth of the hungry worker, or “pen sioner,” as the author calls him, who assumes the same posture. Otten two, sometimes three pensioners are thus fed at once by one repleto. The latter commonly yields the honey-dew com placently, bat sometimes she is seized and ar rested by the pensioner, occasionally with great vigor.