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(Ofllee: Bank block, up-stairs.)
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ttibcc in Bank Block, over Die Postoffice.
1e027
\V. T. WOFFOIiD,
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—AND—
DEALER IN REAL ESTATE,
( ANS STATION. BARTOW COUNTY, GA.
It. tV. MUItPHEY,
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OPENING ARGUMENT.
By Hon. Thos. W. Milner, of the Coun
ty of Bartow, in the Impeachment
trial of Jno. W. Renfroe, State Treas
urer, delivered Sept. 26, 1879.
May it Please the Court:
The duty has devolved upon me to present,
in a feeble way, the issues ot fact and the prin
ciples of law upon which the House of Rep"
resentatives rely to sustain the Articles of Im
peachment brought agaiust Jolm W. Renfroe,
Treasurer of the State of Georgia.
The novelty of this proceeding, and the ex
peditious manner in which this case has pro
gressed, and my ignorance of the proceedings
of courts of this character, and the circum
stances which surround me at this time, all
conspire to embarrass and render me unable
to address myself, as 1 should like to do, on
such an occasion. The great importance of
this case, both to the respondent and the peo
ple of the State of Georgia, is obvious to each
member of this High Court, and makes it un
necessary for me to ask your patient attention.
Allow me to reduce what I have to say to the
narrowest limits of practicable brevity, for it
is not my purpose to attempt a display of
learning or eloquence, but simply to present
the facts aud explain the principles involved
in this great case in a plain, business manner.
It is my purpose first to take up Ist, 2d aud
:3d Articles of Impeachment, and consider
them together, for they each of them are con
fined to the subject matter, to-wit: That John
W. Renfroe, Treasurer of the State of Georgia,
unmindful of the duties of his office, and ol
his oath of office, has corruptly and illegally
taken and received from certain persons cer
tain sumßof money as interest or commissions
on tin deposits of the public money, contrary
to the Constitution and laws of this State. We
expect to show by testimony,which we are ful
ly prepared to submit to this court at the pro
per time,that in January,lß76,Jno. W. Renfroe
was, by the General Assembly of Georgia,
elected Treasurer to fill the unexpired term of
John Jones, who bad been removed from of
fice, Again in January, 1877, he Was re-elected
by the General Assembly for the full term of
four years. There were certaiu gentlemen
who signed his official bond as his sureties.
The bond which was executed in 1876 wa9
signed by V. R. Tommey, B. J. Wilson, 8. B.
Jloyt, and R. H. Richards, and J. W. Murphy.
These same gentlemen, with the exception of
8. B. Hoyt and R. H. Richards again signed
the official boud of Mr. Renfroe in 18(7.
Under the terms of the Act of 1876, allow
ing the securities on the Treasurer’s bond to
limit their liability, V. R. Tommey bound him
self on the bond of 1876, lor #60,000, B. J.
Wilson for #60,000, 8. B. Hoyt for #30,000, R,
if. Richards for #30,000, aud J. W. Murphy lor
#5,000. On the bond of 1877, V. It. Tommey
bound himself for #60,000, It. J. Wilson for
#IO,OOO aud J. W. Murphy $30,000. Now at
the time the bond ol 1876 was executed Mi.
Tommey was president and Mr. Wilson was a
director of the Georgia Banking and Trust
Company, located in the city of Atlanta, both
of these gentlemen were largely interested in
their bank as stockholders. Mr. 8. B. Hoyt
was president, aud Mr. R. H. , Richards was
cashier of the Atlanta Savings Bauk, and to
gether they owned a large part of the stock of
said bank. We will show that all of these
gentlemen signed the official bond ol J. W.
Renfroe in 1876, upon the condition, which
was assented to by bim, that they, or certain
ones of them, should name particular banks
in which he, as treasurer,, should deposit the
public mouey. The Georgia Banking and
Trust Company WAS at this time a place of de-
VOLUME 11.
posit, and the treasurer was then making cer
tain deposits there. But in pursuance of this
arrangement and agreement between Renfroe
and the named sureties, the Georgia Banking
and Trust Company, and the Atlanta Savings
Bank, were selected and named as the State’s
depositaries, and the treasurer proceeded to
deposit in the vaults of said banks large
amounts of the State funds. We will show
that for the use of these State deposits, the
Georgia Banking and Trust Company paid on
the average monthly balances, an interest at
the rate of five per cent, per annum; the pay
ments were made monthly to Mr. B. J. Wil
son, who seems to have been the main instru
ment in the hands of the treasurer to make
and carry out this arrangement.
Mr. Wilson paid over to the treasurer as he
received this interest on the people’s money,
giving to him his share, which was two per
cent, thereof, and then divided the balance be
tween himself and Mr. Tommey. This ar
raDgemeut eoutiuued until the early part of
1877, when Mr. Wilson withdrew from the
contract. The bank, after that, for the years
1877 and 1878, paid the iuterest to Mr. Tom
mey, who regularly paid Renfroe his share of
the same. There were deposits of the public
money placed with the Atlanta Savings Bank
during the year 187 G, aud for the use of the
same B. J. Wilson received from the bank two
per cent, per annum on the average monthly
balauces. This entire sum was, as the same
was received by Wilson, paid over to Renfroe,
the treasurer of the State.
After Mr. Wilson withdrew from the ar
rangement, Mr. John W. Murphy received the
interest on these deposits with the Atlanta
Savings bank. Mr. John W. Murphy, you
will remember, signed Reufroe’s offical bond
in 1876, limiting his liability to 15,000.00. In
1877 he signed the bond and limited his liabili
ty to $30,000. Mr. Murphy was appointed a
clerk in the treasurer’s office in 1876, aud re
mained in said office until a few days ago,
when he resigned. We will show that in 1876
Mr. Murphy applied to the Treasurer to be al
lowed to make with the Citizens’ Bank, the
Bank of the Slate of Georgia, and the Atlanta
Savings Bank, an arrangement similar to that
made by Wilson and the other sureties with
the banks which have already been mentioned.
We will show that J. W. Renfroe, treasurer of
this State, assented to this proposition, and
with his permission Mr. Murphy contracted
with the banks named, that they should pay
him live per cent, per annum on the average
monthly balances of the public deposits, Mur
phy agreeing on his part that the treasurer
should deposit large sums of the public money
in said banks. The interest was paid by the
banks to Murphy on the monthly balances,
aud the same equally shared between Murphy
and Renfroe.
This arrangement between these parties and
the Treasurer continued until about the Ist of
November, 1878. There was paid by these
banks to Renfroe and liis sureties during all
this time the large sum of $22,198.65, for the
use of the money of the people of Georgia
which had been deposited with them, on con
dition aud on terms that they would pay in
terest. Of this large sum of money $10,358.81
was paid to Renfroe, the balance was paid to
his sureties, as follows: Wilson received $651.-
41, Mr. Tommey received $4,582.11, and J. W.
Murphy $6,607.32. We will show that of the
aggregate sum received by Renfroe $5,058.19
was paid to him before the adoption of the
Constitution of IS? 7 , and $5,300.62 after that
instrument became the organic law of the
State. We will show these facts and circum
stances which will establish the fact that all
this money was received by Renfroe for his
own individual beuefit, and converted to his
own use, with the full knowledge on his part
that it was paid as iuterest on the funds of the
State by the banks.
These facts we will establish by testimony
at the proper time. They will be offered in
support and maintenance of the charges con
tained in the first three articles, with the ac
companying specifications. We insist that
these facts show conduct on the part of the
respoudent, as an officer of the State, which
in law amounts to high crimes and misde
meanors. Conduct which, though not indict
able under auy law of our penal code, imper
illed the safety of the public funds—the treas
ury of the State; and shows the treasurer un
fit to occupy the high and responsible official
position to which he has been elected by the
general assembly of the State.
What is an Impeachable offense? This ques
tion has been fully discussed in a very late
case in. this Court. It would be considered
not out of place for me to discuss it briefly at
this place in my argument. At the risk,there
fore, of proving tedious, allow me to read
some authorities on this question. We insist
that the treasurer’s conduct in receiving this
interest on the public deposits is impeachable
as a high crime aud misdemeanor, in that he
violated his oath of office; he violated his duty
under the plain and comprehensive provisions
of the statute laws of the State regulating and
defining the duties of his office; he violated
the plain and positive prohibition of the con
stitution of the State. I have not had time to
examine into tiie many authorities on this sub
ject, but, from a hasty examination of the law,
I find that the following definition of what
are impeachable high crimes and misdemean
ors is well sustained by both English and
American writers on the subject. That defi
nition is as follows:
“An impeachable high crime or misdemean
or is one iu its nature or consequences subver
sive of some fundamental or essential piinci
ple ol government, or highly prejudicial to the
public interest; and this may consist of a viola
tion of the Constitution, of law, of an official
oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omit
ted, or without violating a positive law by the
abuse of discretionary powers from improper
motives or for an improper purpose.”
I desire to read a few pages of a learned and
exhaustive brief of all the precedents and au
thorities upon this subject in this country and
England, given by the author of this definition
of what are impeachable offenses:
“Whatever ciimes and misdemeanors were
the subjects of impeachment in England prior
to the adoption of our constitution, and as un
derstood by the framers, are therefore subjects
of impeachment before the Senate of the
United States, subject only to the limitations
of the constitution. The framers ot our con
stitution, looking to the impeachment trials of
England, aud the writers on parliamentary
and common law, and to the constitutions ami
usages of our own States, saw that no act ol
Parliament or of any State legislature ever un
dertook to define an impeachable offeuse.They
saw that the whole system of crimes, as de
fined iu acts of parliament, and as recognized
at common law, was prescribed for and adapt
ed to the ordinary courts.” 2 Hale’s PI. Crown
ch. 20, p.|150.
“They saw that the high court of impeach
ment took jurisdiction of cases where no in
THE FREE PRESS.
dictable crime had been committed, in many
instances, and there were then as there yet
aie, two parallel modes of reaching some but
not all offenders—one by impeachment, the
other by indictment. In such eases a party
first indicted may be afterwards impeached,
and the latter trial may proceed, notwithstand
ing an indictment; on the other hand, the
King’s Bench held in the Fitzharris case, that
an impeachment was no answer to an indict
ment in that court. The two systems are in
no way connected, though they may adopt
principles applicable to the other, and each
may shine by the others borrowed light. With
these landmarks to guide them, our fathers
adopted a constitution under which official
mal.easance and nonfeasance, and in some
cases misfeasance, may be the subject of im
peachmeut, although not made criminal by act
of congress, or so recognized by the common
law of England or of any State in the Union.
They adopted impeachment as a means of re
mo\ ing men from office whose misconduct
imperils the public safety and renders them
unlit to occupy official position.” Says this
author, “All this is supported by the elomeuta
ry writers, both English and American on par
liamentary ami common law by tho Engllsll
and American usage iu cases of impeachment;
by the opinion of the framers of the constitu
tion; by eoutemporaneous construction—all
uucontradicted by any author, authority, case
or jurist, for more than three quarters of a
century after the adoption of the constitu
tion.”
We could produce many authorities to show
that the phrase “high crimes and misdemean
ors,” as used iu the constitution in this eohn
try aud England, are not limited to crimes de
fined by statute, or as recognized at common
law.
Christian, who may be supposed to have un
derstood the British constitution when he
wrote, says: “When the words high crimes
and misdemeanors are used iu prosecutions by
impeachment the words have no definite sig
nification, but are used merely to give
greater solemnity to the charge.” Note to 4
Blackstone, 5.
Wooddeson, whose lectures were read at
Oxford iu 1877, declared that impeachment ex
tended to cases of which the ordinary courts
had no jurisdiction. He says: “Magistrates
and officers may abuse their delegated powers
to the extensive detriment of the community,
and at the same time in a manner not properly
cognizable before the ordinary tribunals.” Aud
lie proceeds to say the remedy is by impeach
ment. 2 Wooddeson lectures, 596.
ludeed, the word “misdemeauor” has a com
mon law, a parliamentary,and a popular sense.
In the parliamentary sense, as applied to of
ficers, it means “mal-administration,” or mis
conduct uot necessarily indictable, not ouly in
England but in the United States. Demeanor
is conduct, aud he is guilty of misde
meanor who misdemeans or miscon
ducts. The power of impeachment,, so far
as the president is concerned, was inserted in
the constitution to secure “good behaviour,”
to punish “misconduct,” and defend the com
munity against incapacity, negligence or per
fidy of the chief magistrate; to punish abuse
of power, treachery, corrupting bis electore,
or, as Madison declared, for an act which
might be called a misdemeauor. The consti
tution declares that the judges, both of the
supreme aud inferior courts, shall hold their
commissions during good behavior. By a
public law, every judge is required to take an
oath as follows: “I do solemnly swear that I
will administer justice without respect to per
sons, and do equal right to the poor aud the
rich; that I will faithfully and impartially dis
charge and perform all the duties iacuinbent
upon me as a judge, etc., according to the best
of my abilities and understanding, agreeably
to the constitution and haws of the United
States. So help me God.” By another public
law—the constitution —the president is requir
ed to take an oath thit he will faithfully exe
cute the office of president of the United
States, and will, to the best of his ability, pre
serve, protect and defend the constitution of
the United States. These oaths are public latvs,
defining duties, and a violation of them is au
impeachable misdemeanor, for Judge Black
stoue says, “A crime or misdemeanor is an act
committed or omitted in violation of a public
law either forbiddiug orcommaudiug it,”
These views are sustained by the opinions
of the framers of the Constitution, declared by
themselves in convention, by Madison in the
Virginia convention of 1788, and by Alexan
der Hamilton in the Federalist, who says that
several of the State constitutions have follow
ed the example of Great Britain; aud up to
that time the State constitutions had adopted
the British system with only some modifica
tions, but none of them recognizing the idea
that impeachment was limited to indictable
acts, but all affirming that the subjects of this
jurisdiction were offenses of a political nature.
Some of these constitutions limited impeach
ment to “mal and corrupt conduct in office,”
or as the New York constitution of 1777, to
“venal and corrupt conduct in office,” while
tlie constitution of the United States discarded
all these limitations and gave the power iu the
broadest terms.
Curtis, in his history of the constitution,
says: “Although an impeaelimeiTt may involve
an inquiry whether a crime against any posi
tive law has been committed, jet it is not nec
essaiily a trial lor a crime, nor is there any
necessity, iu the case of crimes committed by
public officers for the institution ol any special
proceeding for the inflictions of the punish
ment prescribed by the laws, since they, like
all other pcrsons.are amenable to the ordinary
jurisdiction of the courts of justice, in respect
of offenses against positive law. The purposes
of au impeachment lie wholly beyond the pen
alties of the statutes or the customary law. The
object of the proceeding is to ascertain wheth
er cause exists for the removing of a public
officer from office.” Curtis’ history of the con
stitution, 260.
Story says: “Congress lias unhesitatingly
adopted the conclusion that no previous stat
ute is necessary to authorize an impeachment
for any official misconduct. There are many
offenses purelj’ political which have beeu held
to be within the reach of parliamentary im
peachments, not one of which is in the slight
est manner alluded to in our statute books.
And, indeed, political offenses are of so vari
ous and complex a character, so utterly inca
pable of being defined or classified, that- the
task of positive legislation would be imprac
ticable, it it were not almost absurd to attempt
it. What, for instance, could positive legisla
tion do in cases of impeachment like the
charges against Warren Hastings iu 1788? Re
sort, then, must be had either to parliamentary
practice and the common law, in order to as
certain what are high crimes and misdemean
ors, or the whole subject must be left to the
arbitrary discretion of the Senate for the time
being. The latter is so incompatible with the
genius of our institutions that no lawyer or
CARTERSVILLE, GEORGIA, THURSDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 23, 1879.
statesman would be inclined to countenance
so absolute a despotism of opinion aud prac
tice, which might make that a crime at one
time or in one person which would be deemed
innocent nt another time <ind in smother per
son. * * * * And, however much it may
fall in with the political theories of certain
statesmen and jurists to deny ihe existence of
a common law, belonging to and applicable to
the nation in ordinary cases, no one has yet
been bold enough to assert that the power of
impeachment is limited only to offenses posit
ively defined in the statute book of the Uuion
as impeachable high crimes aud misdemean.
ors.” 1 Story on Const., 799.
I could continue for hours to read these au
thorities, which define and Make known what
are impeachable offenses. I will not detain
the Court longer by reading from elementary
writers. Let us come close up to the question
made in this great case. Look at the case un
der our own laws and constitution. John W,
Renfroe, as treasurer, took an oath, when he
was installed, as treasurer of Georgia. That
oath is a public law in Georgia, and in so far
as it defined the duties of his office, he was re
quired to regard it, and we therefore refer to
it as a part of the law of th* - That oath
reads as follows:
“I, John W. Renfroe, do solemnly swear, that
I will faithfully perform all and singular the
duties of treasurer of the State of Georgia, to
the best Of my ability, during my continuance
in office as such; that I am not the holder of
any public money due the State, unaccounted
for; that lam not the holder of any office of
trust under the United States, nor either of the
several States, nor of any foreign State; and
that I am otherwise qualified to hold said ol
flee under the constitution and laws of Geor
gia; and that I will support the constitution of
the United States, and of this State; <&> help me
God! j. \y. Renfroe.”
This oath we will introduce in evidence at
the proper time. I read it here as a part also
of the law of this case. Let me read also in
this immediate connection a paragraph in the
code of Georgia, which has for its purpose the
regulation in part of the duties of the treasurer
of the State. It is this : “ lie ” (that is the
treasurer) “shall not,under any circumstances,
use himself, or allow others to use, the funds of
the State, in his hands; and lor every violation
of this section he is liable to the State for the
sum of five hundred dollars as a penalty, or as
a forfeiture ol salary, if said forfeiture will
pay the penalty incurred.” l’ar. Bof Sec. 92 of
Code 1873.
This section of the code was re-enacted by
the legislature in February, 1876, in the identi
cal words. Again, we find the following con
tained in our code: “It is, moreover, the duty
of the treasurer, to keep sale y the scrip for
bank stock, the State bonds and other evidences
of the educational fund, and manage and con
trol the same for the purposes to which they
are pledged. He may, under the direction ol
the Governor, deposit all funds set apart for
the purpose of education, or any other purpose
not required for immediate use, in any charter
ed bank ot this State, subject to his draft as
treasurer, and with the approval ol the Gover
jior make such contract with the banks for the
use of the funds as may he beneficial to the
State,” par. 7, sec. 92, code 1873. The last sec
tion of the code which we have read is also re
enacted in the same words in the statute of
1876, approved Feb. 25th, 1876. These were the
laws of force in Georgia, when Mr. Renfroe ex
ecuted the bond given by him in 1876, as treas
urer. The bond which was signed by V. R.
Tommey, a. i>. iioj-t, n. Wilson, • w Rich
ards and John W.Murphy, as his sureties. This
bond was executed in the year 1876, shortly af
ter his election as treasurer, by the general as
sembly. This was after the passage of the act
of 1876, which has been alluded to, it was by
the terms of this act that these sureties limited
their liability on that bond as stated.
This act of 1876, was passed for the protec
tion of the State treasury, to define the obliga
tions pertaining to the office of treasurer, and
to prescribe his duties. it provided the man
ner of his election and term of office, his oath
and bond, and the conditions of his bond; it
provided that by express stipulation in writ
ing the sureties on his bond might limit their
liability, etc. All the regulations and require
ments were by this act thrown around the
treasury of the State, and were deemed wise
and prudent by the patriotic legislature of 1876.
The 10tli paragraph of section XII. of this act,
is as follows: “He shall keep safely the scrip
for bank stock, the State bonds, and other evi
dences of the educational fund, and manage
and control the same for the purposes to which
they are pledged. He may, with the approval
ol the Governor, deposit all funds set apart for
the purpose of education, or any other purpose
not required for immediate use, in any charter
ed bank iu this State, subject to his draft as
treasurer, and. with the governor, make such
contract with said bank, lor the use of such
funds, as may be beneficial to the State.”
Tlie next paragraph is as follows: “The treas
urer shall not, under any circumstances, use
himself, or allow others to use, the funds of the
State in his hands,” etc. These paragraphs of
this act are but a literal re-enactment of the
same sections which we have read from the
code. Under the law he could have made an
arrangement with these banks, subject to tlie
approval of the governor, for the use of the
public funds by them—such contract as would
have been deemed beneficial to the State. These
banks were certainly solvent—the Georgia
Banking and Trust Company and Atlanta Sav
ings Bank, and tlie other banks named as
places of deposit. They paid interest on the
monthly balances of the deposits held by them.
A part of this interest went into the pockets
of Renfroe, the balance was appropriated by
bis sureties. Why did he not make the con
tract so as that the benefit would go to the
State. He violated his sworn duty, and under
tlie law of the State, and all the authorities, lie
committed an impeachable offense.
But there are certain provisions of the con
stitution which I will readhere. No matter
what may be said of the law in the code, and
the statutes which existed prior to the adoption
of the constitution. The constitution of 1877
speaks on the subject of the offenses charged
against this officer, in no uncertain way. Ar
ticle XII, section 9, paragraph 1, of that con
stitution, reads as follows: “The receiving, di
rectly or indirectly, by any officer of the State
or county, or member or officer of the general
assembly, of any interest, profits or perquisites
arising from the use or loan of the public
funds in his hands, or moneys to be raised
through his agency for State or county pur
poses, shall be deemed a felony, and punishable
as may be prescribed by law, a part of which
punishment shall he a disqualification for hold
ing office.”
Article V, section 1, paragraph 5: “The treas
urer shall not be allowed, directly or indirect
ly, to receive any fee, interest, or reward from
any person, bank, or corporation, for the de
posit or use, in any manner, of the public funds;
and the General Assembly shall enforce this
provision by suitable penalties.”
These are plain and comprehensive provi
sions of the organic law of the State. They
need no prohibitory statute passed to make
them operative so lar as this officer ivas con
cerned. They plainly and flatly forbid what
we say we will prove he has been guilty of.
And his plain and palpable violation of the
Constitution, when added to his w ilful and de
liberate violation of the duties required of him
by the code,and by the statute of 1876,we insist
make his conduct such a highcritne and mis
demeanor, as when fully established by proof,
will require at the hands of this High Cour
his removal from office, or other judgment as
this Court in its wise discretion may make un
der our Constitution.
I have presented the facts and law which we
rely on for the support and maintenance ol the
first, second and third articles of impeachment;
but before I leave this branch of this case I de
sire to make some relerence to the answer ol
the respondent.
This answer ol tlie respondent is a most re
markable document. I will read such parts of
this document as may l>e necessary to make
myself understood in my remarks upon the
same. It sets out as follows: “In answer to ar
ticles first, second and third, this respondent
says that lie did receive during the years men
tioned therein, sums of money from the banks
in which he had made deposits, as treasursr, of
funds belonging to the State of Georgia. The
suggf stion that he should lake such money
came from his sureties on his official bond, who
said to him that the banks would pay them for
having the deposits turned into said banks,
and being on respondent’s official bond, they
claimed a right to be heard in suggesting the
banks in which%ucb deposits should be made,
provided this should not be in conflict with any
law of the State. They did not request respon
dent to violate any law of tlie State for the pur
pose of making any deposit whatever. Respon
dent’s answer to them was, that if such pro
ceeding was in violation of no law, he had no
objection to give to the deposits the direction
they wished, liclore uuj aotio,. at ail had
been taken in responses this proposition, re
spondent gave close attention to the law, to
ascertain whether the receipt by his sureties
or by himself, of such money from the banks,
would be in contravention of any existing law.
This was in the early part ol the year 1876, and
of course, prior to tlie adoption of the present
constitution.
The only law which the respondent could
find bearing on the subject was that section of
the code which provides that “He (the treasu
rer) shall uot, under any circumstances, use
himself, or allow others to use the funds in his
hands, and for every violation,” etc. He ad
mits that he took the interest for the use of the
deposits; that the suggestion came from his sure
ties. He examined the law carefully and close
ly before he consented to the arrangement,
and could find no law on the subject, except
the section of the code which he quotes.He cer
tainly must have read the section of the code
which immediately precedes the section or
paragraph which he quotes. The paragraph
quoted by him is paragraph 8 of section 92 of
the code, and paragraph 7 of the same section
which immediately precedes the one quoted by
him could liaruly have escaped the notice of
one reading the entire section. The whole
section would have been read by him if he was
in good faith seeking for light on this subject
at that time. And what would this preceding
section have told him ? “That he may, under
the direction of the governor, deposit all funds
set apart for the purpose of education, or any
other purpose not required for immediate use,
in any chartered bank of this State, subject to
his draft as treasurer, and with the governor
make such contract with said bank for the
use of such funds as may be beneficial to the
State. No ! he did see this paragraph in
the section of the code he was reading
at the time, but skipped over it, and read
that one which forbids him to use simply
himself the money in hand. He, therefore,
proceeded to make the arrangement by which
he and his sureties were benefited. His con
tract was made with the banks for the use of
the money, but that contract was made for
Renfroe’s benefit, and not the benefit of the
State! By this contract Renfroe has put into
his pocket more than $10,000.00! and the State
has lost that sum unless he be required to pay
it into the treasury of the State. '•'The only
law ” which he found, sadly happens not to be
tho laa* nn the subiect which existed at the
time, and which if it been complied with,
this trouble would not have befallen this treas
urer.
He sets up in his answer that the provision
or paragraph of the code which he discovered,
and which he quotes in his answer, came up
for consideration beiore the general assembly
ol Georgia in 1871, and received what he insists
should be regarded as a “legislative construc
tion.” Certain suits had been commenced
against N. L. Angier, then treasurer of the
State, to recover the penalties then prescribed,
upon the ground that he had received such
gratuity on deposits to the amouut of $7,000 or
SB,OOO. The following resolution was passed in
reierence to said suits: “Whereas it has not
been customary to require the State treasurer
to pay in the treasury interest on the deposits
of the State funds:
"Be it resolved , That the treasurei of the State
shall not be liable lor any such interest; and
"Be it further resolved, That the suits now
pending against the present treasurer, involv
ing such interest, under the provisions of sec
tion 86, paragraph 8 of Irwin’s revised code, he
discontinued, and that the attorney general is
hereby instructed to dismiss said suits.
“Approved December 8,1871.”
This resolution, I say, is plead here as a leg
islative construction of the section of the code,
and as a precedent to Justify this treasurer in
so using and controlling the public funds as to
make an interest on the same and increase his
own private estate. I have already attempted
to show how he could have so used this money
and performed the duties of his olliee, as to
have made an arrangement which would have
benefited the State. He takes cover under this
Angier resolution. Well, let us look into its
history a little. In the first place, we insist
that it is of no use whatever as a “legislative
construction” otthe section of the code. This
court would hardly give to it the force and ef
fect of a law which abrogated or repealed the
provisions ot the code. But if I understand
this resolution properly, it was simply an act
on the part of the democratic party, then just
taking control of the State, intended as a sort
of compensation to Angier for what he did in
services rendered the State in the dark days
when Bullock and his crew were controlling
the oftices of the State and its government.
Thoro is another matter which 1 flftsil’G to refer
to in this immediate connection, which, to my
mind, makes it plain that the respondent’s an
swer rather aggravates the high crimes and
misdemeanors charged against him, than pal
liates or excuses.
lie says that he might have “encountered
serious difficulty,” had :t not happened that he
was a member of the general assembly in the
year 1871, which legislature passed this Angier
resolution. He was elected to the office of
treasurer by the general assembly of Georgia
in 1876, in the early part ol February or Janu
ary of that year, and this arrangement which
he was considering, about to he entered into
with his bondsmen, was on hand after the pas
sage of the act of 1876, which was a general
regulation of the treasury department of the
State. This act which allowed his sureties to
tolimit their liability on the bold; this act
which was and is to-day the very law under
which he has transacted the ilutiesof hisoffice;
the act which provides the books to be kept in
his office, and all the details thereof, and which
he read no doubt carefully and studiously;
this act re-enacted the section of t he code which
he quotes in his - answer; it re-enacts the sec
tion which precedes it immediately. And here
in this act of 1876, approved February 25, 1876,
we have the law of the Georgia treasury and
the prescribed duties oi the treasurer; it pro
vides that he shall not use or permit others to
use the money i 1 his hands under certain penal
ties; it provides that he may make such con
tracts with nanks lor the use of the public
money as maybe beneficial to the State; it makes
all these provisions identical with the law as we
find it in the code of 1863, which existed at the
passage of the Angier resolution of 1871. And I
ask this court which should have been looked
to by this officer as a lesgislative construction
of the code, the resolution of 1871 or the act of
1876?
The act of 1876 was the law at the time this
arrangement was made between these sureties
and this treasurer, and was the law under
j which h e made his bond; and to which he
should have looked for “legislative construe
! tion”ofsucli resolutions as the Angier rcsoiu-
I tlon, especially when he was in search after a
i Precedent upon which to predicate his light to
take and receive as his own the interest which
he made by loaning out the money.
But I will not discuss longer this part of the
answer of the respondent. It is plain to me
that this officer has violated his high trust, and
been unmindful of the duties of his high
office, in this, that he did not look to the law
of 1876 as the rule of his conduct—this law,
which was placed on the statute book just at
the time he assumed the responsible duties oi
his office. He must have known of the exist
ence of this act of 1876. lie does not plead that
he did not know the law as contained in this
act. And his arrangement with Wilson and
his other sureties, by which he enriched him
self, was a clear violation of the law—deliber
ate and intentional. I repeat that his viola
tion of the duties required of him as treasurer
by the act of 1876 was wilful and intentional!
We gather the intention which prompts the
conductof a man from the circumstances wl icli
surround him at the time of the commission of
the act. There is no other way by which we
able to read the secict purposes of the hu
man heart than by the light of the surrounding
circumstances. Apply this rule to the act or
conduct of this officer, while taking and
receiving this interest for the use of the public
deposits. Mr. Wilson paid him a large part of
this money—how was it done? under what
was this: "Addition, division and silence! ’’
Mum was the word ! Wilson would go into
the office with a sealed envelope, hand it to
him—he accepted it always. No questions were
asked. No memoranda was made. The money
was secretly and quietly put into his pocket,
and the stillness of the grave was preserved by
the high contracting parties. Why all this se
crecy ? What docs it mean? It means this
only: That he knew in his heart that his con
duct would not bear the light of day; beuce it
must be covered over with silence, Does this
not appear to be a wilful and deliberate viola
tion of the Ltw, and is not the corrupt intention
of the act manifested by the effort made to hide
and to cover the guilt ?
This secrecy and silence was kept up by
Renfroe for a long time, before even .1. W. Mur
phy, who every one knows to be a “ sharp and
quick” fellow, in ordinary transactions, could
discover the secret. At last his suspi
cions were aroused by the sight of these
sealed envelopes dropping into the
hands of the treasurer, and he sum
moned the courage to do so, and actual
ly did inquire of Renfroe what it all meant?
Renfroe told him very freely and frankly, and
from that day, Murphy began the work ot
making what he could out of the State deposits
In the way of interest. His first step was to
raise his liability on the bond of Renfroe, from
$5,000 to $30,000. This was in January of 1877,
and but a short time after he had made the
valuable discovery. He then with the knowl
edge and consent of Renfroe proceeded to cer
tain banks in the city of Atlanta, and proposed
to control the deposit of State funds into their
vaults, on condition that they would allow him
an interest on the average monthly balances.
This arrangement was perfected with the
knowledge and by the authority of Renfroe,
with the Atlanta Savings bank, the Citizen's
bank, and the Bank of the State of Georgia.
These banks each paid to Murphy the sum of
five per cent, per annum on the average month
ly balances; as regularly as the month rolled
round he got his interest and divided it with
Remroe. wiiu cm nay that Kenrroe did not
know that he was violating the law in receiv
ing this interest in this manner? These are
the circumstances which we say throw light on
the intention and knowledge of Renfroe in the
commission of the act charged against him !
We expect to establish this by good and suffi
cient evidence at the proper time.
But the respondent says in his answer that
this practice of receiving this interest from the
banks in which deposits were made, was con
tinued until soon after the first session of the
general assembly undei the constitution of
1877, which com ened on the first Wednesday
in November, 1878, He then put a stop to it,
for this reason: He was informed by the Hon.
John I. Hall, then and now a member of the
house of representatives, that he w'as about to
introduce a bill in the house making it a penal
offense. That this was the first time that he
learned that there were provisions in the new
constitution forbidding this practice ! What
is this ? He pleads his ignorance of the prohib
itory clauses of the new constitution ! Was he
not here in the capitol building, iu his office,
at the time the sovereign people of Georgia, in
convention assembled to make an organic law
for the people of the State and for posterity ?
Did not that convention hold its session just
above his office room ? And did it not send a
committee into his office? That convention
fixed his salary—fixed it too low, if you please.
But did not it, almost in the same breath, say
to this officer that he should not, directly or in
directly, receive interest on the public depos
its ? Can this high court listen to this humili
ating plea of ignorance from this high officer
of our State government ? May the court
please: If we are to excuse this officer for vio
lation of statute law and the law of the consti
tution on the plea of ignorance, then might we
not as well unbar the penitentiary and unloose
the chains of our convict gangs ? Many of
them cannot read, and did not know, when
they committed the act which consigned them
to confinement, that they were violating the
law. This court, we insist, cannot hear this
plea of ignorance. The question is, simply,
has the law been violated? Bet me read the
following from Sedgewick on the subject of
ignorance:
“We have already had occasion to notice the
rule that ignorance of the law cannot be set up
in defense. All are bound to know the law,
(tnd tiiisholdo firooil n£ well in regal'd to tile
common law as to statute law—as well in re
gard to criminal as to civil cases. In regard
now to penal laws, it is strictly true that igno
rance is no excuse for the violation of a statute.
So in regard to frequent attempts which have
been made to exonerate individuals charged
with disobedience to penal laws on the ground
of good faith or error of judment, it has been
held that no excuse ol this kind will avail
against the peremptory word of the statue im
posing a penalty. If the prohibited act has
been doe, the penalty must be \}au\.”-Sedge
wick on State and Constitutional Law, page 100.
In the trial of Lord Mellville it was insisted
that his use of the publi • money was not im
peachable unless the motive was guilty. “The
question in the case,” said the defense, “as in
all cases, is the motive of the heart, acto non est
reus, nisi meus sit rea—A person is not guilty if
his heart is not guilty.” But in the questions
put to and decided by the judges, the motive
was ignored, ar.d only the legality of his con
duct decided. Our code, and our own supreme
court, declare the familiar doctrine that laws,
after promulgation, are obligatory upon all the
inhabitants of the State, and ignorance of
the law excuses no one.
In concluding my remarkszn these first three
articles of impeachment, brought by the house
of representatives against John W. Renfroe,
allow me to again say, that in the proper place
we will offer the evidence sufficient to support
and maintain said articles.
I desire now to address myself to the charge
contained in the fourth articleof impeachment.
This article charges John W. Renfroe, treasu
rer of this State, with illegally, wilfully and
corruptly charging, demanding and receiving
from A. K. Childs, president of the Northeast
ern raili'oad company, and from li. L. Moss,
treasurer of said company, the sum of $247 for
affixing his signature officially as treasurer to
the coupons attached and belonging to five
hundred and twenty bonds issued by said rail
road company, indorsed by the State. This was
rates of advertising.
Advertisements will lie inserted at the rates of
n , r * nc * l f° r the hrst insertion, ami
i* lfty Cents for each additional insertion.
CONTRACT RATES.
Space. i mo. 8 mos. 6 mos. 1 year.
One inch, $2 50 $5 00 $7 50 $K)~Oo“
two inches, 375 750 12 50 18 00
Ihrce inches, 500 10 00 17 50 25 00
Four inches, 625 12 50 22 50 82 00
I ourth column 750 15 00 25 00 40 00
Half column, 15 00 25 00 40 00 000
One column, 20 00 40 00 60 00 100 00
NUMBER hi.
an official act required of the State treasurer
b> the charter of the company, granted by the
legislature. We expect to show by crcdihle
testimony that this charge was made by Mr.
Renfroe of the officers of this railroad compa
ny, and they paid It. That it is conduct which
is in direct violation of the law and constitu
tion of the State there can be no doubt. 111 the
first place, we insist that in taking this fee
from the people he violated this section of the
code:
“Extortion shall consist in any public officer
unlawfully taking, by color of his office, from
any person,any money or thing of value that
is not due to him, or more than his due.”— Code
$4507.
Again: ‘‘Any public officer who shall, by
himself, his deputy, or other person employed
by him, be gnilty of extortion in demanding
and receiving other and greater fees than by
law allowed him; or shall, by color of his office
take from any person any money or any other
thing of value that is not due to him, or more
than his due, such officer shall be subject to
indictment, and,on conviction, shall be pun
ished as prescribed in $4310 of this code, and
shall, moreover, be dismissed f t’Ain ofllou,"
Code, $4508.
Under these sections of the code we insist
that the taking of this money from these men,
as a fee for an official act, a fee not allowed
him by law, the treasurer was guilty of extor
tion, fhis is an indictable offense; nevertheless,
it is an impeachable offense. But there is still
another law in this State which this treasurer
in this act violated, it is tnis: Paragraph 7,
section 2, article 5, of the constitution of 1877:
“The secretary of State, the comptroller gen
eral anu the treasurer shall not be allowed any
fee, perquisite or compensation, other than
their salaries, as prescribed by law, except
their necessary expenses when absent from
the seat of government on the business of the
State.” The 11th section o' the act of 1870 says:
“He (the treasurer) shaH receive no perquisites
lor any official act, but the fees prescribed
shall be collected by him and paid into the
State treasury.” Where is the law which au
thorized this treasurer to charge and receive
this lee lor placing his name on the coupons
attached to these bouds ? Under the act of
1876, if there was any law to authorize the
charge of these fees, and they were collected
by authority of law, then they should be iu the
treasury of the Statu. We expeet to show that
tlroy were collected and put into the pocket of
tliis respondent, and we say that liis conduct
in so charging and receiving this fee is a plain
and palpable violation of the law, the consti
tution and his oath of office. For these reasons
we insist that for this act—he should be im
peached.
j come now to the fifth article of impeach
ment. This article charges John W. Renfroe,
treasurer of this State, with Wrongfully ami
corruptly proposing to E. P. Alexander, pres
ident of the Georgia railroad and banking
company, to deposit with said railroad and
banking company of the State funds, to be
taken from the treasury of the State, large
sums of money varying $50,000 to SIOO,OOO, to
remain continuously on deposit with said
railroad company, upon the condition anil in
consideration that said Alexander, as presi
dent, would appoint a personal friend, to-wit:
T. J. Pritchett, to some position of employ
ment and profit. By this conduct we insist
that the treasurer proposed to use the funds
of the State for his own personal aggrandise
ment, and for the accomplishment of his own
private purposes and designs. I submit
whether or not this act docs not violate that
section of the act of 1876 which forbids the
treasurer from using nr allowing othore to use
the public fund ? What difference is there in
the act of using the money of the State for the
purpose of making interest thereon by a loan,
and in using it for the object alleged in
article?
1 submit that this is a grave anil serious
charge against this public officer. Here he is
attempting to use the people’s money for his
own private gain, or that of His personal
friend. Under such a precedent a State treas
urer may lay the foundation of political pro
motion and preferment. Suppose one of the
heads of a department of the government at
Washington, should so far forget the obliga
tions of his official duty as to direct his power
and patronage, not to the promotion of the
welfare of the country, but with the known
and avowed purpose of his own personal or
political aggrandisement, who would insist
that he ought not to be impeached and re
moved from office? Take our treasurer; sup
pose lie should, select as his places of deposit,
the banks of his political and personal friends
for no purpose save his own political aggran -
disement, who would say that his conduct was
not Impeachable? I submit that this was an
effort to improperly use the public money in
trusted into his care and keeping. He should
have been making an effort to place this
money, for which ho had no immediate use,
with some solvent bank in this State, under a
contract beneficial to the State. This was his
sworn duty under the law of the State, and by
so doing doubtless he could have caused at
least the sum of $22,000.00 or more, to have been
covered into the treasury as interest on the
people’s money.
Iu this way he could have made and saved to the
State more than enough to have paid the salary of
the treasurer for the term of ten years. But this
was not in the mind of the man. lie was looking
to his own interest, and the $22,000, and over, has
gone into his own pocket, and into the pockets
of his personal friends. We insist that
if we show by testimony, sufficient to establish the
charge contained in this, the fifth article of im
peachment, that the conduct is such in law as will
amount to an impeachable offense. We have about
closed cur statement of this great case; and now,
may it please the court: We insist that we will
prove that John W. Renfroe, has, for the sake of
his own private gain, and his own personal aggran
disement, been disgracefully instrumental in estab
lishing a precedent subversive of the good faith
wnicb siiouia be found ia tlio oonJnet ~f all persons
to whom the great concerns of this State, and of
the good people thereof, may be hereafter confided;
in that he has violated his oath of office—a public
law, and toe rule of his conduct; the plain and
simple statute laws ot the State—the guide to
proper and honest management and control of the
great interests of the people confided to
him; the strong and emphatic language of
the constitution of the State—the voice of the
people expressed in solemn convention as
sembled, as to his rights and duties as the trustee
and servant of the people ; all these laws which are
foifthe protection of the people of the whole State,
he has deliberately and wilfully violated, and, if in
the judgment of this high court he be found guilty,
then must follow the judgment and condemnation
of the law; the high crimes and misdemeanors, and
and the infamy attached thereto, will have been
conspicuous, historic and eternal.
This prosecution was instituted for the benefit of
the public, and not to harass this respondent. If
guilt is shown, we invoke punishment for the sake
of example, and not for the purpose of personal
vengeance. The purpose is, the correction—the pu
rification—of public and official morals in this grand
old commonwealth. As another has so beautifully
and forcibly said, “If I could employ the voice of
an angel and render it audible to the remotest
corners of the earth, I would caution every
friend of virtue, before he accepts of any
great public engagement—lwould invite him to
attend to the punishment which would be the
consequence of misconduct.”
May it please the court: lam done. W T hat I
have said has been from a sense of duty alone, to
the heuse of representatives and all the people of
this great State of Georgia. May it please the
court: We are ready to make good our charges
against John W. Renfroe, treasurer of this State,
whenever it is the pleasure of this high court to
hear the evidence.
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