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N, S: -MORSE.
HIGHLY IMIN'UTAVr ♦ ORiUifcBONDK.YCE
BETWEEN THE
SECRETARY OF WAR
AND .
GOVERNOR BIOWN,
Hr wing out of a It Made I pon the
Governor for the
RESERVE MILITIA 01< GEOIiiiJA,
TO BE TURNED ( JO COM I DERATE CONTROL.
oi America, )
War Department, -
Richmond, Vu, , August 30, 1801. .) •
his Excellency J. E. linen,
Governor of Georgia, Mdledgedlle, Ga :
Sir— The conditffm of vour fie, subjected
to formidable inv. ion 4111! in -wu-d wi ■» in
structive raids in n,u- -ru < : ~ ■in ihS en
emy, require* the command of ail the forces
that can be nummot.p 1 for dr! • t .in re
cent official correspond nee 0 torn i ltd to the*
Department, it appears, on your statement
that you have organ zed ten Uiotieiud or more
of the militia of yourSi tk, and 1 am instructed
by the President to make rap isition ou you
for that number, and'such further force of
militia, to repel invasion, an you may be able
to organize, for Confederate service. Those
within the limits of Gen. Mood’s Diprulrnent
will report to him: those outside, to Use Corn
man lant of the Depart ment of Mouth Carolina
and Georgia
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
James A. Seddon,
(Secretary o! vYar.
Executive Department, |
Millsdoevillh, Ga., beet. 12,1864. j
Mon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War:
Sir —Your letter of the 30th of last month
only reached me by last mail.
You refer to the fact that J have organized
ten thousand of the mil'.! a of this State, and
say you are instructed by Urn President, to
make requisition upon me for that number
•ml such other foice of militia to repel inva
sioE as I may be able, to 01 gun an.
You preface this requisition by the remark
that the condition of my B.la to subjected to
formidable invasion and menaced with de -
structive raids ' a different directions by the
•netny, requires thoconimand of all the forces
that can be summoned for defence
In common with the people of Georgia, I
bare abundant reason to regret that the Presi
dent has been so late in making this discovery.
This “formidable invasion” commenced in May
last and has steadily forced jts way, by reason
of overwhelming numbers, through iiie*moßt
fertile section oi UeOi; ia, till its leader is now
in possession of the city of Atlanta, menacing
the centre of the State, threatening, by Ids
winter campaign, to cut the last line of rail
road that connects Virginia and the Carol inns,
with Alabama and Mississippi. The-President
during most of tiie time since the campaign
•gainst Atlanta began, has had at his com
mand a large fore'' *-*>*r! I *>> !..■■• • . 1
000 men, in Texas and L «ui..ina V. Since tiie
brilliant victories achieved by our armies in
the lattor State early in the season; tins large
force ha? bad no oveuv- to >r.i, except
the troops of a few garrisons, who were in no
erudition to penetrate the interior ol the coun
fry. or do any serious damage, lie has, also,
if correctly reported, had about 20,000 men
under Gen. Early, invading Maryland and
Pennsylvania, thereby uuUiug Northern senti
ment against us, and aiding President Lincoln
to rally nis people to reinforce Ins armies.—
About the same time Gen Al 01 gau was raid
ing in Kentucky, and Gen. Fonost,. the great
•avalry leader, had Iren kept iu Northern
Mississippi to repel the raid? utter the country
had b«en so often overrun as to leave but lit
tle public property for them to destroy.
Thus reversing the rule upon which most
great Generals, who have been* successful
have acted, of rapid concentration of his force
*t vital points to destroy the 'invading army,
the President has scattered his forces from
Texas to Pennsylvania, while a severe Mow
was being struck at the heart of. the Confed
eracy; and Atlanta has been sacrificed and the
interior of Georgia thrown open to further id
vasion for waut of reinforcement to the Aimy
of Tennessee. Probably few intelligent men
iu the country, except tin* Pre-Men! and his
advisers, have failed to see that it Geu. Forrest,
and Morgan had bceu sent to destroy the rail
roads over which Gen. Sherman's supplies have
been transported for three hundred miles
through an enemy's country, and to keep the
roads cut for a few weeks, and at the same time
the forces of Gen. E Knby .Smith and Major
Gen. Early, or even half ol them,! ~and b, <m sent
to reinforce Gan. John* Rn, or alter be w is su
perceded, Geu. liood, the irrny of invasion
might not only have beten repulsed aud driv
en back, but routed aud destroyed.
This would instantly have relieved Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee from in
vasion and raids, aud have thrown open the
green fields of Kentucky' for the support of
our gallant troops. As the army ol Gen. Sher
man is the ouly protection provided by the
Lincoln Government for the Western States,
and as the battle for the posei-sion o! a large
portion of the Mississippi Valley, as well as of
the Gulf States, was to be fought in Georgia,
justice, not only to the people of Georgia, but
the people of ail the States, required that all
the troops which wore not actuary necessary
t« the defense ot Richmond, aud to hold the
enemy in check at the most viml points ou the
eoast, should have been concentrated for the
destruction of the Federal army iu Georgia,
which wouild, in all probability, have brought
the war to la speedy teiruination.
I have the President to send rein
forcement to the army for the defense of At
lanta ever since the enemy were at Etowah.—
Rut mvery small number have been sent, aud
If I am correctly informed, part of the troops
under General Hood s command have been
•rdered from this to other States *
While we have been sorely pressed bv the
•aeiuy. a «omp of 30.000 Federal prisoners has
been kept in the rear of our army, which has
added greatly to our embarrassments, and has
it leerns required all the small force of Con
federate reserves, organized by Major Geu.
Cobb, with other occasional reiulorcenients
to guard them. The reserved force organized \
under the lajte conscript act for Srate defense. I
has been thus employed. 1 presume, by order :
•1 the President, and in the hour of her j
peril, Georgia has not had a single on of them '
at the fro .it with a musket in bis In , \ to aid '
in her defense. Had the militia been at his !
•ommand for such service as he might have I
ordered, and at such place as he nbght desig
nate, the presumption is that the same remark
night have been applicable to them, as other
employment could, as in case of the local com-
Kies under the President’s command, have
n found for them at other places while the
enemy were besieging Atlanta.
Another remat k ible fact deserves attention.
During the whole march of the enemy upon
Atlanta, and for "more than a 'idiepjt
waa «lo*«ly invested and shelled by the euemy.
it never seems to have occurred tot he Presi
dent _t® make requisition upon me for the
nallltia of .Georgia to aid in repelling this
•'formidable invasion' 1 or these “destructive
iwids, 1 ' and it is only when, he is Informed
that I have an organization of, gallant, fear
leM men ready to defend the State against
oaurpations of power as well as invasions by
th*) enemy, that he makes requisition upon rue
for this force and all others i can organize,
J must express my astonishments, however,
that you and the President should seem to be
tpuraal ht «b« fact that this force was organ
AUGUSTA, GA., WEDNESDAY MORNING, MARCH 22, 1865.
ized by me to aid in repelling the army of in
vasion, that it was placed by me under the
command of General Johnston aud afterwards
for General Hood of the defense of Atlanta,
and that the brave men of which it-is com
posed under the command of the General ap
pointed by the President for the defense of the
city, have taken their full share in the dan
gers, fatigues and sufferings of the campaign,
and have acted with distinguished valor both
upon the battle field and for over forty days
in the* trenches around the city of Atlanta,
and that they formed the rear guard when At
lanta was evacuated, aud brought off with
them safe and in good, order the reserve ar
tillery of the army which was especially en
trusted to them by the Commander in-Chief.
For all this no word of thanks or praise c6tneS
from the President to encourage them. Th*y
were militia. Their Geuerais aud other olii
cers were- not appointed by the President and
their services aie ignored by him.
In making this requisition it is quite clear
that it was no part of tire President’s object
to get these brave men into.service. They
were there at the time, in tllfe trenches, among
those who were nearest to the enemy, where
they never faltered in a single instance. It
was not done to produce harmony in the com
mand, for the most perfect harmony has exist
ed between me and both the Gene.als who
have commanded the army since the miFi-ix
were called out, and it is well known that I
placed them in for the time under tire absolute
control of the Confederate General command
ing. It was not done to increase the number
in service at the front, for the President is too
familiar with the obstacles thrown in my way
t»y Confederate officers when I have attempted
to compel men to go to the trenches, to have
committed this mistake. It was certainly not
done to cause Georgia to furnish her quota o f
troops required in like proportion of other
States, for she has already furnished more than
her just quota, and to every call responded
with more than were required; while sue has
boyie the rigors of conscription executed with
as much severity as iu any other State. I hear
ot no similar rquisition having been made up
on any other Slate. While Georgia has more
than filled every requisition made up
on her in common with her sister States, and*
has borne her full share of conscription, and
has tor months had her reserved militia under
arms from sixteen to fifty-fiye years of age, I
am informed *tiat even the Confederate reserves
of other States from seventeen aud from forty
live to fifty, have till lately been permitted
by the President to spend their time at home
attending to their ordinary business. Without
departing from legitimate inquiry ns to the
cause of this requisition, I might ask why this
dffitinction is made against the good people of
this State, and why her Confederate reset ves
are kept constantly iu service, and why req
uisition i3 made for her whole militia, when
Me same is not required f any other State. It
is quite clear that it was not made either to
compel the State to do her just part which
she lias always don«, or to put mure of her
sons into active service for her defense, for
every man called for by the requisition was in
service before it was ma le. The President
must then have had some other motive in
making the requisition, and I think it not'un
charitable under all the circumslames to con
clude that the object was to grasp into his
own hands the entire control of the whole re
aped militia of the State, which would ena
ble him to disband its present organizations,
and place in power over it his own partizans
nid favorites as Major General, Brigadier Gen
erals, etc., etc, in place of the distinguished of
licers who were appointed to command in con
formity to lfce Constitution of the country aud
the laws of the State, and who have command
ed the organization with so much honor to
themselves, satisfaction to the troops, and ad
vantage to the public service.
Again, it is worthy ot remark that the re
quisition is made upon me for the whole mili
tia of the State—all I have organized and all
I can organize— without limitation of time or
place-of service. If I comply with it, the mi
litia of Georgia, after the. President has ob
tained absolute control ever them, may be tak
eu for the war from their State, as tens of
thousands of their brave fellow citizens now
are, whrie Georgia and their home- are being
overrun. If lam asked to trust the sound
judgment and good faith of the President for
their discharge aud return to their homes at
such times as their services are not indispen
sable in the military field, I cannot forget the
laith that was violated last fail to thousands
of Georgians who were organized under a
requisition from the President to be “employed
in the local defense of important cities, and
iu repelling in emergencies the sudden or tran
sient iucursious of the enemy,” to be employed
“only when ana so long' as they might be
needed,’’“with the privilege of remaining at
home iu the pursuit of their ordiaary avoca
tions, unless when called for a temporary exi
gency to active duty.’ ’
Thousands of these men organized for six
months’ service with the guarantees above
mentioned, were called out early in .September
lust, aud were kept constantly in service till
the expiration of their term in March- Da
ring most ot the time they were guarding no
important city. There was no sudden eater- j
goncy or transient incursion of the enemy, no j
exigency for the last four months of the time, j
and still they were kept iu service in violation
of the faith that had been pledged to them,
and were denied th.e privilege of goiug home
or attending to the ‘ pursuit of any of their
ordinary avocations,” and this, too, after the
contract under which they had entered the
service had been pressed upon the considera
tion of the President.
It is imposible for the agricultu al and
other industrial pursuits of the people to be I
saved from ruin if the whole reserve military i
of the State, from sixteen to fifty five, ars pul j
permanently iato the service as regular troops. ■
Judging from the past. I cannot place them at i
.the command of the President tor the war, !
without gieat apprehension that such would -
be their tate. ludeed, not even the Presi- I
dent's promise to the contrary is found in the |
requisition you now make.' lam not, there- I
fore, willing to expose the whole reserve mili- i
tia of Georgia to this injustice, aud our ]
agricultural and other,interests to ruin, when !
no other State is required to make auy such j
sacrifice or fill any such requisition.
The Conititution of the Confederate States :
authorizes the States, as welljas the Confeder
cy, to keep troops iu time of war when ae- :
tualiy invaded, as Georgia now is. Her j
military have Been organized and called into ;
active service under her own laws for her own
defense; aud I do not'feel that I am authorized \
to destroy her military organization at the j
behest of the President, or to surrender to j
him the command of the troops organized and
retained by her by virtue of the reserved .
power for her own defense, wheu greatly j
needed for that purpose, and which are her j
only remaining protection against the en
croachments of centralized power. I there
fore decline to comply with or fill this extra
ordinary requisition. While I refuse te gratify
the President’s ..ambition iu this particular,
“M-Up last vestige of the sover-
of the State by placing the remainder
i her militia under his control for the war, I
beg to assume you that I shall not hesitate to
1 outer .fhem tothe front, and they will not
I '■nun the. thickest of the fight, when the enemv
; is to be met upon the soil of tlwir beloved
j Mate. Nor will I withhold them from the
1 temporary command of the Confederate Gene
ral who controls the armyr during great emer
gencies wheu he needs-their aid.
I shall, however, retain the , power to with
draw them and to furlough or disband them
for a time, to look to their agricultural and
otner vital mterestw-which would otherwise be
ruined by neglect, whenever I see they can bo
spared from the military field without endang
ering the safety of the State. Os this the Gov
ernor w the State, at MiiicdgeviUs, where he is
near the field of operations and can fre
quent interviews with the Commanding Gen
eral, ought to be as competent to judge as the
President of the Confederacy, some hundreds
of miles from the scene of action, charged with
the defense of Richmond, and all the other
responsibilities which requires his attention
and divides his Time.
Georgia now has upon the soil of Virginia
nearly fifty regiments of as brave troops as
ever met the enemy in deadly* conflict, not
one ol which ever faltered in tiie hour ot
trial. She has many others equally gallant
aiding in the defense of other States. In
deed the blood of her sons lias crimsoned al
most every battle-field east of the Mississippi,
from the first Manassas to, the fall of Atlanta.
Ter gallant sons, who still survive, are kept
by the Pr< sident’s orders from her soil, while
their homes are being ouerruu : their wives
and children driven out before the enemy and
reduced to beggary aud want, and their almost
idolized State exposed to temporarv subjuga
tion aud ruin. Experience having shown
tiiat the Army of Tennessee, with the aid of
♦he militia force of the State, is not able to
withstand and drive back the overwhelming
numbers of the army of invasion, as the Ex
ecutive of Georgia, in behalf of her brave
sous now absent in other States, as well as of
her whole people at tome, I demand as an act
of justice that such reinforcements, be sent
as arc necessary to enable the army upon her
soil to stop the progress of the enemy, and dis
lodge and drive him back.
111 view of the fact that the permanent pos
session of Georgia by the enemy, not only
ruins her people, but cuts the Confederacy
east of the Mississippi in two, and strikes a
death blow at the Confederate Government it
self, I trust this most reasonable request will
be granted. It, however, I should be inform
ed that the President will send no reinforce
ments, and make no further effort to strength
en our defenses, I then demand that he permit
all the sons of Georgia to return to their own
State, aud within her own limits, to rally
around her glorious flag ; and as it flutteis in
the breeze in defiance Os (he foe, to strike for
their wives and their children, their homes and
their altars and the “green graves” of their
kindred and their sires ; and I as their Execu
tive promise that whoever else may be with
drawn from her defense, they wilt drive the
enemy back to her borders, or overwhelmed
and stricken down, they will nobly perish in
one last grand and glorious effort to wrest the
standard of her liberties and independence
from the grasp of the oppressor and plant it
immovably upon hersacred soil
I am very respectfully,
Your obedient seivant,
Joseph E. Brown.
Confederate States of America, (
War Department, •]
Richmond, Ya., October 8, 1864. (
Mis Excellency J. E. Brown,
Governor of Georgia,
MiUedgevUli. Qa :
Sir—Your letter of the 12th inst. reached
me some days since. Its tenor and spirit have
caused painful surprise. It requires forbear
ance in reply to maintain the respect I would
pay your station, and observe the official
propriety you have so transcended. I shall
seek to notice only such portions, as appropri
ately pertain to an official communication.
The Department on the 30th of August, un
der the direction of the President, made a re
quisition upon you for the entire miiitia, which
had been or should be organized by you, that
they might be employed to?repel the “formid
able invasion” of Georgia by the enemy, and
to secure her from “destructive raids ”
The requisition was for militia Tet a -state of
organization, ihe appointment of the officers
of militia is secured by the Constitution to the
State from which they are drawn, and propos
ing to accept organized militia, the officers
legally appointed would necessarily accom
pany their commands.
The inducements to this call were several.
You had in official communication stated that
you had ten thousand militia organized
and you were known to be apparently busy in
organizing others 1 Os these, a portion it was
known were with the Army of Tennessee in
some auxiliary relation, and had rendered
valuable service with that army in the dt*
sense of Georgia. Only a limited number,
however, not believed to constitute half the
number reported oy you to be actually organ
ized, were so empJoyed, and were, as has been
announced by you, held there only at your
pleasure, and for such time and during such
operations as you might approve. The ser
vices of these gallant defenders of their State
were so appreciated, as to render it desirable
that the full number organized, or to be or
ganized, should be secured, to repel the for
midable invasion threatening to overrun the
State; and both to impart greater unity and
efficiency to the command of them, and enable
the General Commanding to rely on the period
and tenure of their services, it was necessary
they should be in Confederate service, and
subjeot not to your judgment or disposal, hut
to the control of the constitutional Command
er-in Chief. It is easy to see how uncertainty
as to their oontrol or retention, must -impair
relianoe by the Commander on these troops,
and embarrass ail calculations for their em
ployment aa l efficiency in combined opera
tions. Aa additional ground of the call was
that some of those troops had been detailed
for objects not admitted by the enrolling offi
cers in the State to be authorized by Confede
rate law, aud others were claimed as primarily
liable, or previously subjected to Confederate
This had engendered controversy
and endangered collision between the local
Confederate wad State authorities, which it,
was most desirable to anticipate and preclude..
Besides, these militia, as far as they were
serving with the Confederate army, had to be
subsisted from the commissary stores of the
Confederacy, and might equitably expect pay
from the Treasury; but if held as Stale troops
only, both subsistence and pay constituted a
charge on the State alone.
Serious embarrassments had already arisen
on these very points, and departure had been
necessary from the regular obligati ms of the
Confederate Government, which were act just
to either that Government or its disbursing
officers. The powers o£ tbs Confederate Gov
ernment to provide for the common defense,
are exercised according to laws, through agen
cies adopted by Congress. None of these laws
contemplated the fulfillment of this duty, by
troops organized and held by the* State in its
own service, and under officers responsible on
ly to it. *
The C (institution of the Confederate States
does not confer on the State power to keep
troops iu time of war. The States are prohib
ited trout ‘ keeping troops or sh ps of war in
♦ ime ot peace, entering into any agreement or
compact with another State, or with a foreign
power, or engaging in war, unless actually in
vaded, or in sneh imminent danger as will not
admit of delay.’’ The power of keeping troops
i u time of war, is thus reserved, and naturally
i ncluues is necessary to accomplish
the object ol reservation, and is limited in its
scope and operation only bv the Constitution
cf the Confederate States, ‘ and the laws which
shall be made in pursuance thereof/’
not imply any withdrawal from the Confeder
ate Gevernment of those instrumentalities and
agencies rim the -*(mstftdtTßnras¥sufided to
the Government of the Confederacy f or the fui
lillment of the obligations it has imposed up
on, it.
The powers to declare war, to raise armies,
to maintain a navy, to make rules for the
government of the land and naval forces, te
make rules concerning captures en land and
water, to protect each of the States against
invasion, which are deposited with Congress,
manifest the purpose of the States in farming
their Constitution, to charge the Confederate
] Government with the burden of providing for
j the common defence. The clause in the Con
i stitutiou relative to the Militia, wa j framed in
harmony with the same purpose. The Consti
tution changes Congr with the organization,
equipment and discip’ r-e of the Militia, and
designates the President as Commander In-
Chief of those that m v be called into service-
It was evidently the design of the Constitu
tion. aud of tip- laws -i Congress in pursuance
thereof, which aie tae supreme law of the
laud, that the President should have the <Vis
cretion and th powet of calling this M'lUqi
into service, and 1-wing personally, or
through Confederate o immanders, the dispo
sition aud command J them. In a crisis of
great peril, aud in a- e A plain invasion of
jur State, he bus ext.oised this power, aud
made the coust-rtutim-vi. oquuoment on you.
You have met if v’i'.nrtinct refusal.
This is the fir.-' insfae-m 1 . the annul? of the
Confederacy of the suggestion of a doubt on
the right of.the Pr'-.-Mont to make such a
call, aud the obligation ->f compliance by the
State Executive.
Daring the lasi- war with Great Britain, 'a
question of the kind was made hv the Govern
ors of Massachusetts and Connecticut with the
President ot the then United States. They
claimed to decide whether the exigencies ex
feted which authorized the President to make
a requisition for militia to repel invasions, and
denied his power to associate them with other
troops under a Federal officer. They affected
to believe t-h exercise of such a power imper
iled State R glits ana pi. ipot-ed personal ambi
tion The judicial tiibuals determined ad
versely to the pretentions of the-e Governors,
and the country did not !aii to discover lurk
ing undev their specious pruecce.-, hostiliity
scarcely less criminal to the Constituted au
thoritie? of the Union, nn unlicensed ambition
in themselves and a dangerous purpose in the
midst of war to cripple patriotic efforts for the
public defense. The impression was not wanting,
either then or since, that they were in commu
nication with the enemy, or at least purposed
to give them encouragement and moral sup
port.
Without imputing to you such designs, I
cannot repress apprehensions of similar effects
from your analogous course under she present
more trying circumstances, as indeed it must
be admitted in aif paititulars; aud especially
on the main point of the existence of invasion
there was piore plausibility in their case than
yours, on the grounds assigned for refusal.
On anal} zing your Excellency’s letter, it is
apparent that the prominent and influencing
reasons of your action spring from a spirit of
opposition to the Government of the Confede
rate States, aud animosity to the Chief Magis
trate whom the people of the Confederacy have
honored bv their choice and confidence. Your
reasons may reduced to the following:
1. That the campaign in Georgia, noi having
been controlled by the President according to
your conceptions, or with the means you ad
vised, you will not permit any force you can
control to be subject to his disposition, but
will yourself retain thqjr control, and mete
out your assistance according to your views of
policy and State int resi.
2. That you suspect the President-of a de
sign, after the reception of these Militia, to
disorganize or disband them that he may dis
place the officers commanding them aqd sub
stitute his f vidv.us v 1 .av/bau-s.
3- You apprehend tba'tafbcse Militia, under
the Presiciont ’s'dTintioiw/li be employed for
such length of time, a .d/under such condition,
as will be deleterious tb/the interest of them
selves and the State, ahtl ’ esteem yourself a
better judge oil these points, especially to when
and where they shall be employed,' lurloughed
or discharged, etc.
4. That these troops, besides being necessa
ry as a defence against mvesion, are also ne
cessary to defend the State against usurpations
ol flower, and as “a protection against the en
croachments of centralized power,” and that
the knowledge of the President of their ability
and disposition to do this was the motive for
the call on you.
Iu reference to the first, it might not bo safo
as it would not We expedient now to expose,
the circumstances of the present campaign,
the counsels that guided, or the resources that
have been or could be commanded for its ope
rations. ,
None should have known more certainly
than your Excellency the zeal and energy with
which the President aud this Department, un
der life auspices, have striven to command re
sources and means-for the defense of Geoigia
and the overthrow of the invader, nor the im
pediments and difficulties often unfortunately
resulting from the obstruction of the local au
thorities which they had to encounter. Aware
early of the danger that menaced tiie State,.be
sides conceutrati :g troops from other Depart
ments for its defense, this Department strained
all the powers vested in it too. recruiting the
army within the limits of Georgia, and accu
mulating supplies lor its support The legis
lation oi the Congress that ended its session
in February last had seen comprehensive and
vigorous.
Your Excellency cannot have forgotten how
that legislation was denounced and the efforts
of the Department- impaired by the counter
vailing action of the Executive and local au
thorities of your State*. ■To department it
cannot be imputed as fau-f# tliat Georgia was
invaded by “overwhelming* ’numbers.” The
ten thousand ml-litia you-fodast to have organ
ized, without adding-to-f-bbffiount toose you are
proceeding to organize* with
the vetefau regiment'? i*im*tT> the Ist of May,
would be an- invttluabf i e>-«*aequisi?ion to the
Army of Tennessee,, and-in*#improbably have
hurled back the-invaderdfcbAr'the threshold of
your State. U: c *!-«■
That they, ot a large-proportion of them at
least, were not reedy thv-’that service and oth
er auxiliary mean*, to its Operations were not
afforded. I am bound to ijfink was due to the
oostacles and embarrassTfietits interposed by
your Excellency and the ideal authorities with
your countenance, to the enforcement of the
acts of Congress for the recruitment and main
tainance of the armies. Tour Excellency may
not have foreseen and realized the extent and
import of tne approaching invasion, but to
whom, then, with most safety and wisdom
(aqart even from constitutional obligation)
can the disposition and. command of the troeps
in question be committed ?
In your second reason it is difficult to find
anything but the ascription to the President of
an unworthy design—a design that cannot be
accomplished without disappointing the objects
which I have explained as ihe cause of the re
quisition. The disbanding of the militia or
ganizations, after their call into service, would
result in the discharge of such men as are not
liable to service under the act of Congress of
February last, and those who are liable, in
such an event, woul 1 be placed in those veter
an regiments raised for Confederate service in
the State of Georgia prior to April, 18t>2, whose
diminished numbers atrest the fidelity, valor
and suffering with which they have performed
. their duty. Whether, therefore, the militia be
retained in their militia organisations, as is
contemplated, or be disbanded, as you appra
hend may be done, in neither event can new
organizations be made or new officers appoint
ed. Y our suspicions as to the motives and de
signs of th« President are simply chimeri
cal. . i,.
In your third retoQU. your Excellency h»3
apparently forgotten the trueAnquiry. where,
constitutionally and legally, in ail such mat
ters, the discretion of tkcision.is lodged, -and
further, that a provision adaqnate. iu the View
of Congress, against-abuse has . been provided
in the limitation ol tune-dor which 'the militia
may be Mailed out ,Ao six aoßths, ; ..i Q
trating the danger of undue detention in Con
federate service, your ftsoeiien*-. refers to the
couise p»Mp«ffe|o#ard3 the local
service enlisted by you last Fall, under $ call
from the Department. Dutfegffihe last wiidarC
your addroafld. to this Department
an acrimonious letter on this subject, which
was replied to in a spirit of forbearance, at and
with a careful abstinence from-the use of re
criminating language.
Justice to myself demauds that I should
place upon the records of the department the
t icks to which you have asrain alluded in the
same language of acrimonious reproach. It
had been designed to. raise troops for special
defense and local service, as 'the general rule
throughout the State, to constitute a part of
i the Provisional Army, and to be subject to the
call of the President when needed. You asked
to supervise and control the whole matter,
aud unfortunately the privilege was ganted.
Y’ou abused It to form noudescript, organ
izations, not conforming to the regulations of
the Provisional Army, scant in men and
absouurling iu officers, with every variety of ob
ligati- oi fo r local service, of the most restricted
ehar.cter, and for the brief period of only six
m ut!:s. thus it was that you were enabled to
indu'ge the vain boast of raising some sixteen
thousand men tor the defense of the State,
while in faot, source a decent division of four
thousand men could be mustered for. the field
aud those o-ily for six mouths service. From
the time they were passed to Confederate
service, there was pressing necessity for their
presence in the field, tor Georgia was not only
menaced, but actually invadeu, aud the num
ber was too limited to allow substitution or
furlough. Apart from this you persistently
claimed that they should be heldaud regarded
as Militia. In that view, they could not, if
dismissed, be recalled on emergency as local
troops, and this naturally induced their deten
tion for the full period of their limited term
of service.
io your last reason I refrain from replying
as its character would justify. I cannot think
tae signiflcancy of the language quoted has
been duly appreciated by your Excellency. I
prefer to consider them as in 00 ns id -rate ut
terances rather than the foreshadowing of a
guilty purpose to array your State in aimed
antagonism against the Confederacy, and so
to betray the cause of herself 1 and sister
States
Such purpose ITtnow would be horned and
rebuked by her heroic and loyal pto -
pie, aud it will not, while it be posTbie to
avoid it, be ascribad by me to one whose offi
cial station makes him tbeir recognized organ.
I must, however, gravely regret that the spirit,
of your Excellency’s past action aud public
expressions, has caused grievous misconcep
tions ia relation to the feelings and purposes
of yourself , and perhaps of others of influence
in your State, in the convictions of our ene
mies to their encouragement, and to mortifi
cation of many patrioiio citizens of the Con
federacy.
Our enemies appear to have conceived you
were even prepared to entertain overtures of
separate accommodation, and that your State,
so justly proud of its laith, valor and renown,
cold be seduced or be'raycd to treachery and
desertion. So painful a maniiestation of the
hopes inspired by your indulgence of resent
ments and suspicions against the Confederate
Administration will, it is honed, awaken to con
Bideration and a change of tutor, action. To
the Department it would be fur more grateful,
instead ot being engaged in remiu iing you of
constitutional ouiigations and repelling unjust
imputations, to be co-operating with ypur Kv
ceueticjr, in a spirit oi Unity aim biinuaencf', fa
the defense of your State and the overthrow of
the invader. .
Very ypur obd’t serv’t,
James A. Seddon,
Secretary of War.
Executive Department, l
Milledgvillk, Deo. k
Novemoer i 4th, 18(14. j
Ron. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War :
Sm : Official engagements have prevented
earlier attention to your letter of Bth ult,,
which reached me on the 20th.
You are pleased to characterize a portion of
my letter as acrimonious, and claim that I have
transcended the bounds of official propriety,
and seem to desire me to understand that you
labor under difficulties in restraining yourself
within the bounds of forbearance in your reply.
As the acrimony of my letter consisted in a
simple narrative of tiuths, communicated in a
plain, straight forward manner, oading things
by their right name, 1 feel that am I due you no
apology. Os course no personal disrespect
was intended. lam dealing, not with indivi
duals, but with great principles, and with the
conduct of an administration of the Govern
ment, of which your. Department is but one
branch. And if yon will not consider the re
mark acrimonious, I will add that the people
of mv State, not beffig dependent and never
intending to be, upon tha f Government for the
privilege of exercising their Constitutional
rights, nor the Executive of the State lor his
official existence, I shall on ad occasions feel
at liberty to exercise perfect independence in
the discharge of my official obligations, with
no other restraints than those thrown around
me by and sense of duty, and tlib Constitution of
my country, and the iaws of my State
You remark that this is the first instance in
the annals of the Confederacy of the suggestion
or a doubt on the right of the President to make
such a call, and the obligation of eomplanee by
the State Executive. Doubtless you are right, as
this is unquestionably the first instance in the
annals of either the old or new Confederacy of
such a call, made by the president. It presents
the isolated case ©t an attempt, by the Presi
dent, to single out a particular State, and, by
grasping into his own hands its whole military
strengtn, to divest it of its last vestige of pow
er to maintain its sovereignty; not only deny
ing to it the right plainly reserved in tin Con
stitution, to keep troops in time of wa . when
actually invaded, but claiming the power to
deprive it of ita whole militia and leave it not
a man to aid in the execution of its laws, or
to suppress servile insurrection in its midst.
Ihe President demands that Georgia shall
turn over to him, and relinquish her command
and control over every militiaman now organ
ized by her Executive, and ail he may be able
to organize, The militia is composed mainly
of a class of men and boys, between ages not
subject by the laws of Congress of the State
to serve in the Confederate armies. The Preai
dent calls for all the State has of the above
ascription. As no such requisition was ever
before made upon any State, and it probably
never entered into the mind of any statesman
that such a call ever would be made, it never
became necessarv to question the right to
make it.
You cite the case of the refusal of the Gover
nors of Massachusetts and Connecticut, during
the last war with Great Britain, to furnish
troops for the common defense upon the re
quisition of the President of the United States,
and say it must be admitted that mj course is
analogous to theirs “in all particulars,” and
that there was more plausibility in their case
than m mine, in the grounds assigned for re
fusal. Let us test this 'statement by the stand
ard of truth. You say the cases are anologous
“in all particulars.’ 7 I deny that they are
analogous in any particular. To show the
character of the call, I quote the language of
Jrirahjkleßl:&fc»nrae; ft *
■‘ltjviil l*recollected that when a call was
Otftde q& the Militia of that State, for service
ia*tbe.late war, under an arrangement which
was aliha applicable to the Militia of all the
States, an<l in. conformity with the acts of Con
gress, the Executive of Massachusetts refused
to comply with the call.’ 7 That, then, was a
fall uuder-aA-arrangement alike applicable to
the Militia of all the States. This is not a call
made under aaArraogement alike applicable to
the Militia of all the States, or indeed of any
of. the other States. This is a c* ll f ;° r all tbe
Militia which the Executive of Georgia has or
ganized or may be able to organize,
call was made by the President upon the Mi l
tia of any other States. The analogy fails then
at the very first step. But let us trace it & lit
tle further. That wag a * or 1080
VOL. LXXIV. —NEW SERIES VOL. XXIV NO. 12~
the age required to do military service in the
armies of the Uqited States, This is a call for
men who are exempt by act of Congress from
all service in the Conlederate armies, aud ot
whom it is expressly declared oy act of the
Legislature of Georgia, that they sfiall not bo
liable to any draft or other compulsory pro
cess to fill any requisition for troops ui on the
Governor of the State by the President of the
Confederate Stiies.” That was a call which
the t resident could! legally make, and which
the_ Governors had lawful authority to lilt—
ims is a call which the President had no law
tu right to make, and which the Gov.erno
could not fill without violating a positive sta
tute of his state. That was a call lor active
Militia who were not in service, but, were at
home attending to their ordinary puisuils.
lhis is a call for reserve Militia, who. at the*
time it was made and were, for months pas;,
had been in actual service—most of the time
in the trenches around Atlanta, under the cuii
rtaaf fire of the guns of the enemy. In that
case, the Governors of Massachusetts aud Con
necticut refused to place the Militia of those
States under the command of a Federal Gen
eral. In this case the Militia had already been
placed by the Governor of Georgia under the
command of a Confederate General, where
they were on the very day the call was made,
aud had been tor some mouths previous.
Ia that case, the Governors of those States
adjudged that no emergency existed to justify
the call tor the Militia, after the President had
decided that it did, and they lefused to order
them into the field, to this cast*, the Governor
of Georgia admitted that the emergency did
exist, aud had ordered them in months before
the President saw the emergency, and called
for the services of the Militia In that , case
+ he President was making up honest effort, to
get the Militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut,
into service to aid in repelling any assaults that
might bo made by the enemy. In this case, the
Presidenf, after the reserve Militia of Gem gin
had teen called out by the Governor and nut
into active service, was using his official iuliu
ence, as -flown by General Orders Nos. 03 ..mi
and 67,' issued by life Adjutant General, to
get the Militia of • Georgia out of service,
where they were confronting the enemy and
shedding their blood in defence of their St .te
When they were the trenches under the
fire of tiie enemy, the President held out, as
a reward lor their delinquincy .in case of their
desertion from the State Milin -and return,
home, a guaranty of the privilege oi remaining
there in local companies, to be called out only
in emergencies, to defend their own counties
and vicinage.
1 append to this letter paragraph i, Ge .er.il
Oorders No 63, and a paragraph of General
Order No. H 7, by reference to" which it, be seen
that ail detailed men were required, and all
exempts from Confederate service invited to
euroli themselves in local companies at home
with promise that they should be called otu
only ia oyieigeucies. to’defend the counties oi
their residence and contiguous comities.
The present Militia of Geoigia aie coin posed
of exempts from service and such
detailed toen as are riot in the military sen ice
of the Confederate State’s. L’ho Militia of the
State, then at the front, was composed, of men'
of these classes oniy. The order was addr. i
ed to all men of both classes. The Preside A
dapfeti thn.right of ihaHinEt-.g-ii;. of jG*.. T
to call out ths detailed men for service, .7 ;
would, if consistent, stand ready to protect.
them in case they would desert the Militia
service and return home aud join his local
oompunie3 Thus the strong temptation ol re
maining at home was held out by the Pie.fi
dent to these men, if they would ingloriously
abandon Atlanta, when beleaguered by the
enemy, and, after desertion from the Militia,
enlist in Confederate service, which would give
the Ptesideut the entire command of them and
enable him to destroy the Militia organization
of the Slate. Fortunately the temptation sue
cceded in seducing but a small portion ot the
Militia to desert and return home. They were
generally true men and stood gallantly by their
color®, knowing that their country needed then
services at the front an 1 not in local compa
nies in the rear. General Order No. 63 Evas is
sued on the Cth of August and was followed by
General Older No. 67 on the 16th same month
The President then waited two weeks, and as
the Militia still remained in the trenches
around Atlanta, he found itj necessary to
chaugt his policy and resort to a requisition
upon me for the whole militia of the Btate, as
the only means left of accomplishing his ob
jects.
President Madison offered no such induce
ments to, and made ao such requisition upon
the Miiitia of Massachusetts and ,Connecticut
So much for the analogy oi the two cases. But
you. are as unfortunate in your facts as in your
analogy, as will be further seen by your state
meat that the “judical tribunals, determined
adversely to the pretensions of the Governors.”
By reference to the Stir volume Massachusetts
Reports, Supplement, page 549, you will find
that the judges of the Supreme Court of that
State had the case before them, and determined
every point made by Governor Strong in his
favor, and “adversely to the pretensions” ol
the President.
But you remind me, that the 10,000 Militia,
which you say I had organized, with -those 1
was proceeding to organise, if incorporated
with the veteran regiments, prior to the first of
May, would have been an invaluable acquisition
to the Army of Tennessee and not improbably
have hurled back the invaders from the thres
hold of my State. If this were true aud the
movements and strength of the enemy were
so much better understood by the President
than by myself, as you w'ould have the coun
try believe, why was it that the President
made no call for the Militia in May, when ttie
armies were above Dalton ‘i Why was the call
delayed till the 30th oLAugust, two days be
fore Atlanta fell, and then mailed to mo too
late to reach Miiledgeville till afeer-the fall ?
If the control of the whole Militia of the Stale,
by the President was so essential to the de
fence of Atlanta, how do you account for the
neglect of the. President to call lor them till
after the campaign had ended, in tha surren
der of the city to the enemy ?
Seeing that the President did not seem to
appreciate th 9 emergency, and the danger to
Atlanta, upon consultation with that tar-see
ing General and distinguished soldier Joseph E
Johnston, I had ordered the Militia to report
to him and aid the gallant army of Tennessee.
I first ordered out the civil aud military officers
of the State, when the armies were near Dal
ton, and afterwards called out the i£je£ vet ‘
Militia, including all between sixteen‘£na*.uuv
five years of age, when they were at ft mines aw.
During all this time, and for nearly tW-> months
afterward, no call wa3 made by the President
for their services. If tbe statements you how
make are correct, surely such neglect, by the
President in so critical an emergency, involves
little less than criminality. ,
Again you state, as one of the inducemen »
to the call, that I had stated in official cor
"pondsDce that I had ten thousand 1
ganized—that a portion of
to be with the army of e ° mi , ed nilM f je r,
auxiliary relktioo--on!y tute half the
however- not belmre* aCt ually organ
number reported by me
iZ You are again incorrect in your facts and
Tvrtunaoelv^ignorant of the strengtn ot the
mrce that S under your command.
In the official correspondence to v* inch I sup
nose vou allude, I did not state that 1 had or-
Luiaed ten thousand Mil’tia. Ihe language
u«ed, was, “nearly ten thousand armed men. 7
At that time the two regiments ot tne state
Line, who are regular troops tor the war, num
bered nearly fifteen hundred They, too, were
placed under the Coniederate Commander, and
nearly five hundred of them, while under hri
command, nave been disabled or Lost upon the
battle field. But if I hail made the statement
as you incorrectly charge it would been
true.
The f l ri I m ,'? thl >’ report, fi>i war led bv Maior
General G. VV. Smith, who commands the Oi -
vteion of State Militia, to General Hood du• , i
10th September, lStil, bat a few d.? alter,
tail of Atlanta, showed upon the muster ro ts
Oi bis Division, nine ttousund one .hundred
and seventy men. This report did not in -
elude the regiment of Fulton County Mditia
i which had been e'e'a- lied tor local service in
I lh o city,nuder the command of Brig Gen M.
| ' ’ .Vnghlot <lm Omiied rate army : now. : i
regiment oi Troup County Militia, -which was
i stationed, by the Conmi lading General at West
, lyi,K ’ unt,er G a : yier, ot the Conte,t
j uai • army. Nor did i> mciu.hr the two regi
ments of the State Line, which had been order
Si HwfdM ? lv ""°® sos the ■ " Oi fences
rfilo? » ,d “ .' U P. iIUk ‘ ;i ‘‘ iiv.tauon of cadets
Ot the Georgia Military last rule, who ,I H I gal
lant serviec ni tfeu Men „t V- „,-i v.
did it embrace the nam-. . .... ... ~J ,L,
°L this Division, who uev tiune i' tiieir" b icT"
to the enemy, bnl tell upon the bai:h.-ueld •;
dmd in the hospital. These ha i lend ~vd rl).»
i.ui Service in the pen r of tin- patriot u»
then country beloro the .'resident saw the n<*
Csssitv which induced him to call for th«m, au.l
as ihey slept at the dace of Ins cull in the sol •
uier s giave, they were uuiortuuafcely. unable
to respond. But ii you say that tue whole
ten thousand were r.,n in the trenches with
muskets m their In. , . i reply, tt.,u while
many weie sics, and so n. - absent without leave,
a .avgei proportion oi tba number upon the
muster toils were mere than of probably any.
othri Division m Gen Hood’s army. And
judging from the late speech oi the President
in Macon, a much larger immbor than the usua I
average in the armies of the (Jortiederacy.
As I understand your •i. iUr, you d-uy that
it was the purpose or Uie Pit-.'.ieiif o disband
or disorganize the Militia, and save he iutended
to take Hie organization, with id: its officers,
and main fain it, i do not protend quote
your language, but state what I understand to
oe the substance. Uniomir,a.ely, your own
re.onl contrailiclh you. fn the requisition
made by you, occurs this sentence: ‘•Those
within ihe limits ot Gen. Hood’s Department,
will rep or: to him ; I host; outside to the Goni -
manduut ol the Depart men oi South Carolina,*
and Georgia. The line between these De
pirtments cuts in two Gen. Smith’s Division,
and probably three of die four brigades of
which it is composed, and the requisition oi * •
deis.that part of th r. D. vision, autt thoseJui
gades on one side ot it, to report-to General
Good, then at Atlanta, and that part on the
oilier side to the Commandant vyuose head
quarters were at Ch irk con. Bui tins was not
ad, it amounted to an order m advance, if 1
responded to the call, 1 i a largo proportion of
lire Militia then under arms to leave Atlanta
hi the very crisis of her lata, and return home
and report to Genera* .Jones whose headquar
ievs were at Charleston Thij would not only
nave peimanemly divided and disbanded the
mnitia organization, as it existed under th<j
laws of the State, bur, would have aided the
Frosideat in carrying out his policy already re.
terred' to, oi withdrawing the Militia from At
lauta before its fall, and compelling armed
mm, then aiding iu ils def<t* : avean.i,
report to a Command ~ ; . • coat-;, vvhe..-
there was uo ahva -it a-•. .• v ... ... m : U.G o. -
may. ;iy ni nw was th Fv^e^t
A..... ■ . |
P .•eieo.i •.••>!
ted it into the requisition itself'
• Past expe.k*? trnas amjs&OiVh that the Pres i •
dent will surmount ali obstacles to secure L.
himself iho appointment of ,ue officers win
are to command troops under ms control. Soon
alter the commencement of the war, Georgia
tendered to iiiinau exce-ieut • :-j ;- Uo of her
most gallauLsous, sully armed, accoutred, and
equipped, with two mouths training in cam i
ol instruction, lie refused to accept it as . i
was, but disbanded it, aud lef’usmg toreco"
inzu the Commanding General (though every
officei, I believe, in the brigsiue, from the
highest to ihe lowest, petitioned to have him
retained,) scattered the regiments into other
ii (glides. Ihe tweive mourns men entered
the service with officers elected by them, and
ac accepted them with their officeis. The Con
stitution oi the Confederate (Suites, as 1 have
heretofore most conclusively. shown, and as
the Legislature of the -.me lias resolved, as
well as the laws ol the State, authorize them to
elect their officers to fib. vacancies mat occur.
Ihe President has disregarded t his rigat, and
claims and exercises the right to appoint all
ouch officers for them. Jim past course, as
wed as tbe plain language of the requisition,
shows that you misrepresent ihe President
vvuen you deny that it was his* purpose in
making the requisition to disband the militia;
and I am satisfied that I do him no injustice
in supposing that it was his intention, after
they were disbanded, lo appoint bis own par
tisaus and favorites to command 1 ~em.
lielerence is made in your letter, to the act
ot Congress, to show yiac the President could
only hold die militia six moulds under a call
'upon the Governor, for their services. You
seem.to forget that many ol tho-e th< uin ser
vice, lor wnom he called, had already served
nearly lour months. Aud you seem to suppose
that I will be unmindful how easy it would bd*
at the cud ol bix months, lor the President sim ■
piy to renew the call for another six months ,
aud continue this to Iho end ot tha war, an
in this way keep the o:d men and boys Geo.
gia constantly in service, to the destruction o t
all her agricultural aud other material inter- •
ebt, while uo such requirement is made of any
other State. But il mis were no! possible by
these repeated ealis, what guaranty nave thsy
under the act ot Congress aud tne promise oi
tne President,■ tuat ruey would be disbanded
at the cud of six months t The original
tweive mouths men entered the service under
the like protection, as they supposed, of an
act of Congress, and a solemn contract with
tire President that they should be dischagred
at the end oi their time. But before the
time exp-ued the Preside -t procured another
ac: of*ot Oongroos, wu c r changed the law on
that subject, and ns then reiused to be bound
by bis contract, and tuose of them who survive
arc yet in Service uea. me end of the lourtb
year. Even tho lu-'loi.ghs promise J tin in were
not allowed. *Au.i mmmters ol religion who
made a contract with tin Government to serve
for one year, and otaeis who agreed to erve
three years in the ranks, are he.J auer the c-x
--pira'ion of their time, wneu they would ue
embraced in the exemption act, wn.cn protects
those at home, ii the government had kept k
faith and discharged them according to tne
C °Lhtffis connection I must also notice your
remarks in reference to the six months men of
SiXin tins State. And as every material
Kiateuumt you now make upon that subject -
contradicted by the records ol your Depart
ment—made up over your own signature, the
ta-k is an unpleasant one.
You say, *‘it had been designed to raise
troops for special defence ami local service sot
tbe war with the obligation ot service as the
general rule throughout the State, to constitute
a part of the provisional army, aud to be su-.
jeefrto the call of the President when heeded. 1 '
If tnia statement means anything, it is in
tended to mean that the call was made on me
tor the troops to servo for the war, with obli
gation as the general rule, to do service through
out the State. 1 hat is what you now say.—
\Vhat did yon then say -i quote irotn your
requisition oi tith June, ISiid.
-The President has tuerefore determined to .
make a requisition on me Governors oi the
several Stems, ♦ to furnish by an appointed time ,
for service wu thin theot-.te, a.ud lor the limi—
i purwd oi six mon.hu, an tuber oi m—n .
cto. A tr am, in tne same requisition say.
‘-I a m instructed by the President, in his name,
tomaktvhfi you a requisition lor eight thou
sand men, to be furnished Devour State, sot
tbe perifld of six months from the firsj, day of
. August next, unless m the intermediate time,
- [WXCiiVhJSb ON fOt'fiTU I’AUfi }