important part of the story of the peace movement, and
the hope for peace itself, is the process by which hawks
come to see their own mistakes. A brilliant history/
autobiography in this regard is Dan Ellsberg's Secrets, about his
evolution from defense hawk to historic whistleblower during
the Vietnam War. Ellsberg writes movingly about how he was
influenced on his journey by contact with young men on their
way to prison for draft resistance.
The military occupation of our minds will continue until
many more Americans become familiar with the strategies and
doctrines in play during the Long War. Not enough Americans
in the peace movement are literate about counterinsur
gency, counterterrorism and the debates about "the clash of
civilizations"—i.e., the West versus the Muslim world.
A. Hope foe Peace
The writings of Andrew Bacevich, a Vietnam veteran and
retired Army lieutenant colonel whose own son was killed in
Iraq in 2007, is one place to begin. Bacevich, a professor at
Boston University, has written The New American Militarism and
edited The Long War, both worth absorbing.
For the military point of view, there i: the 2007 Army-
Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual developed by Gen.
Petraeus, with its stunning resurrection of the Phoenix model
from Vietnam, in which thousands of Vietnamese were tortured
or killed before media outcry and Senate hearings shut it down.
David Kilkullen, Petraeus' main doctrinal adviser, even calls for
a "global Phoenix program" to combat Al Qaeda-style group
ings. These are Ivy League calls to war, Kilcullen even endors
ing "armed social science" in a New Yorker article in 2007.
For a criticism of counterinsurgency and defense of the
"martial spirit," Bing West's recent The Wrong War is a must-
read. West, a combat Marine and former Pentagon official, wor
ries that counterinsurgency is turning the army into a Peace
Corps, when it needs grit and bullets. "America is the last •
Western nation standing that fights for what it believes," he
roars.
Not enough is being written about how to end the wars
in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but experts with much to
say are the University of Michigan's Scott Atran (Talking to
the Enemy) and former UK envoy Sherard Cowper Coles (Cables
from Kabul). Also there is my own 2007 book. Ending the War
in Iraq, which sketches a strategy of grass-roots pressure
against the pillars of the policy (the pillars necessary for the
war are public opinion, trillions of dollars, thousands of avail
able troops, and global alliances; as those fall, the war must be
resolved by diplomacy).
The more we know about the Long War doctrine, the more
we understand the need for a long peace movement. The pil
lars of the peace movement, in my experience and reading, are
the networks of local progressives in hundreds of communities
across the United States. Most of them are citizen volunteers,
always immersed in the crises of the moment, nowadays the
economic recession and unemployment. Look at them from the
bottom up, and not the top down, and you will see:
• the people who marched in the hundreds of thousands
during the Iraq War;
• those who became the consumer base for Michael Moore's
documentaries and the Dixie Chicks' anti-Bush lyrics;
• the first to support Howard Dean when he opposed the
Iraq war, and the stalwarts who formed the anti-war base for
Barack Obama;
• the online legions of MoveOn who raised millions of dol
lars and turned out thousands of focused bloggers;
• the voters who dumped a Republican Congress in 2006 on
the Iraq issue, when the party experts said it was impossible;
• the millions who elected Obama president by an historic
flood of voluntary enthusiasm and get-out-the-vote drives.
• the majorities who still oppose the Afghanistan and Iraq
wars, and want military spending reversed.
This peace bloc deserves more. It won't happen overnight,
but gradually we are wearing down the pillars of the war.
It's painfully slow, because the president is threatened by
Pentagon officials, private military contractors and an entire
Republican Party (except the Ron Paul contingent), all of whom
benefit from the politics and economics of the Long War.
But consider the progress, however slow. In February of this
year, Rep. Barbara Lee passed a unanimous resolution at the
Democratic National Committee calling for a rapid withdrawal
from Afghanistan and transfer of funds to job creation. The
White House approved of the resolution. Then 205 House mem
bers, including a majority of Democrats, voted for a resolution
that almost passed calling for the same rapid withdrawal. Even
the AFL-CI0 executive board, despite a long history of milita
rism, adopted a policy opposing Afghanistan.
The president himself is quoted in Obama's Wars as oppos
ing his military advisors, demanding an exit strategy and mus
ing that he "can't lose the whole Democratic Party."
At every step of the way, it must be emphasized, public
opinion in congressional districts has been a key factor in
changing establishment behavior.
Is Peace IPossilble?
In the end, the president decided to withdraw 33,000
American troops from Afghanistan by next summer and con
tinue "steady" withdrawals of the rest (68,000) from com
bat roles by 2014. At this writing, it is unclear how many
remaining troops Obama will withdraw from Iraq, or when and
whether the drone attacks on Pakistan will be forced to an end.
The Arab Spring has demolished key pillars of the Long War
alliance, particularly in Egypt, to which the CIA only recently
was able to render its detainees for torture.
Obama's withdrawal decision upset the military but also
most peace advocates he presumably wanted to win back. The
differences revealed a serious gap in the inside-outside strat
egy applied by many progressives.
After a week of hard debate over the president's plan, for
example, Sen. John Kerry invited Tim Carpenter, leader of the
heavily grass-roots Progressive Democrats of America, into his
office for a chat. Kerry had slowly reversed his pro-war posi
tion on Afghanistan, and said he thought Carpenter would be
pleased with the then-secret Obama decision on troop with
drawals. From Kerry's insider view, the number 33,000 was a
very heavy lift, supported mainly by Vice President Joe Biden
but not the national security mandarins.
(Secretary of Defense Gates had called Biden
"ridiculous," and Gen. McChrystal's later
ridicule of Biden helped lose the general his
job.)
From Carpenter's point of view, 33,000
would seem a disappointing too little, too
late. While it was definite progress toward a
phased withdrawal, bridging the differences
between the Democratic liberal establish
ment and the idealistic progressive networks
will remain an ordeal through the 2012
elections.
As for al Qaeda, there is always the threat
of another attack, like those attempted by
militants aiming at Detroit during Christmas
2009 or Times Square in May 2010. In the
event of another such terrorist assault
originating from Pakistan, all bets are off:
According to Woodward, the United States
has a "retribution" plan to bomb 150 sepa
rate sites in that country alone, and there
are no apparent plans for The Day After.
Assuming that nightmare doesn't hap
pen, today's al Qaeda is not the al Qaeda of
a decade ago. Osama bin Laden is dead, its
organization is damaged, and its strategy of
conspiratorial terrorism has been displaced
significantly by the people-power democratic
uprisings across the Arab world.
It is clear that shadow wars lie ahead,
but not expanding ground wars involving
greater numbers of American troops. The
emerging argument will be over the ques
tion of whether special operations and drone
attacks are effective, moral and consistent
with the standards of a constitutional
democracy. And it is clear that the economic
crisis finally is enabling more politicians to
question the trillion-dollar war spending.
Meanwhile, the 2012 national elections
present an historic opportunity to awaken
from the blindness inflicted by 9/11.
Diminishing the U.S. combat role by escalat
ing the drone wars and Special Operations could repeat the
failure of Richard Nixon in Vietnam. Continued spending on the
Long War could repeat the disaster of Lyndon Johnson. A grad
ual winding down may not reap the budget benefits or political
reward Obama needs in time.
With peace voters making a critical difference in numerous
electoral battlegrounds, however, Obama might speed up the
"ebbing," plausibly announce a peace dividend in the trillions
of dollars, and transfer those funds to energy conservation and
America's state and local crises. His answer to the deficit crisis
will have to include a sharp reduction in war funding, and his
answer to the Tea Party Republicans will have to be a Peace
Party.
Tom Hayden
After more than 50 years of activism, politics and writing, Tom Hayden
is a leading voice for ending the wars in Afghanistan. Iraq and Pakistan
and reforming politics through a more participatory democracy.
8 FLAGP0LE.COM • SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
