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August 14, 19121
TIIE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.
Ily Prof. William Dinwiddle.
l'rof. Dunlap's "A System of Psychology,''
one of the latest, cleanest, and
least psychological of the shorter
treatises, is peg enough to hang a few
reflections on.
Tht author frankly admits that tho
!;eld of psychology "Is In great and Increasing
danger of becoming unsystematized
to the point of chaos," and "that
the date of psychology cannot at
present be definitely described except
in terms of theories which are more or
icss philosophical, and that the attempt
to divorce the date from the theories
would result In the uncritical acceptance
of theories." These admissions
should be acceptable to an adherent of
the "old psychology," for he has thought
this all along; and his pleasure would
pass over into full approbation, were
he allowed to supply the "theories" for
the date. But the pleasure veers
around to disappolntmnt, when the crux
of Prof. Dunlap's "theory" is reached,
and he says; "Modern psychology is
truly said to be psychology without a
soul, but if the transcendental point
of reference or subjects is what is meant
by the term soul, psychology not only
does not deny the soul, but positively
affirms it. We must, however, bear in
mind the fact not only that we can
know nothing about the Ego, but that
there is nothing to be known about It."
Surely this must be one of the "less
philosophical" theories mentioned above.
The "old" psychologist, with his agedimmed
vision, is not now sure which is
in the lead, Prof. Dunlap, Herbert
Spencer, or Mrs. Eddy.
The worst having thus perhaps been
said, other points of interest may be
noted. Dr Jamps r?h1potp/i onH ^o-htiv
to the designation "new." Rightly, because,
though not accordng to Dr.
James, the enormous mass of psychological
data so often included In "new"
psychologies, interesting and valuable
indeed, if after all, though much of it
new, none of it psychology; it might be
called, in their parlance, "subliminal."
Rightly, again, not "new," for careful
comparison of terms, such as "content,"
"apperception," the use of "perception,"
and many others, with those
formerly employed, offers convincing
proof that the newest thing about the
new psychology is its vocabulary. To
this there is no intrinsic objection; but
an anachronistic glossary would save
much time for the old psychologist trying
to become new, or not to become
new.
While the sacred precincts of many
psychologists seem to have the sign up:
"Only facts admitted here," yet once
inside the palisade, we And obscure
hints, tenatlve suggestions, mangled
remains of theories, or sometimes, as in
'lie quotation from T>r. Dunlap, above,
colossal straddles, with room for everything
between. Occasional refreshment
is found in open advocacy of theories,
rising, no doubt, as miasma was thought
to rise, from the ground, out of some
"sub-conscious" cellar.
But these more or less surrepetitious
theories are not "new." Empiricism is
not new; Darwinian evolution is not
new, nor are its multiplying progeny of
re-incarnated variations new; pantheism
is not new, even the psrychic va
riety; agnosticism is not new; atheism
i8 not new; even pragmatism is as old
s* the Garden "of Eden, and mythical
enough to satisfy a higher critic. No,
the new psychology is not new; most of
its facts are filched from physiology and
re-branded; its eclectic assortment of
theories confessedly do not belong to it,
nor are th"ey new. Dr. James is right.
But the vocabulary is new, a possible
Esperanto-like advantage, for while, as
THE PRE8B YTERI
said already, the old psychologist loses
time in the re-naming of the tools of his
work-shop, It must be confessed that he
had already lost time and efficiency because
several of them had sometimes
the same name, or more than one name
apiece. Only one "old" text comes to
mind which is perfectly clear-cut in
terminology. Some of these new words
such as "ageusia," "anaphia," "athalposia,"
"arrhigosia," "gargalanaesthesia,"
etc., are more new and scientific
than beautiful; others, such as "intuited,"
"illuded," "repugned," "a repugn"
(a desire not to), etc., remind us
of amplified spelling, with all Its inelegant
and unfamiliar horrors.
iLet us be generous, even if mistaken,
and admit that the point of view of the
new psychology is another new characteristic.
There are advantages in
adopting the total dental "content" as
the unit of study, and analizing It into
Its elements. It is the word-method
versus the letter-method in psychology;
vet when wo lnnV Ho?ir ???.- 41? -?
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pleted task, the results are surprisingly
similar to those of former methods.
Prof. Dunlap's style and treatment
are lucid. Some of the Information he
gives us is not found in all the recent
shorter treatises. For example, we
learn that the molecules of odorous substances
are above a certain minimum
weight; that water, vapor and carbon,
though of sufficient molecular weight,
are odorless because of "protective
adaptation," which also brings immunity
to the odor of one's own perspiration;
that pungency increases with molecular
weight. The ear ossicles do not transmit
sound vibrations, but damp them.
A frog may be frozen stifT or boiled to
death without trying to escape, if the
temperature change very slowly. The
skin is not sensitive by points but by
areas, and so the retina, too. A parson
without the semicircular canal ot the
inner ear cannot be made dizzy. The
two hands touched behind a screen, can
not after a while be diktingushed.
Musical and non-musical people employ
different methods of estimation of pitch.
"We know of no 'center* in the brain
or the perception of ie:a?i?.ue ami we lo
not know that It is a critical function at
all," which is doing remarkably well for
a new psychologist. Identity is a relation.
"The perception of relation is
commonly called intellect;" and, encouraging
admission for metaphysicians
out of a Job, "we cannot deal adequately
with thte relation in abstraction from
other forms ..f con!?nt without ceiling
outside of the field of psychology."
Imaglnat'o" is the basis of niemoiy of
all reasoning processes, which latter
surely fits the higher critics. "A part
of our perceptive ability is native or
instinctive/' another boon of the idle
metaphysician.
"'As soon as you begin to discriminate
extensive parts within a sensation, or
mass of sensations, you have space," or
more simpiy, as soon as you begin to
discriminate extension, you have extension;
and "The fundamental spatial relation
seems to be betweenness," which
hardly illuminates, and surely the usual
relation involves only two terms, whereas
this calls for three. If we did not
have the "experience of thinghood, substance
would never have been invented,
which either is empiricism, or admits
fVl.O + AVt\A?>lA?AA<J ? ? 1 *
wai c?fciicuvcu UKina.na BUDstances
for their explanation, a sound
position. Temporal extent is the
"amount of change between determining
points;" that is, time is change and
naught else. And '*both past and future
actually exist," corroboration of the
author's previous statement that imagination
is at the basis of memory,
thought and perception. Reality is
"doubtless a relation or group of relations,
a 'feeling of reality,' the current
AN OF THE SOUTH
empirical philosophy would call it, and
there we are obliged to leave it for the
present."
"Instead of-experiencing pleasure and
pain, we mart now call it "hedonoalgesis."
All the emotions are probably
based on the "feelings." "'Possibly all
food flavors are unpleasant to the child
experiencing them for the first time"
"Natural selection" explains pleasure
and pain, as for example, pain from
"mutilation, exhaustion, or hugner, and
pleasure from food and the society of
the opposite sex," which is obvious to
all?evolutionists; finally there is a
suspicion that pleasure and pain, "are
forms of visceral sensation."
While it would be "extremely unfashionable
to speak of "mental faculties,"
yet we may talk of "content factors,"
and be sure we are "a la mode;" for
example, "admiration and interest, to
whatever activities they may lead, are
factors in the content of your consciousness,
and not anything to be supplied
by your consciousness or your ego,"
that ego about which we remember,
"fTiaro la 1 "
w?va v 10 UUuiilll5 IU ue HIIOWII,
"The common type of religious emotion,
or what passes for such, is generally
tinctured heavily with hedonoalgetic
factors." "I^ange and James
went so far as to say that the emotion
consists wholly of bodily sensations."
It is the human body that is capable of
"consciousness-reflexes." "Volition is
an emotional state." In deliberation,
"one of the ideas may shortly gain the
ascendancy; the other either fading out
of consciousness or losing its conative
strength, and thus the content becomes
a volition," and "there is no discoverable
force, as of an ego or active self,
at work at transforming the content."
"However you may feel?whatever
feelings you may 'have'?these feelings
are part of you; to name these is to describe
in part the sort of self you are?
c? ?" ?? ? ? ? ? ? .. .. . .. ... .
Davidson
Mecklenbui
Davidso
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(951) 17
or 'have'?at that specific time." "Here
we can only wonder who or what "you";*^
is. "The self, furthermore, contains all
the other sensations (and relations)
which make up the perceived human
body." "The body, in short (as an experienced
fact, not as a materialized supposition),
is fundamentally the self."
This is plain enough, surely. "A striking
demonstration of the truth of this
statement" (just quoted., says Prof.
Dunlap, "is found in the uniformity with
which all naturally developed religions
which assume a persistence of the self
f1 or /IrxofT* ooftrlIA ? i *? - *
w. uvoui wvnuc iu il tx ixKiy 01 some
~ort. But "the self Is by no moans exhausted
by the body and the feelings."
"Family, business, and society relations,
for example, tend to become relations
within the Belf." Finally here, "The
mass of habitually experienced content
is the self."
But the "self" is empirical and
known, while the "Ego" is assumed, and
"there is nothng to be known about
it."
"There are an Indefinite number of
possible principles of bifurcation of the
self." "There may be three of these
fractional personalities, or even more."
"It is probable that none of us are free
from the taint of divided personality."
Of the subconscious the author says
it is not necessary to assume such "a
sub-department of consciousness," and
takes issue with those "who have considered
digestive functions and the
growing of the nails as supervised by
this subsidiary consciousness," and with
those who say "that by hypnosis the
subconscious part of the mind is made
nnn an lona "
These salient points give us a fair
though incomplete view of the field of
modern psychology. How would the
philosophical and theological systems of
a Hodge, a Dabney, or a Thornwell be
presented to a mind so taught?
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ell-prepared men who are
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se who know the college
; courses. It is purely a
quipment in Dormitories,
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ire excellent and carefully
and religious influences
Ity is a body of consistent
npus sentiment is against ;;
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tember 5th, 1912.
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