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the military and naval arsenals, magazines, | and slcrehougeg, it is believed tlri' such an i sic* would be regarded hv all as palpable ' lunation of Executive power, subversive ofj bf the form as well as the fundamental princi- j pies of our Government. Bi' where) is the difference in principle, whether the! public property be in the form of arms, mtini-{ iinns *f war, and supplies, or t'n gold and si l ’- ' ver, ° r bank notes? None can be perceived—■ none is believed to exist. Congress cannot,; therefore, take onl of the hands nfthe execu-I five Depnrjmenf, the custody of the public ) pronertv or money, without an assumption of; Executive power, and a subversion of the first j principles of the constitution. T e Congress of the United States have , never passed an act imperatively directing that the public moneys shall be kept in any par- ' ticular place or places. From the origin of thp Government to the year 1816, the statute book «as wholly silent on the subject. In 1788 a Treasurer was created, subordinate to the Secretary of the Treasury, and through htm to the President. He was required to give. bond, saf lv to keep, and faithfully to ■ disburse the public moneys, withou* any di J reclion as to the manner nr places in winch they should be hep'. Bv reference to the i practice of the Government, it is found, that from its first organization, the Secretary of the Treasury, acting under the sttporversinn of the Prcsieent, designated the places m which the public moneys should be kept, and cpoci dlv directed all transfers from place tn place. This practice was continued, with the sihmt acquiescence of Congress, from 1759 down to 1816: and although many banks were] pelpmod and discharged, and although a por-| tion of the moneys were first placed in the ' State Banks, and then in the former bank ofj the United S'ates, and upon the dissolution of j that, were again transferred to the Stale Bank, no legislation was thought necessary by Con- ' gross, and al’ ho operations were originated 1 and perfected bv Executive authority. The St*cr> tary of the Treasury, responsible to the j President, and with his approbation, made con-: tracts and arrangements in relation to the I whole subject matter, which was thus entirely , committed to the direction of the President,) under his responsibilities to the American] Panpie, and those who were authorized to im peach and punish him for any breach of this important trust. The act of 1916, estnblis’ ing the Bank of the United States, directed the deposites of public money *o he made in that bank and its • branches, in places in which the said bank and i branches thereof mav be established, “unless j the Secretary of the Treasurv should otherwise j or er and direct.” in which event, he was re quired to give his reasons to Congress. This was hut a' continuation of Lis pre-existing powers ns the Head of an Executive Depart ment. to direct where the deposites - should be 'made, with the sopr.raddcd obligation of giving his reasons Io Congress for making them else- . where than in the Bank of the United States > ami its branches. It is not to be considered : that ttiis provision in any degree altered the relation between the Secretary of the frensti- I r l . and the President, as the responsible Head' of the Executive Department, or released the | latter fr”tn his constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws he faithfully execu-' ted.” On the contrary, it increased Ins re«j tqmmsilufities, hv adding another to the long , Ji<t of laws which it was his duty to carry into, ©fleet. It would bean cxt'nordinary result, if, !><•-j can. e the person charged by law with n public ■ July, is one of the Bcc r etarms, it wore less the duty of llm President to see ‘hat law faithful ly executed, thin other laws enjoining duties upon subordinate officers or private citizens. Tftbere he any ihlTerenco, it would seem that ♦he obligation is tho stronger in relation to the former, because the neglect is in his presence, and the remedy at hand. It cannot be doubted that it was the legal! Jittv of the Secretary nf the Treasury tn order ( and direct the deposited of the public mono' to bo made elsewhere than in the Bank of the United States, whenever sufficient reasons ex isted for making the change. If. in such a case he > rgleetcd or refused to act, he would neg. Icet or refuse to execute the la w. U hat would then be the sworn dutv of the President ? Cmild he sav that the constitution dtd not bind him to see the Jaw faithfully executed, because it uasoneofliH Seeretaru s. and not himse-f noon whom the service was specially imposed? Might he not be asked whether ther« was any s>icl. limtißti' n '<> his obligations proscribed in the Constitution? Whether he is not equally bound to lake care that the laws be faithfully executed, whether they impose duties on the highe-t officer of State, or the lowest subor- ' dinate in any of the Departments? Might he not be told. that it was for the sole purpose of causing all executive effi ers. from the highest to *he lowest, faithfully to perform the servi ces required of them bv law—that the People of the United States have ’made him thetr' Chief Magistrate, and the rotistit ition has clothed him with the entire Executive power; of this Government? The principles implied; in these questions appear ton plain to need elu- I c»d ition But here, also we have rntemporancoua construction of (heart, which shows that it was noi understood as tn any wav changing the re lations between the President and Secretary of the treasury, or ns placing the latter out of Executive control, even in fetation to the de-1 posites of the public money. Nur on this point are wo left to anv equivocal testimony, i Th»* documents nf the Treasury Department show th-Rt th Secretary of the Treasury did apnlv tn the President, and obtain his anprn bation and sanction tn the original transfer of the public dep<»sites tn the present Bank of the United States, and did carry the measure mtn effect in < b»-dience to ho derision. They al so show that transfers nf th-* public dep >sites from the Branches of the Bank of the United Status to State Batiks, at Chilicot k e ; Vine tn-1 naii, and Louisville, m 1849. were made with ] the approbation of the President, and bv his] authority. They show, that upon all import- ; ant questions appertaining tn his Department, | whither they •■elated to the public deposites o» - ; other matters, it was the constant practice ofj the Secretary of the Tieasury to obtain for Ins j acts tiie approval and sanction of the Presi dent. T hese acts, and the principles on which j they were founded, were known to all the de- j partments of the Government, to Gongress, I and the, country; and, until ve> v recently, ap-! pear never to have been called in questton. 'j I'lms was it settled by the constitution. the . laws, and the whole practice of the Govern- ; rnent.. that the entire Executive power is vested i in the President ofthe United States; that as, incident to that power, the right of appointing ) and removing those oflv-ers who are to aid , him in the execution of the laws, with such re- ' strictinns ordv as the constitution prescribes, j is vested in the President; that the Secretary, of the freasury is one of those officers; that the custody of the public property and money; is an executive function, which, in rela'ion to ' the money, has always been exercised thro igh ' the Secretary of the Treasury and his subor-i dinates; that in the performance of these du-j ties, he is subject to the supervision and con- , trol of the President, and in all important mea sures having relation to them, consults the ■ Chief Magistrate, and obtains his approval and ] sanction; that trie law establishing the Bank did not, as it could not, change the relation be tween the President ami the Secretary—did' not release the former from his obligation to i see the law faithfully executed, nor the latter from the President’s supervision and control; that afterwards, and before, the Secretary did in fact consult, and obtain the sanction of the President, to transfers and removals of the public deposites; and that all departments of the Government, and the nation itself, approv ed or acquiesced tn these nets and principles, as in strict coulormity with our constitution and laws. During the last year, the approaching ter mination, accord'ng to the provisions of its charter, and the solemn decision of the Atner- I ican People, of the Bank of the United States, made it expedient, and its exposed abuses and corruptions, rmde it, in my opinion, the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, to place the , moneys of the United States in other deposi tories. The Secretary did not concur in that opinion, and declined giving the necessary or der and direction. So glaring were the abus es and corruptions of the Bank, so evident its fixed purpose to persevere in them and so palpable its design, by its money and power, to control the Government and change its cha racter, that I deemed it the imperative dutv of the Executive authority, by the exertion of ( every power confidml to it bv the constitution and laws, to check its career, and lessen its ability to do mischief, even in the painful al-) ternative of dismissing the Head of one of the Departments. Al me time the removal was made, other causes sufficient Io justify it ex istcjJ; but il lhev had not, tlto Secretary would h ive been dismissed for’his cause only. His place I supplied by one whose opinions were well known to mt*, and whose frank ex pression of them, in another situation, and whose generous .sacrifices of imerest and feel- 1 mg, when tmcxpeci mil v called to the station he now occupies, ought forever to have shield ed his motives from suspicion, and his charac ter from reproach. In accordance with the miintons long before expressed by him, he pro ceeded, w«th my sanction, to make arrange ments for depositing the moneys of the United States in other safe institutions. 1 he resolution of the Senate, as originally framed, and us passed if it refers to these acts, presupposes a right in that body to interfere , w ith this exercise of Executive power. If the principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to oercei e where it,may end. If, by a mere de nunciation like this resolution, the President 1 should ever he induced to act, in a -natter of ofirial duty, c ntrarv to the honest convic tons of his own mind in compliance wi'h the wish es of the Senate, the constrmion d indepen dence of the Executive Department would bn is effectually destroyed, ami its power as ps i fectualli transferred to the Senate, as if that tmd bad been accomplished by an amendment of the constitution. But if the Senate have a right to interfere with he Executive powers, they have also the ritfht tn tnak" that interfer ence elfeotivi-; and if (he assertion oftho pow er implied in the resolution |»e silently acqui esced in, we may reasonably apprehend (hat jt will he followed, at some future day, by an attempt at actual enforcement. The Senate mav refuse, except on the condition that he will surrender his opinions to theirs and obey their will, to perform their ow n con<(i(utioml functions; to pass the necessary laws: to sanc tion appropriations proposed bv the House of Representatives, and to confirm proper nom inations made bv the President. It has alrea dy been maintained (and it is not conceivable that the resolution of the Senate can be based on any other principle) that the Secretary of the Treasury is the officer of Congress, and 1 independent of the President; that the Presi dent has no right to control him. and con.se-' q-ientlv none tn remove him.—With the same propriety, and on similar grounds, may the Se cretaries nf \\ nr and the Navy, and the Post master General, each in succession, be declar ed independent oftho President, the subor : dinntas of Congress, and removable only w ith the concurrence of the Senate. Followed tn. its consequences, thia principle will be found effectually to destroy one co-ordinate Depart ment of the Government, to concentrate tn the hands ofihe Senate the whole Executive pow er, nnd tn leave the President as powerless as he w ould be useless—the shadow of authority, after the substance had departed. Tne time and the Occasion which have cal led Girth the resolution of the Senate, seem to impose noon me an addi-iona! obligation not tn pass it over m silence. Nearly foriv-five yeers had the Presideol exercised, withatfl € question as to his rightful authority, those pow ers for the recent assumption of which lo now’ denounced. The vicissitudes of peac and tvai‘ had attended our Government; violent parties, watchful to take advantage o r any seeming usurpation rm the part of the Execu tive, had distracted our counsels; frequent re movals, or forced resignations, in every sense tantamount to removals, had been made of the Secretary and other officers of the Tresury; and vet, in no one instance is it known, that any man, whether patriot or parties had raised his voice against it as a violation of the Con stitution. The expediency and justice of such changes, in reference to public officers of all grades, have frequently been the topics of dis cession; but the constitutional right of the President to appoint, control, and remove the Head of the Treasury, as well as all other De partments, seems to have been universally con ceded. And what is the occasion upon which other principles have been first officially as serted t The Bank of the United States, a great moneyed monopoly, had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter, by controlling the elections of the People and the action of the Government. The use of its corporate funds and power in .that attempt, was fully dis closed; and it was made known to the Presi dent that the corporation was putting tn train the same course of measures,'with the view of making .another vigorous effort, through an in terference in the elections of the People, to control public opinion and force the Govern ment to yield to its demands. This, with its corruption of the press, its violation of its char ter, its exclusion of the Government Directors from its proceedings, its neglect of duty, and arrogant pretensions, made it, in the opinion of the President, incompatible with the publie interest and the safety of our institutions, that it should be longer employed as the fiscal agent of the I’reasury. A Secretary of the Trcastt ry, appointed in the recess of the Senate, who had not been confirmed by that body, and whom the President might or might not at his pleasure nominate to them, refused to do what his superior in the Executive Department con sidered the most imperative of his duties, and became in fact, however innocent his motives, the protector of the Bank. And on this oc casion it is discovered for the first time, that those who framed the constitution misunder stood it; that the first Congress and all its successors hnvo - been under-a delusion; that the practice of near forty five years, is but a continued usurpation; that the Secretary of the Treasury is not responsible to the Pr >sidont; and that to remove him is a viol ition of the constitution and I iwg, for which the President deserves to stand forever dishonored on the journals of the Senate, There are al<o some other circumstances connected with the discussion and passage of the resolution, to which I feel it to bo, not on ly my right, but mv duty, to refer. Il appears by the journal of the S mate, that among the twenty-six Senators who voted for the resolu tion on its final passage, and who had support ed it in debate, in i’.s original form, were one oftho Senators from t te State of Maine, the two Senators from New Jersey, and one of the Senators from Ohio. It also appears by the same journal, and by the files oftho Sen ate, that the Legislatures of these States had severally expressed their opinions in re-ped to ; the Executive proceedings drawn in question ] before the Senate. The two branches <»<* the Legislature of the J State of Maine, on the 25th of January. 1534, ' passed a preamble and series of resolutions in the following word- :* “ Whereas, at an early period after the elee tion of Andrew Ja kson to the presidency, in accordance with the sentiments which he had uniformly expressed, the attention of Congress was called to ’he constitutionality and expedi ency of the renewal of (be charter of'he U- S'a'es Bank; And whereas, the Bn k has transcend’d its chartered limits in the manage ment ofi's business transactions, and h is ab tu <l »n»*d the object of its creation, hv engaging hi n.fli’icnl controversies, by wield’ng its power and influence to embarrass the adtninistratioh ol’ibe Genera! Government, and by bringing insolvency and distress upon the commercia 1 rommunitv. And whereas, the public security f rom such an institution consists less in its pre sent pernniarv ranacitv to discharge its liabili ties than tn tho fidelity with which the trusts reposed in it have been exec ted : And where as. the abuse and misapplication of'he powers conf' rr<’d have destroyed the confidence of the public iti ‘ho officers nf the Bank, and demon strated that such powers endanger the stability of ronubliean institutions : Therefore, Resolv ed, That in the removal of the public dep ts i‘es from the Bank of the United States, as' well as tn the manner of their removal, we re cognise in the administration an adherence to cons’ituiional rights, and the performance of a public dutv. Resolved, That this Legislature entertain the same opinion as heretof' re expressed by preceding Legislatures of ibis Btnfe. that the Bank of the United Stalos ought not to be re chartered Resolved, That the Senators of 'bis State in the Congress ofthe I nite>l States be ins'nr’ted and the Representatives ho requested, to op- j pose the restoration of the dpnnsites and the ) renewal of tho charter of the United States! Bank.” On the 111|> f January. 1834, tho House of; Assembly and Cnun il eompoa,ng the L■•?<»- j lature of the State of New Jersey, passed a. preamble and a series of resolutions in the fol j lowin'* words ; * “ W Pereas the present crista in our public affairs calls for a decided expression nf the i voice nf the people of this State: and whereas : we consider it the "ndoubfed right of tho Le- j gislature of the several States to instruct those I who represent their interest in the councils of the nation, in all matters which intimately con cern 'he puhlio »eal, and mav affect the hap piness or well be ; nj cf tho pcopla : There fore i “2. Pi if r/’.voZiti'rZ f‘i/ ilce. Council and Gen ■‘ra’ I’isembh/ of this Sfote.. Dia’ whil •we ac knowledge with feelings of devout gratitude our obligations to the great Ruler of nations for his mercies to us as a people, that we have been preserved alike from foreign war, from the evil, of internal commotions, and the machinations of d ,*s>gnin ; and atnbt.ious men •vho would prostrate the fair fabric of our Un ion; that we ought, nevertheless, to bumble our-udves in H : s presence and implore His aid for the perpetuation of our republican institu tions, and for a continuance of that unexam pled prosperity which our country has hitherto enjoyed. .•2. Resolved, That we have undimtnishccl confidence in the integrity and firmness ofthe venerable patriot who now holds the distin guished post of Chief Magistrate of this nation, and whose purity of purpose and elevated mo tives have so often received the unqualified approbation of a large majority of his fellow citizens. 3. Resolved, That we view with agitation and alarm the existence of a great moneyed incorporation, which threatens to embarrass the operations of the Government, and by means of its unbounded influence upon the cur rency nf the country, to scatter distress and ruin throughout the community; and. that we, therefore, solemnly belive the present Bank of the United States might not to be recharted. 4 Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our members of the House of Representatives be requested to sustain, by their votes and influence, the course adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. fancy, in relation to the Bank of the United States and the deposites of the Government moneys, believing as we do the course ol the Secretary to have been constitutional, aud that the public good required its adoption. 5. Resolved, That the Governor be request ed to forward a copy of the above resolutions to each of our Senators and representatives from this State in the Congress of the United States-” On the 21st dtv of February last, the Le gislature of the same State, reiterated the opin ions and instructions before given, by join' re sobit'nns, in he following words: “ Resolved hi/ fh°. and General Is se.inbhi of the State of Vein Jersey, I'liat they do adhere to the resolutions passed bv them on the 11th dav of January last, relative to the President of the United States, the Bank of the United States, and the course of Mr. 'Pa nov in removing the Government deposites. R"solved, That the Legislature of New Jer sey have not seen any reason to depart from such resolutions since (he passage thereof; and tit is (heir wish that they should receive from our Senators and Representatives of this State in tho Congress of the United States, that at ten’ion and obedience which are duo to the opinion of a sovereign State, openly expressed in its Legislative capacity.” On the 2d of January, 1834, the Senate and House of Representatives composing tho Le gislature of Ohio, pass nd a preamble and re solutions in the foil >wiug words : “ AA r h“roas there is reason to believe that the Bank of tho U tited S'ams will attempt to ob tain a renewal of its charter at the present ses sion of Congress; And whereas it is abundant ly evident that sa d Bank has exercised powers derogatory to the spirit of our free institutions and dangerous to the liberties of these U. S' ites : And whereas, there is just reason to donut 'lie constitutional power of '’ongress to gran* '.c's of "icorporation for banking nurp >«- e- oit of the Disftiet ofColumbia ; And where as. we believe the proper disposal of the public I md-to be of the utmost importance to the P «onl« of these United States, and that honor a id good faith require tie ir equitable distribu tion : r'vroforc Res deed hv the General Assem'dy of the State of Ohio, That wo consider tho removal of he public -I 'posites from 'he Bank of the United States as required by the b’s' interests of our <•<> m’r . a id tha' a proper sense of pub- Ip-duty itnperiouslv demanded that that insti tu'ion should be no longer used as a depository of the poblic funds. Resolved, also, That we view, with decided disapprobation, the renewed attempts in Con gress to secure the passage of the bill provid ing for the disposal of the public domain upon the principles proposed by Mr. Clay, inasmuch as we believe that such a law would be une qual in its operations, and unjust in its results. Resolved, also, That we heartily approve of the principles set forth in the late veto mes sage upon that subject, and, Resolved. That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives request ed, to use their influence to prevent the re chartering of the Bank of tiie U Slates; to sustain tho admin s ia r io i m it- removal of the pulili’ - deposites; and to oppose the passage <>f a land lull containing the principles adopted m the act tmon that subject, passed at the lag! session of Congr ss. Resolved. I’liat the Governor he requested '<• transmit copies of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives” It i- th s seen that four S matora have de- * flared b>, their votes that the President, in the late Executive nro'-oed:ugs m relation to the revenue had been g iilty of the imneachnble i often”e ot ‘ is-’itmtnj upon htm-elf authority! “and power not cnnfeired bv the constitution “and I !••«, bit m derogation of both,” whilst the Leg;-hit'.res of’heir respective States had deliberat< lv approved those verv proceedings, as consistent with the ’•♦institution, and de manded liv the public g< od If these four votes had b<*' n given in a’-< ' rdance with the sentirnen sos th** Legislatures, a- above ex pressed, 'ln re would have been but twenty tour votes ci.: o* lorty-six for censuring the i President aud the unprecedented record ofhis conviction could not have been placed noon the jouma's of tiie Senate. In th is referring 'o • e relations and in structions of the Slate Legislatures; 1 disclaim j and repudiate ail authority or design to inter" sere with the responsibility due Ir .tn m ; inhere of tlie Senate to their own consciences, (heir constituents, and their country. The facte ■now stated belong Io the history ol the pro ceedmgs, and are important to the ju-t devel i nptnenl of the principles and interests involved ■ in them, as well as to the proper vindication of the Executive Department; and with that view, and that view only, are they here made i the topic of remark. 4 | The dangerous tendency of tho doctrine : which denies to the President the power of’ ' supervising, directing, md removing the Sec , retarv of the I'reasurv, i like manner with the other Executive offi-ers, would soon bo manifest in pramim. were the doctrine to be ' established. The President is ’he direct rep resentative of the American People, but tho Secretaries are not. If the Secretary oftha Treasury be independent of the Presideiit in , the execution oftho laws, then is there no di rect responsibility to the People in that impof-' taut branch ofthie Government, to which ig committed the care of liie national financi s.-w And it is in the power of the Bank of the Unit ed States, or any other corporation, body of men, or individuals if a Secretary shall bp ; found to accord with them m opinion, or can be induced in practice to promote their views, to control, through him, the whole action of the Government, (so far as it is exorcised by his Depar merit,) in defiance of the Chief Ma gistrate elected by the people and ; to them- ) But the evil tendency of tho particular doc trine adverted to, though suffi.-ientlv serious, would he as nothing in comparison with the permcious consequences which would inevifq.- bly flo.x from the approbation and allowance by the People, and the practice by the Sen ate, of the tint onsf 11111 iotta I power ol iirrai”n ing mid censuring the official conduct of ?ho Executive, in the manner recently pursued.- * Such proceedings are eminently calculated to unsettle the fotiudauong of the Government; to disturb the harmonious action of its different Departments; and to break down the checks’ and balances by which the wisdom of its fra mers sought to ensure its stability and useful ness. ['he honest clifTcrences, of opinion which occasionally exist between the Senate and the President, in regard to matters in which both are obliged to participate, are suffi. iently em barrassing. But the course recently adopted by the Senate shall hereafter be frequently 1 pursued, it is not only obvious that the harmo ny of the relations between the President and ’ the Senate will be destroyed, but that other and graver effects will ultimately enstje. If J the censures of the Senate be submitted to by r the President, the confidence of the People in his ability and virtue,'and the character anil usefulness of hts administration, will soon bo at an end, and the real power of the Govern ment will fall mto the hands of a body, hold ing tho offices for long terms, not elected by the People, and not to them directly rosponsj- * ble. If, on the other hand, the -illegal cen sures of the Senate should be resisted by the * President, collisions and angry controversies might ensue, discreditable tn their progress,, and tn the end compelling the People to adopt the conclusion, either that their Chief Magis (rate was unworthy of their respect, or that tho Senate was chargable with calumny and ■ injustice. Either these results would impair public confidence in tho perfection of the sys tem, and le id to serious alterations of its frame work, or to the practical abandonment of some of its provisions. I I he influence of such proceedings on the other Departments of’ the Government, and more especially on the Stales, could not fail to be extensively pernicious'. When the judges in the last resort of official themselves overleap the bounds of their an* thority, as prescribed by the Constitution, 'vhnt general disregard of its provisions might not their example be expected to produce?— Aud who does not perceive that such contempt of the Federal constitution, by one of its most important Departments, would hold out tha strongest temptation to resistance on (he pari ot the State sovereignties whenever they shall suppose their just rights to have been invad ed? thus till the independent Departments of the Government, and ’he States which com- •* pose our confederated Union, instead of nf tending to the r appropriate duties, and leaving those who may offend, tn bo reclaimed or punished in the maimer pointed nut in the con stilu ion, would fall to mutual crimination and recrimination, and give t<» the People, confu sion and anarchy, instead of order and law; 1 until at length some form of aristocratic pow er would be established on the rums of the con stitution, or the States be broken into separate communities. Far be il from me to charge, or to insinuate, ’hat (he present Senate of the United Statee intend, in the most distant way, to cncoura°(j such a result. It is not of their motives or designs, but only of the to; deucy of their acts, that it is my duty to speak. It is, if possible’ to make Senators themselves sensible of tho danger which lurks under the precedent set in • heir resolution; and at any rate to perform my duty, as the responsible Head of one of the co-equal Departments of the Government, that I have been compelled to point out the consequences to which the discussion and pas sage of the resolution may lead, if the tenden-* cy of the measure be not cheeked in its mcep- * tion. It i» due to the high trust with which I have been charged; tu those who may be called to succe< d in • tn it; to the Representatives of the People, whose constitutional prerogative hap U been unlawfully assumed; to (he People and to " the States; to the constitution they have estab lished; that 1 should not permit its provision? to be broken down by such an attack on the Executive Department, without at least some effort “to preserve, protect, and defend them. ilh this view, and for the reasons which have been elated, I do hereby solemnly pjwtct? i