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2 right; whatever ia useful is good. But it ia objected, “there are occa aione, in which the hand of the assas sin would be useful. It might be useful to rob a miser, and give the fnoney to the poor. It may be use ful to got a seat in Parliament by bribery or false swearing ; as by that means we may serve the public more effectually than in our private sta tion." But to all these, and to all others similar, Paley says, No ! They are not expedient! They are not useful ! They may seem so, but they are not. Because they take not into consideration the one-billionth part of the consequence. Paley, then, does not degrade right; he only ele vates utility to the level of right, and makes both synonyms of the will of God. .This, then, is that utility which, ft is continually said, seeks for nothing above this earth* nor takes into account aught besides the convenience of an hour. An utility which hath no limit but infinity, and whose voice is the voice of God in the harmony of the past, the present, and the great to morrow. And as every atom of matter exerts an influ ence upon endless worlds and sys tems beyond the supernatural vision even of the magical tube of Boss, so every theught and every action is felt by an infinity of worlds of thought and feeling, save by the eye of God unseen, as they roll ever on ward in circles,of rythmic Mpauty and song. Gironde. For the Georgia Collegian. Answer to “ Gironde,” on Dr. Paley. Editors Collegian We object to the views of “ Gironde" in regard to conscience, and purpose to investi gate them, and also attempt to prove (Dr. Paley to the contrary notwith*. standing,) that there is “such a thing as a natural conscience." “Gi ronde ’ has wronged the opponents of Dr. Paley, by saying that « they arc guilty of the fallacy, ‘ lgnoratio Elenchi , in holding that, in the case of Caius Toranius’, “as the savage would have no knowledge of the rela tions existing between the parties, “he could not form a judgment in the premises." For solely upon these relations, the relations of father and son, with tbeir attendant incidents aud full meaning, would depend the magnitude of the son’s guilt in betray ing his father; and, of course, with out a knowledge of these relations, it vrc-uld be impossible to estimate that guilt. If you alter the relations of the parties, you change the nature of the act of betrayal. The fact that the savage could not, before ho un derstood the relations of the parties, correctly estimate the sou’s guilt, does not prove “ that he did not have a natural conscience ," but only shows that his conscience had never before been called upon to decide the merits THE GEORGIA COLLEGIAN. of such a case. We think that this argument of Dr. Paley savors some what of the fallacy, “ Ignoratio Elenchi.” The fact that a faculty has not been exercised in a certain direction does not prove that it does not exist. Who would be so foolish as to say that Caspar Hauser had no natural sense of vision, because be could form no conceptions of light and colors when be came forth from the dark dungeon in which he had been confined from infancy? When “ Gironde" admits that the above mentioned argument “ proves that the savage has a capacity for moral education," he virtually admits that the savage has a natural conscience ; for as the supposition is, that only “ the relations of the parties" are to be made known to him, without any comments thereon, the expression “ moral education” as here used must mean that as soon as these relations are known he will be enabled to esti mate the son’s guilt. He has not been told that the son’s conduct was wrong, but simply informed of the relations of the parties. Why does he pronounce it wrong? From ex ample? No. For be has had no example set him in this respect, From education? No. For he has been educated only in regard to the rela tions of the parties. From sympa thy ? No. For be does nqt know how the father and the otho: a/elt in view of the aon’u JPJdMjf cannot feel with them in order that he may thus determine the moral qual ity of the act. From habit? No. lor he has had no previous expe- 1 rience in the matter. From what then ? We say, from the operations of a natuial conscience , from an in stinctive impulse arising by the prin ciples of his constitution, so soon as he understands the relations of the parties, and which impulse is by the Creator connected with the very con ception of these relations. Now, as the savage would pro nounce the son’s conduct wrong , the idea of wrong must have already been in his miod, or he could not thus predicate it of the sonfs conduct. So, if any one affirms that an act is right or wrong, he must have previously possessed the ideas of right and wrong. Whence come they and how are they obtained? Dr. Paley, as quoted by “ Gironde," says “ that they are drawn from example, edu cation, authority, sympathy and ha bit." This is not true, as we shall endeavor to show. If these ideas of right and wrong are derived from “ example," then we can make m\>- ral distinctions only in so far as we have had examples set us for so do ing. Such a supposition outrages common sense. Beside, example, as well as education, which we will here consider, presupposes the existence of these moral distinctions, for a man cannot imitate, or bo educated to, a thing that does not exist. Example and “education” may modify , but they cannot originate these distinc tions. They are not derived from “ authority," if by authority be meanj, law , for, if they were, then previous to all law there would have been no such ideas as those of right and wrong. But law presupposes these ideas and is built upon them. How then can that be the origin of them which presupposes and is foun ded upon them ? Tho man who pro mulged tho first law, “commanding what was right and prohibiting what was wrong,” must necessarily. have possessed these ideas of right and wrong. They are not derived from “ sympathy," for if they were, we would be conscious of this element in our moral decisions. But we are not aware of its presence. Beside, as wo intimated in the case of “ the savage," a man would have to un derstand the feelings of others, know how a certain thing affected them and then adopt their feelings in order to determine that moral quality of that thing; thus making the rule of right —the standard of morality—uncer tain and variable, by having it to de pend upon the feelings of men. This doctrine is absurd, for, thereby, un less we know tho feelings of others and can sympathize with them in re gard to a thing, we are incapable of moral "distinctions with\espect to that thing. Thus if there is no sym pathy, there is no knowledge of right, no obligation to do right, and hence no morality. These ideas of right and wrong are not derived from habit,” for habit (like example, ed ucation and law) presupposes their existence. From whence then are they derived ? Their origin is to be found in our mental constitution, for they are innate or rather connate, and present themselves as soon as the mind reaches a certain stage of development. They are intuitions, belonging to that class of ideas call ed “ first principles of the under standing,” and are the spontaneous development of the human soul, a distinct part of our nature as truly as are any of our instinctive impulses. Such are our ideas of right and wrong. Bight and wrong themselves, as well as truth, beauty and their opposites, considered subjectively as conceptions) of the mind, are simple ideas incapable of analysis or defini tion. But regarded objectively they are realities, qualities absolute and inherent in the nature of things, not contingent but necessary ; not sim ply relative to the human mind, but independent; universal, and, we might add, eternal. As we have na turally a faculty for discerning beau ty and its opposite in objects, so we have naturally a faculty for discern ing right and wrong in actions.— Beason recognizes the existence of these qualities, right and wrong.— Judgment decides that a certain act possesses one or the other of these qualities, i. e. is a right or wrong ac tion. Thero is then an obligation to perform or not to perform the act, and a consciousness of merit or de merit, according as we comply, or fail to comply, with this obligation. These mental operations constitute what we call Conscience, and which may be thus defined: That faculty by which we discern the moral qual ity of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections with re spect to this quality. ' Bupert. Secret Societies. [Let not our readers imagine from this discussion, that our College is divided into snarling factions. Last session, it is true, there was much party spirit; but during the vacation preceding the present term, a power ful reaction seems to have set io,and all our students came back to Col lege intending to forget the animosi ty of the past. We do not supposo there is a College in the U. S. where greater unanimity prevails than at ours. The discussion will be tolera ted only so long as the disputants maintain a dignified debate and avoid all personality.— Eds. Collegian.] For the Georgia Collegian. " \ Messrs. Editors: V , We who cliffer from the viewVo^a writer in your last issue, concerning “ Secret Societies," are ready to take up the gauntlet so gallantly thrown down, and, to this end, we would fain claim a short space in the columns of the Collegian. In entering upon the discussion, we freely grant, in the first place, most of the points which our friend, the author, claims ! We allow that most of the members of these socie ties, are men of high intellectual pow* er; we grant that their pursuits are of a literary character; we grant that they receive the sanction of the College authorities; lastly, we do not deny that in a College of Virgin ia, there may be dissentions among the students, not caused by Secret Societies. While we allow that the members of these secret societies generally possess a high degree of talent, wo wish it to be borne in mind that they do not possess all the talent in the University ! We claim that there arc many, possessed of the highest order of talent, who are connected with tho University, and who, not only do not belong td secret societies, but bitterly oppose them. This fact has been acknowledged repeatedly, by. the members of these secret organi zations, in that, they have on many occasions, earnestly solicited mem bers of the College to join their socie ties, who have positively refused,,.