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2 first quoted, that in multiplying two fractions, each less than unity, the -product is less than either the muhi plieand or multiplier. Ho concluded that this was impossible, and urged that as God had commanded the peo pie of the earth to increase and multi ply; therefore to multiply signified to increase !! I Hence, he came to the conclusion that this thing of the product of two fractions being less than either was untrue, and a devico of the Evil One. . Reply to “ Gironde” on Paley’s Doc trine of Utility,” We are again compelled to differ with “ Gironde’’ in his views respect ing “ Paley’s Philosophy,” and in so doing, protest against being classed among “ Idealists”—either Absolute or Cosmothetic—for we belong to that class called Realists, and believe in the philosophy of‘Common Sense,’ which has as its fundamental princi ples the ultimate facts of conscious ness. In thus expressing a difference of opinion, we feel that we have not done wrong; but, if we subscribed to “ Paloy’s Doctrine of Utility,” we should hesitate to proceed farther, for fear that we might do wrong by advocating an opinion that may be false, and perhaps, inducingotthers to believe it; for this would bring about ik injurious results” and thus be “ in expedient” and therefore “ wrong.” Fortunately for our peace of mind we do not “ subscribe to Paley’s doctrine o t Utility,” and hence can proceed to the investigation of “Gironde’s” po sition without any compunctions of conscience. We do not intend to join issue with “ Gironde” as to the truth of the as sertion that “ whatever is expedient is right,” but wish to consider the doctrine which he impliedly , and Pa ley expressly , teaches, viz: “ That utility is the true ground of moral obligation.” If by the expression u whatever is expedient is right,” be meant that expediency and right are co-extensive, i. e. belong to the same actions and in the same degrees, we have nothing to say against it—only that we would not know whether to refer expediency to right or right to expediency, and hence might very properly reverse the proposition and say that whatever is right is expe dient. If, however, by the expres sion, ‘ whatever is expedient is right,’ be meant that, as ‘ Gironde’ seems to hold, a thing is right because it is ex pedient, i. e. productive of the gene ral good, and that this idea of the greatest amount of happiness is the true ground of moral obligation, we have much to say against it—more than circumstances will justify. “ Gironde” says : “ God wishes the (happiness of His creatures. Outside THE GEORGIA COLLEGIAN. of Revelation, actions are estimated by their utility. Those actions that contribute to the general good are right, and those that do not are wrong. Why ? Because God wishes the happiness of His creatures.” — This reasoning is not very clear or satisfactory, and 'if it proves any thing, it proves only that an action is right or wrong because it is, oris not, in obedience to God’s will, and not because it is, or is not, productive of happiness. We do not deny that, in general, actions which are productive of general happiness are found to be right, nor that the moral quality of some actions is discovered, in part, from their results; but we do deny that actions are right simply because they are productive of general bap piness, and that the tendency of an action is the only test of its moral quality. As we endeavored to show in our former article, right and wrong are realities—absolute quali ties—which inhere in actions from the very nature of things, and those actions which possess one or the oth er of these qualities are right or wrong simply because God has made them so; and we have a faculty (conscience) for discerning these qualities in actions and teaching us our duty with respect to such actions as possess these qualifies. Bat it is [unnecessary to say more on' this point. Our chief object at present is to inquire whether or not “ the idea of the greatest amount of happiness is the true ground of moral obliga tion,” i. e. whether or not we are un der obligation to perform an action only on the ground that it will be productive of the general good. We may admit that right and the great est good always coincide, that duty and happiness go hand in hand; but this does not prove that we are under obligation to do a thing because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. For wo may suppose that, although God has thus inseparably connected happiness with duty, He may have designed (as we think He did) that our obligation to do certain things should not rest upon their ten dency to produce the greatest amount of happiness. We account for the fact that duty and productiveness of happiness al ways coincide, on the ground that He ‘ who doeth all things well,’ could not consistently with His character, have done otherwise than conformed, in the creation of man, to that law of harmony which pervades His en tire Universe. For, as the desire for happiness is implanted in our nature, if we were so constituted that up rightness would not tend to produce happiness, there would be a strange inconsistency in our constitution which would proclaim the Author of our beinga bungler and our nature a failure. The impulse to seek bappi- ness and the obligation to do right — “the law of a pure instinct and the law of a good conscience”—would wage a constant warfare with each other. This we conceive to be the reason why God has so intimately connected happiness with duty. It now remains for us to show why the utility of actions should not con stitute the ground of moral obliga tion. This we will proceed to do, and, at the outset, as the basis of our arguments, we lay down the follow ing proposition : The moral govern ment of God is just and the system under which He has placed us is per feet. As this proposition is true, any doctrine which is subversive of it — which makes God’s moral govern ment appear unjust and onr present system defective—is false and cannot have the sanction of God. The doc trine of utility has this effect, as we shall attempt to prove. It is an in dispensable requisite to the justice of every rule of action that it be pub lished—made known in some man ner—to those who are to be affected by it, and it is manifestly unjust that a person should pay the penalty of violating a law, the nature of which he did not know and had no means of knowing. According to the doc trine of utility, the only publication which God has given His laws is to be found in the fact thatiobedience to them is productive of general happi ness, aDd disobedience to them is productive of general misery; and therefore our only means of deter mining whether or not we shall per form an act is by finding out wheth er it is productive of general happi ness or of general misery. Hence, as there are some rules of moral action which would be unpublished nod whose requirements would be un known, (the consequenoe of obe dience or disobedience to them bein<* O unknown) this doctrine of utility sets the seal of injustice upon God’s mo ral government, and must therefore be false. Beside, as this doctrine of utility— the fact that wo are under obligation to do only that which is productive of general happiness—would often place us in a fearful dilemma (in that we cannot always estimate the con sequences of actions) and make our present system appear defective, it certainly must be erroneous and can not have the sanction of God. In fine, we are subject to a law of which we know nothing, pay the penalty of violating it through unavoidable ig norance and can never learn any thing concerning it save by breaking it. Verily, this is a beautiful system of Ethics! We hold that if this doc trine of utility is true, it must be uni versally true , and apply as well to our conduct toward God as to our con duct toward man. Does it thus ap ply ? We think not. For in our conduct toward God we must be not only moral and vutuous r but also pi ous. Now, we maintain that obedience to God from any other motive than that He is God, our Creator, Bene, factor and Preserver, is not piety, but simply prudence ; and hence, as this doctrine of utility is, in its opera tions, insufficient to engender that which we certainly owe to God —pi- ety —it is an incorrect moral guide. We will now, with bared head and unsandaled foot, go a step farther — even into the domain of Deity—and say that if the above doctrine be true it must apply to and control the con duct of God himself. If this be true, then God must have no other rule of action save that of benevolence. If then, with God, there is no higher law than that of benevolence, we must suppose efther that He never could have prevented crime (which is productive of misery) or that a cer tain amount of crime was necessary for “the general good.” Choose your horn, ‘ Giroode.’ But we need make no such supposition as the above, for there is a higher law than that of benevolence—a law founded upon those eternal principles of justice which are coeval with God himself—a law which embodies the unalterable qualities of right and wrong, and which, though God crea ted, binds Jehovah on His Throne, and cannot, even by Him, be chang ed. We mean The Moral Law, of which the Decalogue is but an expo sition or embodiment. Actions are right or wrong simply because they are, or are not, in obedience to this law; and we are under obligations to do right and refrain from doing wrong, solely because this law (which is the will of God) thus com mands us. Rupert. Secret Societies, The Editors h&vrng been assured that the readers of the Collegian were interested in the discussion concern ing Secret Societies, have reconsider ed their former decision and will al low the argument to continue. As no answer to the article against Se cret Societies has been attempted, the writer of that article is willing that we should first essay a reply. Our design hitherto has been to show that College dissensions would exist independently of Secret Socie ties. Hence the charge of creating feud could not be laid at their door ; for we sustained the statement that dissensions did arise in College when no Secret Societies were here—by the testimony of Alumni—whose ve racity no man may call in question. Now the greater part of 1. R.’s piece was on this issue—“ Whether Secret Societies ought to exist here,” which is distinct from the issue, “ Whether they Lave engendered discord here.”