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f^very City has an out-
standing shop; Atlanta
now has two.
• • •
.|eoi\-frol\Sii\
130 Pqachtr** — L«nox Squar*
HENRI’S BAKERY
for discriminating people
Complete Catering Service
Fully Equipped to Seat and Serve Any Size Party
Anywhere
Atlanta or Out of Town
Hot or Cold
61 Irby Avenue
237-0202 BUCKHEAD
Going Places?
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The Finest Charter Buses For
Conventions — Fishing Trips — Picnics —
Company Outings — Synagogue Groups —
School Trips — All Group Travel
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Southeastern Stages, Inc.
226 ALEXANDER ST., N. W.
ATLANTA IS, GA. 874-2741
nuj a.
eanerd
HAND CLEANING AND STORAGE
636-1681
2231 Cheshire Bridge Rd., N. E.
Atlanta, Ga.
voice ^-acro^s the Southern
frontier, calmly declaring that
Israel’s destruction was at
hand.
Does anyone expect us to
forget that picture? It is the
point of reference for every
thing that we now do and say.
Our policy can be simply
phrased: never to return to the
political anarchy and territor
ial vulnerability from which
we have emerged. For the
dangers that faced us were felt
by Israel, and by much of
world opinion, against a spec
ial background of Jewish
memories.
Dark recollections crowd in
upon us whenever we think
about implications of defeat.
The issue was not only mili
tary occupation but physical
massacre. After all, much in
Jewish history is too terri
ble to be believed; but nothing
is too terrible to have happen
ed. Thus with the reaction on
June 5. our history celebrated
one of its sharpest transitions.
The moment will linger and
shine in the national memory
forever, the unforgettable hour
of truth that will move Israel
to its ultimate generation.
* * *
When we set out for the in
ternal arena on the morrow of
the war, the national decision
was not to maneuver tactical
ly, but to take a stand on prin
ciple. We would identify the
factors which had brought
about the collapse of the armis
tice regime; and from the di
agnosis the remedy would
flow in total consistency.
First, the pre-1967 situation
was fragile and eccentric in
its juridical and political
structure. The 1949 agreements
and the “hopes and expecta
tions” of 1957 were temporary
and hedged in with every kind
of political reservation. They
did not commit their Arab
signatories to the ideological
necessity of proclaiming the
end of the conflict. And since
the 1957 arrangements were
announced in a way that lib
erated Egypt from responsibil
ity, Cairo’s honor and perman
ent interest were never en
gaged.
It follows the the new peace
settlement must be expressed
in normal ties which leave no
room for doubt that the sig
natories are totally committed
to each other’s sovereignty.
The conception of negotiated
peace treaties is mainly im
portant for its effect on Arab
ideologies. These are often
more decisive than Arab facts.
The form and content of the
peace must be such as would
require Egyptian and Jordan
ian leaders, on the morrow of
signature, to begin the long,
hard process of detoxification.
They would have to tell their
people that a great historic
conflict is now resolved, and
the Arab nationalism is recon
ciled to a sovereign and dis
tinctly Jewish state, as part of
the history, the reality and the
destiny of the Middle East.
There is no reason why they
should say this about any “ar
rangement” that is not freely
negotiated and contractually
signed.
* * ♦
Second, & peace negotiation
must provide an opportunity
for determining agreed and
secure boundaries. Prime Min
ister Golda Meir has pointed
■out that if the boundaries are
. to be agreed, they cannot be.
identical with the present
cease-fire lines. If we add her
vehenjent opposition, and that
of her predecessor, to the idea
of a State of Israel in which
the power of Jewish majority
and decision is not eternally
and totally assured, we get a
picture of the degree in which
the territorial problem is still
open.
It is not true that Israel’s
security could rest exclusive
ly on the nature of the peace
and need not have any top
ographical or territorial im
plications. The June 4 lines
were never agreed as final
boundaries as is clear from the
relevant provisions of the 1949
agreements. But no less decis
ive is the fact that they were
not “secure boundaries,” as the
events of May-June, 1967, dra
matically provide.
A secure boundary for Israel
is one that can be defended
without the agonizing needs
of preemptive action. The
previous lines, with their top
ographical disadvantage in the
North, the Southwest and the
East, involved such compre
hensive Arab proximity to
every settled area and popu
lation of Israel that whenever
a tripartite Arab concentra
tion was concerted, Israel’s
choice was to await the slaugh
ter or to strike at the concen
trations of Arab air and armor
before they could be brought
to action against her.
Moreover, the ability to cut
off Israel’s water in the North
and to obstruct Southern mar
itime passage gave Arab states
the convenient opportunity of
creating situations which
would lay the tactical military
initiative on Israel’s shoulders.
There is of course, little to be
said for the doctrine which I
heard in Paris, May 24, 1967:
“The aggressor is he who
shoots the first bullet.” The
nature of aggression is far
more lucidly illuminated by
the French historian Taine a
century ago. He said, simply:
“The aggressor is he who
The Southern Israelite
12