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accompany a cease-fire with a
request for withdrawal to
previous lines, we have seen a
steady reinforcement of cer
tain basic political attitudes.
That there can be no with
drawal of forces from cease
fire lines, except on the estab
lishment of peace; that this
peace must directly and form
ally- engage the honor and in
terest _of Arab states; that in
due time there must be direct
negotiation and formal signa
ture; and that the Middle East
must at last have secure and
recognized boundaries which
are not identical with previ
ous armistice or cease-fire
lines—all these ideas are not
isolated Israeli obsess ions.
They represent. a central cur
rent in international thought.
To be exhorted by govern
ments and people across the
world not to move without
peace has been for me an im
pressive experience, in com
parison with the contary doc
trine to which we had to lis
ten 11 years ago.
Our dialogue with the Unit
ed States, however frank in ac
knowledgement of divergen
cies, must, in justice, include a
recollection of American’s pio
neering role in advancing
these ideas and clinging to
them against heavy challenge.
This role in turn would never
have unfolded without the po
litical phase which preceded
the June 5 hostilities. On this
point Ambassador Rabin has
spoken with perception:
“I should point out one out
standing achievement of the
period of waiting. One of the
factors in the delay was the
political consideration. Israel
gave a number of states time:
firstly the U. S. to prove that
it was not possible—by politi
cal means—to prevent Egyp
tian belligerence. I do not
mean a delay of 48-72 hours,
but to a greater number of
days. The discussions of the
Security Council during that
period proved that the UN was
not capable of bringing about
a change in the situation that
had been created at that time.
The efforts of the state that
had guaranteed freedom of
passage after the Sinai cam
paign to implement their
undertakings were unsucces
sful.
“This feeling of failure on
the part of the free world ex
ercised a great influence upon
the resolute attitude to pre
vent the inclusion of the with
drawal as part of the cease-fire
forces as part of the UN cease
fire decision.
“The complete absence of
the inclusion of the with
drawal as part of the cease-fire
decision spared Israel difficult
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and severe political struggles.
“It was the strength of the
Israel Defense Forces alone
that routed the Arab force?
and established new defensive
lines from Suez in the East,
the Jordan in the West, and
the Golan Heights in the
North.
“The political result of the
waiting was one of the factors
that made it possible to con
tinue to maintain these de
fense lines as long as the Arab
states .are not prepared for
peace. Today, among other
factors, because of the waiting,
we are capable of maintaining
the best defensive lines for Is
rael that could have been sket
ched in the Middle East, with
out any decision or pressure
for withdrawal, and with
many states, headed by the
U. S., prepared to continue to
assist us and increase the arm
ing of Israel.”
We enter the third year of
our political struggle with our
political fortifications intact.
It is a rare and unexpected
achievement. It owes much to
the unity and strength of the
national will. It is fortified by
a genuine belief that the Mid
dle East is ripe for an adven
ture in innovation, and not for
a repetition of past instabili
ties. And it is directly anch
ored in the decision of the Is
rael Government, in June 1967,
to define peace and security as
its central goals, to which all
other issues including territo
rial changes would be strictly
adapted. The result is that Is
rael’s policy, in its major ex
pression has been at work
within an international con
sensus.
It is not only that time has
been gained and security pre
served. The value of time lies
in its potentiality of influence
on the Arab mind. Our strat
egy is to convince the Arab
governments that the ice will
not thaw except under the
warm wind of a direct, sub
stantive, detailed dialogue on
peace. They are still gripped
by a nostalgic hope that a solu
tion short of peace and mutual
recognition will make its ap
pearance from outside.
The candidates for an ex
ternally fashioned solution
change. The General Assem
bly, regular and special, the
Security Council, and Ambas
sador Jarring have all done
their work; and nothing on the
ground is altered. The dream
now focuses, unrealistically, on
the hope that the four perma
nent members of the Security
Council do not mean what they
say and will both formulate
and “impose” a solution which
will leave Arab governments
The Southern Israelite