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PAGE 4 THE SOUTHERN ISRAELITE February 8, 1980
The Southern Israelite
The Weekly Newspaper For Southern Jewry
Our 96th Year
The ‘Carter
Vida Goldgar
Editor and Publisher , i : ■; .* ;
Faith Powell
Assistant Editor
Linda Lincoln
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Mark Nicholas
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by Kenneth W. Stein
s AnistiQl Profcator
Near Eastern History, Emory University
President Carter has responded
to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan by announcing the so-
called Carter Doctrine. He has put
the Soviets on notice that the oil
rich Persian Gulf is in our strategic
national interest. Unlike the
Truman or Eisenhower Doctrines
of 1947 and 1957 respectively, this
framework does not emphasize
ideological containment; this
doctrine stipulates a physical
limitation upon Soviet expansion.
In order to restrain the Soviet
lurch southward, the U.S. is
seeking to harness an Islamic
world already revitalized. The
objective is clear: to galvanize
virulent Muslim religious
opposition towards impious
communism.
Simultaneously, a U.S. priority
is to move forward on Palestinian
autonomy and in strengthening
Egyptian-lsraeli bilateralism.
Risk and reason
Fpcusing on current and future
Soviet expansionism deflects to
some degree Muslim opposition to
the normalization of relations
between Cairo and Jerusalem. Yet,
employing the Muslim world as
proxy against the Soviets while
fostering Israeii-Egyptian amity
makes successful fulfillment of the
Carter Doctrine that much more
difficult.
The difficulty lies not only in
balancing these two objectives; the
difficulty lies in a Soviet Union
that wiU not remain disciplined by
detente and in a Muslim Middle
East that does not fully trust the
motivations of the West.
The Afghanistan invasion and
the Carter response commences a
new round of U.S.-Soviet rivalry
in the area. Syria has recently
received massive infusions of
advanced military equipment to
the consternation of Israel. The
visit last week of Soviet Foreign
Secretary Gromyko to Damascus
is another indicator of Syria’s
importance in Moscow’s active
Middle East initiatives. Having
been on the diplomatic sideline for
two years in the shadow of the U.S.
supported Egyptian-lsraeli peace
effort, the Soviets are saying that
the Middle East is important to
their national security as well.
The Islamic Foreign Ministers’
Conference left little doubt about
its equal antagonism for the
Soviets and for Zionism. Meeting
in Pakistan last week, the Foreign
Ministers demanded once again
Israeli return of Arab Jerusalem.
Willing cooperation of the
Muslim world to endorse the
Carter Doctrine may hinge in a
large measure upon the U.S.
ability to obtain^ Israeli
compromise. . ■ " ■ >
Implementing both the Carter
Doctrine and Palestinian
autonomy remain formidable tasks.
Explicit linkage of these foreign
policy objectives could mean hard
times for both. The Carter
Doctrine requires full autonomy,
but so do the Palestinians.
Mideast policy
by Alon Ben-Meir
qny type of militancy. The masses
Cheers!
C T j” 7 s' United States military might has —
Cheers for the John F. Kennedy Middle School. While adults
are sniping at each other and countries threaten war, students at
JFK dug in and devoted themselves to a better understanding of
others. (See story page one).
There is much reported about problems in our schools so it is a
pleasure to share this happy story with our readers.
We congratulate JFK students anjtfaculty on their ambitious
undertaking, and feel certain seeds planted now will grow in the
minds as well as the gardens, t
once again demonstrated its
impotence, both as a deterrent and
„as a viable force. The Iranian
situation is a recent case in point.
Patently, the U.S. falls short in two
ways: we lack the military
capability foT swift response to
Iranian-type crises, and more
damaging, we lack a coherent
strategy to make such responses
possible. Although U.S. political
and military strategists are aware
of this s>..ious handicap, they have'
failed not oiily to accurately assess
political dynamics throughout the
Arab world, but also changing
political and economic realities in
a potentially troubled area.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which
has utilized other nations' forces
(Cubans, East Germans,
Vietnamese, and various terrorist
groups) by proxy, the U.S. has
neither sought nor encouraged the
use of foreign militaries to serve its
purposes. Moreover, because of
Watergate and “revelations" about
the FBI’s and CIA's unscrupulous
conduct, covert activities in
foreign countries were critically
curtailed. Therefore, the dual lack
of covert action and conventional
mobile and rapid striking forces has
left the U.S. with two options:
nuclear weapons and massive,
conventional warfare.
Many observers tend fo dismiss
the emergence of anti-American
sentiments in the Islamic world as
temporary and inconsequential.
Yet, a close analysis of the rise of
Islamic militancy does noe indicate
that anti-Americanism is a fad.
"Anti-something’’ will always he
hatred and animosity. The U.S.,
which is the most visible foreign
nation involved in’ the Arab-
Islamic world, will remain a target.
Anti-Americanism is also
heightened by the existence of
Israel arid the manner in which
U.S.-Israeli relations are perceived
by these countries.
The Iranian crisis has shown
that U.S. dependence on a single
dictator, benevolent or otherwise,
is self-defeating. Many U.S.
“allies" in the Arab world—Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman,
the United Arab Emirates, North
Yemen, and others—-are governed
by rulers who face growing
opposition to their regimes.
Political immaturity continues to
prevail throughout the region,
inevitably leading to political
instability and turmoil.
Considering the enormous
importance of the Arab-Istamic
world to the U.S. economic,
strategic, and political interests,
U.S. strategists will, therefore,
have to begin to think in terms of
an American military presence in
the Middle East and throughout
the Islamic World. The U.S. will
eventually have to station a
significant military force on
friendly soil. Presently, Israel and
Egypt are strategically compatible
The terrain of both countries can
he used as a staging ground from
which the U.S. could rapidly
dispatch contingency forces to any
troubled areas. The stationing of
U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force
troops in both countries can
further solidify the peace
agreement between them.
a necessary ingredient in the rise of Moreover, once this alliance
became a fall accompli, the Arab-
Islamic world would eventually
have to accept the reality of an
American presence in the region.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, fearing
adverse internal reaction, would
have to acquiesce, if not join, the
new alliance. No other nation,
including the Soviet Union, could
effectively reject or oppose this
development. The U.S. can now
rally the American people behind
such a move and might find both
the Israelis and Egyptians willing
to enter into a military alliance that
can, and in fact should, serve their
(Israel and Egypt) national
interests as well.
While the establishment of U.S.
military air and naval bases in
Israel and Egypt might stir a new
wave of anti-Americanism, it
remains the only realistic hind
viable option that the U.S. can
adopt to protect its interests
throughout the Middle East and
Africa: The JJ.S. must, therefore,
abandon its policies of
appeasement and vacdlation in
favor of a strategy, of firm and
quick response to all emergencies
that threaten our vital interests.
It is not suggested here that the
United States become the trigger-
happy policeman of the Middle
East. Rather, the point is that the
U.S. must be seen to be prepared to
back up its commitments and
interests in the area with more
than feeble rhetoric or the
occasional symboli|ftnilitary
show. A visible American presence
in the Middle East, coupled with
an unambiguous resolve to use it if
necessary, ought to do much to
reassure our friends and allies and
to induce second thoughts among
potential troublemakers.