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without being forcibly struck with the anolo- py'in the causes which led to their separa tion, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the establishment of the central power in the King, commenced a system of taxation, which, under King Solo mon, was greatly increased, to defray the ex pense of renting the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the scat of the cen tral government, and the other profuse ex penditures of hi? magnificent reign. Increas ed taxation was followed by its natural conse quences—discontent c^d complaint; which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succession of his son, Rehoboam, the 10 tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a reduction of the taxes; the temple bein» fin ished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no longer re quired, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties —a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under consideration, and after consul ting the bid men, the counsellors of ’98, who advised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers; he hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make the reduction, and the seces sion of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, fol lowed. The tribes ofJudah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house cf David. But, to return to the point immediately un der consideration. He knew that it was not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but it might be said to be the opin ion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government of a majority, acting through a representative body, without check or limitation in its power; yet if we may test this theory by experience and reason, we will find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tendency of all governments based upon the will of an absolute majority, with out constitutional check or limitation of pow er, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism, and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives. I know (said Mr. C.) that in venturing this assertion I utter that which is unpopular, both within and without these walls; but, where truth and liberty are concerned such considerations should not be regarded. He would place the decision of this point on the fact, that no government of the kind, among the many attempts which had been made, had ever endured for a single generation; but, on the contrary, had invari ably experienced the fate which ho had as signed to them. Let a single instance be pointed out, and he would surrrender his opin ion. But if we had not the aid of experience to direct our judgment, reason itself would be a certain . guide.' The view which considers the community as a unit, and all its parts as having asimilar interest, is radically erroneous. However small the community may be, and however homogeneous its interests, the mo ment that government is put into operation, as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to make appropriations, the different portions of community must, of necessity, bear different and opposing relations in reference to the action of the government. There must inev itably spring up two interests; a direction and a stockholder interest; an interest profi ting by the action of the government, and in terested in increasing its powers and action; and another at whose expense the political machine is kept in motion. He knew how difficult it was to communicate distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium of gen eral .propositions, without a particular illustra tion ; and in order that he might be distinctly understood, though at the hazard of being te dious, he would illustrate the important princi ple which he had ventured to advance by ex amples. Let us then suppose a small community of five persons, separated from the rest of the world; and to make the example strong, let us suppose them all to be engaged in the same pursuit,and to be of equal wealth. Let us fur ther suppose, that they determine to govern the community by the will of a majority; and to make the cose as strong as possible, let us suppose that the majority, in order to meet the expense of the government, lay an equal tax, say of $100 on each individual of this little community. Their treasury would con. tain five hundred dollars. They are a ma jority; and they, by supposition, have con tributed three hundred as their portion, and the other two, (the minority) two hundred.— The three have the right to make the appro priation as they may think proper. The ques- fom is how would the principle of the abso lute and unchecked majority operate, under these circumstances, in this litte community ? If the three be governed by a sense of justice —if they should appropriate the money to the objects for which it was raised, the Com mon and equal benefit of the five, then the object of the association would be fairly and honestly effected, and each would have common interest in the government. But, should the majority pursue an opposite course; should they appropriate the money in a man ner to benefit their own particular interest, without regard to the interest of t?« two, (and they will so act, unless there be-some effi cient check, he who best knows human na- ture will least doubt,) who does not sec that the three and the two would have directly op posite interests, in reference to the action of the government 1 The three who contribute to the common treasury but three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by appropriating the five hundred to their own use, convert the action of the government, into the means of making money? and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increasing the taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five; that is, they take back to themselves alt that they had put in; and in addition, that which .wasput in by their.associates; or, in other words, taking taxation and appropriation to gether, they have gained, and their associates have lost, two hundred dollars by the fiscal action of the government. And opposite in- terests in reference to the action of the gov ernment, is thus created between them, the one having an interest in favour and the other an interest against the taxes; the one to in crease, and the other to decrease the taxes; the one to retain the ’taxes when the money is no longer wanted,and the other to repeal them’ when the objects for which they were levied have bccnexccuted. Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to twenty-four individuals, to be governed in like manner by the will of a ma jority; it is obvious that the same principle would divide them into two interests—into'fc majority and a minority, thirteen against ele ven, or In some other proportion; and that all the consequences, which he had shown to be applicable to the small community of five, would be equally applicable to the greater— the cause not depending upon the number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the government itself. Let us .now suppose that, instead of governing themselves directly in an assembly .of the whole, without the in tervention of agents:, they should adopt the representative principle; and that, instead of being governed by c. majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of their representatives. It is obvious that the oper ation of the system would not be affected by the change, the representatives being respon sible to those who choose them, will conform to the will of their constituents, and would act as they would' clo, were they present, and acliug for themselves; and the same conflict of interest which we have shown would exist in one case, would equally exist in the other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system of hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger iutcrcst, against the minority, or the weaker interest; the object of which, on the part of the former, would he to exact as much as 'possible from the latter, which would neces sarily be resisted by all the means in their power. Warfare, by legislation, would thus lie commenced between the two parties, with the same object, and not less hostile than that which is carried on by distinct and rival ra tions—the only distinction would be in the instruments and the -mode. Enactments, in the one case, would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other; and the in evitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings between the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism that feeling which embraces the whole, and substitute iu its place the most violent party attachment; and, instead of having one com mon centre of attachment, around which the affections of the community might rally, there would, in fact, be two—the interests of the majority, to which those who constitute that majority would be more attached, than., they would be to the whole, and that of the minori ty, to which they in l ike manner would also be more attached than to the interests of the whole. Faction would thus take the place of patriotism, and, with the loss of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow; and in its train, anarchy; and, finally, despotism, or tiio establishment of absolute power in a single individual, as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile interests, on the principle that it is better to submit to the will of a sin gle individual, who, by his being made lord and master of the whole community, would have an equal interest in the protection of all the parts. Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train of consequences, this little community should adopt a written con stitution with limitations restricting the will of the majority, in order to protect the minority against the oppressions which he had shown would necessarily result without such restric tions. It is obvious that the case would not be in the slightest degree varied, if the ma jority be left in possession of the right of judg ing exclusively of the extent of its powers without any right on the part of the minority to enforce the restrictions imposed by the con stitution on the will of the majority. The point is almost too clear for illustration.— Nothing .can he more certain than thpt when a constitution .grants power, and impo ses limitations on the exercise of that power, whatever interests may obtain possession of the government, will be in f .vor of extending the power at the expense of the limitation ; and that, unless those in whose behalf the limitatons were imposed, have, in some form or mode, the right of .enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the limita- tion, and the government must operate pre cisely in the same manner as if the will of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power. He had thus presented all possible modes, in which a government, bound upon the will of an absolute majority, would be modified and had demonstrated that, in all its forms, whether, in a majority of the people, as in a mere democracy, or in a majority of their rep- resentutive's, without a constitution, or with a constitution,to be interpreted at the wi 11 of the majority, the result would be the same ; two hostile interests would inevitably be created by the action of the government, to be foil owed by hostile legislation, and that by fac tion, corruption, anarchy, and despotism The great and solemn question here pre seated itself—la there any remedy for these evils; on the decision of which depends the question, whether the people can govern themselves, which has been so often asked with so much scepticism and doubt ? There is a remedy, and but one, the effects of which, whatever may be the form, is to organize so- ciety ita refference to this conflict of interests, which springs out of the action of government and which caa only be done by giving tc each part the right of self protection.; which in a word, instead of considering the comma nity of twenty four as a single community having a common interest, and to be gov erned by, the single will of an entire ma jority, shall, upon all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen against the eleven, take the will notoffoetwen- ty four as a unit, but that of the thirteen a.i*i that of the eleven seperately, The majority oi each governing the parts and< where they con cur, governing the whole, and where they dis - agree, arresting the action ofifoe government; This he would call the concurring,. os dis tinct from the absolute majority*!... It woubj not be; sis was gcnerufiy'suppggQ/},?* miuoriu governing a majority .In eitherway,the number would be the same whether taken as the abso lute or as theconcurring majority.Th.us,them .- jority of the thirteen is seven,and of the eleven six,and the two together make thirteen,which is the majority of twenty four. But though th, number is the same, the mode of counting is essentially different; the one representing the strongest interest, and the other, the wea ker interests of the community. The first mistake was, in supposing that the government of the absolute majority is the government of this people—that beau ideal of a perfect government, which had been so enthusiast, cally entertained in every age, by the gener ous and patriotic, where civilization and liber ty had made the smallest progress. There could be no greater error: the government oi the people is the government of the whole cm- munity—of the twenty-four—the self govern, ment of all the parts—too perfect to be re- duced to practice in the present, or any past stage of human society. The -government of the absolute majority, instead of the govern ment of the people, is but the government of the strongest interests,-and when not efficient ly cheeked, is the most tyrauical and oppres sive that can be devised. Between this ide al perfection on one side, and despotism on the other; none other can be devised but that which considers society, in refference to its parts, as differently affected by the action of the government, and which takes the sense of each part separately, and thereby the sense of the whole in the maimer already illustra ted. -j These principles as he had already stated, are not afiected by the number of wliich a community may be composed, and are just as applicable to one of the thirteen millions, the number of which composes, oiqr^, as of the small community of twenty four, tyhich I have supposed, for the purpose of illustration; and are not less applicable to the., twenty four states united in one community, than to the case of the twenty four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction between a large and a small community, not affecting the princi ple, but the violence of the action. In the former, the similarity of the interests of all the parts, will limit the oppression from the hostile action of the parts, in a great degree, to the fiscal action of the government merely ; but iu the large community, spreading over a country of great extent, and having a great diversity of interests, with different kinds of labor, capital, arid production, the conflict and oppression will extend, not only to a monop ly 'of the appropriations, on the part of the stronger interests, but will end in unequal taxes, and a general conflict between the en- tire interests of conflicting sections ; which if, not arrested by the most powerful checks will terminate in the most oppressive tyranny that can be conceived, or in theaes truction of the community itself. If we turn our attention from these sup posed cases, and direct it to our government, and its actual operation, we will find a practi- cal confirmation of the truth of what has been stated, not only of the oppressive operation of the system of an absolute majority, but also a striking and beautiful illustration, in the for mation of our system, of the principle of the concurring majority, as distinct from the ab solute, which he had asserted to be the only- means of efficiently, checking the abuse of power, and of course, the only solid founda tion of constitutional liberty. That our gov eminent, for many years, has been., gradually verging to consolidation, that,the constitution has gradually become a dea^.lettqr, and that all restrictions upon the power ^'government have been virtually removed so as practically to convert the general government into a gov eminent of an absolute majority, without check or limitation, cannot be denied by any one who has impartially observed its opera tion. It is not necessary to trace the commence ment and gradual progress of the causes which have produced this change in our sys tern; it is sufficient to state that the change has taken place within the last few years. VVhut has been the result? Precisely that which might have been anticipated; the growth of faction, corruption anarchy-, and not despotism itself, its near approach, as wit ucssed in the provisions of this bill. And from what have these consequences sprung We have been involved in no war. ’We have been at peace with all the - world. We have been visited with no* national calamity Our people have been advancing in gener al intelligence^ and as great and alarming as has been the advance of political corruption the morals and virtue of the community at large have been advancing in improvement What, he would again repeat,, is the cause? No other can be assigned but a departure from the fundamental principles of the con stitution, which has converted the govern ment into the will of an absolute and irres ponsible majority, and whicbi by the laws which must inevitably govern,; in all such ma jorities, have placed in conflict thc great inter ests of the country, by a system of hostile legislation; by an oppressive and unequal im position of taxes; by unequal qad profuse ap propriations, and by rendering foe entire la bor and capita] of the weaker mterests subor dinate to the stronger. This is tiie causp „qnd foes^^he fruits, which have converted the government into the distribution of the loaves and the fishes. He held it impossible for any one -to look at the theoretical illustration of the principle of •he absolute majority in the casus which he 'ad supposed, and not be struck with the prac tical illustration in the actual operation of our overnment. Under every circumstance, •e majority, will ever have its American Sya ; ivoi—r(lie meant nothing offensive to any senator)—but the real meaning of the Amer- tcan system is, that system, of plunder which the strongest interest ever waged, and will •ver wage, against the weaker, where the i uer is not armed with some efficient and oustitutioiial check to arrest its action. Noth ing but such check on the part of the weaker interest can arrest it; mere constitutional lim itations are wholly inefficient. Whatever in- terest obtains possession of the Government will, from the nature of things, be in .favor of he powers and against the limitations imposed by the constitution, and will resort to every device that can be immagined to remove those restraints. On the contrary', the opposite in terest; that which he had designated as the stockholding interest; the tax payers; those on whom the system operates, will resist the ibuse of powers and contend for the limita tions. And it is on that point, then, that the contest between the delegated and the reser ved powers will be waged ; but in this con test, as the interests in possession of the gov ernment are organized and armed by all its powers and patronage, the opposite interest if not in like manner organized and possessed of a power to protect themselves under the provisions of the Constitution, will be as inev- itably crushed as would be a band of unorgan between the several departments, and in par ticular the structure and the important func tions of this body; but to suppose that the sen. ate or any department of this Government was intended to be fog guardian of the reserved . hts, was a great and fundamental mistake, he Government, through all its departments ■presents the delegated, and not the reserved powers ; and it was a violation of the fuada. mental priaciple of tree institutions to suppose that any but the responsible representative of any interest, could be its guardian. The dis. tribution of the powers of the General Govern ment apd its organization, were arranged to prevent foe abuse of power, in fulfilling the mportant trust confidedtoit;and not,as propos in'.; re instrument of taking money (irony one portion of the community to be given" to an other, and which has rallied around it a great, u powerful, and mercenary < corps of office holders, office seekers, And expectants, desti tute of principle and patriotismi ’and who have no standard of morals or politics but the will of the Executive—the will of him who has ized militia, when opposed by a veteran and trained corps of regulars. Let it never be for- ottenthat power can only be opposed by power, organization by organization; and on tiiis theory stands our beautiful federal sys tem of government. No. free system was ever farther removed from the principle that the absolute majority, without check or limi tation, ought to govern. To understand what our government is, we must look to the Constitution, which is the basis of the sys tem. He did not intend to enter into any minute examination of the origin and the source of its powers; it was sufficient for his purpose to state, what he did fearlessly, that derived its power from the peopln of the separate states, e«ch ratifying bv itself, each binding itself, by its own separate convention, and tiie concurrence of the majorities of the several states forming the constitution; thus taking the sense of the whole by r that of the several parts, representing the various inter- ests of the entire community- It was tiiis concurring and perfect majority which formed the constitution, and not that majority which would consider the American People as asin gle community, and which instead of repre seating fairly and fully the interests of the whole, would but represent, as has been sta ted, theinlerest of the strongest section. No candid man can dispute that he had given a correct discretion of the constitution ma king power, that power which created and or ganized the government; which delegated to it, as a common agent, certain powers, trust for the common good of all the States and which had imposed strict limitation and checks against abuses and usurpations. In administering the delegated powers, the coil stitution provides very properly, iu order to give promptitude and efficiency, that the gov ernment should be organized upon the princi ple of the absolute majority, or rather of two absolute majorities combined: a majority of the states considered as bodies ^litic, which prevails in this body, and a majority of the People of the states, estimated in federal nuin hers, ia the other House of Congress, combination of the two prevails in the choice of the President; and of course, iu the ap pointment of judges, they being nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, It is fous that the concurring and tiie absolute majorities are combined in one complex sy tern; the one in forming the constitution, and tiie other making and executing the laws; thus beautifully blending the moderation, jus- tice, and equity of the former and more per- feet majority with the promptness and energy of the latter7*but less perfect. To maintain the ascendency o* the Constitu tion over the law making majority, is the great and essential point on wliich the success of the system must depend; unless that ascendency- can be preserved, the necessary consequence must be, that the laws will supercede the con. stitution, and finally the will of the Executive, by the influence of its patronage, will sup er sede the laws, indications of wliich are already perceptible. This ascendency can only be preserved through the action of the states, as organized bodies, having their own seperate Governments, and possessed of the right, un der the structure of our system, of judging of their seperate powers, and of interposing their authority to arrest-foe enactments of the Gen eral Government within their respective lim its. He would not enter, at this time, into the discussion of this important point; as it had been ably and fully presented by the; sen. ator from Kentucky, [Mr. Bibb] and others who had preceded him in this debate, on the same side ; whose arguments not only re mained unanswered, but were unanswerable. It was only by the power of iuterpretation that the reserved rights of the states could be peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroachments of the General Govern- uient,that the limitations imposed upon its au thority would be enforced and its movements confined to the orbit allotted to it by the con stitution. It had indeed, been said in debate, that this could be effected by the organization of the General • Government itself, particularly by the action of this body, which represented the states, and that the states themselves must look to the General Government for the pre servation of many of the most important to their reserved rights. He did not [said Mr. C.] underrate the value to be attached to the organic arrangement of the General Govern ment, and the wise distribution of its powers terously supposed, to protect the reserved pow. ers, which are confided wholly to the guardi anship of the several states. Against the view of our system which fie had presented, and the right of the state to in terpose, it was objected that it would lead to anarchy and dissolution. He considered the objection as without the slightest foundation, and that so far from tending to weakness or disunion, it was the sourse of the highest pow. er, and of the strongest cement. Nor was its tendency in this respect difficult of explana- tion. The government of an absolute major, ity, unchecked by efficient constitutional res. traint,though apparently strong, was in reality an exceedingly feeble government. That ten. lency to conflict between the parts; which he had shewn to be inevitable in such govern, inents, wasted the power of the state in the hostile action of contending factions,. which left very little more power than the excess of the strength of the majority over the minority. But a government based upon the principle of the concurring majority, where each great interest possessed within itself foe means of self protection, which ultimately requires the mutual consent of all the parts,necessarily cau. ses that unanimity in council,and ardent attach, ment of all the parts of the whole, and rives an irresistible energy to a government so con structed. power and patriotism, and conclusively show* hot only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under some form by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the community was made necessa- ry in the action of Government, but also, that the virtue, patriotism and strength of the state, were in direct proportion^ to the perfection of toe means of securing such assert.' In csti. mating the operation of this principle in our, system, which depends, as be had stated, on me right of interposition on foe part of the states, we must not omit to take into consid. eration the amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement of the system be corrected, by the concurring assent of three fourths of foe States, and thus in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any derangement occasioned by the executive action of a state. In fact, the power of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal against the usurpations of the General Government, the jointagent of all the states to the states them! selves,to be decided under the amending power, affirmatively in favor of the Government, by the voice of three fourths of the states, as the highest power known under the system. Mr. C. said, that he knew the difficulty, in pur country of establishing the truth of the principle for which he contended, though res. ting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience of free nations. He knew that the governments of the several states would be cited as an argument against the conclusion to which he had arrived, and which for the most part, were constructed on the principle of the absolute majority; but in his opiuion, a satisfactory answer could be given; that the objects of expenditure which fell within the sphere of a state Government, were few and inconsiderable, so that be their action ever so irregular, it could occasion but little derangement. If, instead of being mem. bers of this roat confederacy,they formed dis. tinct communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses neces. He might appeal to history for the truth of 8rtry to their defence, the law’s which he had these remarks, of which the Roman furnished the most familiar and striking. It was a well known fact, that from the expulsion of the Tarquins to the time of the establishment of the Tribunarian power, the Government feil into the state of the greatest disorder and distraction,and he might add, corruption. How did this happen 7 The explanation will throw important light on the subject under con sideration. The community was divided in to two parts—the Patricians and the Plebei aits, with the powers of the state principally ia the hands of the former, without adequate check to protect the rights of the latter. The result was as mi at he expected. The Pa trici ms converted the -towers of the govern ment into the means of making money, to nn rich themselves and their dependants. They, in a word, had their American System, grow- ing out of the peculiar character of the Gov ernment and condition of the country. Th.s requires explanation. At that period, accor ding to the law's of nations, when one nation con- quered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors; and, according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired, were divided into parts, one allotted to the poorer class of people, and the other -ssi /ned to the use of the treasury* of which the Patri- ciaus had the distribution and administration. The Patricians abused their power by witB- holding from the people that which ought to- havc been allotted to them,and by converting to their own use that which ou^ht to have gone into the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the eutire spoils of victory', and they had thus the most powerful motive to keep the State perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverishment and oppression of the. people. After resisting the abuse of power by all peaceable meaus, and the op pression becoming intolerable, the people at last withdrew from the city—they, in a wor-1, seceded ; and to induce them to reunite, the Patricians conceded to the Plebeians, as the means of protecting their separate interest, the very power which he contended was ne cessary to protect the rights of the States; but which is now represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted to the people the right of choosing three trtbu es from among themselves, whose persons should be sucred, and who should have the right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even against their execu tion—a power which those who take a shal. low insight into human nature, would pro. nouuce inconsistent with the strength and uni ty of the State, if not utterly impracticable.— Yet so far from that being the effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascen dant, and victory followed her steps till she had establisned an almost universal domin ion. ; How can such a result, so contrary to all anticip ition, be explained ? The explanation appeared to him to be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring assent of both foe patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependent on the other, and of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be effected with- out the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, each was compelled to con sult the good will of the other, and to elevate ►to office, not simply those who might have the confidence of the order to which he belonged, but that of the other. • The result was, th Jt men pdssessing those qualities which would naturally command confidence, moderation, wisdom, justice and patriotism, were elevated to office; and'these, by the weight of their authority, and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of unanimity, neces sarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders, furnishes the real explanation of foe power of the Roman State, and of that extraordinary ,wisdom, moderation and firm, ness which in so remarkable a degree char, acterised her pnblic men. He might illus. trite the truth of the position he had laid down, by reference tQ the histoty of all free states, ancient and modern, distinguished for their 1 iid down as necessarily controlling the ac- 3 tion of a state where the will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, auar- chy and corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which he had referred, were perceptible in some of the Lit. ger and more populous members of the Un ion, whose Governments had a powerful cen- tr.il action, and which already showed a strong tendency to that moaied action wliich is tne invariable forerunner of corruption and convulsions. But to return to the General Government; we have now sufficient experience to ascer tain that the tendency to conflict in its action, is between southern and oilier sections. The 1-tier having a decided majority, mast halrnu. l11_, be possessed of the powers of the (lav- eminent both in tiiis and in the other House: and beiiu; governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to tiie human o; they must become the advocates of the power of Government, and in the same degree oppo sed to the limitations ; while the other aud weaker section is as necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. In one word; the one sectio ; is the natural iruardian of the delegated powers and tne o:h r of the rcsor. ved; and the straggle on the side of the for- merwillbe to eni rge the powers, while that on the opposite side will be to r strain them within their constitutional limits. The con test will, in feet, be a contest between pow er and liberty, and such he considt red tlw present—a contest in which tiie weaker see- tion, with its peculiar labor, productions, and situation, has at stake all that can be dear to freemen. Should they bo able to maintain ia their full vi .or their rosreved rights, liberty and prosperity will be their portion; but if they yield and permit the stronger interest to consolidate within itself all jthe powers of the Government, then wll its fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines which | they have expelled, or of their slaves, in this great struggle between the delegated and reserved pewerk, so f.r from repining that his lot and that of those whom lie represented, is cast on the side of the latter, he rejoiced that such is the fact; for though we participate in but' few of foe advantages of the Government, we are compensated, and more than compen sated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor did he repine that the duty, so difficult to be discharged as the defence of foe reserved powers, ugainst apparently such foarful odds, had been assigned to them. To discharge successfully this high duty, re- quires the highest qu i!i‘i ;s moral and intel lectual ; and should we perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to its magnitude, in stead of being niece planters, our section will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But on the oth r hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny—it we yield to the steady eucruchroent of power, the severest and most debasing calamity and corrupiion will overspead the land. Every southern man, true to the interests of his sec tio i, and faithful to the duties which Frovi- deuce has allotted him,-will be forever exclu ded from the honors and emoluments of this Government, which will be reserved for those only, who have qualified themselves by politi cal prostitution, for admission into the Magda- dalen Asylum. Tins Collection Biu—~Mr. Clay, in one of his speeches in foe Senate expressed it as his opinion, that if was proper the collccuon bill should be passed, because it was neces- sary to display the power and firmness of the government in foe execution of it* duty; ye those who are opposed , to foe bill, level all their artillery against fog administration and its friends, and style Mr. Clay their western allv Perhaps their friendship tow rds bun, results from the fact, that while he thought foe bill should be passed, he failed to vote tor it either on its being ordered to a third reading or on its final passage. It is immaterial to them what a man thinks, provided he does not act in opposition to their views;-—Selected-