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“The ferment of a free, is preferable to the torpor of a despotic. Govern UlCUt.” VOL. II. ATHENS, GEORGIA, MAY 4, 1833. NO. 7. The Southern Banner, IS niBUSlIIIU IS THE TOWS OF ATHENS, GEORGIA, EVE.'.Y SATURDAY, BY ALBO.Y €11 AS ft. TERMS.—Three dollars per year, payable in ad- vanco, or Fou: - dollars if delayed to the end of the year. The Utter amount will be rigidly ex eted of all who fail to meet their payments in advance. No subscription received for less than one year, un less the money is paid in advance ; and no paper will be discontinued until all arrearages are paid, except at the option of the pualislier. A failure on the part of subscribers to notify us of their intention of ro- linquishmcut, accompanied with the amount due, will be considered is equivalent to a new engagement, and papers sent accordingly. Anvertisemtnts will be inserted at the usual rates. UTAH Letters to the Editors on matters connected with the establishment, must be post paid in order to ,ecuro attention. j;r Not ice of tilt sale of Land and Negroes by Ad. miiiistrators, lixecutors, or Guardians, mutt bo pub. lished sixty dai/s previous to the day of sale. The sale of Personal Property, in like manner, must be publish id forty days previous to the day of sale. Notice to dot tors and creditors of an estate, must bo published forty days. Notice that Application will 1* made to the Court of Ordinary, for Lo.ivc to sell Land or Negroes, must be published four months. Notice tiiat Application will be made for Letters of Administration, must lie published thirty days, and for Letters of L'ismission, six months. *!*!■;ax:as or jib. wf.bster, or MASSACIU’SETTS. . [Concluded.) Such is the language, sir, addressed to the people, while they vet had the constitution un- der consider ation. Tfce powers conferred on the new government wore perfectly well understood to be conferred not by any state j ents ^ nd blending in one indh or ti.e people of any state, but_ by the people \ J J |hdr , , or tUe lut ure. of the United States. V irgmi. is more expli. I • Ril , A A iit S in ; ust . no | itica l nr inci How can she absolve her citizens from their obedience to the laws of the U. S ? ilovv can she aimul their obligations and oaths ? How can the members of her Legisla ture renounce their own oaths ? Sir, secession as a revolutionary right, is intelligible ; as a ri'jfht to be proclaimed in the mi 1st of civil commotions, and asserted at the head of ar mies, I can understand it. But as a practical right, existing under the constitution, ‘and in conformity with its provisions, it seems to me to be nothing but a plain absurdity ; for it supposes resistance to government, under the authority of the government itself; it supposes dismemberment, without violating the princi ples of union ; it supposes opposition to law, without crime; it supposes the violation of oaths, without responsibility it supposes the tot:d overthrow of Government without revo lution. The constitution, sir, regards itself as per petual and immortal. It seeks to establish a union among the people of the states, which shidl last through all time. Or, if the com mon fate of things human must be expected at some period, to happen to it, yet that ca tastrophe is not anticipated. The instrument contains ample provisions lor its amendment, at all times : none for its abandonment at any time. It declares that new states may come into the union, but it does not declare that the old states may go out. The union is not a temporary partner ship of states. It is the association of the people, under a consitution of Government: uniting their power, joining together their highest interests, cementing their present en- divisiblemass, Whatsoever is steadfast in just, political principles—wliat- pancuiar, man any outer soever permanent in the structure of ltu- :ipa assembled to ratify society—whatsoever there is which can cit, p •rlinps, 11 this particular, than any oilier state. Her eo iven the constitution “in the name and behalf of the people of Vir ini i, duel urc and make known, that tiie powers granted under the Const itti! ion being thrived from the people of the F. . tutes, m iv be resumed by thorn whenev er the same shall be perverted to their injury or opprossio ..” Is this language which describes the forma tion of a compact between states, or laiguage deseri' i i >; tin grind o r powers to a new Gov er numf by the whole people of the United Stales? Among all the other ratifications there is man society—whalso derive an enduring character from being founded on deep laid pr.nciplos of constitution al liberty, and on the broad foundations of the public will, all these unite to entitle tins in strumeut to be regarded as a permanent con sul mion of Government. In the next place, Mr. President, I contend that there is a supreme law or' the laud, con sisting of the constitution, acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it, and the public treaties. This will not be denied, because, such are the very words of the constitution. But I contend further, that it rightfully be- not one whici. speaks of the constitution as a i ... , , - - „ . compact between states. Those of Massa- j \ on ^ t0 'Congress, anl to the courts ol the chusctts and New Hampshire express the I Ualtfcd States, to settle>the constitution of this transaction, in my opinion with suilicient aceu- I su P* eme *aw, in OB . 1 u < ^ ases " - s iS . e ‘, raev. They recognize the Divine goodness, j med \ and bcre ans?8 the r i r “ at P raCt,CiJi “in affording'.-he i*eopi.e of the United 1 T«est.on, Who ts to construe firudlythc con it. States an opportunity of entering into an ex- M!on 0 the United Mites ? We all agree mat plint and sol mu compact with each oilier,by the constitution is the supreme law,but who assenting to and ratifying a new constitution” , shall interpret that law? In our system ot the You will observe, sir, that it is the people, and | division of powers between diffi rent Govern, not i he states, who have entered into this 1 meat3 , controversies will necessarily some- compact, audit is the people of all the United times anse ’ respecting the extent ol the pow. State,is a question which the state Legislature or the state Judiciaiy must determine. We all know that these questions arise daily in the state Governments, and are decided by those Governments; and I know no govern ment which does not exercise a similar power. Upon general principles, then, the Govern ment of the United States possessesthis author ity ; and this would hardly be denied were it not that there are other Governments. But since there are state Govcmra -nts and since these like other Governments, ordinarily con strue their own powers, if the Government of the United States construes its own powers also, which construction is to prevail, in the case of opposite constructions ? And again, as in the case now actually before us, the State Governments may undertake not only to construe their own powers, but to decide directly on the extent of the powers of Con gress. Congress has passed a law as being within its just powers ; South Carolina denies that this law is within its just |>owers, and in- sists that she has the right so to decide this point, and that her decision is final. How are these questions to be settled ? In uiv opinion, sir, even if the constitution of the United States had made no express provisions for such cases, it would yet bo diffi cult to maintain that, in a constitution existing over four and twenty States, with equal au thority over all, one could claim a right of construing it for the whole. This would seem a manifest impropriety—indeed, an ub surdity. If the Constitution is a government existing over all the States, though with limi ted powers, it necessarily follows that, to the extent of those powers, it must be supreme. If it be not superior to the authority of a par ticular state, it is not a national Government. But as it is a Government, as it has a legisla tive power of its own, and a judicial power co-extensivc with the legislative, the inference is irresistible, that this Government, thus cre ated by tiie whole, .uid for the whole, must _ j have an authority superior to that of the : ar ticular Government of tiny one part. Con gress is the legislature of all the people of the United States ; the Judiciary of the General Government, is the judiciary of all the people of the United States. To hold therefore, that this legislature and this judiciary are sub ordinate in authority to the legislature and judiciary of a single state, is doing violence to all common sense, and overturning all es tablished principles. Congress must judge of the extent of its own powers so often as it is called on to exercise them, or it cannot act at all ; and it must also act independent of state control, or it cannot act at all. The right of state interposition strikes at the very foundation of the legislative power of Congress. It possesses no effective legis- States extend to it. It reaches the case ; the question ; it attaches the power of the nation, ai judicature to the case itself in whatever court it may arise or exist; and in this case the Supreme Court has appelate jurisdiction over all courts whatever. No language could provide with more effect and precision than is here done, for subjecting constitutional questions to the ultimate decision of the Su- preme Court. And, Sir, this is exactly what the Convention found it necessary to provide for, and intended, to provide for. It is, too, exactly what the people were universally told was done when they adopted the Constitution. One of the first resolutions adopted by the Convention was in these words, viz: “ that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national fevenue, and questions which in volve the national peace and harmony.”— Now, Sir, this either had no sensible mean ing at all, or else it meant that the jurisdic tion of the national judiciary should extend to these questions with a paramount authority. It is not to be supposed that the convention intended that the power of the national judi- ciary should extend to these questions, and that the ju(licatures of the states should also extend to them, with equal power of final dccis. ion. This would be to defeat the whole ob- ject of Ate provision. There were thirteen judicatures already in existence. The evil complained olj or the danger to be guarded against, was contradiction and repugnance in the decision of these judicatures. If the fra mers of the Constitution meant to create i fourteenth, and yet not to give it power to re vise and control the decisions of the existing thirteen, then they only intended to augment the existing evil; and the apprehended danger, by increasing, still further, the chances of discordant judgments. Why, Sir, has it be come a settled axiom in politics, that every Government must have a judicial power co extensive with its legislative power? Cer taiuly, there is only this reasoji, viz: that the laws may receive a uniform interpretation and a uniform execution. This object can be no otherwise attained. A statute is what it is judicial by interpreted to be; and if it be construed one way in New Hampshire, and another way in Georgia, there is no uniform law. One Supreme Court with appellate and final jurisdiction, is the natural and only adequate mcuus, in any Government, to se 3 cure this uniformity. The convention saw all this clearly, and the resolution which I have quoted, never afterwards rescinded, powers. But will they view the question i n its other aspect; will they show us how it is possible for a Government to get along with four and twenty interpreters of its laws and powers? Gentlemen argue, too, as if, in these cases, the state* would be always rig!it,‘ and the General Government always wrong. But, suppose the reverse; suppose the state wrong, and, since they differ, some of them must be wrong, are the most important and essential operations of the Government to be embarrassed and arrested, because one state holds a contrary opinion. Mr. President, every argument which refers the constitution ality of acts of Congresss to state decision, appeals from the majority to the minority; it appeals from the common interest to a par ticular interest; from the councils of all to the council of c-ne ; and endeavors to super cede the judgment of the whole by the judg ment of a part. I think it is clear, Sir, that the Constitu tion, by express provision, by definite and un equivocal words, as well us by necessary im. plication, has constituted the Supreme Court of the United States the appellate tribunal in all cases, of a constitutional nature, which as sume the shape of s suit, in law or equity.— And I think I cannot dt> better than to leave this part of the subject by reading the remarks made upon it by Mr. Ellsworth, in the Con vention of Connecticut; a gentleman Sir, who has left behind him, on the records of the Government of his country, proofs of the clearest intelligence and of the deepest saga city, as well as of the utmost purity and integ rity of character. « This Constitution,” says he, “ defines the extent of the powers of the General Government. If the General Legis lature should at any time, overleap their lim its, the judicial department is a constitution al check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorise, it is void ;— and the judiciary power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be voiu On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits; if they make a law which is usurpation upon the General Government, the law is void; and upright, independent judges, will declare it to be so. And let me now only add,Sir,that in the very first session of the first Congress, with all these well known objects, both of the conven lion and the people, full and fresh iu his mind Mr. Ellsworth reported the bill, as is gener ally understood, for the organization of the passed through various modifications, till it judicial department, and in that bill, made provision tor the exercise of this appellate finally received the form which the article now wears in the Conditution. It is undeniably true, then, that the framers of the Constitu tion intended to create a national judicial 1 live power, if such right of state interposi- power, which should be paramount, on na tion exists, because it can pass no law not tional subjects. And after the Constitution subject to abrogation. It cannot make was framed, and wtile the country was en- laws for the Union, if any part of the Union gaged in discussingits merits, one of its most may pronounce its enactme .ts void and of no i distinguished advocates (Mr. Madison) told effect. Its forms of legislation would be an | the people that it was true that, in controver- , f idle ceremony, if after all, any one of four and sics relating Jo the jpundary between the tux> the! twent y might bid defiance to its autlior- jurisilidions, the tribunal which is ultimately to other legislatures, it' must be trusted with this _ . „ . . . • ... _ - itv. Without express provision in the Con - decide, is to be established under the General t power. The members ofCongressarecho- This consent of the i . enera oyernmen , c aim isngi o u- sldudoi therefore, sir, this whole question is Government. Mr. Martin, who had been a sen by the people,and they are answerable timate decision ? The practical result of th«, ... I ers of each. Who shall decide these contro versies ? Does it rest with the General Gov ernment, in all or any of its departments, to ; exercise the office of final interpreter ? t Or may each of the states, as well as Stales. These conventions, by this form of expression, meant merely to say, that the people of the United States had,-by the bles sing of Providence, enjoyed the opportunity jof establishing anew constitution, founded in I the consent of the people, I people has been called by European writers. . „„ Ithe Social compel ; and, in conformity to tliis who,e dcbate tarn8 on th ‘ s »*° ,ut * 1 he . g c,N common mode of expression, these convcn- fie 1 ™ 10 contends that each state may judge ef< jp t ij ese exist, in a government intended tions speak of that assent, on which the new i for ltselt ^ aa y a * eg ® d ™ da * loa ol the const*, j p or t | lc . w j l0 ] e t he inevitable consequence is, "constitution was to rest, as an explicit and ^on, and may finally deci ie for itself, and . thut t[ie lilW8 of ^ locative power, and solemn comp; ct, nol which the states had en-' ma y execute ,ts own decisions by its own [ered into with each other, but which the pco-1 P awc1 / ^11 the recent procec lings i., Soutn pic of the Uni cd States had entered into. j Carolina are founded on tins cl.uin ot right. Finally sir, how can any man. get over the J* cr convention has pronou..ce< the revenue Lords of the constitution itself ?_“ we, the ,aWsof tbe Un,ted Slates unconstitutional; and Worm or the United Status do okdain this decision she does not allow any authori- Ind establis h this CONSTITUTION’.” These ty °f the United States to overrule or reverse, fi ords must ct .se to be a part of the consti- ° f course she F e J ccta thc authority of Con- ition parchment power of the Supreme Court, in all the pro per cases, in whatsoever court arising; and that this appellate power has now been exer cised for more than forty years, without inter, ruption, and without doubt. As to thc cases, Sir, which do not come be fore the courts, those political questions which terminate with the enactments of Congress, it is of necessity that these should be. ulti mutely decided by Congress itself. Like nust ct .se to be a p irt of the consti- -thev nust be obliterated from the i & ess > because tne ver >’ ob J ect ° fdie ordl - ent on which they are written, before naace ‘store verse the decision of Congress; Hiy human ingenuity or human r-.ument can E?moYC thc po pular basis on which that con- titutio.. rests, and turn the instrument into a lore compact between sovereign states. Thc second proposition, sir, which I pro- dsc to maintain is, that no state authority in dissolve ill; relations subsisting between ie Government of the United States, and ulividuals ; that nothing cun dissolve these Nations but revolution ; and that therefore, Jcrt can be no such thing as secession with- it revolution. All this follows ; as it seems } me, as a just consequence, if it be first j toe decision of this judicial power, must be binding ou and over the whole. No man can form the conception of a Government ex isting over four and twenty slates, with a regular legislative and judicial power, and of the existence at the same time, of an authori ty, residing elsewhere, to resist, at pleasure or discretion,the enactments and the decisions of such a government. I maintain, therefore sir, that from the nature of the case and as necessarily decided by those provisions which member of the Convention, asserted the same j create a legislative power and a judicial pow- j thing to the Legislature of Maryland, and ur ged it as a reason !br rejecting the Constitu tion. Mr. Pinckaky, himself also a leading member of the convention, declared it to the people of South Carolina. Every where, it was admitted, by friends and foes, that this power was in the Constitution. By some it was thought dangerous, by most it was to the people; like other public agents, they are bound by oath to support the Constitution.— These are the securities that they will not violate their duty, nor transcend their powers. They are the same securities as prevail in other popular governments; nor is it easy to see how grants of power can be more safe ly guarded, without rendering them nugatory. before the If the case cannot come belore the courts, thought necessary, but by all, it was agreed ; and if Congress be not trusted with its dccis- to be a power actually contained in the in- ion, who shall decide it? The gentleman and she rejects, too,the authority of the courts ., ,, A . „ . . ,, . J , c’ . , an inference wholly unavoidable, the acts of ot the U ated States, because she expressly i > „ , , • . ’ , . * .... „ , ’ .. . / . / Congress, and the decisions ol tic national prohibits all appeal to those courts. It is in • ° r . . v , . . . ... „ — , • .. * K • ; courts, must be of higher authority than state order to sustain this asserted right ot being : . , . .° ..... . . . . , . . . ° .. °, laws and state decisions. It this be not so, her own judge, that she pronounces the con- 1 • .. . « . ’ .. .• r.u IT *. ia. . . . there is, taero can be, no General Govem- stnution of the United aiati s to be but a com pact, to which she is a party and a sovereign party. If this be established, then the infer ence is supposed to follow, that being sover eign, there is no power to control her decis- ion, and her own judge ment on her own com pact is and must be conclusive. I have already endeavored, sir, to point ved that the constitution of the United S. out the practical consequences of this doc a Government proper, owing protection to trine, and to shew how utterly inconsistent it “viduals, uni entitled to their obedience. » 3 , with all ideas of regular government, and The people, sir, in every state, live under how soon »t 3 adoption would iuvolve the whole o Gover..meuts. country in revolution and absolute anarchy. They ow. chedicnce to both. These Gov. I bo P e ‘t ‘ 3 easy now to shew sir, that a doc. mhents, though distinct, are not adverae. trine bringing such consequences with it, is ach has its separate sphere, and its peculiar 1 a °t 'veil founded; that it has nothing to stand were aiid duties. It is not a contest be- on but theory, and assumption : and that it i-een two sovereigns lor* the same power like the ware of thc rival Houses in England; lor is it a dispute between a government de icto, and a government de jure. It is the base of a division of powers between two gov- prinvents, m ule by the people, to which both ire responsible. Neither can dispense with [die duty which individuals owe to the other; ^either can call itself roaster of the other: the people are masters ofboth. This division of powvr, it is true, is in a great measure un. ino<v.: in Europe. It is the peculiar system bf America ; und though new and singular, n is uot incomprehensible. The State con- ■titu tions are established by the people of the "?>atD8. This Constitution is established by r e p'topic of all the Stiites. How then fcan a state secede? How can a state what the whole people have done ? is refuted by plain and express constitutional provisions. I think the government of the U. States does possess, in its appropriate depart- ments, the authority of final decision on ques tions of disputed power.' I think it possesses this authority both by necessary implication, and by express grant. It is not to be denied, sir, that this authori ty naturally belongs to all Governments. They all exercise it from necessity, and as a consequence of the exercise of other powers, The state Governments themselves possess it except in that class of questions which may arise between them and the General Govern ment, and in regard to which they have sur rendered it, as well by the nature of the case, as by clear constitutional provisions. In oth er, -and ordinary coses, whether a particular law be in conformity to the constitution of the taero ment. But, Mr. President, the constitution has not left this cardinal point without full and explicit provisions. First, as to the authori- ty of Congress. Having enumerated the spe- cific powers conferred on Congr ess, the con- stitutiou adds, as a distinct and substantive clause, the following, viz: “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for car rying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers, vested by this Constitu- tion in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” If this means any thing, it means that C on gress may judge of the true extent and just interpretation of the specific powers granted to it; and may judge also of what is necessary and proper for executing those powers. If Congress is to judge of what is necessary for the execution of its powers, it must, of neces- sity, judge of the extent and interpretation of those powers. And in regard, Sir, to the judiciary, the Con, stitution is still more express and emphatic. It declares that the judicial power shall ex tend to all cases in law or equity arising un der the Constitution, laws of the United S. and treaties; that there sdiall be one Su preme Court, and that this Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of all these cases, subject to such exceptions as Congress may make. It is impossible to escape. from the generality of these words. If a case ar ise under the Constitution, that is, if a case ar- ise dependingon the construction of the Con stitution, thfc judicial power of the United strument. The convention saw thc absolute necessity of some control in t!ie National Gov- eminent over St.ite laws. Different modes of establishing this control were suggested and considered. 'At onetime it was propos ed that thc laws of the states should, from time to time, be laid before Congress, and that Congress should posses a negative over them. But this was thought inexpedient and inadmis-, sible ; and iu its place, and expressly as a substitute for it, the existing provision was introduced; that is to say, a provision by which the federal Courts should have authori ty to overrule such state laws as might be in manifest contravention of the Constitution.— Thc writers of the Federalist in explaining thc Constitution, while it was yet pending before the people, and still unadopted, give this account of the matter in terms, and as sign this reason for the article as it now stands. By this provision Congress escaped from the necessity of any revision of state laws, left the whole sphere of state legislation quite un touched, and yet obtained security against any infringement of the constitutional power of the General Government. Indeed, Sir, allow me to ask again, if the national judicia- ry was not to exercise a power of revision, on constitutional questions, over the judica tures of the states, why was any national ju dicature erected at all. Can any man give a sensible a reason for having a judicial power in this Government, unless it be for the sake of maintaining a uniformity of decision, on questions arising under the Constitution and laws of Congress, and ensuring its execution? And does not this very idea of uniformity ne cessarily imply that the construction given by the national courts is to be the .prevailing con struction? How else, Sir, is it possible that uniformity can be preserved. Gentlemen appear to me, Sir, to look at but one side of the question. They regard only the supposed danger t>f trusting a Gov. eminent with thc interpretation of its own savs each state is to decide for herself. If so, then, as I have already urged, what is law in one state is not law in thc other. Or, if the resistance of one state compels an entire repeal of thc law, then a minority, and that a small one, governs the whole country. Sir,those who espouse the doctrines of nul lification, reject, as it set ms to me, the first great principle of all republican liberty; that is, that the majority must govern. In mat tors of common concern, the judgment of a m ijority must stand as the judgment of the whole. This is a law imposed on us by the absolute necessity of the case; and if we do not act upon it there is no possibility of main taining any Government but despotism. We hear loud and repeated denunciations against what is called majority government. It is de clared with much warmth, that a majority government cannot be maintained in the United States. What then, do gentlemen wish?— Do they wish to establish a minority Govern ment ? Do they wish to subj *ct the will of the many to the will of the few ? The hon- orable gentleman from South Carolina has spoken of absolute majorities, and majorities concurrent; language wholly, unknown to our Constitution, and to which it ii| not easy to affix definite ideas. As far as I under stand it, it would teach us. that the absolute majority may be found in Congress, but the majority concurrent must be looked for in the states. That in to say, Sir, stripping the matter of this novelty of phrase, that the dis sent of one or more states as states, renders void the decision of a majority of Congress, so far as that state is concerned. . And, so this doctrine, running but a short career, like other dogmas of the day, terminates in. nulli fication. If this vehement invective against majorities meant no more than that, in the construe-ion of government, it is wise to provide checks and balances, so that there should be various limitations on the power of the mere majority, would only mean what the Constitution of the United States has already abundantly pro vided. It ia full of such checks and balan ces. In its very organization, it adopts , a broad and most effectual principle in restraint of the power of mere majorities. A majori ty of the people elects the House of Repre sentatives, but it does uot elect the Senate. The Senate is elected by the states, each state having, in this respect, an equal power. No law, therefore, cau pass without the as sent of a majority of the Representatives of the people,and a majority of the rcprsestiuaiveaof the states also. A majority of the Ituprc- sentatives of the people must concur, and a majority of the states must concur, in every act of Congress; and the President is elected on a plan compounded ofboth these principles. But, having comjiosed one House of Repre sentatives chosen by the people in each state according to its numbers, and the other of an equal number of members from every state ; whether larger or smaller, the Constitution gives to majorities in these Houses, thus con- • stituted, the full and entire power of passing laws, subject always to the constitutional res trictions aud to the approval of the President. To subject them to any other power is clear usurpation. The majority of one house may be controlled by the majority of the other; and both may be restrained by the President’s negative. These are checks and balances provided by the Constitution, existing in the Government itself, and wisely intended to se cure deliberation and caution in legislative proceedings. But to resist the will ol* the ma jority in both Houses, thus constitutionally exercised ; to insist on Jhc lawfulness of in terposition by an extraneous power ; to claim the right of defeating the will of Congress, bv setting up against itr the will of a single state, in neither more nor less, ;is it strikes me, than a plain attempt to overthrow the Government. The constituted authorities of the United S. are no longer a Government, if they be not masters of their own will; they are no longer a Government, if an external power may ar rest their proceedings; they are no longer a Govemnent, if acts pass by both Houses, and approved by the President may be nullified by state vetoes or state ordinances.. Does any one suppose it could make any difference as to the binding authority of an act of Con- gress, and of the duty of astute t > respect it, whether it passed by a mere majority of both Houses, or by three-fourths of each, or tho unanimous vote of each ? Within the limits and restrictions of tho Constitution, the Gov ernment of the United States, like all other popular Governments, acts by majorities. It can act no otherwise. Whoever therefore, denounces the Government of majorities,.dc- * , nounces thc Government of his own country, and denounces all free Governments. And whoever would restrain these majorities, while acting within their constitutional limits, by an external power,whatever he may intend, asserts principles which, if adopted, can lead to nothing else than the destruction of the Government itself. Does not the gentleman perceive, Sir, hoy* his ..rgument against majorities might here be retorted upon ? Does he not see how cogent ly he might be asked, whether it be the char acter of nullification to practise what it preaches? Look to South Carolina, at the present moment. How far are tho rights of minorities there respected ? I confess sir, I have not known, inpoaceable times, the power of thc majority carried with a higher band or upheld with more relentless disregard of the rights, feelings, and principles of the minority, a minority embracing, as the gentleman himself will admit, a large portion of the worth and re3- hending in its numbers, men who have been associated with him, and with us, in these halls of legislation; men who have served their country at home, and honored it abroad; men who would cheerfully lay down their lives for their native state, in any cause which they could regard as the cause of honor and du ty; men above fear and above reproach; whose deepest grief and distress spring from the conviction that the present proceedings of the state must ultimately reflect discredit up. on her: how is this minority—how are these men regarded ? They are enthralled ,and dis franchised by ordinance,and actsof legislations subjected to tests and oaths, incompatible, as they conscientiously think, without oaths al- ready taken, and obligations already assumed; they are proscribed and denounced os recre ants to duty and patriotism, and slaves to a foreign power ; both the spirit which pursues them, apd the positive measures which ema nate from that spirit, are harsh aud proscrip tive beyond all precedent within my knowl edge, except in periods of professed revolu tion. It is not, sir, one would think, for those who approve these proceedings,to complain of the power of majorities. ♦ ; Mr. President, all popular governments rest on two principles, or two assumptions : First, That there is, so far a common in terest among those over whom the Govern ment extends, ns that it may provide for the defence,protection,and ;ood government of tho whole, without injustice or oppression to parts. ' Second, That the representatives of the people, and especially the people thems dves, . are secure against general corruption, and may be trusted, therefore, with the exercise of power. Whoever argues against these principles, argues against the practicability of all free governments. And whoever admits these, must admit, or cannot deny, that pow er is as safe in the hands of Congress, as in. those of other representative bodies.^—