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the actual condition of other commercial countries, must, as it seems to me, dispel . all remaining dotibtsjipon the subject. Ii has since appeared that evils, similar t< those suffered by ourselves, have been ex perienced in Great Britain, on the eontin ent, and indeed, throughout the commer cial world ; and that in other countries, as in our own, they have been uniformly preceded by an undue enlargement of the boundaries of trade prompted, as with us, by unprecedented expansions of the sys tems of credit. A reference to the amount of banking capital, and the issues of pa per credits put in circulation in Great Britain by banks, and in other ways, dur ing the years f<l4, 1 and ISJ<>, will show an augmentation of the paper cur rency there, as much disproportioned to the real wants of trade as in the United States. With this redundancy of the pa per currency, there arose in that country also a spirit of adventurous speculation, embracing the whole range of human -en terprise. Aid was profusely given to pro jected improvements. Large investments were made in -foreign stocks and loans, credits for goods were granted with un bounded liberality to merchants in foreign countries; and all the means of acquiring and employing credit were put in active operation, and extended in their effects to every department of business, and to every quarter of the globe. The reaction was proportioned in its violence to the extra ordinary character of events which pre ceded it. The commercial community of Great Britain were subjected to the great est difficulties, and their debtors in this country were not only suddenly deprived of accustomed and expected credits, but called upon for payments, which, in the actual posture of things here, could only be made through a general pressure, and at the most ruinous sacrifices. In view of these facts, it would seem impossible for sincere inquirers after trutli to resist the conviction, that the causes of the revulsion in both countries have been substantially the same. Two nations, the most commercial in the world, enjoying hut recently the highest degree of appar ent prosperity, and maintaining with eacli other the closest relations, are suddenly, in a time pf profound peace, and without any great national disaster, arrested in their career, and plunged into a state of embarrassment and distress. In both countries we have witnessed the same Re dundancy of paper money, and other facil ities of credit; the same spirit of specula tion; the same partial successes; the same difficulties and reverses; and, at length, nearly the same overwhelming ca tastrophe. The most material difference between the results in the two countries has only beenfthat with us there has also occurred an extensive derangement in the fiscal affairs of the Federal and State Gov ernments, occasioned by the suspension of specie payments by the banks. The history of these causes and effects, in Great Britain and the United States, is substantially the history of the revulsion in all other commercial countries. •The present and visible effects of these circumstances on the operations of the Government, and on the industry of the people, point out the objects which call for your immediate attention. They are—to regulate by laws the safe, keeping, transfer, and disbursement, ofthe: public moneys; to designate the funds to be received and paid by the Government; to enable the Treasury to meet promptly every demand upon it; to prescribe the terms of indulgence, and the mode of set tlement to he adopted, as well in collect ing from individuals the revenue that has accrued, as in withdrawing it from former depositories, and to devise and adopt such further measures within the constitutional competency of Congress, as will behest calculated to revive the enterprise and to promote the prosperity of the country. For the deposite, transfer, nml disburse ment, ol the revenue, National and State Banks have always, with temporary and limited exceptions, been heretofore em ployed ; but, although advocates of each system are to be found, it is apparent that the events ol the last few mouths have greatly augmented the desire, long exist- i mg among the people of the United States, to separate the fiscal concerns of the gov ernment from those of individuals or cor porations. Again, to create a National Bank, as a fiscal agent, would be to disregard the pop ular will, twice solemnly and unequivocally expressed. On no question of domestic policy is there stronger evidence tlint the sentiments of a large majority are delib erately fixed; and I cannot concur with those who think they see, in recent events, a proof that these sentiments are. or a rea son, that they should he changed Events, similar iu their origin and character have heretofore frequently oc curred without producing any such change ; and the lessons of experience must he forgotten, if we suppose that the present overthrow of credit would have been prevented by the existence of a trt tional hank. Proneness to excessive is sues has ever been the vice of the hank ing system, a vice as prominent in nation al as in State institutions. This propen sity is as subservient to the advancement of private interests in the one as in the other ; and those who direct them both, being principally guided by the same views, and influenced by the samp mo tives, will he equally ready to stimulate extravagance of enterprise by improve ment of credit. How strikingly is this conclusion sustained bv experience. The Bank of the United States, with the vast powers conferred on it by Congress, did not or could not prevent former ami sim ilar embarrassment, nor has the still grea ter strength it has been said to possess, under its present charter, enabled it, in the t-xi-tin_r emergency, to check other institutions or even to save itself' In Great Britain where it lias been seen, the same causes have been attended with the same effects, a national bank possessing powers far greater than are asked for by the warmest advocates of such an in stitution here, has also proved unable to prevent ail undue expansion of credit, and the evils that flow from it. Nor can I find any tenable ground for the re-es lablishniciit of a national bank, in tin* derangement alleged at present to exist in the domestic exchanges of the country, or in tliq facilities it may be capable of af fording them. Although advantages of this sort were anticipated when the first Bank of the United States was created, they were regarded as an incidental accommo dation : not one which the Federal Gov ernment was bound, or could be called upon to furnish. This accommodation is now, indeed, after the lapse of not many years, demanded from it as among its first duties ; and an omission to aid and regulate commercial exchange, is treated as a ground of loud and serious complaint. Such results only serve to exemplify the constant desire, among sonic of our citizens, to enlarge the pow ers of the Government, and extend its control to subjects with which it should not interfere. They can never justify the creation of an institution to promote such objects. On the contrary, they just ly excite among the community a more diligent inquiry into the character of those operations of trade, toward which it is desired to extend such peculiar favors. j The various transactions which bear the name of domestic exchanges, differ i essentially in their nature, operation, and utility. One class of them consists of bills of exchange, drawn for the pffrpose 1 of transferring actual capital from one part of the country to another, or to an ticipate the proceeds of property actually transmitted. Bills of this description are highly useful in the movements of, trade, and well deserve all the encourage-i nient which can rightfully be given toj them. Another class is made up of bills of exchange, not drawn to transfer actual j capital, nor on the credit of property transmitted, but to create fictitious capi tal ; partaking at once of the character of notes discounted in bank, and of buuk notes in circulation; and swelling the mass of paper credits to a vast extent m the most objectionable manner. These [ bills leave formed, for the last few years, I a large proportion of wliat-are termed the domestic exchanges of the country,serving l as the means of usurious profit, and con-! stituting the most unsafe and precarious I paper in circulation. This species of! traffic, instead of being upheld, ought to { to be discountenanced by the Government 1 and the people. In transferring its funds from place to place, the Government is on the same footing with the private citizens, and may resort to the same legal means. It may do so through the medium of bills drawn by itself, or purchased from others; and in these operations it may, iu a man ner undoubtedly constitutional and legit imate, facilitate and assist exchanges of individuals founded on real transactions of trade.—The extent to which this may be done, and the best means of affecting it, are entitled to the fullest considera tion. This lias been bestowed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and his views will be submitted to you in his report. But it was not designed by the consti tution that 11 io government should assume the management of domestic or foreign exchange. It is indeed authorized to reg ulate .by law the commerce between the States, and to provide a general standard of value, or medium of exchange, iu gold and silver ; but it is not its province to aid individuals in the transfer of their funds, otherwise than through the facili ties afforded by the i’ost Office Depart ! meut. As justly might it be called on to provide for the transportation of their merchandise.—These are operations of trade. They ought to be conducted b\ those who are interested in them, 111 the same maimer that the incidental difficul ties of other pursuits are encountered by other classes of citizens. Such aid has not been deemed necessary iu other coun tries. Throughout Europe, the domestic as well as the foreign exchanges arc car ried on by private houses, often, if not generally, without the assistance of banks. Yet they extend throughout distinct sown eignites, and far exceed in amount the real exchanges of tlte United States. There is no reason why our own may not he conducted in the same manner, with equal cheapness and safety. Certainly this might he accomplished, if it were fa vored by those most deeply interested ; and few can doubt that their own inter est, as well as the general welfare of the i country, would be promoted, by leaving such a subject iu tile hands of those to i whom it properly belongs. A system founded on private interest, enterprise and competition, without the aid of legislative grants or regulations by law, would rapidly prosper; it would be • free from the influence of political agita tion, and extend the same exemption to trade itself; and it would put an end to i j those complaints of neglect, partiality, in justice, and oppression, winch arc the un BRUNSWICK ADVOCATE. avoidable results of interference by the Government, in the proper concerns of individuals. All former attempts on the part of the Government to carry its legis lation, in this respect, further than was designed, by the Constitution, have in the end proved injurious, and have served on ly to convince the great body of the people, more and more, of the certain dangers of blending private interests with the opera tions of public business; and there is no reason to suppose that a repetition of them now would be more successful. It cannot be concealed that there exists, iu our community .opinions and feclingson this subject in direct opposition to eacli other. A large*portion of them, combin ing great intelligence, activity, and influ ence, are no doubt sincere in their belief that the operations of trade ought to be as sisted bwsucli a connection; they regard a national bank as necessary for this pur pose, and they are disinclined to every measure that does not tend, sooner or la ter, to the establishment of such an insti tution. On tiie other hand, a majority of the people are believed to be irrecon cilably opposed to that measure : they con sider such a concentration of power dan gerous to their liberties ; and many ofthem regard it as a violation of the Constitu tion. This collision of opinion has,doubt less, caused much of the embarrassment to wjkich the commercial transactions of the country have lately been exposed. Banking has become a political topic of the highest interest, and trade has suffered in the conflict of parties. A speedy ter mination of this state of things, however desirable, is scarcely to be expected. We have seen for nearly half a century, that those who advocate a national bank, by whatever motive they may be influenced, constitute a portion of our community too j numerous to allow us to hope for an early abandonment of their favorite plan. A)u the other hand, they must indeed form an erroneous estimate of the intelligence ami temper of the American people, who suppose that they have continued on slight or insufficient grounds, their persevering opposition to such an institution; or that they can be induced by pecuniary pressure or any other combination of circumstun-, ces, to surrender principles, they have so long and so inflexibly maintained. My own views of the subject arc uu-! changed. They have repeatedly and un reservedly announced to my fellow cit izens ; w ho, with full knowledge of them, conferred upon me the two highest offices of the Government. On the last of these i occasions, 1 felt it due to the people to tip- j prize them distinctly, that, in the event of my election, 1 would not be able to co-J opperate in the re-establishment of a] national bank. To these sentiments, 1 have now only to add the expression of an increased conviction, that the re-estab lishment of such a bank, in any form, j w hilst it would not accomplish, the bene ficial purpose promised by its advocates: I would impair the rightful supremacy of : the popular will; injure the character and ! diminish the influence of our political system; and bring once more into exis tence a concentrated moneyed power, hos ; tile to the spirit, and threatening the per- 1 { manency, of our republican institutions. \ i Local banks have been employed for j the deposite and distribution of the rev enue, at all times partially, and on three different occasions, exclusively: first, ante rior to the establishment of the first bank |of the United States ; secondly, in the : interval between the termination of that [ institution and the charter of rt sueees i sor ; and thirdly, during the limited peri od which lias now so abruptly closed. The connection tints repeatedly attempted, pro- veil unsatisfactory on each successive occasion, notwithstanding the various measures which were adopted to facilitate or insure it success. On the last occasion, in the year ISM, the employment of the State hanks was guarded especially in every way which experience and caution could suggest. Personal security was required for the safe-keeping and prompt payment of the moneys to he received, and full returns of their condition were, from time to time to he made by the deposito ries. In the first stages the measures was eminently successful, notwithstanding the violent opposition of the Bank of the 1 iiited States, and the unceas ing efforts made to overthrow it. The select h inks performed with fidelity, and without any embarrassment to themselves or the community, their engagements to the Government, and the svstein promis ed to he perm niently usi fill But when it became necesary, undi - the act of June, IShi, to withdraw from them the public money, for the purpose of placing it in additional institutions, or of trans ferring it to the States, they found it, m many cases, inconvenient to comply with tlte demands of tiie Treasury, and numerous and pressing applications were made for indulgence* of relief. As the instalments under the deposite law be came payable, their own embarrassments, and thS necessity, under which they lay jof curtailing their discounts and calling in their debts, increased the general dis tress, and contributed, with other causes, to hasten the revulsion in which, at length, they in common with the other banks, were fatally involved. Under these circumstances it becomes our solemn duty to inquire whether there are not, in any connection between the Government and banks of issue, evils of .great magnitude, inherent in its very nature, and against which no precautions can effectually guard. I Unforeseen in the organization of the Gov rfcrmnent, and forced on the Treasury by early necessities, the practise of employing banks, was in truth, from the beginning, more a meas ure of emergency than of sound policy. When we started into existence as a nation, in ad dition to the burdens of the new Government, we assumed all the large hut honorable load of debt, which was the price of our liberty ; but we hesitated to weigh down the infant in dustry of the country by resorting to adequate taxation for the necessary revenue. The fa cilities of banks,in return for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps too readily received, by an embarrassed Treas ury. During the long continuance of a Na tional debt, and the intervening difficulties <>t a foreign war, the connection was continued from motives of convenience ; but these cau ses have long since passed away. We have no emergencies that make banks necessary to aid the wants of the Treasury ; we have no load of national debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposite a large surplus : No public interest, therefore, now requires the re newal of a connection, circumstances have t dissolved. The complete organization of our Government, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which prevails between the different States, and with foreign Powers, all enable us now to select the system most consistent with the Constitution, and most conducive to the public welfare. Should we then, connect the Treasury for a fourth time with the local banks, it can only be under a conviction that past failures have arisen from accidental, not inherent defects. A danger, difficult, if not impossible, to be avoided in such an arrangement, is made strik ingly evident in the very event by which it has been now defeated. A sudden act of the banks intrusted with the funds of the people, deprives the Treasury, without fault or agency of the government, of the ability to pay its creditors in the currency they have by law a right to demand. This circumstance no fluctuation of commerce could have produced, if the public revenue had been collected in the legal cur rency, and kept in that form by the officers of the Treasury. The citizen whose money was in bank receives il back, since the suspension, at a sacrifice in its amount; whilst he who kepi it in the legal currency of the country, and in his own possession, jmrsues, without loss, the current of his business. The Government, placed in the situation of the former is involv ed in embarrassments it could not have suffer ed had it pursued the course of the latter.— These embarrassments are, moreover, aug mented by those salutary and just laws which forbid it to use a depreciated currency, and, by so a- ing, take from the Government the abili ty which individuals have of accommodating their transactions to such a catastrophe. A system which can, in a time of profound peace, when there is a large revenue laid by, thus suddenly prevent the application and the use of the money of the people, in the manner and for the objects they have directed, cannot be wise ; but who can think, without painful reflection, that, under it, the same unforeseen events might have befallen us in the midst of u war, and taken from us, at the moment when 1 most wanted, the use of those very means which were treasured up to promote the nation al warfare and guard our national rights ? To j such embarrassments and to such dangers will j this Government be always exposed, whilst it takes tlic moneys raised for, and necessary to, the public service, out of the hands of its own ' officers, and converts them into a mere right of | action against corporations entrusted with the • possession of them. Nor can such results be i effectually guarded against in such a system, j without investing the Executive with a control over the hanks themselves, whether State or National; that might with reason be objected , to. Ours is, probably, the only Government ! in the world that is liable, in the management ■ of its fiscal concerns, to occurrences like these. But this imminent risk is not the only danger | attendant on the surrender if the public mon | ey to the custody and control of local corpora tions. Though the object is aid to the Treas ury, its effects may he to introduce into the operations of the Government, influences the most subtle, founded on interests the most selfish. The use by the banks, for their own benefit, of the money deposited with them, lias receiv ed the sanction of the Government from the commencement of this connection. The mon ey received front the people, instead of being kept till it is needed for tiioir use, is, in conse quence of this authority, a fund, on which dis counts are made for the profit of those who happen to be owners of stock in the hanks se lected as depositories. The supposed an 1 of ten exaggerated advantages of such *i boon will always cause it ff be sought for with avid ity. I will not stop to consider on whom the pat ronage incident to it, is to be conferred; whether the selecth n and control be trusted to Congress or to the Executive,either will be sub jected to appeals made in every form which the sagacity of interest can suggest The banks, under such a system, are stimulated to make the most of their fortunate acquisition; the dejms ltes are treated as an incre:ise of capital; loans and circulation are rashly augmented, and, when the public exigencies require a re turn, it is attended with embarrassments not provided for, nor foreseen. Thus banks that ! thought themselves most fortunate when the public funds were received, find themselves most embarrassed when tiie season of payment suddenly arrives. Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system are not limited tu the banks. It stimulates a i general rashness of enterprise, and aggravates the fluctuations of commerce and the curren cy. This result was strikingly exhibited dur ing the operations of the late deposite system, and especially in the purchases of public lands. The order which ultimately directed the pay ment of gold and silver in sucli purchases, greatly checked, but could not altogether pre vent, flic evil. Specie was indeed more diffi cult to be procured than the notes which the banks could themselves create at pleasure; but stiff, being obtained from them as a loan, and returned as a deposite, which they were again at liberty to use, it only passed round the cir ! cle with diminished speed. This operation could not have been performed, had the funds of the Government gone into the Treasury, to be regularly disbursed, and not into banks, to be loaned out for their own profit, while they were permitted to substitute for it a credit in account In expressing these sentiments, I desire not : to undervalue the benefits of a salutary credit to any branch of enterprise. The credit be , stowed on probity and industry is the just re- I ward of merit, and an honorable incentive to ’ further acquisition None oppose it who love their country ariflunderstand it - welfare. But when it is unduly encouraged—when it is ! made to inflame the public mind with the temp tations of sudden and unsubstantial wealth— when it turns industry into paths that lead sooner or later to disappointment arid distress it becomes liable to censure, and needs cor rection. Far from helping probity and indus try, the ruin to which it leads falls most se verely on the great laboring classes, who are thrown suddenly out of employment, and by the failure of magnificent schemes never in tended to enrich them, are deprived in a mo ment of their only resource. Abuses of credit and excesses in speculations will happen in despite of the most salutary laws; no Govern ment perhajis can altogether prevent them; but surely every Government can refrain from contributing the stimulus that calls them into life. Since, therefore, experience has shown, that to lend the public money to local banks, is hazardous to the operations of the Government, at least of doubtful benefit to the institutions themselves ; and productive of disastrous de rangement in the business and currency of the country, is it the part of wisdom again to re new the connection? It is true that such an agency is in many re spects convenient to the Treasury, but it is not indispensable. A limitation of the expenses of the Government to its actual wants, and of the revenue to those expenses, with convenient means for its prompt application to the pur poses for which it was raised, are the objects which we should seek to accomplish. The collection, safe-keeping, transfer and disburse ment of the public money, can, it is believed, bo well managed by officers of the Govern ment. Its collection, and to a great extent, its disbursement also, have indeed been hither to conducted solely by them; neither National nor State Banks when employed being requir ed to do more than keep it safely while in their custody, and transfer and pay it in such por tion at such times as the Treasury shall direct. Surely banks are not more able than the Government to secure the money in their pos session against accident, violence, or fraud.— The assertion that they are so, must assume that a vault in a ban!; is stronger than a vault in the Treasury ; and that directors, cashiers, and clerks, not selected by the Government, nor under its control, are much more worthy of confidence than officers selected from the people and responsible to the-Governmcnt; officers bound by official oaths and bonds lbr a faithful performance of their duties, and con stantly subject to the supervision of Congress. The difficulties of transfer, and the aid here tofore rendered by banks, have been less than is usually supposed. The actual accounts show that by far the larger portion ol’ payment is made within short or convenient distances from the places of collection; and the whole number of warrants issued at the Treasury in the year lt>s4—a year, the results of whidji will, it is believed, afford a safe test for tKe future—fell short of live thousand, of an aver age of less than one daily for each State; iu the city of New York they did not average more than two a day, and at the city of Wash ington only four. The difficulties heretofore existing are, more over, daily lessened by an increase in the cheapness and facility of Communication; and it may he asserted with confidence; that the necessary transfers, as well as the safe keeping and disbursement of the public moneys, can be with safety and convenience accomplished through the agency of Treasury officers. This opinion has been in 'some degree continued, by actual experience since the discontinuance of the banks as fiscal agents iu May last; a peri od, which, from the embarrassments in com mercial intercourse, presented obstacles as great as any that may be hereafter apprehend ed. The manner of keeping the public money since that period, is fully stated in the report .nfthe Secretary of the Treasury. That officer I also suggestsviiie propriety of assigning, by law, certain additional duties to existing estab lishments an 1 officSfs,which with the modifica tions and safeguards referred to by him, will he thinks enable the Department to continue to perform this branch of the public service, with out any material addition either to their num ber or to the present expense. The extent of the business to be transacted has already been stated ; an 1 in respect to the amount of money with which the officers employed would be entrusted at any one time it appears that, as suming a balance of five millions to berat all times kept in the Treasury, and the whole of it left in tiie hands of the collectors and re ceivers—the proportion of each would not ex - coed an average of thirty thousand dollars; but that deducting one million for the use of the mint, and assuming the remaining four millions to he in the hands of one half of the present number of officers—a supposition deemed more likely to correspond with the facfc£-the sum in the hands of each would be still less than tiie amount of most of the bonds now taken from ! the receivers of the public money. Every ap -1 prehension, however on the subject, either m respect to the s tlety of the money, or the faith ful discharge of these fiscal transactions, may, it appears to me, lie effectually removed by adding to the present means of the Treasury, the establishment by law, at a few important points, of offices for the deposite and disburse ment of such portions of the public revenue as cannot with obvious safety and convenience, be left in the possession of the collecting offi cers until paid over by thtgn to the public cred itors. Neither the amounts retained in their hands, nor those deposited in the offices, would, in an ordinary condition of the revenue, die larger in most cases than those often under the control of disbursing officers of the Army j and Navy; and might be made entirely safe, by requiring such securities, and exercising such controlling supervision, as Congress may by law prescribe. The principal officers whose appointments would become necessary under this plan, taking the largest number suggested by- the Secretary of the Treasury, would not exceed ten; nor the additional expenses, at tiie same estimate, sixty thousand dollars a year, j There'can be no doubt of the obligation of i those who are entrusted with the affairs of Government, to conduct them with as little cost to the nation as is consistent with tiie public interest; and it is for Congress, and ultimately for the people, to decide w hether, the benefits to be derived from keeping our fiscal concerns 1 apart, and severing the connection which has hitherto existed between the government and banks offer sufficient advantages to justify the necessary expenses. If the object to lie ac complished is deemed import int to the future welfare of the country, 1 cannot allow- myself to believe that the addition to the public ex penditure of comparatively so small an amount; i as will be necessary to effect it, will he object- ! ed to by the people. # It will be seen by the report of the Postmas ter General, herewith communicated, that tiie fiscal affairs of that Department have been i successfully conducted since May lastptpon the j principle of dealing only in the legal currency of the United States, and that it needs no leg islation to maintain its credit, and facilitate the management of its concerns; the existing laws being, in the opinion of that officer, ample for those objects. Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for a season, and increased services required from the public functionaries; such are usually incident to tiie commencement of every system, but they will be greatly lessened in tiie pro gress of its operations. "I he power and influence supposed to be con nected with tiie custody and disbursement of tiie public money are topics on which tiie public mind, is naturally, ami, with great pro priety, peculiarly sensitive. Much has been said of them m reference to the proposed sep aration of the Government from banking in stitutions ; and surely no one can object to any appeals or animadversions on the subject, which are consistent with facts, and evince a proper respect for tiie intelligence of tiie people. If a Chief Magistrate may be allowed lio speak for himself on such a point, I can truly say, that to me nothing would be more acceptable, than the withdrawal from the Ex ecutive to tlis greatest practicable extent, of all concerned in the custody and disbursement of the public revenue ; not that I would shrink from any responsibility cast upon me by the duties of my office, but because it is my firm belief that its capacity for usefulness is in no degree promoted by the possessions of any patronage not actually necessary to the per | formance of those duties. But under our , present form of Government, the intervention of Executive officei-3 in the custody and dis bursement of the public money seems to be unavoidable, and before it can be admitted that the influence and [lower of the Executive would be increased by dispensing with the a > gency ol banks, the nature of that intervention m such an agency must be carefully regarded, and a comparison must be instituted between its extent in the two ca es; The revenue can only be collected by offi ! cers appointed by the President, with the ad ! vice and consent of the Senate. The public moneys, in the first instance, must therefore, i m all cases, pass through hands selected by the Executive—other officers appointed in the same way, or, as iu some cases, by the President alone, must also be entrusted with them When drawn for the purpose of disburse ment It is thus seen that, even when banks are employed, tiie public funds must twice pass through tiie hands of executive officers. Be : sides this, the head of the Treasury Depart ! meat, who aiso holds his office at the pleas ure of the President, and some other officers of the same depart neat, must necessarily be invested with more or less power in the selec tion, continuance, and supervision, of the banks that may he employed. The question is then narrowed to the single [joint, whether, in the intermediate stage between the collec tion and disbursment of the public money, the agency ol banks is necessary to avoid a dan gerous extension, of the patronage and influ ence of the Executive ? But is it clear that the connection of the Executive with power j lul moneyed institutions, capable of minister ing to the interests of men in points where they are most accessable to corruption, is less liable to abuse than his constitutional agency in the appointment and control of the few public officers required by the proposed plan ? Will the public money, when in their hands, be necessarily exposed to any improper interfer ence on the part of the Executive ? May it not be hoped that a prudent fear of public jealousy and disapprobation, in a matter so pe culiarly exposed to them, will deter him fromany such interference, even if higher motives be found inoperative ? May not Congress so reg ulate, by law, the duty of those officers, and j subject it to such supervision and publicity, as i to prevent the possibility of any serious abuse i on the part of the Executive ? and is there e ■ qual room for such supervision, and publicity in a connection with banks, acting under the | shield of corporate immunities, and conducted by persons irresponsible to the government and the people ? It is believed that a considerate ; and candid investigation of these questions will result in the conviction, that the proposed plan is far less liable to objection, on the ; score of Executive patronage and control, than I any bunk agency that has been, or can be, devised. With these views, I leave to Congress the measuros necessary to regulate, in the present emergency, the safe-keeping and transfer of the public moneys. In the performance of constitutional, duty, I have staff'd to them, without reserve, the result of my own reflec tions. The subject is of great importance; and one on which we can scarcely expect to be as united in sentiment as we are in inter est It deserves a full and free discussion, and cannot fail to be benefitted by a dispassion ate comparison of opinions. Well aware my self of the duty of reciprocal concession a mong the co-ordinate branches of the Gov ernment, 1 can promise reasonable spirit of co operation, so far as it can be indulged in with ont the surrender of constitutional objections, which l believe to be well founded. Any sys tem that may be adopted should be subjected to the fullest legal provision, so as to leave noth ing to the Executive but what is necessary to the discharge of tiie duties imposed on him ; and whatever plan may he ultimately estab lished, my own part shall be so discharged as to give to it. a fair trial, and the best prospect of success. The character of the funds to he received and disbursed hi the transactions of tiie Gov ernment., likewise demands your most careful consideration. There can be no doubt that those who fra med and adopted the Constitution, having in immediate view the depreciated paper of the <Confederacy—of which five hundred dollars in paper were, at times, only equal to one dollar in coin—intended to prevent the recurrence of similar evil, so far at least as related to the transactions of the new Government, They gave to Congress express powers to coin mon ey, and to regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin ; they refused tu give it power to establish corporations—-the agents, then as now, chiefly employed to create a paper cur rency ; they prohibited the States from making any.thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts ; and the first Congress di rected, by postive law, thft the revenue should be received in nothing but gold and silver. Public exigency at the outset of tiie Gov ernment, without direct legislative authority,led to the use of banks as fiscal aids to the Treas ury. In admitted deviation from the law, at the same period, and under the same exigency, the Secretary of the Treasury received their notes in payment of duties. The sole groUHd on which the practice, thus commenced, wa9 then, or has since, been justified, is the cef-