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AUGUSTA HERALD*
Vot. XVI No. 20.]
INSTRUCTIONS—CONTINUED.
* ■■■>
1 have to repeat that the great object which
you have to secure, in regard to impressment
is, that our flag shall protect the crew, and
providing for this in a satisfactory manner,
that you are authorised to secure Great Brit
ain effectually against the employment ofher
stamen in the service of the United States.
'1 his it is believed Would be done by the adop
tion of either of the above alternatives, and
the application to that which may be adopted,
of the checks contained in the law of the last
session relative to seamen ; in aid of which it
will always be in the power of Great Britain
to make regulations operating in her own ports
witi a view to the same effect. To termi
nate, however, this controversy in a manner
satisfactory to both parties, the President is
willing, should other checks be suggeitetj( as
likely to be more effectual, consistent iilhfthe
spirit of our constitution, that you should
adopt them. The strong feature of the Irst
alternative which authorises the naturalization
of seamen, requires their continued residence
in the United States for five years, as indis
pensable to the attainment of that right. In
case this alternative be adopted, the President
is willing for example, to secure a compliance
with that condition, to make it thedutyjof
each alien, who may be desirous to become a
citizen, to appear in court every year, formic
term of five years, till his right shall be com
pleted. This example is given, not as a limi
tation, but an illustration of your power : for
the exclusion of British seamen from our ser
vice, no repugnance is felt. To such exclu
sion the amicable adjustment of this contro
versy with Great Britain affords a strong mo
tive, but not the only one. It is a
sentiment in the United States that they qugh
to depend on their own population, for the supt t
ply of their ships of war and merchant s e r-V
vice; experience has sllewn that it is au atom- >
dam resource. In expressing this sentirom/?,
you will do it in a manner to inspire mire
fully a confidence, that the arrangement
which you may enter into, will be carried
faithfully into effect, without derogating,
however, from the conciliatory spirit 0 f the
accomodation.
A strong desire has heretofore been expres
sed by the British government to objain of t ie
United States an arrangement to prevent the
desertion of British seamen, when j n our ports
and it cannot be doubted, that a stipulation ki
that effect would be highly sa|j s f ß ctury, ts
well as useful to Britain.# it li fairlj
to be presumed that it, alone, would afford td
the British government a strejng inducement
to enter into a satisfactory arrangement of the
difference relating to imp/ e . <ment. The
claim is not inadmissible, especially U the
United States have* a reciprocal interest in
the restoration of deserters . from American
Vessels in Bmish parts. may tfc?refore
agree to an article : such as path beenfhereto
fore authorised by the United States 1 wtAh
shall make it the duty of ea ch party to delWer
them up.
Os the right of the United States to
exempted from the degrading practice of ift.
pressment, so much has b,een already said,
and with such ability, that i,t wquldbe useless,
especially to you, who are Otherwise so well
acquainted with it, to dilatejon its merits. I
must observe, however, til ft the practice is
utterly repugnant to the hAt of nations ; that
it is supported by no treaty with any nation;
that it was never in by any; and
that a submission to it by the United States,
would be the abandonment, in favor of Great
Britain, of all claim to neutral rights, and of
all other rights on the j
This practice is not founded on any belliger
ent right. The greatest extent to which the
belligerent claim has beeu carried, over the
vessels of neutral nations, is, to board, and
take from them, persons in the land or sea
service of an enemy contraband of war, and en
emy s property ’All nations agree respecting
v the two first articles, but there has been and
still exists a diversity of opinion as to the last.
On that and other questions of considerable
importance, disputes have a risen which are yet
unsettled. The Empress C.tharine of Rus
sia, a distinguished advocate, of just principles
placed herself in 178 Q at th.-e head of neutral
nations, in favor of a liberal construction of
their rights, and her have general
ly followed her example . i n a H the discus
9i« ns on these topics, w e find nothing of the
British claim to impr^ ssment; no acknowl
edgement of it in any greaty, or proof of sub
mission to it by any po. ! Wer> If instances have
occurred in which Brit.j 9 j 1 cruisers have taken
British seamen from vessels of other na
tions, they were,,as it is presumed, in cases ei
t ter not acquisced ife > * o f an extraordinary
nature only, > countenance to their
p-acuce and ’p .yJ iL*!, jelalion to the Uni
ted Stavr^p_lri| ng; i nd) if such there
th’ ' ’ * claim in
SlF'' war •' Jpuimpressment, or
/ claim A(|-a* powers. This
'.he UnitedStatts
on "htcfiimitce thereof been
it w *.
the e d to another
it«f' subjects
W b ; v vir ; ue
, uc W s A i has been dts-
W nation by the
Prince Regent. Knowing the nature of the
claim, we know also the extent of the right
and obligations incident to it. Allegiance is
a political relation between a Sovereign and
his people. It is the obligation which binds
the latter in return for the protection which
they receive. These reciprocal duties have
the same limit. They afe confintd to the
dominions of the Sovereign beyond which he
has no rights, can of course claim no allegi
ancc. A citizm or subject of one power, en
tering the dominions of another, owes allegi
ance to the latter, in return for the protection
he receives. Whether a sovereign has a
right to claim the se. vice of such of his sub
jects ashavo left his own dominions is a ques
tion, respecting which also a difference of
opinion may exist. It is certain that no sove
reign has a right to pursue his subjects into
the territories of another, be the motive for it
what it may. Such an entry, w ithout the con
sent of the other power, would be a violation
of its territory, and an act of hostility. Of
fenders even conspirators, cannot be pursued
by one power into the territory of another, nor
are they delivered up by the latter, except in
compliance with treaties, or by favor. That
the vessels of a nation are considered a part of
its territory, with the exception of the belli
gerent right only, is a principle too well estab
lished to be brought into disscussion Each
state has exclusive jurisdiction over its own
vessels. Its taws govern in them, 8c offenders
against those laws are punishable by its ttibu
nals only. The flag of a nation protects every
thing sailing under it, in time of peace and
in time of war likewise, with the exception of
the belligerent rights growing out of the war.
An entry on board the vessels of one pow
er by the cruisers of another, in any other
case, and the exercise of any other authority
over them, is a violation, ®f right, and an act of
hostility.
The British government, aware of the truth
of this doctrine, has endeavored to avoid its
consequences in the late declaration of the
Prince Regent. It has not contended that
British cruisers have a right to pursue and
search our vessels for British seamen. It as
serts only that they have a right to search
them for other objects, and being on board for
a lawful cause, and finding British seamen
there, that they have a right to impress and
bring them away, under the claim of allegi
ance. When we aee a systematic pursuit of
our vessels by British cruisers, and the im
pressment of seamen from them not at ports
of the enemy, where a regular blockade had
been instituted, and by the blockading squad
ron, but in every part of the ocean, on our
coast, and even in our harbors, it is difficult to
believe that impressment is not the real mo
tive, and the other the pretext for it. But to
place U»is argument of the British govern
ment ,wn the strongest ground, let it be ad
mitted that the entry was. lawful, is it to to
cbmmit an act not warranted by the purpose
for which the ontry was made ! There is a
levity in this argument, which neither suits
the parties nor the subject. The British gov
ernment founds its rights of impressment
from our ships on-that of allegiance, which is
a permanent right’, equally applicable to pease
and war. The Tight of impressment there
fore, from the vessels of other powers must
likewise be permanent, and equally applicable
to peace and war. It would not, however,
take this broad ground, lest the injustice and
extravagance of the pretension might ekeite
the astonishment and indigation of other pow
ers, to whom it would be equally applicable.
To claim it as a belligerent right would have
been equally unjust and absurd, as no trape of
it could be fountain the Belligerent Cbde.
The British Government was, therefore redu
ced to a very embarrassing di’.mma. To
acknowledge that it could not support the
claim, on either principle, would be to relin
quish it, and yet it could rely on neither. It
endeavored to draw some aid from both. A
State of War exists which brings the parties
together, Great Britain, as a belligerent, and
the United States as a Neutral Poweh—■
British officers have now a right to boardxnd
search American vessels, but lor what ? Per
sons in the service of an enemy, contraband of
war, or'Enemy’* property ? This would not
accomplish the end. It is however, the ut
most limit of the belligerent right. Allegiance
which as an attribute of sovereignty, comes
to her aid and communicates ail the necessa
ry power.—-The National Character of the
neutral vessels cedses. The complete right
of sovereignty and jurisdiction over it is trans
ferred to Great Britain. It is on this founda
tion that the British Government has raised
this monstrous superstructure. It is with this
kind of argument that it attempts to justify
its practice of Impressment from our vessels.
The remark contained in the declaration of
the Prince Regent, that in impressing Brit
ish seamen from vessels, Great
Britain exercised no right which she wss not
willing to acknowledge as appertaining equally
to the Government of the United States, With
respect to American seamen in British merch
ant ships, proves only, the British gorpn
ment is cons ious of the injustice of the
claim, and desirous of giving to it such aid
as may be derived from a plausible argument.
The semblance of equality, however, in this
proposition, which strikes at first view, disap
pears on i fair examination. It is unfair, firs;
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1814.
because it is impossible for the United States
to take advantage of it. impressment is not
an American practice, but utterly repugnant
to our Constitution and laws. In offering to
reciprocate it, nothing was offered, as the Biit
ish Government well knew. It is unfair, se
condly, because if Impressment was allowable
a reciprocation of the practice would be no
equivalent to the United States.— l*he exer
cise of a right in common, at sea by two Na*
tions, each over the vessels of the other, the
one powerful and the other comparitively
weak, would be, to put the latter completely
at the mercy of the former. Great Britain,
with her vast Navy, would soon be the only
party which made impressmenr. The United
States would be compelled to abstain from it,
and either to submit to the British rule, with
all abuses incident to power, or to resist it.
But, should the United States be permitted to
make impressment from British vessels, the
effect would be unequal. Great Britain has,
perhaps, thirty ships of war at sea, to one of
the United States, and would profit of the ar
rangement in that proportion. Besides, im
pressment is a practice incident to war, in
which view, likewise, the inequality is not
less glaring, she being at least 30 years at
war, to one cf the United States. Other con
iterations prove that the British Govern
ment made this acknowledgement merely as a
pretext to justify its practice of impressment,
without intending that the right or practice
should ever be reciprocated. What would be
the effect of its adoption by American ships
of war, with British merchant vessels. An
American officer boards a British merchant
vessel and claims, as American citizen, whom
he pleases. How many British seamen
would disclaim a title which would take them
to the United States and secure them there
all the advantages of citizenship ? The rules
of evidence, as the ground of impressments
in every instance, must likewise be reciproca
ted between the two governments. The ac
knowledgement of the men would surely be
a better proof of iheir national character titan
the decision of a British officer who boarded
an American vessel, however impartial he
might be, and strong his power of discrimin
ation, when opposed by the voluntary and sol
emn declaration of the party. In this way we
might draw from the Btilish service the
greater part, if not all their seamen. I might
further ask, why was this acknowledgement
made at this late period, for the first time only,
after the declaration of war, and whempn that
account it could produce no effect i liUp e va
rious discussions of this subject, in i ,any of
which it has been demanded whether ttyyt Brit
ish government would tolerate such a prac
tice from American skips of war, no such in
timation was ever given.
If Great Britain had found the employ
ment of her seamen in our service injurious
to her, and been disposed to respect our rights,
the regular course of proceeding would have
been for her government to have complained
to the government oi the United States of the
injury, and to have proposed a remedy. Had
this been done, and n*o reasonable remedy
been adopted, sound in principle and recipro
cal in its operation, the British government
might have had some cause of complaint, and
some plea for taking the remedy into its own
hands. Such a procedure would, at least,
have given to its claim of impressment the
greatest plausibility. We know that such
complaint was never made, except in defence
of the practice of impressment, and that in
the mean time the practice has gone on, and
grown into an usage, which, with all it abuses
had resistance been longer delayed, might
have become a law. The origin and progress
of this usurpation afford strong illustrations of
the British policy. The practice* and the
claim began together, soon after the close of
our revolutionary war, and were applicable
to deserters only. They extended next to
all British seamen then to all British sub
jects, including as in the case of emigrants
from Ireland, persons who would not have
been subject to impressment in British ports,
not being seafaring men—and, finally, to
Swedes, Danes jmd others, known to be Brit
ish subjects, and by their protections appear
ing to be naturalized citizens of the United
States.
Othe'r views may be taken of the subject,
to shew the unlawfulness and absurdity of
the British claim. If British cruisers have
a right to take British seamen from our ves
sels, without regarding the abuses insepara
ble from the practice, they may take from
them, on the same principle, and with much
greater, reason, every species of property to
which the British government has any kind
of claim. Allegiance cannot give to a sove
reign a better right to take his subjects than
ownership to take his property. There
would be no limit to this pre’ension or its
consequences. All property forfeited by ex
poration, contrary to the laws of Great Bri
tain, every article to which her sovereignty,
jurisdiction or ownership would extend, in
British vessels, would be liable to seizure in
those of the United States. The laws of En
gland would be executory in them. Instead
of being a part of the American, they would
become a part of the British territory.
. It might naturally be expected that Great
j Britain would have given, by her conduct,
' awne support to her preotemuyn, that 41 alts
[Whole No. 800.
had not disclaimed altogether the principle
! of naturalization, she would at least have
excluded from her service foreign seamen.
Hpr conduct however has been altogether at
variance with her precepts. She has given
great facility to naturalization in all instan
ces where it could advance her interest and,
peculiar encouragement to that of foieign
seamen She naturalizes by special act of
Parliament. She naturalizes all persons who
reside a certain term of years in lirilish col
lonies, all those who are born of British sub
jects, in foreign dominions, and all seamen
who have served a certain short term in the
British service, and would doubtless protect
all such as British subjects, if by
them so to do. Her Governors of
ing Provinces are at this time compelling
emigrants thither from the United States, to
bear arms against the United States.
The mediation offered by Russia presents
to Great Britain, as well as to the United
States \ fair opportunity of accomodating
this controversy with honor. Th# inter
position of so distinguished a power, friendly
to both parties, could not be declined by
either, on just ground, especially by Great
Britain, between whom and Russia there
exists at this lime a very interesting relation.
When the British Ministers >are made ac
quainted at St. Petersburg with the coii 'ithm*
on which you are authorised to adjust this
difference, it seems as if it would be impossi
ble for Great Btitain to docline them. Should
site do it, still a.ihering to her former preten
sions, her motive could not be misunderstood.
The cause of the United Stales would thence
forward become the common cause oi nations.
A concession by them would operate to the
disadvantage of every other power. They
Would all find in the conduct of Great Bri
tain ah unequivocal determination to destroy
the rights of other flags, and to usurp the
absolute dominion of the ocean. It is to bo
presumed that the British government will
find it neither for the honor or interest of
Great Britain, to push things to that extremi
ty, but will have accepted this mediation!
and have sent a minister or ministers to St.
Petersburg with full powers to aojust tho
controversy on fair aud just conditions.
Should improper impressions have been
taken of the probable consequences of the
war, you wjll have ample means to remove
them, it is certain that from its prosccutiun
Great Britain can promise to herself no
advantage, while she exposes herself to g*eat
expenses, and to the danger of still greater
losses. The people of the United States, ac
customed to the indulgence of a long peace,
roused by the causes and progress of the w .r,
are rapidly acquiring military habits ami be
coming a military people. Our knowledge
in naval tactics has increased, as has our
maritime strength. The gallantry and suc
cess of navy have formed an epoch
in naval lijatory. The laurels which these
brave men have ga'ned, not for themselves,
alone, but for their country, from an tnemy
pre-eminent in »»val exploits, for ages past,
are among ifie proudest boasts of their grateful
and affectionate fellow-citizens. Our manu
facturers have taken an astonishing growtii.
In short, iqvpvery circumstance, in which the
war is felt, its presure tends evidently to unite
our people, to draw out our resources, to invig
orate our means, and to make us more truly
an independent nation, and, as far as may
be necessary, a great maritime power.
If the British government accepts the me
diation of Russia, with a sincere dsire to re
store a good understanding, between the two
countries, it may be presumed that a fair op
portunity will be afforded for the arrangement
of many other important interests, with advan
tage to both parlies. The adjustment of the
controvt sy relating to impressment only,
though very important, would leave much un
finished. Almost every neutral right has
been violated, and its violation persisted in to
the moment that war was declared. The*
President sincerely desires, and it is doubt-'
less for the interest of Great Britain, to pre-,
vent the like in future. The interposition of m
the Emperor.of Russia to promote an accom- ¥
modation of those differences is deemed par- I
ticularly auspicious. >,<r
A strong hope is, therefore, entertained, 0£
that full powers will be given to the British
commissioners, to arrahge all these
of controversy in a satisfactory manner. In*’ 1
entering on this interesting part of your duty. H,r
the first object which will claim your aiten- *
tion is, that of blockade. The violation of
our neutral rights by illegal blockades, carri
ed to an enormous extent by oiders in Coun
cil, was a principal cause of the war.—>Theso
orders, however, and with them the blockada
of May ! 806, and, as is understood, all other
illegal blockades, have been repealed, so that
that cause of war has been removed, All that
is now expected is, that the British govern
ment will unite in a more precise definition of
blockade, and in this no difficulty is anticipa
ted ; for having declared that no blockade
would be legal, which was not supported by
an adequate force, and that the blockade*
which it might institute should be supported
by an adtquate force, there appears to be,
according to the just interposition of these
terms, no difference of opinion on the subject.
The British government has recently, ia
two formal acts, §ivs« definition* of blockade*