The Jeffersonian. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1907-1917, December 12, 1907, Image 1
THE JEFFERSONIAN
Vol. IL No. 46.
The Money Clouds Habe Vanished.
New York, December 8. —The events
of the past week in the financial
world have been such as usually
mark the gradual return of confidence
and the restoration of normal con
ditions in the banks. The decision
-of the secretary of the treasury to
issue only about $40,000,000 of the
$150,000,000 in new securities, which
he expressed a willingness to issue
if conditions required, the disclosure
of unusually strong reserves by
country banks reporting to the
comptroller of the currency, the de
cline in the currency premium, and
the improvement in the New York
bank statement, have been important
events of the week which have tended
towards stability and reassurance.
Plethora of Money in the Spring.
The action of the secretary of the
treasury, in limiting the issues of se
curities, was a part of the original
plan recommended to him to meet the
situation by a resolute and adequate
measure, but to carry the execution
of the measure no farther than cir
cumstances required. The result of
limiting the issue of the Panama 2
per cent bonds to $25,000,000, and
the one year treasury certificates to
about $15,000,000, will be to con
siderably simplify the problem of
treasury management and money mar
ket conditions during the spring. It
is anticipated by far-sighted bankers
here that there will be a plethora of
money soon instead of a dearth, and
it will be necessary to reduce in some
way the large volume of currency
which has been brought into use
during the crisis.
Increase of Money in Circulation.
.The increase in money in circula
tion outside the treasury, as shown
by the monthly statement of the
treasury department for November,
was $131,872,887. Os this amount
the increase in gold in the country is
computed at about $72,000,000, in
cluding domestic production as well
as importation from abroad The
other principal form of increase is
in bank emulation, in which an in
crease of $7,533,521 was obtained by
the disbursement of bank notes held
in the treasury cash, and $46,237,730
was obtained by actual increase in
the notes issued by the comptroller
and outstanding.
There have been fears in some quar
ters that if anything approximating
$100,000,000 in new bank notes were
issued upon the security of the new
one-year certificates the resulting
inflation would expel gold in large
amounts after the credits established
by the crop movement were exhausted.
This danger will be reduced to a
minimum by the relatively small
issues made by the treasury, and if
small amounts in gold should be
exported, it is felt that they could be
spared, in view of the large gold re
sources in the country, to which
President Roosevelt called attention
in announcing the new loans. The
A Weekly Paper Edited by THOS. E. WATSON and J. D. WATSON.
total gold in the country reported by
the last treasury statement is $1,561,-
714,719, which is equal to more than
50 per cent of the total fftfney in
circulation.
Further Increase in Bank Notes.®
Some further increase. in bank
circulation is expected here upon the
Panama bonds and the treasury
certificates, but it is believed that the
bonds will be deposited’ in many
cases as security for the public money
w which has been left with the banks,
and will not be employed as a basis
for circulation until the one-year
certificates are canceled in the spring,
when money withdrawn from banks
by the treasury for the redemption
of the certificates will release the
bonds and the latter can then be
for the certificates as
security for circulation. If this
proves to be the case, the increase in
bank circulation will not be very
great during the next few months,
and may even turn downward as
soon as it becomes apparent that the
banks have a large accumulation of
cash for which there is little demand.
The reports of the condition of the
national banks on December 3, which
are being published i n various
’ x-alities and are gradually;, reaching
the comptroller of the currency, are
verifying the anticipations of leading
bankers that large reserves would be
disclosed in the interior banks, that
the disclosures would tend to restore
confidence, and that the banks would
be willing to release such excess re
serves after making their statements.
A rough calculation of the reports
of the Chicago banks, including some
state banks, indicates reserves of
nearly 35 per cent. About the same
proportion is reported from New
Orleans, and still higher reserves at
smaller places, where the law only
requires 15 per cent, including de
posits in reserve cities. The fact
that two failures of national banks
of a certain degree of importance
have occurred during the week with
out apparently causing any shock
to confidence, even in their own
localities, and still less in the financial
centers, is regarded here as another
favorable indication of the state of
the financial markets.
The New York Situation.
The increase of $4,671,000 in actual
cash in New York clearing house
banks is regarded here as one of tljp
symptoms that the currency crisis, as
such, is practically over. The re
duction of loans by about $11,600,000
is also considered a favorable in
dication of diminished pressure. The
increase in the required reserve of
$6,779,000 reduces the deficit in New
York reserves to $46,210,000, and
part of this will be covered by gold
yet to arrive.
Not much is expected among New
York bankers in the way of currency
legislation by congress at the present
Atlanta, Ga., Thursday, December 12, 1907.
session. The fact that the presiden
tial ,elevon is approaching and that
therk ie diversity of view as to
the \ of new legislation,
leads \ that the subject
will be iered, without final
action, du\ ’ esen t session.
The necessity important
measure of reK o .fyiito generally
recognized, but \ kth of senti
ment for a strong central bank is
checking in some degree the move
ment for giving wide powers of note
issue to the existing national banks.
—Atlanta Constitution.
HARD TIMES AND CLEARING
HOUSE CERTIFICATES.
Political economists, when political
economy was just beginning to be
recognized as a science, decried the
idea that panics and hard times may
be caused by a mistaken policy of
government. Even Herbert Spencer
vehemently declared that acts of
pariliament could neither cause nor
cure the evils of business depression.
Since that time history has testified
to the fact that panics may be
brought about by errors of legislation
in times when crops are .good and
when there has been no over-pro
duction vs ’’ .’imodities.
While it is generally conceded that
manipulation of the stock market by
certain Wall street interests was the
direct cause of the present panic, it
must not be forgotten that behind
the manipulator is legislation that
makes possible. The
primary fault lies in the laws govern
ing the national banks and the trust
companies. The secondary fault lies
iii laws created by the influence of
the special interests.
The fundamental principle of the
present banking system, briefly
stated, is this theorem: No great
number of depositors will withdraw
their funds simultaneously.
is true during times of confidence and
prosperity. But at the least alarm
depositors begin to withdraw their
money, and the banks are crippled, if
not actually ruined. And under our
present business system the failure
of the banks means the collapse of
the entire business structure. The
theory that will not work under all
conditions is wrong.
This country has recently witness
ed the singular spectacle of univer
sal law-breaking in times of peace,
for which action public sentiment and
public policy demanded there be no
punishment. The banks absolutly
refused to pay depositors funds which
were legally due them; locked great
amounts of money in their vaults;
paralyzed the circulation of the busi
ness life-blood; depreciated the earn
ing capacity of the laborer and caused
widespread misery and suffering. To
remedy this condition the banks
issued certificates guaranteed by the
Clearing House Associations. These
Price five Cents.
certificates, so the banks maintained,
were of greater stability than the
national bank sote, as instead of the
credit of one bank behind them, with
its deposit of United States Bonds,
they were backed by .the credit of all
the associated banks. It can be easi
ly'shown that this is a fallacious ar
gument. In the first place, the panic
was the result of, loss of confidence
in the banks and the issuing of clear
ing house certificates by the banks in
lieu of currency was an admission of
the weakness of the banking system.
If the depositors lacked confidence
in the individual banks their confi
dence could not be strengthened by
any association of banks. In the
second place, clearing house certifi
cates are not legal tender and in
reality have no more value than an
individual check given by one person
to another. These certificates are
somewhat similar to the currency
isued by the Confederate Government
when there was no confidence in the
stability of the government. It
makes no difference how solvent a
bank may claim to be, it becomes in
solvent when confidence is destroyed
and depositors withdraw their mon
ey.
The banks were in a bad predica
ment and the country was in a bad
predicament. Doubtless the action
of the bunks was the best way they
saw to escape a difficult situation. The
deplorable fact is that errors in legis
lation are responsible for this state
of affairs. The recent panic brought
into the spot light these costly errors.
The people now wonder why the
laws regulating trust companies allow
them to lend 80 per cent on stocks
and bonds as collateral. The stock
gambler deposits 10 per cent, his
broker puts up 10 per cent more, and
the trust companies lend the balance
on stocks and bonds as collateral. Os
course, when the corne r in copper
collapsed and the value of certain
stocks dropped below 50, the lending
trust companies were hard hit and
some of them were forced to the wall.
The whole intimately connected
banking system received a shock from
which it has not yet recovered.
Several plans have been suggested
for guaranteeing bank deposits and
for establishing a national bank of
issue as obtains in Germany and
France. This should be done by all
means. But there is,another thing
of more fundamental importance.
The time is coming when
economists will realize that gold and
silver have no intrinsic value. Gold,
except the small amount used in the
arts, has no commercial value. Nei
ther has silver. The stamp of the
government on gold and silver gives
it its value as money. The stamp of
the government on any metal or on
paper would have the same effect
When it is internationally recognized
that the fiat of the government gives
the real value to money as a unit or
medium of exchange, men will no
longer toil in mines for useless met-
(Continued on Page Five.)