The Columbus times. (Columbus, Ga.) 1841-185?, September 30, 1841, Image 1

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I'UBLISiIED EVERY THURSDAY MORNING, BY JAMES VAN NESS, in the “ Granite Building,” on the corner of Oglethorpe and Randolph Streets. TERMS: Subscription—three dollars per annum, payable in advance, three dollais and a half at the end of six in >:iihs, or four dollars, (in all cases) where pay ment is not mi le before tne expiration of the year. N > subscription received for less than twelve momlis witho it payment in advance, and no paper discon tinued, except at the option of the Editor, until all arrearages are paid. AoveitTisiMEKTsconspicuoindy inserted at me <!c 1- lar per one hundred words, or less, for the first In sertion and fifty cents for every subsequent contin uance. Those sent without a specification of the nu nW oftnsertiotis. will be published until ordered out and charged accordingly. Yeirlv A OVERT!srMeiTs. —For over 24 and not exceeding 3 lines, fifty dollars per annum ; fo over 12 and n>l exceeding 24 lines, thirty-five dol lars per ann in ; lor less than 12 lines, twenty dol tars per annum. 2. All rule an I figure work double the above prices. Leoxl Advertisements published at the usual rates, and with strict attention to the requisitions ot the law, Ai.l Svi.es regulate 1 by law, must be made before th- court house doo-, between the hours ot 10 in the morning and four in the evening—those of Isnd in tho county where it is situate; those of persona property, where the letters testamentary, of adminl istra'i >u or of > i irdiasstpp were oVained—and are requited to be previously advertised in 3ome public gazette, as follows: Sheriffs’ Sles uu ler regul ir executions for thir ty days ; un ier mortgage ti fas sixty days, before the dav of sale. S v t,Es of lau I an I negroes, by Executors, Adminis trators or Guardians, for sixty days before the day of sale. Sai.es of personal property (except Negroes) forty days. Ct r.v tions bv Clerks of the Courts ol Ordinary, upon annlication for letters of administration, must be pub lished foi thirty days. Ut r vtions upon application fo’ dismission, by Exec u'ors, A Iminiatrators or Guardians, monthly for six in iriths. Orders of Jourts of Ordinary, (accompanied with a copy of the bond or agreement) to make titles to land, must be published three months. Notices bv Executors, Administrators or Guardians, of aopli ra'inn to the Court of Ordinary for leave to sell the land or negroes of an estate, fiiur months. Notices by Executors or Administrators, to the debtors and ere litors of an estate, for six weeks. Sheriffs’, Clerks of Court &c. will be allowed the usual (eduction. ILT Letters on business, must be post paid, to entitle them to attention. BOOTS, SHOES AND BROGANS. A LARGE and well assorted stock of the above named articles can be found at No. 13, Hayn-e street. Charleston. S. C. The subscriber- are pleased to infirm their customers and the country merchants generally, that they have secured ilieir Fall and Winter Goods, anil shall be pleased to serve them personally or by order. They also will say that they have ao unusual laqte assurtment of Negro Brogans, lioili hlaek and ru.ssett, adapted to plantation use. All of which will be sold on reasonable ‘erins. H. STODDARD & WOOD, Formerly H S TODDARD, MILLER & Cos. No. 13, Hayne-st. Charleston, S. C. September 23 3.1 4t ■ W ARE-HOUSE AND COMMISSION BUSINESS. WE have associated under the firm of Yonge & Spencer, for the transaction of the above bu siness, and hope to receive a share of public patronage. We will occupy the old stand known as “ Yonge’s Ware House On Front street, which is now being put in good order, and intend having it enclosed with n substantial brick wall We will attend to the sale of Cotton oi other produce on waggons or in store, at the usual rates. We have a good sup and v of Bagging and Rope, which we will furnish to our customers on accommodating terms. WILLIAM P. YONGE, RICHARD P. SPENCER. Columbus. Sept. 0 31 ts WHISKEY, RUM, GIN, &c. < ALWAYS on hand, and for sale by JOHN U. HOWELL, s Corner of Crawford and Broad-sts. . September 16 32 if , SHOES AND HATS. OF various quality and sizes, for sale by 1 JOHN D. HOWELL, [ Uotnor ot Grawf ini anil Hro*l sis. . Sentember lf> 32 if , _ *i COT I ON AND WOOL CARDS. * 17^ (JR sale by JOHN D. HOWELL, tl Corner of Crawford and Broad sts. ( j September 16 32 if ( Raw hides'wanted. 1 A NY quantity will he nurchased at fair prices, 1 by JOHN D HOWELL, < Corner of Crawford and Broad-st. | Septerffbef 16 32 ts , glass And putty. ] qua isy Window Glass and Putty, for sale < by JOHN D. HOWELL, C Writer of Crawford and Broad sts. i September 16 32 if | SALT) Iron, &I A constant supply of sail and assorted Iron, always on ban I. . JOHN I). HOWM.L, Coriter of Crawford and Broad-sts. September lfl 32 ts CROCKERY. FINE and commou Ware, for sale bv JOHN 1). HOWELL, Cdrrier of Crawford and Broad-sts. September 22 3d ts DRY GGODS. STAPLE and Fancy Dry Goods, of every des cription, suitable for the trade, for sale ilv JOHN D. HOWELL, Corner of Cra vford and Broad-sts. September 23 33 if FINE LIQUORS. WINES, Brandies, and Holland Gift, of superior quality, for sale by JOHN D. HOWELL. Corner of Crawford and Broad-sts. September 23 S3 ts CASTINGS. POTS, Ovens, Spiders Skillets, Fire-Irons, and other articles in this line, for sale by JOHN D. HOWELL, Corner of Broad and Crawford sts. September 16 32 ts WOODEN WARES. A LARGE and well assorted lot of Tubs, Buck a-"* “j„£j d!* Powell, Corner of Broad and Crawfrrd-sts. i September 16 3- *f WHITE LEAL) AND OIL. ENGLISH and American White Lead and Lin seed Oil, for sale by J. D. HOWELL, Coiner of Crawford and Broad-sts. September 23 33 ts BAGGING, ROPE AND TWINE~ A GOOD supply of the above articles for sale on accommoda ing terms, at the Ware House of WM. P. YONGE, August 5 26 ts • Front-street. ’ _ DR. TAYLOR HAS removed his office to Preston’s Row, a few doors East of Preston’s Corner,where he may generally be found, unless when professionally engage Feb. 9. I ‘I JOHN. L. LEWIS, IS mv authorized Agent to transact any busines of mine, during my absence from Columbus. M. A. ROBINSON. June 3 17 ts “notice. JOHN L. LEWIS, Esq. will act as the Agent of the undersigned, during his temporary absence iu Alabama. N. W. COCKE. June 17 >9 2t BROUGHT TO JAIL IN Columbus, Georgia, on the 11th August, a ne gro man who says his name is DICK ; he is rath er of a copper color, s tys he belongs to Madison Hey wood, of Talladega county, Ala. The said negro has been runaway for nearly two years. H- broke jail from me 27th July, 1840. and he then said he be longed to Edward Williams, of Talladega county, and then went by the name of Joe; his age 23 or 24 vea*s; 5 feet. 8 inches high. The owner is requested to come forward, prove property, pay expenses and take him away. W. BROWN, Jailor. September 9 31 ts CAUTION. OST about a month ago, a note supposed to be j P A made payable to Thomas E, Taggart or bearer signed by Hoxev & Mitchell, dated some time in 1837 for sixty-two dollars and some odd cents. 1 forewarn all persons from trading fbr sail) note, as payment on ■aid note has been stopped. 9 MICHAEL McQ.UATD. September 23 33 3: THE COLUMBUS TIMES. VOLUME I.] S P B K C It Os Mr. CalMou.x, of South Carolina, on the Dis tribution Bi l, delivered in the Senate of the United States, August 24, 1841. Mr. Calhoun said If this Dill should become a law, it would make a wider breach hi the constitution, and be followed by changes more disastrous, than anv one measure which has ever yet been adopted, it would, in its violation ot the constitution, go far beyond the general wel fare doctrine of Ibrmer days, which stretched the p over of the Government as lar as it was then supposed was possible by construction, however bold. But as wide as were the lim its which it assigned to the powers of the Go vernment, it admitted bv implication that there were limits, while ibis bill, as I shall show, rests on principles which, if admitted, would supersede all limits. According to the ge ieral welfare doctrine, ! Congress had pi wer to raise money, and ap propriate it to all objects which it might deem calculated to promote the general welfare— that is, the ptosper ty oi the Slate, regarded : in their aggregate character as members of the Union, or, to express it more britfly, and i:i language onr e so common, to national ob- I jtcis; thus excluding, by necessary implica tion, all that were not national, as falling within the spheres of the separate Slates. As wide as are these limits, they are too narrow for this bill. It takes in what is excluded un der the general welfare doctrine, and assumes for Congress the right lo raise money, to give by distribution to the Slates; that is, to be applied by them to those very local Stale ob jects to which that doctrine, by necessary implication, denied that Congress had a right inappropriate money: and thus superseding all the limits of the constitution—as far, at least, as the money power is concerned. The advocates of this extraordinary doctrine have, indeed, attempted to restrict il, in their argu ! menl. to revenue derived from the public lands; but facts speak louder than words To test the sincetity of their argument, amendments alter amendments have been offered to limit lie operation of the bill exc'tisively to the revenue derived from that source, but which as ofieti as offered, have been steadily voted down by their united votes. But I take high er giound. The aid of those test votes, as strong as they are, is not needed to make good the assumption that Congress has the rigid to lay and collect taxes for the separate use of the States. The circumstances under which it is attempted to litrce this bill through, speak of themselves a language too distinct to be misunderstood. The Treasury is exhausted ; the revenues from the public lands cannot be spared ; they are needed lor the pressing and necessary wants of the Government. For every dollar withdrawn from the Treasury, and given to the States, a dollar must be raised from the customs to supply its place; that is admitted. Notv, I put lo the advocates of this bijl—is there, can there be, anv real difference, either in principle or effect, between raising money from customs, to be divided among the States, •md raising the same amount, from them to supply the place of an equal sum withdrawn Iroin the Treasury to he divided among the Slates? If there be a difference, mv faculties are not acute enough to peiceive it; and I would thank anv one who can, to point it out. B it, it tins difficulty could be surmounted, it would avail nothing, unless, another not In terior, can also be got over. The land from which the revenue proposed to be divided, is derived, was purchased (with the exception of the small portion, comparatively, lying be tween the Ohio and Mississippi rivers) out nl the common hinds of the Union, and with money derived, for the most part, from cus toms. Ido not exempt the portion acquired from Georgia, which was purchased at its full value, and cost as much, in proportion, as Florida, purchased from Spain, or Louisiana from France. Il money cannot be raised from customs or other sources lor distribution, I ask, how can money derived front tiie sales ol land pur chased with money raised from the customs or oilier sources, be distributed among the States? If the money could not be distribu ted before it was vested in and, on what prin ciple can it he when it is converted hack again into money by the sales of the land ? It prior to the purchase it was subject, in making ap propriations, to ihe limits prescribed by ihe constitution, how can it, alter having been convened back again into money by the sale of the land, be freed from those limits? By what art, what political alchyrny, could the mere passage of the money through the lands free it from the constitutional shackles lo which it was previously subject ? But if this difficulty also could be surmount ed, there is another, not less formidable and more comprehensive* still to overcome. Il ihe lauds belong to the States at all, they must belong to them in one or two iher m iheir federative character, as members “fa common Union; or in their separate, as distinct and it dependent communities. 1; the lormer, this Government* which was created as a common agent to ca ry into effict the objects for which the Union was formed, holds the lands, as it does all its other delegated powers, as a trustee for the States in ilieir fed eral character, lor the execution of those ob jects, and no other purpose whatever; and can, of coutse, under the grai l of the consti tution “to dispose of the territories or other j properly belonging to the United Elates,” dis pose of the lands only under its trust powers, and in execution of the objects for which they were granted by the coustiiutioni When, then, tne lands or other p.operiy of the United Slates, are disposed ot by sale —that is, con verted into money—tfie trust, with all its lim itations, attaches as Lilly to the money, as it did to the lands or property of which it is the proceeds. Nor would the Government have any more tight to divide the land or the money among the States—that is, to surrender it to them—than it would have to surrender any other of its delegated powers. Il il may surrender either to the States, it may also sur render the power of declaring war, laying du ties, or coining money. They are all delega ted by the same parties, held under the same instrument, and in trust, for the execution of the same objects. The assumption of such a right is neither more nor less than the assump tion of a right paramount to the constitution j tse lf__the right on the part of the Govern ment lo destroy the instrument, and dissolve the Union, from which it derives its existence. To such monstrous results must the principle on which this bill rests lead, on the supposition that the lands (that is, the territories) belong to the United States, as they are expressly declared to do by the constitution. But the difficulty would not be less if they should be considered as belonging to the States, in their individual and separate char acter. So considered, what right can this Government possibly have over them ? It is the age.it, or trustee, for the United States;— the Slates as members of a common L r nion, and not of the States individually, each of which has a seperate Government of its own to represent it in that capacity. For this Go vernment to assume to represent them in both capacities, would be to assume all powers— jto centralize the whole system in itself. But, ! admitting this bold assumption; on what ’ principle of right or justice, if the laDds real v COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, THURSDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 30, 1841. belong to the States—or, which is the same thing, ts the revenue from the lands belong to theqt—can this Government impose the vari ous limitations prescribed in the bill? What right has it, on that supposition, to appropriate funds belonging to the States separately, to ‘the use of the Union in the event of war, or in case the pri, ? of the lands should be in creased above a dollar and a quarter an acre, or any article of the tariff above twenty per centum ad valorem. Such, and so overwhelming, are the consti tutional difficulties which lieset this measure. No one wh i can overcome them--who can bring himself to vote for this bill—need trou ble himself about constitutional scruples here alter. He may swallow without hesitation bank, tariff, and every oilier unconstitutional measure which has ever been adopted or pro posed. Yes; it would be easier to make a plausible argument for the constitutionality of the most monstrous of the measures proposed by ihe abolitionists--for abolition itself—than for this detestable bill: and vet we find Sena tors from slaveholding Scales the very safety of whose consiitnentsdependson a strict con struction of the constitution, recording their names in favor of a measure from which they have nothing to hope, and every tiling to fear. To what is a course so blind to be attributed, bui to that fanaticism of party zeal, openly avowed on this floor, which regards the pre servation of the power of the whig parly, as the paramount consideration ? It tins staked its existence on the passage of this and the other measures for which this extraordinary session was called ; and when it is brought to ilie alternative of their defeat or success, in the anxiety to avoid the one and secure the oilier, constituents, constitution, duty and country,—are all forgotten. A measure which would make so wide and fatal a breach in the constitution, could not but involve in its consequences many and dis astrous changes in our politic.il system, too numerous to be iraced in a speech. It would require a volume to do them justice. As ma ny as may fall wi.hin llie scope of my remarks, I shall touch in their proper place. Suffice it for die presenL to say, that such and so great would they be, as to disturb and conlbund the relations of all the constituent parts of our beautiful but complex system -of that between this and the co-ordinate Governments of the States, and between them and their respective constituency. Let the principle ol’ the distri bution of the revenue on which this bill rests, be established, and it would follow, as certain ly as it is now before us, that this Government and those of the States would be placed in antagonist relations on all subjects except the collection and distribution of revenue; which would end, in converting ibis into a mere ma chine of collection and distribution lor those of the States, to the utter neglect of all the functions for wh ch it was created. Then the proper responsibility of each to their re spective constituency would be destroyed; then would succeed a scene of plunder and corruption without parallel, lobe billowed by dissolution, or an entire change ol’ system. Yes; if any one measure can dissolve 1 his Union, this is that measure. The revenue is the State, said the great British statesman, Burke. With us, to divide the revenue among its members is to divide the Union. This bill proposes to divide that from the lands. Take one step more, to which this will lead if not arrested; divide the revenue from the customs, and wfiat of Union would be ielt ? I touched more fully on this, and olher important points connected with this detestable measure, during the discussions of the last session, and shall not now repeat what I then said. What I now propose is, te trace the change it would make in our financial system, with its -bearings on what ought to he the poboy of the Government. I have selected it, not be cause it is the most important, hut because it is that which has heretolore received the leasi attention. This Government lias heretofore been sup ported almost exclusively from two sources of revenue —the lands and the customs; except ing a period at its commencment, and dutirg the late war, when it drew a great portion of its means from internal taxes. The revenue from lands has been constantly and steadily increasing with the increa e of population, and may, for the next ten years, he safely es timated to yield an annual average income of $5,000,000, if they should lie properly admin istered— a sum equal to more than a fourth of what the entire expenditures of the Govern ment ought to f>e. with due economy, and re stricted to the objects for which it was institu ted. This bill proposes to withdraw this large, permanent, and growing source of revenue, from the Treasury of the Union, and to dis tribute it among Ihe several Elates; and tfie question is,—would it be wise to do so, viewed as a financial measure, in reference m wfiat ought to he the policy ol the Govt ri ment ? which brings up the previous question, wfiat ought that policy to be? In the older of tilings, tfie question of policy preceil*s that of finance. The latter has reference 10, and is dependent on, the former. It must first he determined wfiat ought to be done, b fore it can be ascertained how much revenue will be requued, and on wfiat it is to be raised. To the quesiion. then. What ought to be the policy of the Government ? the shortest and most comprehensive answer which I can give is, that it ought to he the very opp site of that li>r which this extraordinary session was called, and of which this measure forms so prominent a part. The effect of these measures is to divide and distract the country within, and to weaken it Without; the very reverse of the objects for which tfie Govern menl was instituted—which was to give peace, tranquility, and harmony within, and power, security, and respeciability without. We find, accordingly,that without, where strength ivas required, us powers are undivided. In its exte ior relations—abroad, this Govern ment is the sole and exclusive representative of tfie united majesty, sovereignty, and pow er of the states constituting this great and glorious Union. To the rest of the world, we are one. Neither State nor Slate Gov ernment is known beyond our borders. With in, it is different. There we form twenty-six distinct, independent,and sovereigneommuni ties,e ich with its separate Government, whose powers are exclusive within, as that of this Government is without, with the exception of three classes of powers which are delegated to it. The first is, those that were necessary to the discharge of its exterior functions—< U ch as declaring war, raising armies, providing a navy, and raising revenue. The reason for delegating these requires no explanation.— The next class consists < f those powers that were necessary to regulate the exterior or in ternational relations of the States among them selves, considered as distinct communities— powers that could not be exercised by the Sta'tes separately, at.d the regulation of which was necessary to their peace, tranquility, and that free intercourse, social and commercial, which ought to exist between confederated States. Such are those of regulating com merce between the States, coining money, and fixing the value thereoC and the standard of weights and measures. The remaining dass consists of those powers which, though not belonging to the exterior relations of the States, are of such nature that they could not “THE UNION OF THE STATES, AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES.” be exeicised by State*'sejmrateiy, without one injuring the other- -such as imposing du ties on impoits; in exercising ol which, the maritime Elates, having the advantage of good ports, would tax those who would have to draw (heir supply through them. In as serting that, with these exceptions; the powers of the Elates are exclusive within, I speak in general terms. There are, indeed, inkers not reducible to either of these cases; hut they are 100 few and inconsiderable to be regarded as exceptions. On the moderate and prudent exerise of ihese, its interior powers, the success f the Government, and with it our entire pditical system, mamlv depends, If the Government should be restricted in their exerefe to the objects for which they were delegated, petce, baimonv, and tranquility would reign witiin; and the attention of tne Government, umb sorbed by distracting questions within, and its entire resources unwasted by expenditureson objects foreign lo its duties, would he directed with all its energy to guard against danger horn without, to give secuii y to our vast commercial and navigating interest, and lo acquire that weight and respectability for out name in the family of nations which ought to belong lo the freest, most enterprising, and most growing people on the glebe. If thus restricted in the exercise of these, the most delicate of its powers, and in the exercise of which only it can come in conflict with the Governments of the States, or irterfere with their interior policy and interest, this Go vernment, wth our whole poli Lai system, would work like a charm, and become the admiration of the world. The States, left undislurbed wilhin their separatespheres, and each in the full possession of ils resources, would, with that generous rivalry which al ways takes place between clusters of free Slates of the same origin and language, and which gives the greatest possible impulse to improvement, carry excellence in all that is desirable beyohd any former example. But, if instead ol restricting these powers to their proper objects, they should be per verted lo those never intended; if, for exam ple, that of raising revenue should be pervert ed into that of protecting one branch of industry at the expense of others; that of collecting and disbursing the revenue, into that of incorporating a great central bank to he located at some favored point, and placed undei local control; and that of making appro priations for specified objects, into that of expending money oil whatever Congress should think proper;—all this would he re versed. Instead of harmony and tranquility within, there would be discord, distraction, and conflict, followed by the absorption of the attention of the Government, and exhaus tion of its means and eneigy on objects never intended to be placed under its control, to the utter neglect of the duties belonging to the exterior relations of the Government, and which are exclusively confined to its charge. Such has been, and ever must be, the effect of perverting these powers lo objects foreign to the constitution. When thus perverted, i they become unequal in their action, operating j lo ttie benefit of one part or class to the injuty of another part or class—to the benefit ol the manufacturing against the agricultural and commercial portions, or of the non productive agatnl the producing class. Ihe more exten sive the country, the greater would he the inequality and oppression. In ours, stretching ovei iwo thousand square miles, they become intolerable when pushed beyond moderate limits. It is then conflicts take place, from the struggle on the part of those who are be nefitted by (fie operation of an unequal system of legislation to restrain their advantage, and on the part of the oppressed to resist it. - When Hus slate of tilings occur, it is neither more nor less than a stale of hostility between the oppressor and oppressed—war waged not by armies, bui by laws; acts and sections of acts are sent by the slinnger party on a plundering expedition, instead of divisions and brigades, which often return more richly laden with spoils than a plundering expedition after the most successful foray. That such must be the effect of the system of measures now attempted to be forced upon the Government by the perversion of its inte rior powers, I appeal to die voice of experi ence in aid of the dictates of reason. I go back to the beginning of the Government, and ask what at its outset, but this very system of measures, caused the great struggle which continued down to 182*4, when the system reached ils full growth in the tariff of that year? And what, from that period to the termination of the late election which brought the present parly into power, lias disturbed the harmony and tranquility of the country, deranged its currency, interrupted its business, endangered ils liberty and institutions, but a struggle on one side to overthrow, and on the other to uphold the system? In that strug gle it fell prostrate; and what now agitales ihe country —what causes this extraordinary session, wuh all ils excitement, but die strug gle on the part of those in power to restore the system ; to incorporate a bank; to re enact a protective tarifl; to distribute the revenue from the lands; to originate another debt, and renew the system of wasteful expen ditures; and the resistance on the part of the opposition to prevent it ? Gentlemen talk ol settling ihese questions; they deceive them selves. They cry peace! peace! when there is no peace. There never can he peace nnlil they are abandoned, or till our free and popu lar institutions a e succeeded by the calm of despotism; and that not till the spirit of our patriotic and immortal ancestors, who achiev ed our independence and established our glorious political system, shall become exiiuct, and their descendants a ba-e and sordid rab ble. Till then, or till our opponents shall be expelled from power, and th-ir hope of resto ring and maintaining their sysletn of measures is blasted, the struggle will be continued, the f.anquility and harmony of the country he disturbed, and the strength and res urces ot the Government he wasted within, and its duties neglected without. But, of all the measures which constitute this pernicious system, there is not one more subversive of the objects for which the Gov ernment was instituted, —none more destruc tive of harmony within, and security without, than that now under consideration. Ils ri rect tendency is to universal discord and dis traction ; to array the new Slates against :he old, the non-indebted against the indebted ; ihe staple against the manufacturing; ohe class against another ; and, finally, the people against the Government. But I pass these. My object is not to trace political consequen ces, but to discuss the financial bearing of this measure, regarded in reference to what ought to be the policy of the Government; which I trust I have satisfactorily shown onghi to be, to turn its attention, energy, and resources, from within to without, —to its appropriate and exclusive sphere, that of guarding against danger from abroad ; giving free scope and protection to our commerce and navigation, and that elevated standing to the country, to which it is so fairly entitled in the family of nations. It becomes necessary to repeat, preparatory to what I propose, thtt the object of this measure is lo withdraw frte revenue from the public lands from the Treasury of the Union, to be divided among the States ; that the probable annua] amoutr that would be so drawn, would average the next len vears not less than five millions of dollars, and that, to make up the deficit, an equal sum must be laid on Ihe imports. Such is the measure, regarded as one of finance; and the question is, would it be just, wise, expedient, considered in its bearings on wi.at ought to ‘..e the policy of the Government? The measure on ils face is but a surrender of one of the two sources of revenue to the States, to be divided among them in pro-, porti n to the r joint delegation in the two Houses of Congress, and to impose a burden to an equal amount on the imports; that is, on the foreign commerce of she country. In every view I can take, it is preposterous, une qual, and unjust. Regarded in its most fa vorable aspect—that is, on tfie supposition that the people of each State would pay back to the Treasury ol the Un on, through the tax on the imports, in order to make up the defi ci', a sum eqtial to that received by the State as its distributive share; and that each indi vidual w’ould receive of that sum an amount equal in proportion to what he ol tfie taxes; what would that be but the folly of giving with one hand and taking back with the other? It would, in tact, be worse. The expense of giving and taking back must be paid for, which, in this case, would be one not ali tie ex|>ensive and troublesome. The ex pense of collecting the dulies on imports is known to be about len per cent; to which must be added the expense and trouble of distribution, with the loss of the use of the money wtiile ihe process is going on, which may be fairly estimated at two per cent, ad ditional; making, in all, twelve percent, for the cost of the process. It follows that the people of the Stale, in order to return back to the Treasury of the Union an amount equal to tfie sum received by distribution, would have each to pay, bv the supposition, twelve per cent, more of taxes than bis 9hare of the sum distributed. That sum (equal to six hundred thousand dollars on five millions) would go to the collectors of the taxes —the custom house officers—for their share of the public spoils. But it is still worse. It is unequal and un- I just, as well as Iboltsh and absurd. The case supposed would not be the real state of the facts. It would be scarcely possible so to arrange a system of taxes, under which the people of each State would pay back a sum equal to that received; much less that the taxes should fall on each individual in the State in the same proportion that he would receive of the sum distributed to the Stale. But, if this be possible, it is certain that no system of taxes on imports —especially the bill sent from the House—can make such equalization. So far from that, I hazard no thing in asserting that the staple States would pay into the Treasury, under its .operation, three times as much as they would receive on average by the distribution, and some of them far more; while to the manufacturing States, if we are to judge from their zeal in favor of the bill, I* duties il proposes lo impose would be bounties, not taxes. If judged by their acts, both measures, the distribution and the duties—would favor their pockets. They would be gainers, let who may be loser* in this financial game. But be the inequality greater or less than my estimate, what could be mure unjust than to distr bute a common fund in a certain proportion among the Stales, and lo compel Hie people of the States to make up tfie deficit in a different proportion ; so that some shall pay more* and others less, than what they respectively received? What is it hula cun ningly devised scheme to take from one Slate,- and give to another—to replenish the Treasu ry ol some of the States from the pockets of the people of theoihers; in reality, to make them support the Governments and pay Ihe debts of other States, as well as their own ? Such must be the necessary result, as between the States which may pay more than they receive, and those which may receive more than they pay; the injustice and inequality will increase or decrease, just in proportion to the respective excess or deficit between receipts and payments, under this flagitious contrivance for plunder. But I have not yet reached the reality of this profligate and wicked scheme. As une qual and unjust as it would be betwenn State and State, it is still more so regarded in its operation between individuals. Between them its true character arid hideous features fully disclose themselves. The money to be distributed would not go to the people, but to tfie Legislatures of tfie States; while that to be paid in taxes to make up the deficiency, Would be taken from them individually. A smalt portion of that which would go to the Legislatures would ever reaeft the pockets of lire people. It would be under ihe control ami management of the leaders arid their friends and partisans, and that they would profit more by the use and management of an irrespongble fund, taken from nobody knows who, than they would lose as payers of tfie taxes to supply its place, will r.oi be doubted by any one wfio knows bow such things are managed. What would be the result? Tiie whole of Ihe revenue from the immense public domain would, if this wicked measure should become the settled policy, go to the profit and aggrandizement ol ihe lead ers for tfie time of ihe dominant party in the twenty six State Legislatures, and their parti sans and supporters, that is, to the most in fluential, if not the most wealthy clique for the time in the respective States; while the deficiency would be supplied from the pockets of the great mass of tfie community, by taxes on tea, coffee, salt, iron, coarse woollens, and, lor the most part, other necessaries of life. And what is that but taking from the many and giving to the few, —from those who look to their own means and industry for tfie sup >port of themselves and families, and giving to those who look to the Government for sup|>ort, to increase the profit and influence of political managers and their parlizans, and diminish that of the people ? When it is added, that the dominant parly in each State for the tune would have a direct interest in keepingup and enlarging this pernicious fond, and that their combined influence must for the time be irre sistible, it is difficult to see by what means the country can ever extricate itself from this measure, should it be once established, or what limits can be prescribed to ils growth, or the extent of the disasters whioh must follow. It contains the germ of mighty and fearful changes, if it be once permitted to shoot its roots into our political fabrick, unless, indeed, it should be speedily eradicated. In what manner the share that would fall to the States would, in the first instance, be applied, may, for the most pa*-t, be anticipa ted. The indebied States would probably pledge it to the payment of their debts ; the effect of which jvould be, to enhance iheir value in the hands of the holders—tfie Roths childs, the Barings, the Hopes, on the other side the Atlantic, with wealthy brokers and stockjobbers on thi3. Were this done at the expense of the indebted States, none could object. But far different is the case when at the expense of the Union, by the sacrifice of the noble inheritance left by our ancestors, and when the loss of this great and perma nent fund must be supplied from the industry I and property of a large portion of the eommu -1 mtv, who had no agency or responsibility in [NUMBER 34. c nit ranting the debts, or benefit from the ob ject* on which toe funds were expended. On what piinciple of justice, honor or constitution, can this Government interfere, and take It out their pockets to increase the profit of the most wealthy individuals in the Tne portion that might fall to the States not indebted, or those not deeply so, would probably for the most part be pledged as a fund on which to make new loans for new schemes similar id ihuse for which the existing Slate debts were contracted. It may not be applied so at first; hut such would most likely te the application on ttie first swell of the tide of expansion. Supposing one half of the whole sum to be derived from the liwids should be so applied : estimating the income from that source at five millions, the hall would fur nish the basis of anew debt of forty or fitly | millions. Stock to that amount would be created; would find its way to foreign mar kets; and would return, as other stocks ol like kind have, in swelling the tide of imports in the first instance, but in the end by dimin ishing them 10 an amount equal to the inter est on the sum borrowed, and cutting off in the same proportion the permanent revenue from die customs; —and this, when the whole support of the Government is about to be thrown exclusively on the foreign commerce of the country. So much for the permanent effects, in a financial view, of this measure. The swelling of the tide of imports, in the first instance, from the loans, would lead to a corresponding flush of revenue, and that to extiavaganl expenditures to he followed by embarrassment of the Treasury, and a glut of goods, which would bring on a correspond ing pressure on the manufacturers; when my friend front Massachusetts, (Mr. Bates,) and other Senators from that quarter, would cry out for additional protection, to guard against the necessary consequences of the very meas ures they are now so urgently pressing through the Senate. Such would be the consequences of this measure, regarded as ore of finance, and in reference to its internal operation. It is not possible but that such a measure,’ so unequal and unjust between Slate and State, section and section —between those who live by their own means and industry, and those who live or expect to live on the public Crib —would add greatly to that discord and strife within, and weakness without, which is ne cessarily consequent on the entire system of measures of which it forms a part. But its mischievous effects on the exterior relations of the country would not be limited to its indirect consequences. There it would strike a direct and deadly blow, by withdraw ing entirely from the defences of the country one of the only two sources of our revenue, and that much the most permanent and grow ing. Ii is now in the power of Congress to pledge permanently this great and increasing fund to that important object—to completing the system of fortifications,and building, equip ping, and maintaining a gallant navy. It was proposed to strike out the whole bill, to expunge the detestable project of distribution; and to substitute in its place the revenue from the public lands, as a permanent fundi sacred to ttie defence of the country< And from what quarter did this patriotic and truly statesmanlike proposition come? From the far and gallant West; from a Senator (Mr. Linn) of a State the most rewrote front (lie ocean, and secure from danger. And by whom was it voted down? Strange to tell, by Senators from maritime States —States most exposed, and having deepest interest in a measure defeated by their representatives on this floor. Wonderful as it may seem, Lou isiana, Mississippi, Georgia and South Caro lina,- each gave a vote against it. North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey, gave each two votes against it. New Yo-k gave one; and every vole from New England, but two from New Hamp shire and one from Maine, was cast against it. Beit remembered in all after times, that these votes from States so exposed, and hav ing so deep a stake in the defence of the coun try, were cast in favor of distribution—of giving gratuitiously a large portion of the fund from the public domain to wealthy Brit ish capitalists! and against the proposition tor applying it permanently to the sacred purpo ses of defending their own shores from insult and How a range that New York and New England, with their hundred mil lions of property# and so many thousand hard and enterprising sailors annually afloat, should give so large a vote for a measure above all others best calculated to withdraw protection from both, and so snrfall a Vote for one best calculated to afford them protection! Bui strange as that may be, it is still more strange that the staple States,—the Slates ihat will receive so little from distribution, and which must pay so much to make up the deficiency it will cause—States so defenceless on their maritime frontier—should cast so large a vole for their own oppression, and against their own defence! Can lolly, can party infatua tion he the cause one or both, go further. Let me say to the Senators from the com mercial and navigating States,- in all sober ness* that there is now a warm and generous feeling diffused throughout the entire Union in favor of the arm of defence with which vour interest and glory are so closely identified. Is it wise, by any act of yours, to weaken or alienate such feelings 1 And could you do an act more directly calculated to do so Re member, it is a deep principle of our nature not to regard the safety of those who do not regard their own. If you are indifferent to your own safety, you must not be surprised if those less interested should become so. But as much as the defences of the country would be weakened directly by the withdraw al of so large a fund, the blow would be by no means so heavy as that which, in its con sequences, would fall on them. ‘That would paralyse the right arm of our power. To understand fully how it would have that effect, we must look not only to the amount of the sum to be withdrawn, but also on what the burden would fall to make up the deficiency. It would fall on the commerce of the country, exactly where it would do most to cripple the means of defence. To illustrate the truth of what I state, it will be necessary to inquire what would be our best system of defence And that would involve the prior question.- from what quarter sre we most exposed to danger? With that I shall accordingly begin. There is but one nation on the globe from which we have any thing serious to appre hend ; but that is the most powerful that now exists, or ever did exist. I refer to Great Britain. She is in effect our near neighbor, though the Atlantic divides us. Her colonial possessions stretch along the whole extent of our eastern and northern borders, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Her power and influence extend over the numerous In dian tribes scattered along our western border, from our northern boundary to the infant republic of Texas. But it is on our maritime frontier, extending from the mouth of the Sa bine to that of St. Cfoix—a distance, with the undulations of the coast, of thousands of miles, deeply indented with bays and navigable riv ers, and studded with our great commercial emporiums ; it is there, on that long line of frontier, that she is the most powerful, and we the weakest and most vulnerable. It is there sbe stands ready, with her powerful navy, sheltered in the commanding positions of Hali fax; Bermuda, and the Bahamas, to strike a blow at any point she may select on this long line of coast. She is the quarter from which only we have danger to apprehend, and the important inquiry which next presents itself is. how can we best defend ourselves against a power so formidable, tluis touching us on all points, excepting portion of our boundary along which Texas joins us. Eve y portion of our extended frontier de mands attention, inlands as well as maritime ; but With this striking difference:—theton the former, our power is as much greater than hers, as hers than ours on the mari time. Therfe wg would be the assailant; and whatever works may be erected there ought to have reference to that fact, and look mainly to protecting important points from sudden seizure and devastation, rather than to guard against any permanent lodgment of a force within our borders. The difficult problem is the defence of our maritime frontier. That; of course, must con sist of fortifications and a navy; but the ques tion is, which ought to be mainly relied on, and to what extent tne fine triay be considered as superseding the other. On both points 1 pro pose to make a few remarks. Fortifications, as the n earis of defence, are liable to two formidable objections; either cf which is decisive against thfem as an exclusive system of defence. The first is, that they are purely defensive Let the system be ever so perfect, the works located to the greatest advantage, and planned and constructed in the best manner, and all they can do is to repel attack. They cannot assail. They are like a shield without a sword. If they should be regarded as sufficient to defend our maritime cities, still they cannot command respect, or give security to our widely spread and impor tant commarcial and navigating interests. But regarded simply as the means of defence they are defective. Fortififcatibns are nothing without men to garrison them; and if Wu should have no other means of defence, Great Britain could compel us, with a moderate fleet stationed at. the points abo\e mentioned, and with but a small portion of her large military establishment, to keep upon our part, to gu.u. our coast, ten times the lofce, at many tine's the cost, to garrison our numerous forts. Aid ed by the swiftness of steam, she could men ace at the same time every point of our coast, while we# ignorant of the time or point where the blow might fall, would have to stand pre pared, at every moment and at every point, to repel her attack. A hundred thousand men constantly under arms would he insufficient fofthe purpose; and we would be compelled to yield, in the end, ingloriously, without stri king a blow r , simply from the exhaustion of our means. Some other hiode 6f defence; then; must be sought. There is none other but a navy. I; of course; include steam as well as sails. If we want to defend our coast and protect our rights abroad, it is absolutely necessary. Thai only questions are; how lar our naval force ought to be carried; and to what extent it would supersede the system of fortification ? Before I enter on the consideration of this important point, I owe it to myself and the sub ject to premise, that my policy is peace, and that I look to the navy but as the right aim of defence—not as an instrument of conquest or aggrandisement. Our road to greatness, as I said on a late occasion, lies not over the ru ins of others. Providence lias bestowed on us anew and vast region, abounding in re sources beyond any couutryof the saute ex tent on the globe. Ours is a peaceful task— to improve this rifch inheritance ; to level itef forests; cultivate its fertile soil; develope its vast mineral resources; give the greatest ra pidity and facility of intercourse between its widely extended parts; stud its wide surface with flourishing cities; towns, and villages: and spread over it richly cultivated fields. So vast is our country, that generations after gen erations may pass a way in executing this xask during the whole of which time we ttould b£ rising more surely and rapidly in numbers; wealth, greatness, and influence, than any other people have ever done by arms. But; to carry out successfully this our true plan of acquiring greatness and happiness, ft is hot of itself sufficient to have peace and frhhfjuil .ty Within. These are indeed necessary, iff order to leave the Slates and their citizens in the full and undisturbed possession of their resources and energy, by which to woik out; in generous rivalry, the high destiny which certainly awaits our country if we should be but true to ourselves. But as important as they may be, it is not much less so as to have safety against external danger, and the influ ence and respectability abroad necessary tot secure our exterior interests and rights (so important to our prosperity) against aggres sion. I look to a navy for these objects; and it is within the limits they assign 1 would con fine its growth. To what extent, then; with these views, ought our navy to be Carried?— In my opinion, any navy kssthan that which would give us the # habitual command of our own c_a>l and seas, would belittle short of useless. One that could be driven frofn sea and kept in harbor by the foice which Great Britain could safely and Constantly allot to our coast, wo Old be of little more service than at*auxiliary aid to nor fortifications tii defending our habors and maritime cities.— It would lie almost as passive as they are, and would do nothing to diminish the expense, which I have shown would be so exhausting, to defend the coast exclusively by fortifica tions. But the difficult question 1 still remains so he solved—What naval force would be suffi cient tor that purpose? It will not be expec ted that I should g.ve more than a conjecetu ral answer to such a question, I have neither the data nor the knowledge of naval war fare to speak with any thing like precision} but 1 feel assured that the force required would be far less than what would be thought when the question is first propounded, The very idea of delending ourseives on the ocean against immense power of Great Britain on that element, lias something startling at the first blush* But, as greatly as sbe outnum bers us in ships and naval resources, we have advantages that contervail ilial, in reference to the subject in hand. If she has many ships, she has also many points to guard, and these as widely separated as are the parts of her Widely extended empire. She is forced t.> keep a home fleet in the channel, —another in the Baltic, —another in ihe Mediterranean, -one beyond the Cape o| Good Hope, to uuard her important possessions in the east —and another in the Pacific. Our situation is the reverse. We have no fore gn posses sions, and not a point to guard beyond our own maritime frontier. There our whole force may he concentiated, ready to strike when a vulnerable point is exposed. If to these advantages be added, that both France and Russia have both large and naval forces ; that between us and them there is no point of conflict; that they both watch the navai su premacy of Great Britain with jealous'/; and that nothing is more easy than for us to keep on goxi terms wth both Powers, especially with a respectable naval force at our com mandit will be readily perceived that a force far short of that of Great Britain would effect what I contemplate. I would say a force equal to one-third of hers would suffice; bu: if not, certainly less than half wouid,— And if so, a naval force of that size would enable us to dispense with all fortifications, exce, tat important points, aid such as might be necessary in reference to the navy itself, to the great relief of the Treasury, an J saving to be applied to the navy, where it would he far more efficient. The less considerable points might be safely left to the defence of cheap works, sufficient to repel plundering attacks ; as no large fleet, such as would be able to meet ns, with such a naval force as that prop: sed, would ever think of d.egra-