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42 posed by necessity, il it is not adopt ed from choice, with this great dif ference, that the first uniformity w ill deliver up the votes of the State, to the active managers in the general Assemblies, while the latter would leave them in the hands of the real sovereigns,' the qualified voters of the whole State It can hardly be said that the States would have a choice, when the option would be between falling into the general ticket system, and submitting to a material dimunilkm of their relative weight in the election. The ques tion, then, turns upon tho relative advantages oflhe general ticket and district modes of voting; one or the other of which must soon universally prevail; and it matters nothing to the sovereignty of tlie State, wheth er one shall ho established by the Constitution, or the other imposed by noces« ir y; and as the whole point of this objection is confined to the more right of choice, and of chang ing the systems from time to time, it results that this right cun he of no value where choice is impossible, and change not desirable. 2. The second point in the objec tion is, the supposed diminution of the power of the State in that ten dency to scatter the votes which the district system is admitted to pos sess. Admitting that a unity of its voles may he desirable to a State; that unity will he produced l.y the di - ll iet system, as often as the Stale de sires it. If the majorities in all the districts arc of the same opinion, thi y will create the unity by giving i!,c same vote; if they are not, it is held to he a violation of the rights of so many districts as would have voted differently, to impress their votes into the service of the domi nant party in the general Assembly of the State. In the general ticket mode of election, the vote of the State is directed by the majority oi the State Legislature; the majority itself influenced by some leading members; and the ticket, thus ar ranged is often made to triumph over the whole State, by the inure eflect of discipline, and in open vio lation of the will of the actual sove reigns, the fair majority of the quali lieil voters. It i-capabh of demon stration, that the general ticket elec tion, especially over a large surface, >' niton no election at all iiy f lie peo ple. A small and organised body s| i|>plv the place of numbers, hv unity ot design and energy of action. V, ant of concert in the body of the peo ple, will render superior numbers of no avail. Division will destroy their strength, by scattering their votes; and ant icipation of defeat will ensure it, by preventing numbers from going to the polls. •'>. The last braneli of tho objec tion is in ihe supposed tendency to consolidation, which is seen by some in the abolition of electors, arid the substitution of the direct vote of the people. This is completely and ful ly answered in a foregoing part of this report ; to which it may be ad ded, that, when analysed, it turns out to be nothing more oe-less than an old objection in anew form, to the district system itself For the pur poses of consolidation, it is perfectly immaterial whether the people vote by districts, in their own persons, or through the agency of electors; and if this system is established, it is un known to tlie Committee for what object the institution ot' electors can be supposed to he wanting. Finally, there is a point of view from which to look at the several branches of all these objections, which exhibit them in the light of anomalous, if not very equivocal, pretensions to the character of State rights. It is this.: that they present, ns contending parties, not the Fed eral Government on one side, and the people of a State on the other, but the Legislature of a Slat* against the people of the same State : the scr » ants against their masters, the lead ing m n against the mass, the few Complaining that they will lose the privilege of coiitroliug and directing ilie votes of the many ! The Committee have based tli ir plan of amendment upon the propo sition, that the plan of tho Consti tution had failed in the election of President and Vice-President cf the United States. The points of failure were indicated in its two leading features — the institution of electors and the ultimate election, by s i vn.s, i a the Jlou*e of Representatives. That tho first branch of this proposition lias been fully demonstrated, and the best substitute proposed which the case admits of, is respectfully sub mitted to the decision of the Senate. The establishment of the second ranch, and the demon., tration of the fitness of the proposed substitute, remain to be attempted. That it was the intention of the Constitution, in giving to the State, ■ a tho House of Representatives, an equality of votes for President, to increase the weight and respecta bility of the House, and to give tr ibe small States a chance to act an ificient part in the election, is equal ly clear from the Constitution itself, and from all the cotemporaneous ex positions of that instrument. Upon ;hese grounds the power in question lias often been defended : but if the intention of the Constitution lia fniled ; if the small Plates have not lealised the chance wb'ch was iuten. ded for them ; if the House of Re presentatives has derived no addi tional weight or respectability from acting as umpire between presiden tial candidates; above all, it real evil, both to the House and to the people of the Stales, have been found to result from this contingent power of election ; then there can be no reason for preserving a part of the Constitution which has failed of its object, and produces evil instead of good. The Committee believe that this failure has been complete, and that the principles which should govern the election of a chief ma gistrate, in a free country, require that the choice of President of these United States should r.o longer be permitted to devolve upontl o House of Representatives. These princi ples have been stated, and enforced, in the course of this report. They spring from the dangers to which such elections arc liable. These dangers arc— 1. Os corruption among the vo ter--. 2. Os violence, in the heat of the elections 3. Os coalitions, to elect or defeat a particular candidate. Opposed to these dangers are cer tain rules of action, ripened into axioms, to the test of which, every election of a first officer of a repub lic should be brought. These ax- • iotas are— j To prevent corruption. 1. Multiply the voters. 2. Keep lhe candidates from among | them. 3. Avoid pre-existing bodies ofj electors. To prevent violence, and avoid coc , lions: 1. Seperate the voter--. The plan of election in the Com-j miltoe’s amendment, both for the I first and second election, has been j brought to the test of each of these axioms, and found to abide them.: The voters will consist of millions, j and cannot bo corrupted; they will J be scattered over the territory of the whole confederation, and cannot hold an intercourse with tho candidates; they will vote at several thousand different places, on the same hours of tho same day, and can noil her fight, nor coalesc ; they arc not a pie-exi -ting body, in (he sense of the objection, for that term only applies to small select bodies. j 'Pried by the test of these axioms, the House of Representatives, as an electoral college, stands condemned upon every one of thorn. 1. Ii i- a small body, therefore ca pable of being corrupted. 2. It is a pre-existing body, there fore capable of l-cing tampered with. 3. It -its in the presence of the candidates, therefore, is subject to he influenced by an intercourse with them. 4. it Votes in a body, therefore is subject to violence, and capable of coalitions. In addition to these objections, to which the House of Representatives is subject, in common with all small bodies, it is yet liable to others, pe culiar to i seif, as a Legislative de partment, viz. 1. The anomaly of a Legislature creating the executive. 2. The interruption of its regular business. 3. The introduction of anew test in elections ot members. 4. The application of anew influ ence to these elections. 5. The creation of opposition and administration parties in Congress. 6. The effect of all this upon fair Legislation. 7. The further effect of all this upon the mimls of the people, tiie character of the Government, and the stability of our Republican insti tutions. There is one point, however, and the Committee are proud to state it, in which the Hence cf Representa tives, as an electoral college, must forever he entitled to a preference over any other ot" equal numbers, which can be constituted: it is in the elevation of its character, in the talents which distinguish, and the in tegrity which ennobles it, and which the pride, virtue, and intelligence of the people must be forever anxious to preserve and exalt. The objeCiions which have been stated again-1 bringing the election into the House, are of such a charac ter, in the opinion of the Commit tee, ns to merit the most serious con sideration ; and, when their weight and importance are duly estimated, it can hardly be believed that the framers of our Constitution, if they could have foreseen the frequent occurrence ofthat event, would have consented to endanger the purity of our Government, and the stability of our institutions, by consenting to carry the election before that body, in any contingency whatsoever. Il is obvious, from the whole theory and spirit of the Constitution, that the President was intended to be chosen by electors fresh from the people, and that it never was con templated that the election should devolve on the House of Represen tatives, except in an extraordinary and rare contingency. Rut, from an extension in territory, which could not have been foreseen, and an in crease in wealth and population be yond all expectation, tin. pursuits of our citizens have In come so diver sified, and so many local i* 1 1 rests GEORGIA STATESMAN. have sprung up among them, that it is almost a vain hope tiiat the election of President can ever again be ef fected on the lir-t trial, whether the people vote direct, or through the agency ot intermediate electors; and it seems to be no longer doubtful, that under ordinary circumstances, the choice must, hereafter, devolve upon the House of Representatives The provision of the Constitution, intended only for an emergency, thus becoming one of ordinary application, and that which the wisdom of our fathers designed as the “ Medicine oj the State,” (to be resorted to only in a dangerous crisis) isto become our daily bread.” In this view of the subject, it be comes a question, which addresses itself to the mind and heart of every lover of his country, whether Con gress can be safely trusted with the choice of the Chief Magistrate ot this great and growing Republic, not as an event, which in a seres of years may happen; but which it the ordi nary course of affairs mv.-t inevitably and frequently occur. Tile first ob j ction. and the one which cannot fail to suggest itself to every mind, is the incompatible nature <3 the duties which belong to a Legislative Assembly and to an electoral college. No principle ought, in the opinion ot the Committee, to beheld more sa cred, as none certainly, is more plain ly recognised in the whole structure of our Government, than that which keeps the Executive and Legislative departments seperate and distinct. There seems, indeed, to be. infused into the different branches ot our Government ,j(doubtlcssfor the wise, t purposes,) a jealous spirit, which, generously t herished and properly directed, may be fruitful of the great est benefits That the Legislature should elect the Executive, is an anomaly; it is altogether inconsis tent with the most cherished princi ples of our system, and, in practice, may be found equally fatal to the purity of one branch ot the Govern ment, and the independence of the other. The refer nee of this question, which will call into action the strong est, and some of the w'orst, passions of our nature, to a pre-existing isonv of mex, assembled at the seat of Government, and from their char acter and situation, brought into al most daily contact with til candid ate, on whom they can confer the first office in the Republic, and who, in turn can bestow upon them bril liant honors and rich rewards must, from the very nature of things, ex pose them to the various influences, by which power and patronage have, in every age, seduced men from the path of duty, and tempted them to betray the most sacred trusts When we take into view the great and in creasing patronage of the Executive, and of the various departments un der his control, and perceive how compietely it is in his power to cause the influence of his office to be felt, we must shut our eves, to the lights of wisdom and experience, sf we do not perceive, that the period is not far distant, when the office of i’res:- dent will be conferred as the reward of open intrigue and the do. pest corruption. Rut it is not alone against acts of open and palpable corruption, that it becomes necessary to guard A body, even of high-minded men, ardently engaged in running the race of honorable ambition, will always be liable to be deluded by the fasci nations of office ; and, though they may not be seduced from their course by the treasures which may. be thrown in their way, will be induced to swerve from their duty by temptations more congenial to honorable minds ; and that ready casuistry, by which poli tic in ns so easily deceive themselves, will furnish an apology for a course of conduct, which, in private life, such men would scorn to pursue. All experience demonstrates, that the best security of virtue is found in avoiding all temptations. But even if the danger of corruption in the House of Representatives was iess alarming in its magnitude, and less certain in its occurrence, the Committee would still apprehend, that the preservation of the charac ter both ot' the Legislature and the Executive, and securing to them that place in the public confidence and esteem, without w hich their strength will be but weakness, ard their wis dom folly, would require that they should be far removed even from un just suspicion. In a country like ours, governed by public opinion, it is of the last importance, that those who are appointed to make and exe cute the laws, and who must always give tone to our national character, should conciliate the confidence ot the people, cr at least stand before them unimpeachod: That a suc cessful candidate, exalted to the Chief Magistracy by the members ot Congress, should feel a deep s nse of gratitude towards those to whom he is indebted for his elevation, is neither strange nor the subject of just exception. In the distribution of the numerous offices w ithin bi ght, it would be impossibly tor him so to act otherwise than to exclude altogether from the range of liis choice, men, in other respects, well qualified for the highest otlices, or to subject himself, however unjustly, to the imputation of being influenced by personal and unworthy motive- But if the olccUon hi the House of Representatives were liable to > none of these objections, still, the interruption it will give to the calm and regular progress of Legislation, would itself, be an evil of the most alarming nature. The mixing up oi party feeling, personal animosities, and local interests, with ordinary acts of Legislation, would unques tionably, be one of the greatest ca lamities to which the country could be exposed. Unless those who cre ate the laws, like the judges who ex pound them, are free from prejudice and passion, it is impossible that they can fulfil their high duties with puri ty and wisdom. That the acrimoni ous feelings, and bitter animosities excited, in a contested election, in the House of Representatives, would not subdue at its close, but would, for a long course of time, exert an influence on the deliberations, and perhaps control the decisions, ot the Legislature, by disturbing the tran quility of its course, and tingingevery Legislative act with party views and feelings, is too certain to admit ot a doubt. We may, indeed, tremble for the fate of the country, when Congress shall bo degraded into a mere electoral college, and the high duties of the Legislature shall be confided to the opposing tactions, known only ns tire enemies or parti zans of t lie admir.i. (ration. Hut this is not all. The people themselves, in each a State of things, will be templed to contribute to this evil, by sending men to represent them, on the eve, of every presidential election, not because of the depth of their knowledge, the soundness of their principles, or their peculiar fit ness for Legislation, but on account of their political opinions, in relation to the several candidates for the presidency. Even after the election was over, the evil spirit of the time might continue to operate, and to de mand the election of candidates who would be particularly devoted to the j new administration. That tho ad ministration it self, should be inser.si-| b!e to the success of these candid ates, is not to be expected from hu man nature. Wishes must be form ed, and the knowledge, or even sus picion of these wishes, would bring an ardent and concentrated force to the support of the presumed favor ite : < n the other hand, all the ele ments of opposition would combine againstT.hn : merit would bo out <4 the question; the public good no ob ject, a degrading test would super cede all the recommendations of worth and talents; and even the elections of the State officers might be brought within the vortex of a system, so fatal to (lie interests of the cou. try, ands > full of degrada tion to the voters anil the candid ates. In a Government professedly foun ded upon the vTill of the people, that will, when known, should always be entitled to the most respectful con sideration. Now, as far as public will can be ascertained, it is decided ly opposed to the House of Repre sentatives, as an umpire, in the last resort, between the presidential can didates. Yet, a second choice, by sonic body of electors, is inevitable; a majority, or even a large plurality, cannot be counted upon, in our sub sequent elections. To whom, then, shall it be sent back ? who shall make the second election ? We have teen that the House of Representa tives is an unfit place, and that the people arc against it. Will the pre sent institution of electors do better ; and shall they be retained for that purpose, in defiance of all the objec tions which lie against them ! On the contrary, they will be subject to the main objections which apply against a pre-existing body; they will be, moreover, subject to the opera tion of all the undue influences w hich might be brought to bear upon the House of Representatives, without possessing the same pretensions to high character and public confidence. Then there is no better course, than tO SEND IT BACK TO THE PEOPLE, W itfi the single, limitation, of confining their choice to the leading candid- Clear as the propriety of this course is to the mind of the Com mittee, it is not free from objections in the minds of others. The first and most plausible of these objec tions, grows out of a concern for the rights of the small States, a material portion of whose power, it is appre hended, will be lost by taking from them their contingent faculty of elect ing the President, bv states, in the House of Representatives. Before this objection can he admitted, it ought to he shewn that this privilege is actually possessed by the small States, under the present system. The Committee believe that it is not; for they cannot admit that a privilege personal to a member of Congress, can be treated as the privilege of the State which Ire represents. Now, rt is notorious, that a large portion, il r.ot a majority, of the Repr senia lives who have heretofore been call* . and upon to vote for President in the House of Representatives, have giv en that vote according to the dic tates of their own feelings and judg ment. In this course they have held themselves justified on the ground, that, in giving their votes, they acted in the character of electors under the Constitution, and not ia their repre scrUuit . e capacity. It is also certain, that, as no meßns are provided for a distinct expression of the V ill of the States upon the subject, (as between the candidates who may finally be brought intocompetetion,) it is mani fest that the Representatives may not know, or knowing, may feign ig norance of the opinion ot the State, which he represents, even if he ac knowledges an obligation to conform to it, when known. In many cases he certainly will be ignorant of it; in mo t, lie must be without instruc tions ; and in all, he may disregard them. If, then, the privilege oi vo ting for President, in the House of Representatives, is claimed and ex ercised by the member, as an elector under the Constitution, and not as a Representative from his State ; il the member, and not the State, exercises volition upon this point ; if he de nies the right of tlie State to direct his vote, or admits the right and avoids the obligation; and if the State has neither time nor means to manifest her will, or power to en force it, or the right of vacating the vote after it is given; then, tins boa ted privilege may fairly be set down as belonging, practically, to the member, and not to the State from which lie comes. The question wdiich then presents itself, is one of con flicting claims to power, between an individual, on one side, and the State which he represents on the other; between a member of Congress, in his seat, and tlie forty thousand per sons who placed him there. Holding this to be the only question present ed by the objection under considera tion, the Committee feel no difficulty in assigning the privilege to tho party which, from its own position, is fartherest removed from undue influ ence—by its numbers, is most diffi cult to be corrupted; which, indi vidually, has as much, and, aggre gately, infinitively more interest in the welfare of their country ; and whose lack ot’ information, if any, is | amply compensated by the disinter i estedness of their motives : and, in ! this transfer of power from the mem bers oi Congress at Washington, to ! the whole body of their constituents tat home, it is the opinion of llie Com mittee that the State would be a gainei, instead of a loser. Still, this contingent vote for President, in the House of Representatives, is the cherished form of a lost substance among the smaller States, and*al though now reduced to nothing but an idea, they may be unwilling to give it up, without receiving the be nefit of some concession from the larger ones. Here, then, is room for a compromise : the door opens for one ol those mutually advantageous adjustments, by help of which the Constitution was made, and without w hich it cannot be amended The large Slates overwhelm the small ones, with the consolidated vote of the general ticket; the small States balance the great ones, with the sin gle representative in the House of Representatives. Now', it has been shewn that this apparent power in the great States to consolidate their vote, is, in reality, the usurped pow er of some individuals of the State Legislatures, yet, to the small States its effect is just the same as if the real sovereignty of the State had di rected its force against them. It has also been shown that this supposed power of the small States to balance tHe great ones in the House of Re presentatives, is, in fact, the power of the members in Congress from such States. Yet, to the large ones, the effect is just the same as if it was the power of the States. Here, then, is a grievance on ach side; and, to get rid of it, and receive, in return, a great, substantial, and ar dently desired concession from the other, the large States have nothing to do but to giv e up an abuse, and the small ones to surrender an idea. The only direct objections to the seco?ul election by the people, (sup posing the first to have been adopt ed,) which have come to the knowl edge of the Committee, are few in number and easy of answer. The apprehension of violence in such re newed and protracted contest, is ex pressed by some. But, if the Com mittee have been successful in show - ing that nothing of this kind is to be dreaded in the first election, the only proper inquiry now is, whether the second can produce that effect which the first- could not. The Committee affirm the negative of this proposi tion, and appeal to that well known law in physiology which makes apathy succeed to violence the moment the crisis of excitement has passed a wav; and to the fact, that the number of candidates being reduced in the se cond contest, the peculiar causes of excitement, arising from personal acquaintance and local interests, will also be reduced in exact proportion to this reduction in the number of candidates. Instead of violence, in difference and neglect of the elective franchise is still more to be dreaded m the second than in the first ilec tion. The delay of a second election, is the last of the objections which has come to the know ledge of your Com mittee. This, as involving a ques tion of mere detail, may be passed over with little more than a state ment and explanation of the plan of the Committee on this point. il provides, that the first election shall bo held on the first Thursday and Friday in August, 1828, and cn the same day < in every fourth vc : thcre- [February 28, after ; that Congress shall be in ses sion on the second Monday in Octo ber of these years, to receive and count the votes; and that the second election, when found to be necessary, shall take place on the first Thurs day in Dec. following. These pro visions remove all objections rela ting to delay and want of time. The first election will take place at the period when the people are least en gaged at home, and will hav the further recommendation of taking place on the same day on which sev eral of the States now hold their general elections, near the time at which many others hold them, and tiie one to which all the States would in all probability, soon conform. An interval of about sixty days would then remain for collecting the votes in the different districts, and certify ing the results to the President of the Senate; a period amply suffi cient to send in tli returns from the most remote States. A further in terval ol about sixty days would be allowed for giving notice of, and hold ing the second election ; a sufficient time, in the opinion ot the Commit tee, to communicate to the people the simple fact that a second election was ordered ; the day itself being fixed beforehand, and the minds of lhe voters made up about the can didates, and the fact itself unofficially known before the people would re quire no furtt.cr notice, than that which w ould enable them to go to the polls. For this purpose, the time allowed will be twenty days more than enough, in the remotest sections of the Union. For collect ing the votes in the districts, and certifying the results a second tiim to the Prcsidi nt of the Senate, three months would still remain, as the new officers would not he wanted until the fourth of March. The fact that Congress would be in ses sion two months longer than usual in every fourth year, is an additional re commendation to the details of (his plan ; it being now well known that tho short sessions, (from the great increase of business and of members,) have become too short for the ac complishment of the business on hand, some two hundred orders of the day usually remaining undecided at the last hour ot these sessions, and all tho time and labor lost which had been expended upon them. Tiie Resolution submitted by the Committee would, they confidently believe, entirely effect tiie great ob ject of an election by the qualified voters of the States,upon the second, at all events, if not upon tue first tri al. But, as it is within the range of mere possibility, that inoic than two persons may have the two highest numbers, in the first election, and that two or more may have the same, and the highest number in the sec ond, itvvas believed by some that the plan of amendment would not be complete, unless some provision was made for this remote contingency or a mere possibility ; the committee have therefore agreed, in such case, to leave the decision to the existing provisions of the Constitution ; con sidering it superfluous trouble to write out any new provision for a case which will almost certainly nev er occur, and which may, therefore, safely undergo a nominal reference to the same body which, as a r. al electoral college, has received their decided disapprobation. BRAZIL. Extract of a letter to Mr. Sanderson, of the Merchants’ Coflee House, Philadelphia. “In (Le enclosed paper, dated the nth Dec. last, you will find that tie Emperor of Brazils has declared too against the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. Great preparations were making w hen I left Rio, to carry on the war with vigor ; fitting out all their men of w ar, and enlarging their army—there was a general press for the land and sea service—several transports with sailed for Montevideo, and there was a strong naval force oil Buenos Ayres, block ading that port. There is now seve ral Buenos Ayres privateers (and it is said, some pirates) on the coast of the Brazils. One of them was 01. Cape Frio, and had made several captures. In a short time we may expect any number of privateers, (some with commissions on both sides,) and our trade to that coast will be very hazardous unless our Government see the propriety of sending out a respectable naval force to protect our merchant vessels against the lawless privateers that w ill be swarming hi those seas. Markets at Rio were very dull for American produce. Sugar, coffee, and hides, were scarce and high. The Empress of the Brazils had lately presented a sen and heir to his Imperial Majesty—there was great rejoicing on the occasion. If I was to venture to give an opinion, I should say that Don Padro will leave off wearing his crown, be fore the young prince can do w ithout his caps. From what I could learn while a was at Rio, I iyn satisfied that there is a strong party in the Brazils against the powers that be. lam also very well assured that Bolivar intends to take a peep into that country, before he retires from the field ; this was the general opinion in Upper Peru, when 1 left Arica in October last