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'•) _ CHRONICLE AND SENTINEL. A IIGUSTA. FRIDAY MORNING, JULY 10. FOR PRESIDENT, WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, Os Ohio ; The invincible Hero of Tippecanoe—the incor -0 ruptible Statesman—-the inflexible Republican— the patriotic Farmer of Ohio. FOR VICE-PRESIDENT, /O H N TYLER, Os Virginia; A State Rights Republican of the school of ’SS— one of Virginia’s noblest sons, and emphatically one of America’s most sagacious, virtuous and patriot statesmen. FOR ELECTORS OFPRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, GEORGE R. GILMER, of Oglethorpe. DUNCAN L. CLINCH, of Camden. JOHN CAMPBELL, of Muscogee * JOEL CRAWFORD, of Hancock. CHARLES DOUGHERTY, of Clark. SEATON GRANTLAND, of Baldwin. ANDREW MILLER, of Cass. WILLIAM EZZARD, cf DeKalb. . C. B. STRONG, of Bibb- JOHN WHITEHEAD, of Burke. E. WIMBERLY, of Twiggs. . FOR CONGRESS, WILLI AIM C. DAWSON, of Greene. R. W. HABERSHAM, of Habersham. JULIUS C. ALFORD, of Troup. EUGENIUS A. NISBET, of Bibb. LOTT WARREN, of Sumter. THOMAS BUTLER KING, of Glynn. ROGER L. GAMBLE, cf Jefferson. JAMES A. MERIWETHER, of Putnam. THOMAS F. FOSTER,- of Muscogee. - _ - General Harrison’s Letters. • In accordance with our promise yesterday, we publish to-day the Letters of General Harrison, to Sherrod Williams] and] Harmar Denny, to whick we invite the attention of our readers. General Harrison has now endorsed the sentiments and po litical opinions which are contained in them, and upon those opinions, he stands cr falls by the fia£ of the American people at the approaching elec tion. the principles upon which his pc litical career has been based, through a long and, f eventful life, and his long tried sterling integrity, and uncompromising honesty, and devoted patriot ism, are the Purest guaranty that, if elected, principles #ill be carried out, at least so far ?* J * in the power of the Chief Executive. " j The crowded ■state of our columns toSit />■ not permit us to notice the wiee and worthy editor ” of the Constitutionalist. We must also defer a notice of the redoubtable “L. M.,” by .which we shall place him in a cate gory to which contempt itself cannot travel down. £is empty bravado therefore, is in perfect cha racter, and may be uttered with impunity. General Harrison’ Creed. As General Harrison, in his letter Os accept ance, refers the American people to his letters to Harmar Denny and Sherrod Williams, for his po litical creed, and the principles on which his ad ministration will be conducted should he be call ed to the Presidential chair; in order that there shall be no mistake or misapprehension we.sub join the following correspondence, without.com ment, only asking the reader to peruse it with care. He will not fail to agree with us, that Har rison is the man fitted to administer the people’s government: — GEN. WNT. H. HARRISON. Washington, April 7, 183E. Sir : I consider it the right of every citizen of the United States to ask and demand, and to be fully informed of, the political principles and o pinions o£ those who are candidates for the va rious offices in the gift of the people, and the im perious duty of the candidate to frankly and idly avow and declare the opinions which he enter tains. I therefore, as a voter, a citizen, and an a deep cad abiding interest in the welfare and orosperity of our common coun try. and an ardent desire to see the perpetuity of our free and happy form of government, take the liberty of asking you tc give me your opinion and views on the following sulgects : Ist. Will you [if elected President of the Uni ted States] sign and approve a bill distributing the surplus revenue of the United States teeach State, according to the federal population ofeach, for internal improvements, education, and to such other objects as the legislature of the -several States may see fit to apply the same 1 2d. Will you sign ana approve a bill distribu ting the proceeds of the public lands to each Stale, according to the federal population of etch, for the purposes above specified ] ° Will you sign and approve a bill making ap propriations to improve navigable .streams above ports jpf entry 1 4tn. Will you sign and approve (if it becomes necessary to secure and save from depreciation the revenue and finances of the nation, and to af ford a uniform sound currency to the people of the U. States) a Bill, with proper modifications and restrictions, chartering a Bank of the United States. sth. What is your opinion as to the constitu tional power of the Senate or House of Represen * tativetf" of the Congress of the U. States, to ex punge or obliterate from the journals the records and proceedings of e previous session 1 A frank, plain, and full answer to the foregoing inquiries is respectfully and earnestly solicited. Your answer is desired as soon as possible. I intend this and your answer for publication. I have the honor to be, Your humble and ob’dt s’vt, ®® SHERROD WILLIAMS. general Harrison’s replf. % North Bend, May 1, 1836. gj r I have the honor to acknowledge the re -4 ceipt of your letter of the 7th ult., in which you t request r3fe to answer the above questions. From the manner in which the four first ques tions are stated, it appears that you do not ask ■■■■lriillflHiiik ! I measures to which they respectively refer; but what would be my course, it they were presented to me, (being in tha Presidential chair of the U. States,) in the shape of bills that had been duly passed by the Senate and House of Representa tives. From the opinions which I have formed of the intention of the constitution, as to the cases in which the veto power should bo exercited by the President, I would have contented myself with giving an affirmative answer to the four first questions ; but, from the deep interest which has been, and indeed is now, felt in relation to all these subjects, I think it proper to express my views upon each ono separately. I answer then, Ist. That the immediate re turn of all the surplus money which is, or ought to be in the Treasury of the United States, to the the possession of the people, from whom it was taken, is called for by every principle of policy, and indeed, of safety to our institutions, and I know of no mode of doing it better than that re commended by the present chief magistrate, in his first annual message to Congress in the fol lowing words :—“ To avoid these evils, it ap pears to me that the most safe, just and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the several States according to the rule of represen tation This proposition has reference to a state of things which now actually exists, with the ex ception of the amount of money thus to be dis posed of—for it could not have been anticipated by the President that the surplus above the real wants or convenient expenditures of the goveru would become so large, as that retaining it in the \ Treasury would so diminish the circulating me dium as greatly to embarrass the business of the country. What other disposition can be made of it with a view to get it into immediate circulation but to place it in the hands of the Stale authorities] So great is the amount, and so rapidly is it in creasing, that it could not be expended for a very considerable time on the comparatively few ob jects to which it could be appropriated by the General Government; but the desired distribu tion among the people could be immediately ef fected by the States from the infinite variety of ways in ./hich it might be employed by them. By them it might be loaned to their own banking institutions, or even to individuals; a mode of distribution by the General Government which I sincerely hope is in contemplation by no friend to his country. 2d. Whilst I have always broadly admitted that the public lands were the common property of ail the States, I have been the advocate of that mode of disposing of them which would create the greatest number of freeholders, and I con ceived that in this way the interests of all would be as well secured as by any other disposition ; but since by the small size of the tracts in which the lands are now laid out, and the reduction of the price, this desirable situation is easily at tainable by any person of tolerable industry, I am perfectly reconciled to the distribution of the proceeds of the sales, as provided for by the bill introduced into the Senate by Mr. Clay ; the in terest of all seems to be well provided for by this hill; and as from the opposition which has hitherto been made to the disposition of the lands heretofore contemplated by the representatives of the new States, there is no probability of its being adopted, I think it ought no longer to be insist!;d on. 3. As I believe that no money should be ta ken from the Treasury of the United States to be exp ended on internal improvements but for those which are strictly national, the answer to this question would be easy, but from the diffi culty of determining which of those that are from time to time proposed would be of this descrip tion. This circumstance, the excitement which has already been produced by appropriations of this kind, and the jealousies which it will no doubt continue to produce if persisted in, give additional claims to the mode of appropriating all the surplus revenue of the United States in die manner above suggested.—Each State will hen have the means of accomplishing its own .Jiemes of internal improvement. Still there will vl , r -rticular cases when a contemplated im provenn mt will be of great advantage to the Union i generally, and some particular states, than to that in which it is to be made. In such cases as well as those in the new States, where the val ue of t he public domain will be greatly enhanced by an i mprovement in the means of communica tion, tl te General Government should certainly largely contribute. To appropriations of the latter c haracter there has never been any very warm opposition.—Upon the whole the distribu tion o f the surplus revenue among the States, saems likely to remove most if not all, the causes of dis sension of which the internal improvement systei n has been the fruitful source. There is nothi ngin my opinion more strictly incumbent upon those who are concerned in the administra tion ( »f our government than that of presvering harm ony between the States. From the con strue tion of our system there has been, and prob ably ever will be, more or less jealousy between the ( General and State Governments; but there is nr Hiring in this Constitution—nothing in the char acter of the relation which the States bear to each other—which can create any unfriendly feel ing, if the common guardian administers its fav< >rs with an even and impartial hand. That thi s may be the case all those to whom any portion of this delicate power is intrusted should always act upon the princples of forbearance and concil iat ion ; ever more ready to sacrifice the interests of their immediate constituents rather than vio late the rights of the other members of the fam ily-. Those who pursue a different course, whose n jle is never to stop short of the attainment of all v/hich they may consider their due, will be found to have trespassed upon the boundary they have themselves established. The observations with which I shall conclude this letter on the subject of the veto power by the President will apply to this, as well as your other questions. 4th. I have before me a newspaper, in which I am designated by its distinguished editor, “ The Bank and Federal Candidate .” I think it would puzzle the writer to adduce any act of my life which warrants him in identifying me with the interest of the first, or the politics of the latter. Having no means of ascertaining the sentiments of the directors and stockholders of the Bank of the United States, (which is the one, I presume, with which it was intended to associate me,) I cannot say what their course is likely to be in relation to the ensuing election for President. Should they, however, give me their support, it will be evidence at least that the op position which I gave to their institution in my capacity of representative from Ohio in Congress, proceeded, in their opinion, from a sense of duty which I could not disregard. The journals of the second session of the thirteenth, and those of the fourteenth Congress, will show that my votes are recorded against them upon every question in which their inter est was involved. I did, indeed, exert myself in the Senate of Ohio, to procure a repeal of the law which had imposed an enormous tax upon the branches which had been located in its boun daries at the request of the citizens. The ground of those exertions was not the interest of the bank, but to save, what I considered the honor of the State, and to prevent a controversy between the State officers, and those of the United States. In the spring of 1834, I had also the honor to preside at a meeting of the citizens of Hamilton county, called for the purpose of expressing their sentiments in relation to the removal of the public money from the custody of the bank, by the sole authority of Executive. As President of the meeting, I explained at some length, the m obiec^u^wlricl^^wa^coavene^^nulad vanced no opinion in relation to the re-chartering: 4 of the bank. A most respectful memorial to the President ia relation to the removal of the deposites was a dapted, as were also resolutions in favor of re chastcring ihc Bank; but as I have already said,, this was not the purpose for which the meeting was called, and not upon one presiding officer, I was called upon to give an opinion, but in the event of an equal division of the votes. As a private citizen, no man can be more en tirely clear of any motive, either for re-chartering the old institution, or erecting a new one under the authority of the United States. I never had a single share in the former, nor indeed in any bank, with one exception; and that many years ago failed, with the loss of the entire stock. I have no inclination again to venture in that way, even if I should ever possess the means. With the exception above mentioned, of stock in a bank long since broken, I never put out a dollar at interest in my life. My interest being entirely identified with the cultivation of the soil, I am immediately and personally connected with none other. I have made this statement to show you that I am not committed to any course in relation to the chartering of a bank of the United States ; and that I might, if so disposed, join in the pop ular cry of denunciation against the old institu tion, and upon its misconduct predicate an op position to the chartering of another. I shall not, however, take this course so oppo site to that which I hope I have followed through life, but will give you my sentiments clearly and fully not only with regard to the future con duct of the Goverir.nent on the subject of a Na tional Bank, but in relation to the operations of that which is now defunct. I was not in Congress when the late Bank was chartered, but was a member of the 13th Congress, after its first session, when the con duct of the Bank in its incipient measures, was examined into ; and believing from the result of the investigation that the charter had been vi ola ted, I voted for the judicial investigation, will i a view of annulling its charter. The resolution for that purpose, however, failed, and shortly af ter the management of its affairs was commit) ed to the talents and integrity of Mr. Cheves. Fn >m that period to its final dissolution, although I must confess I arn not a very competent judge of such matters, I have no idea that an rnstitutl an could have been conducted with more ability, i n tegrity, and public advantage, than it has been . Under these impressions, I agree with General Jackson in the opinion expressed in one of h is messages to Congress, from which I make tl ie following extract:—“ That a Bank of the Uni ted States competent to all the duties which /na y be required by the Government , might be so or - ganized as not to infringe on our delegatei I powers , or the reserved rights of the States, I eh. > not entertain a doubt.*” But the period for re- • chartering the old institution has passed, ai : Pennsylvania has wisely taken care to appropri- • ate to herself the benefits of its large capital. The question, then, for me to answer is, wheth er, under the circumstances you state, if elected to the office of President, I would sign an act to charter another bank, I would, if it were clearly ascertained that the public interest in relation to the collection and disbursement of the revenue would materially suffer without one, and thera were unequivocal manifestation of public opin ion in its favor. I think, however, the experi ment should be fairly tried, to ascertain whether the financial operations of the Government can not be as well carried on without the aid of a National Bank. If it is not necessary for that purpose, it does not appear to me that one can be constitutionally chartered. There is no con struction which I can give the Constitution which would authorize it, on the ground of afford ing facilities to commerce. The measure, if a dopted, must have for its object the carrying into effect (facilitating at least the exercise of) some j one of the powers positively granted to the Gen eral Government. If others flow from it, produ ; cing equal or greater advantages to the nation, so much the better; but these cannot be made the ground for juslifhing the recourse to it. The excitement which has been produced by the Bank question, the number and respectabili ty of those who deny the right to Congress to charter one, strongly recommend the course a bove suggested. sth. I distinctly answer to this question, that in my opinion, neither House of Congress can constitutionally expunge the records of the pro ceedings of their predecessors. The power to ' rescind correctly belongs to them ; and for every public legitimate purpose, all Hiat is necessary. The attempt to expunge a part of their journal now making in the Senate of the United States, I am satisfied could never have been made but j in a period of the highest party excitement, when ; the voice of reason and generous feeling is stifled by long protracted and bitter controversy, j In relation to the exercise of the veto powei : by the President, there is, I think, an important: difference between the present Chief Magistrate • and myself. I express this opinion with less dif fidence, because I believe mine is in'strict accor dance with those of al! the previous Presidents to General Jackson. The veto power, or the control of the Execu tive over the enactment of laws by the legislative body, was not unknown in the United Stains previously to the formation of the present federal constitution. It does not appear, however, to have been in much favor. The principle was to be found but in three of the State Constitutions, and in but one of them (Massachusetts) was the Executive power lodged in the hands of a single Chief Magistrate. One other State (South Car olina) had indeed, not only adopted this princi ple, but had given its single Executive Magis trates an absolute negative upon the acts of the Legislature. In all other instances it has been a qualified negative, like that of the United States. The people of South Carolina seem how ever, not to have been long pleased, with this in vestment of power in their Governor, as it has lasted but two years ; having been adopted in 17- 75 and repealed in 1778, from which time the Legislature of the State have been entirely freed from Executive control. Since the adoption of the United States Constitution, the veto principle has been adopted by several other States, and un til very lately, it seemed to be rapidly growing in to favor. Befere we can form a correct opinion of the manner in which this power shall be exercised, it is proper to understand the reasons which have induced its adoption. In its theory, it is mani festly an innovation upon the first principles of republican government—that the majority should, rule. Why should a single individanl control! the will of that majority I It will not be said! that there is more probability of finding greater wisdom in the Executive chair than in the halls of the Legislature. Nor can it possibly be supposed that an individual residing in the centre of an ex tensive country can be as well acquainted with the wants and wishes of a numerous people, as those who come immediately from amongst them —the partakers for a portion of the year in their various labors and employments, and the witness es of the effects of the laws in their more mi nute as well as general operations. As far, then as it regards a knowledge of the wants and wish es of the pople, wisdom to discover remedies for existing evils, and devising schemes for increas ing the public prosperity, it would seem that the legislative bodies did not require the aid of an Executive Magistrate. But there is a principle recognized by all the American Constitutions, which was unknown to the ancient republics. They all acknowledge rights in the minority, which cannot rightfully be taken from them. Experience has skown that in large assemblies * Nile’s Register, vol. 48, page 369. these rights were not always respected. It would be in vain that they should be enumerated, and respect for them enjoined in the Constitution. A popular assembly, under the influence of that spirit of party which is always discoverable in a greater or less degree in all republics, might and would, as it was believed, sometimes disregard them. To guard against this danger, and to se cure the rights of each individual, the expedient of creating a department independent of the oth ers, and amenable only to the laws, was adopted. Security was thus given against any palpable violation of the Constitution, to the injury of in dividuals, or of a minority party. But it was : still possible for a wilful and excited majority to t mact laws of the greatest injustice and tyranny, \ vithout the letter of their charter. And this I take to be the orgin of the veto p ower, as well in the State Governments as that i ol ’ the United States. It appears to have been th c intention to create an umpire between the co ntending factions which had existed, it was , be ; lieved, and would continue to exist. If there wa s any propriety in adopting this principle in 1 the Government of a State, all the reasons in 1 favi >r of it existed in a tenfold degree for incorpo | rath ig it in that of the United States. 'lhe op eiati ons of the latter, extended over an immense tract of country, embracing the products of almost every clime, and that country divided too into a numl >er of separate Governments, in many re spects independent of each other and also of the comm on federal head left but little hope that they could always be carried on in harmony.—lt could , not be doubted that sectional interests would at times) nedominate in the bosoms ol the immedi ate re) iresentatives of the people and the States, and combinations formed destructive of the pub lic good, or unjust and oppressive to the minority. Where could a power to check these local feel ings, and to destroy the effects of unjust combina i tions be better placed than in the hands of that department whose authority, being derived from i the same common sovereign is co-ordinate with the rest, and which enjoys the great distinction of being at once the immediate representative of the whole people, as well as of each particular State 1 In the former character the interests of the whole community would be rigidly supported, and in the latter the rights of each member stead fastly maintained. The representation from the State authorites in the Electoral Colleges, I con sider one of the most felicitous features in the Constitution. It serves as an eternal memento to the Chief Magistrate, that it is his duty to guard the interests of the weak against the un just aggressions of the strong and powerful. From these premises you will conclude that I consider the qualified veto upon the acts of the legislature, conferred by the constitution upon the President, as a conservative, power, intended on ly to be used to secure the instrument itself from violation, or in times of high party excitement to protect the rights of the minority, and the in terests of the weaker members of the Union. Such indeed, is my opinion, and such we must believe to be the opinion of nearly all the distin guished men who have filled the Executive chair. If I were President of the United States, an act which did not involve either of the principles above enumerated must have been passed under very peculiar cicumstances of precipitancy or op position to the known public will, to induce me to refuse it my sanction. If the opinion I have given of the motive of the framers of the Constitution, in giving thf veto power to the President, is correct, it follows that they never could have expected that he, who was constituted the umpire between contending factions, should identify himself with the interests of one of them, and volutarily razee himself from the proud eminence of leader of a nation, to that of chief of a party. I can easily conceive the existence of a state of things by which the chief Magistrate of the State may be forced to act up on party principles; but such a course is entire ly opposed to all the obligations which the Con stitution imposes on a President of the U. States. The immense influence which he possesses, will always give his party the preponderance; and the very circumstance ot its being an Executive par ty, will he the cause of infusing more bitterness and vindictive feeling in these domestic contests. Under these circumstances, the qualified veto given by the Constitution may, if the President should think proper to change its character, be come as ohsolute in practice as that possessed by the Kings of England and France. From the great variety of local interests acting upon the members of the two Houses of Congress, and from the difficulty of keeping all the individuals of a large party under the control of party disci pline, laws will often be passed by small majori ties adverse to the interests of the dominant party; but if the President fhink proper to use the veto power for the purpose of promoting the interests of his party, it will be in vain to expect that a majority so large as two thirds in both Houses would be found in opposition to his wishes. In the hands of such a President, the qualified veto of the Constitution would in practice become absolute. I have, upon another occasion, expressed my views upon the danger of a dominant Executive party. It may perhaps, be said that the Chief Magistrate will find it impossible to avoid the in fluence of party spirit. Several of our Chief Magistrates, however, have been able to escape its influence; or what is the same thing, to act as if they did not feel it. As one mode of avoid ing it, it would be my aim to interfere with the legislation of Congress as little as possible. The clause of the Constitution, which makes it the duty of the President to give Congress informa tion of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, could never be intended to make him the source of legislation. Information should always be frankly given, and recommendations upon such matters as come more immediately under his cognizance than theirs. But there it should end. If he should undertake to prepare the business of legislation for the action of Congress, or to assume the character of code-maker for the nation, the per sonal interest which he will take in the success of his measures will necessarily convert him into a partisan, and will totally incapacitate him from performing the part of that impartial umpire, which is the character that I have supposed the Constitution intends him to assume, when the acts passed by the Legislature are submitted to his decision. Ido not think that he should take the lead as a reformer, even when reformation is in his opinion necessary. Reformers will be nev er wanting, when it is well understood that the power which wields the whole patronage of the nation will not oppose the reformation. I have the honor to be, with great considera tion and respect, Sir, your humble servant, W. H. HARRISON. LETTER TO HARMAR DENNY. The following extracts from General Harri ’ son’s letter to Harmar Denny, will show the prin ciples by which the Ohio farmer will be guided in his administration of the government, should he be elected. They are so plain that every hardworking man in the community can understand them. They are the principles on which our fathers acted in the formation of the constitution, and are the touch-stone of the Whig creed. “Among the principles proper to be adopted by any executive sincerely desirous to restore the administration to its original simplicity and purity, I deem the fol lowing to be of prominent importance. “I. To confine his service to a single term. “ 11. To disclaim all right of control over the public treasure, with the exception of such part of it as may be appropriated by law to carry on _the public gervices, and that to be applied me cisely as the law may direct, and drawn from the treasury agreeably to the long established form of that department. “ 111. That he should never attempt to influ ence the elections, either by the people or the State Legislaluie, nor suffer the federal officers under his control to take any other part in them than giving their own votes when they possess the right of voting. “ IV. That in the exercise of the veto power, he should limit his rejection of bills to: Ist. Such as are in his opinion unconstitutional. 2d. Such as encroach on the rights of the States or individ uals. 3d. Such as involving deep interests, may in his opinion require more mature deliberation or deference to the will of the people, to be as certained at the succeeding elections. “ V. That he should never suffer the influence of his office to be used for purposes of a purely parly character. “ \I. That in removals from office of those who hold the appointment during the pleasure of the Executive, the cause of such removal should be stated if requested, to the Senate, at the time the nomination of a successor is made. “ And last, but not least in importance, “VII. That he should not suffer the Execu department of the government to become the source of legislation; and leave the whole busi ness of making laws for the Union, to the depart ment to which the constitution has exclusively as signed it, until they have assumed that perfected shape, where and when alone the opinions of the Executive may be heard. A community of pow er in the preparation of the laws between the le gislature and the Executive departments, must necessarily lead to dangerous combinations, great ly to the advantage of a President desirous of ex tending his power. Such a construction of the constitution could never have been contemplated by those who framed it, as they well knew that those who propose the bills, will always take care of themselves, or the interests of their constitu ents, and hence the provision in the Constitution borrowed from that of England, restricting the originating of revenue bills to the immediate rep resentatives of the people. So far from agreeing in opinion with the distin guished character who lately retired from the Presidency, that Congress should have applied to him for the project of a banking system, I think that such an application would have manifested not only great; subserviency upon the part of that body, but an unpardonable ignorance of the chief danger to be apprehended from such an institu tion. That danger unquestionably consists in a union of interests between the Executive and the bank. Would an ambitious incumbent of the executive chair neglect so favorable an opportunity as the preparing of the law would give him, to insert in it provisions to secure his influence over it 1 In the authority given to the President by the Con stitution to recommend to Congress such meas ures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,” it was certainly never intended that the measures he recommended should be presented in a shape suited for the immediate decision of the Icgisla tuie. The sages who made the Constitution, too well knew the advantages which the crown of England derives from the exercise of this power by its ministers, to have intended it to be used by our chief magistrate, or the heads of departments under his control. The boasted principles of the English Constitu tion, that the consent of the democratic branch is not only necessary to receive money from the people, but that it is its inviolable prerogative al so to oiiginate all the bills for that purpose, is true in theory, but rendered utterly false and nugatory in effect, by the participation of the ministers of the crown in the details of legislation. Indeed the influence they derive from sitting as members of the House of Commons, and from wielding the immense patronage of the crown (constitutional or usurped,) gives them a power over that body, that renders plausible, at least the flattery, or as it is more probable, the intended sarcasm of Sir Walter Raleigh, in an addresss to James 1., that the demand of the sovereign upon the Commons for pecuniary aid, was required only ‘“that the tax might seem to come from themselves.” “ Having thus given you my opinion of some things which might be done, and others which should not be done, by a President coming into power by the support of those of the people who are opposed to the principles upon which the pre sent administration is conducted, you will see that I have omitted one, which is deemed by many of as much importance as any other, I allude to the appointment of members of Congress to office by the president. The Constitution contains no prohibition of such appointments, no doubt because its authors could not believe in its necessity, from the puri ty of character which was manifested by those who possessed the confidence of the people at that period. It is, however, an opinion very ge nerally entertained by the opposition party, that the country would have escaped much of the evil under which it has suffered for some years past, if the Constitution had contained a provision of that kind. Having had no opportunity of personal observation on the conduct of the administration for the last ten years, I am unable to decide upon the truth or error of this opinion. But I should be very willing that the known subserviency of the Legislature to the Executive, in several mem orable instances, should be accounted for in a way some what less injurious to the character of the country and to republicanism itself, than by the admission that the fathers of the land, the trusted servants of a virtuous people, be seduced from the path of duty and honor, by the paltry trappings and emoluments ol dependent officers. But if the evil really exists, and if there be good reason to believe that its source is to be found in the corruptibility of members of the Legislature, an effectual remedy cannot be too soon applied. And it happens in this instance that there is a choice of remedies. One ot those, however, is in my opinion, free from the objections which might be offered to the other. The one to which I ob ject is that which the late President has been so loudly called upon to adopt, in consequence of a promise made at the commencement of his ad ministration; viz: that the Executive under no circumstances should appoint to office a member of either branch of the National Legislature. There are, in my mind, several weighty reasons against the adoption of this principle. I will de tain you with the mention of but two of them ; because I believe that you will agree with mo that the alternative I shall present, while it would be equally effectual, contains no feature to which a reasonable objection could be made. “As the Constitution contains no provision to prevent the appointment of members of Con gress to office by the Executive, could the Ex ecutive, with a regard to decency and justice, without usujping power from the people, declare a disqualification which they had not thought ne cessary 1 And where is the American citizen who regards the honor of his country, the cha racter of its people, or who believes in the supe riority of a Republican form of government, who would be willing to proclaim to the world that the youthful nation which has attracted so much of its attention, which it has so much admired for its gigantic strength, its undaunted courage, its high attainments in literature and the arts, and the external beauty of its institutions, was within, a mass of meanness and corruption 1 That even the chosen servants of the people were ever ready, for a paltry consideration, to abandon their allegiance to their lawful sove reigns, and to become the servants of a servant. The alternative to the degrading course, is to be found in depriving the Eexecutive of all motive for acquiring an improper influence over the Legislature. “To effect this, nothing in my opinion is ne cesary but to re-establish the principles upon which the administration was once conducted, with the single addition of limiting tK e of the President to one term. A condensed p** 3 meration of what I conceive those priociDl«* I have been is given above. And I thinks* 0 i can doubt, that if faithfully carried out 1 would be effectual in securing the indep e L] y of the Legislature, and confirming the c tion between it and the Executive, to that i* ■! which is warranted by a fair construction 0 f a® Constitution. I can conceive but two mot - I which could induce a President of the p States to endeavor to procure a controlling * fluence over the Legislative body, viz—* 0 3 iU " petuate his power, by passing laws to incrc 3 T his patronage—or to gratify his vanity, 3 f I taining their sanction to his schemes andV jects tor lire government of the country, 1 thus assimilating his situation to that of the h U iled monarebs of Europe. The principles abov suggested would effectually destroy any (W * sition of the person elected by the combined I > votes of the opposition to place himself in e itU | attitude. Retiring at the end of four year?/ • private life, with no wish or prospect of any k! II of his succeeding/ legitimate or adopted, Mfi leave the government as prosperous and.p crei 5 its administration, as when it passed from / s hands of the great ‘A postFe of Democracy/ to Z Father of our Constitution. “ To the duties which I have enumerated,„ ‘ proper, in my opinion, to be formed by a T dent, elected by the opposition to the preset-1 ■ administration, [and which are, as I oeliew,ojf constitutional obligation.] I will add anothc 1 j which I believe also to be of much important PI j 1 mean the observance of the most conciliate ; course of conduct towards our political opponent! After the censure which our friends have sofof. j ly and so justly bestowed upon the present chief * Magistrate, for having in no inconsiderable lV j g rce > disfranchised the whole body politic, j al opponents, I am certain tliat no oppositionist, | true to the principles he professes, would aj! I* prove a similar course of conduct in the person ■: whom his vote has contributed io elect. Fn y Republic, one of the surest tests of a heahkt i state of its institutions, is to be found in the ini munity with which every eitiacn may, upon all occasions, express his political opinions and evet his prejudices, in the discharge of his duty as electin'. “The question may perhaps be asked of me what security I have in my power to ofler, if the majority of the American people should select me for their chief Magistrate, that I would adopt the principles which I have herein laid down as those upon which my administrate would lie conducted ; I could only answer by 1 referring to my conduct, am? the dispositic! 1 manifested, in the discharge of the duties of sev. i eral important offices which have heretofore bee; j conferred upon me. If the power placed in rav i hands has, on even a single occasion, been used 1 for any purpose other than that for which it was 1 given, or retained longer than necessary tc ac- complish the objects designated by those from t ! whom the trusts were received, X will acknow- ] ledge that either will constitute a sufficient reason 1 for discrediting any promise I may make, under « the circumstances in which lam now placed. < I am, dear sir, truly yours, , 1 WM. H. HARRISON. J To Hon. Habmab Db.vsx, j c From theNetc Orleans Bulletin, I Florida War* * Last Attack or the Indians.— A gem’* c man, resident of this city, just arrived from Flo;-! a rida, has furnished us with the following accoumj J of a bold attack of the Indians on a steam boat.! J The steam boat Irwinton, Capt. Brown, from j, Apalachicola bound to Columbus, when below | the town of Irwinton, and above the military i post, was fired into from the shore, by Indians, f The Irwinton had 15 passengers, 3of whoo were ladies—Mr. Brooks and family, Mr. Ham- * ilton, wife and child (for New York), Judas i Spang, Mr. Metchner ot Geo. and others. Capt ’ Brown, having perceived several smokes on shore, s suspected Indians were in the neighbor Hood, and s advised his passengers to retire to the cabin j s They had only done so. when a volley was fired,! I killed the cabin boy, named John Gill, of Phts-l 11 burg. The Indians fired from both shores.- J Some of the bullets passed through the cabii . and the passengers threw themselves upon tbej { floor, and escaped the shots. The pilots also cast , themselves upon the deck, and were unhurt. I The Captain was at this time below crowdin? I the fires. An alarm was now given that the boil J was crowded with Indians, “and we are lost.” ; Alongside of the boat was a loaded barge whickji she was towing up, on which they first got, an! Is then entered the steamer. Eleven of these scowk diels came off in a canoe, three of whom, re * jumping to the barge, capsized the canoe the other eight, who were passed floating dowa. * Two of the Indians who got on board the Invur ton, were killed by the engineer aud mate, who | knocked them down with wrenches,and threw J them into the wheel, where they were torn tope- <1 ces. The third, who appeared to he the leader, and | who supposed his men were with him, enteral t the cabin calling loudly to the others to follow : . him. Most of the passengers had hid themselKsJ 1 and the Indian posted himself at the head of tbef table, apparently waiting a moment for reinforced ] merit. Mr. P. Henricks seized a chair, as tb«| ; only weapon of defence at hand, when thechiej j threw a chair at him across the table. Mr. Meld-1 1 ner, of Randolph county. Geo., a stout manff j i about fifty years of age, then clasped the IndianK J in his arms from behind, and endeavored to lore* I i him out of the cabin, but was not able. At this j # time the mate came in and stabbed him in the ab‘ domen, and throwed him also in the wheel. Judge X Spang continued at the wheel, assisting andec- » < couraging the pilots during the whole affair. - c From the Savannah Georgian. r From Florida. Fort J. R. Smith, June3o, 1810. j On the 29th inst. as a train of six U corted by six men, under the command el a not [ | commissioned officer,) in proceeding from P O,l Fanning to Fort McCrabb, they were fired up°° [ | by a party of twenty Indians, concealed nearly f Town Hammocks. The Wagon Master, | was ahead of the train, had his horse shot m 0 I under him. One mule belonging to the train | j killed, but no man injured. The i#dians carri r off the wagon covers, and finding themselves p u - f « sued by a party of regulars, sent out for tbaJP Ul J pose, crossed the Suwannee above Old f A detachment of regulars are now hot in P u ‘ sU **’ £ :: and it is to be hoped their efforts to^' them may prove successful. In haste. When I am at a Whig meeting, I ly put my band upon my pocket. — Dr. Dun M Pshaw, Doctor I Nobody wishes to ste your whiskey bottle.— Prentice. 1 Important Jcihcial Decisions. —An acU was brought in the Supreme Court of i setts, on Tuesday last, on a post note for» ’ ( which had been presented on the morning 0 | l ! last day of grace, but being refused by the cas J was protested, and an attachment im® e Si made. The question was whether an acl ! oll n |l , be brought on a post note, payable on a gn|- a f l| before the expiration of banking hours on i | The Chiefjustice gave it asthe opinionott * that a note was saleable on any part olihe | , which it was due. oU rt, J It has also been decided by the sam ® t S’ that where the promise of a note P a * d efl ; of S certain, day contracts not to demand pa> a 1 ! it until a certain time after its matu . n y ’ oD tb* fl t 1 not prevent his recovering