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y tion has been largely increased bv mechanical inventions, better trans portation facilities, and the like Ihis argument wi 1 not bear close analysis. 'I hat there has been any greater increase smce 1873 than for tie pieceding twenty years has not yet been proved. It rests upon mere assumption and the dexterous man ipulation of figures. Taking the I mted States alone and estimating the increase in proportion to popula tion it is shown that we have a larger excess of cereals and breadstuffs than formerly. This is an unfair, or at least faulty, method, because the fall in prices has not been confined to this country, and taking the commercial world as a whole the production is no greater per capita than it was twenty or twenty-five years ago. Wheat has always been regarded as a safer test •of value than any other commodity and a steadier quantity in economics than even gold or silver. In my speech of Juno 7, 1890, I gave the figures showing the wheat crops of Europe and America by decades and periods of five years from 1870 down to 1888. Those figures were care fully taken from various standard authorities, and I have no reason to doubt their accuracy. The state ment being as pertinent now as then, I will reproduce it: From 1870 to 1880 the annual average was 1,287,000,000 bushe’e; from 1875 to 1884 the average was 1,249,000,000 bush els ; in 1883, 1,267,000,600; in 1884 1 377,- 000,080; in 1885, 1,204,000,000; in 1886, 1.173,000,000; in 1887, 1,259,000,000; in 1888, 1 224,000,000. For the decade first named the average annual production of the United States was about 328,000,000 bushels, making a total average for the two continents of about 1,625,000,000 bushels. For the five years ending with 1888 the average crop of Europe was 1 247 000,000; of the United States, 440,000,000, making a to tal average of 1,687,000,000, an increase of about 62,000,000 But it is entirely safe to say that the population of Europe and America increased within that time 26,000,000: To have kept pace with the population 3he increase of wheat should have been >600,000,000 bushels, whereas it was only 12,000,000, so that there has actually been a falling off in the production of this great cereal, the price of which is con sidered by all economists the surest ba rometer of the general scale of prices. I may add that in 1889 the product ■of Europe was 1,203,000,000 bushels, and that of America 490,000,000, 1,093,000,000 in all, about 0,000,000 more than the average of the preced ing five years. It no more than kept pace with the increase of population. Even including the importations from India and Australia, I do not think it is possible to figure out any material increase in the wheat sup ply of Europe and America. And yet there are very few commoditiees that have fallen in a greater ratio than wheat, and nothing has caused more distress throughout the agricul tural regions of the country except the fall in the price of cotton. There has been considerable in crease in the product of cotton in America, which is the chief source of European supply; but it must be remembered that cotton being a raw material used in manufacture the product may increase almost indefin itely, and consumption move right along with equal pace. And so it Ivould had not the purchasing power of the people been crippled by a diminution of the money with w’hich to make payment. In the case of such a commodity as cotton goods, when the money supply falls short, people w r ill naturally reduce their purchases to the lowest possible point. But the people must eat, and the wheat has all been consumed. This great cereal has not increased in proportion to population and use, but it evidently has increased relatively to something, and that something is money—the instru ment which measures the wheat. The argument that prices have fallen because of increased production car ries with it the admission that money has not increased in the same ratio. If we ask what controls the price of wheat, we are instantly told “supply and demand.” But when two things are pitted against each other in a trade, the law of supply and demand applies to both. What is it that makes wheat worth a dollar a bushel? Why simply this: the supply of w T heat and the demand for it, and the supply of money and the demand for it, are such that in the popular -estimate they just balanced by a dol lar of the one and a bushel of the other. This suggests the query: Why should not money increase with the increase of products. I am not able to see how any principle of natural justice would be violated by such increase. [Applause.] True, a certain product might be suddenly and enormously increased by some extraordinary circumstance. I do not mean that the supply of money should be increased to meet such a case, because that would throw it out of proportion to other things. But, striking a fair average of the increase of products, I can see no reason why money should not in crease pro rata, thus preserving the general average of prices. The maintenance of absolute equality in such matters is, of course impossible, but in the way I have suggested, it seems to me that a fair approxima tion would be reached. With an in creased production ami a stationary or diminished demand the price of some things would fall, while that of others would rise from opposite con ditions. But these variations would be ad justed by the business instincts of man. If the price of one thing rose very much, more people would en gage in its production, and the price would fall to the general level. On the other hand, if the price of a par ticular commodity fall, some of the producers will engage in other pur suits, the product will diminish and the price rise again to the general level. But where prices are nearly all falling together it is impossible for any such adjustment to take place. COMMODITIES AND LABOR. It is claimed that commodities ought to be cheaper now, because it takes less labor to produce them. That is bad logic, and the economics of the proposition are still worse. If it takes less labor to produce a given commodity, that may be a good reason why the commodity should exchange for less labor, but it is no reason why it should ex change for less money. Money and labor are by no means identical. For the money price of commodi ties to fall as production increases would have the effect of keeping the producer in the same condition, while the possessor of money, and particularly one who has a large amount of it, would realize a great and unconscionable advantage. In this connection 1 want to read a brief extract from a speech by Prof. Taussig, a strong advocate of the gold standard, recently delivered before the Liberal Club of Buffalo, as reported in the Buffalo Express : The fall had been attributed to im proved methods of production, better machinery and cheaper transportation. Personally, the speaker had never been able to find in improved methods of pro duction per se any time explanation of the fall in prices. Commodities had fallen in price, but there was one crucial exception to the general tendency, namely, in regard to money incomes which had not fallen. Tnis was a very important consideration and put a very different face on the relations between debtor and creditor. The former gave back, it was true, the same amount, j ielding a command over more commod ities. The creditor got more than he gave, but on the other hand the debtor had not suffered, his money income was as large as it was before. Here is a distinct recognition of three things: First, that prices have fallen ; second, that improved meth ods of production, etc., have not been the cause, and third, that all the benefit of the change has gone to the creditor. But he says the debtor has not been injured. Whether he has been directly injured or not, he has a good right to complain, for if any benefit accrue to the nation as a whole, the debtor surely ought to receive his share. Let us take a simple illustration to show how this change will work between the man who happens to have money and the producer. We will suppose a community of 101 persons. One of them has SIOO,- 000 in money. The other 100 have no money and are fanners engaged in the production of wheat. Farm ing by the most primitive methods, they produce 1,000 bushels each, worth $1 a bushel, making the total value of their product SIOO,OOO. The man. with the money can buy it all. Now, we will further suppose that by the application of more labor, or, if you please, better methods, they increase their product to 1,500 bushels each, making altogether 150,000 bushels. If the price fall in proportion to the increase, the wheat will now sell for 66| cents per bushel, in all, SIOO,OOO. The man with the money, who has done nothing but watch his dollars and see them grow, can still buy the whole of it. It may be said that as each producer gets SI,OOO of greater purchasing power than formerly, he can procure more of those things whicn he has to buy, and in this way realize a benefit. If this be true it does not obviate the glaring injustice of allowing the miser, doing nothing that is useful to others but simply gloating over his gold, to command 50 per cent, more of the products of other men's labor. A dollar should be no bigger one year than it is another. Besides, if that farmer happens to be heavily in debt he has to pay back just the same number of dollars, no matter how much they may appreciate in value, €nd to this extent he loses all the advantages that would have naturally come to him through the increase of his product. The wrong becomes very much greater though when we consider the caso of the farmer as it actually is. I have sup posed him to have increased his crop, so as to realize the same num ber of dollars. But in fact the far mer can seldom do this. There is a limit to his acres and a limit to the capacity of the soil. Any consider able increase of a given staple is usually the result of bringing more land under cultivation, which in volves the application of more labor or the use of expensive machinery. Now, suppose in the case I have taken the 100 farmers are increased to 150, each producing 1,000 bushels. The price falls to 66f cents, and the owner of the SIOO,OOO commands the product of the labor of 150 men in stead of 100 as before. Each farmer now receives $666,- 66? f instead of SI,OOO. He has lost 33J per cent. “No,” it is said, “he has not lost anything because he can now buy as much with $666 as he formerly could with $1,000.” Per haps he can and perhaps he can not. If all his business be cash, his pur chases just equaling his sales, and everything that he buys falls in the ' same ratio, he neither gains nor loses. But none of these conditions obtain. Everything does not fall in the same ratio. Some things, such as taxes and other expenses in the nature of fixed charges, do not come down at all. The chief fall has been in the great staples, raw materials, as they are generally termed. Again his purchases and sales are not just equal. If the producer realize any profit he must in the na ture of things sell more than he buys. Consequently a fell in prices hurts him more than it helps him. Finally, his business is not all cash; and right here intervenes this ele ment of credit which it is claimed has made silver unnecessary in the monetary system of the w r orld. The great majority of farmers are more or less in debt; some of them heavily. If one has a mortgage of $2,000 on his farm, the value of his crop at a dollar a bushel will pay it in two years ; at G 65 cents per bushel it will take the value of three years’ crops to accomplish the same result. And this principle holds good wher ever deferred payments are to be made. The proportions may vary, but with prices continually falling, the man who incurs a debt always pays it in money that is dearer and more difficult to get than the money of the contract. So that the vast edifice of credit, invoked as an an swer to our demand for free coinage, instead of relieving the situation is the prime cause of the inequity which grows out of a shrinking volume of actual money. * * * * * * * THE GRESHAM LAW. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Cockran] and others, have re ferred to the Gresham law, but not one of them seems to have grasped the true principle involved in the so called law. People speak of the Gresham law very much as they would of the cholera, yellow fever, or small pox. One would think it was a sort of a financial pestilence laden with dis honor and death. What is this dread ful thing? In order to determine just how far it will apply to the cur rency under free coinage we must understand the precise question with which Sir Thomas Gresham was dealing; and then we will be in a po sition to consider the harm which came from the operation of the law. At the time that he conducted his investigation the greater part of the currency of England was below the limit of tolerance; that is, below the legal weight. The full-weight coins had nearly all been melted down or shipped abroad. Hence, the cur rency was in a very bad condition. He therefore laid down the maxim that “ bad money drives good out of circulation.” But this is merely a loose generalization and far from be ing an accurate statement of what had really taken place. In the currency of all countries where coin has circulated freely for a long time there is always a great deal of it that is light. This is produced by natural wear and by various fraud ulent methods, clipping, filling and the like. It was so in England. Now, if a gold or silver smith want ed a certain quantity of metal for use in his art he would either purchase bullion or he would utilize the heavi est coins that came into his hands. The man who desired specie for ex port did the same. The effect was to leave a large proportion of light coins in circulation as money. But it is erroneous to say that the light coins “ drove ” the heavy ones out of circulation. There was no “driving” about it. The heavy coins were not melted down or exported merely because they were heavy, but because a cer tain quantity of gold or silver was needed for those purposes. It was not a case of antagonism between heavy-weight coins and light ones; it was a matter of commercial neces sity. Had there been no light coins in the realm there would have been just as many melted and exported, but in the latter case the coin remain ing in circulation would have been equally good. WHAT WAS THE HARM ? As long as the light coins circu lated at par nobody was injured. But as the abrasion and the sweating and clipping increased, a point was finally reached in the life of each coin when somebody would refuse to take it at its nominal value. Then the holder was subjected to a loss, for if he took it to the mint he could only get its value. This is whe, the injury comes in, and it resulted from the fact that the underweight c cin in circulation was not legal tendi r. But under bimetal ism if one metal be shipped out of the country, tlje one that remains is legal tender, full-standard money, which no man is at liberty to refuse so long as it retains its legal weight. But as soon as a coin drops below the weight prescribed by law, it ceases to be money, and it then pre sents the evil which confronted Eng land in the days of Sir Thomas Gresham. [Applause.] * * * * * * RATIOS ARE LEGISLATIVE. Again, not only is the monetary use of gold and silver an artificial one, but when the coinage is free it absolutely controls the market value. The reason is obvious. Under a free coinage a pound of metal is convert ible into a certain number of dollars free of charge. Manifestly it is worth just the number of dollars it will make. And yet some people seem to think that because an ounce of stand ard gold will always coin into $18.65 its value never changes. So the ratios between the metals for the last two or three hundred years have al ways been legal ratios. If all nations had adopted the same ratio, that would have been the uni versal market price. But as the ratios have generally differed, we find small market variations within the limits of the legal ratios of different countries, Prior to 1785 there was not a market in Europe in which the ratio was 15£ to 1. They ranged from a little above 14 to almost 16 to 1, but nowhere was the ratio 154 to 1. In that year it was deemed ad visable to recoin the French Louis. De Colonne, the French minister of finance, advised the ratio of 154 as a fair average. In England it was about 15.[, in Portugal 15£, in Spain 15*|, m France 14f. All the other European ratios were below 15. So, considering that Portugal furnished England with gold, while France drew her silver chiefly from Spain, DeColonne concluded that 154 was the safe ratio for France, and accord ingly recoinago took place at that rate. A little later, when Hamilton was considering the ratio to be adopted by the United States, he concluded that the French ratio was erroneous, and that a just(average*of European ratios was about 15, which was estab lished by the United States. Mr. Hamilton may have been right; 15 to 1 was possibly the true one prior to 1875 ; but Hamilton overlooked the fact that when a great, powerful and wealthy nation like France adopt ed the ratio of 154 that action itself became a tremendous force in fixing the true ratio. As a historical fact it became the absolutely controlling force. The American Republic was then in its infancy, poor and feeble, and its ratio of 15 became a com plete nullity. In 1834, perceiving that a mistake had been made, the American ratio was changed. But instead of placing ourselves in alignment with France, we went to the other extreme, and adopted the ratio of 16, or more ac curately, 15.988. By our first ratio we undervalued gold and overvalued silver; by our second we overvalued gold and undervalued silver. Both were therefore nugatory. But it was only because France was so much richer and more populous than we, and her conditions were such that she was capable of absorbing and using vast quantities of both metals, thereby controlling their relative value. So gentlemen will see that the condition which made silver 3 per cent, more valuable in Europe than in America was an artificial one. Our silver did not go to Europe be cause it was worth more to the sil versmith there, for it was not. The prices of merchandise, including sil verware were generally higher here than m Enrope. It was attracted by the French coining rate. ****** CHANGED CONDITIONS. It is urged, though, that, con ceding force of the action of France prior to 1873, conditions have changed; that neither France n®r any other country could have main tained free coinage with one metal 30 per cent below the other. That is true. If, while the mints were .open freely to both metals on equal terms at a certain ratio, they had gone apart 30 per cent., the coinage of the dearer metals must have stopped. No silver advocate denies that proposition. The trouble with the suggestion is that it is another case of inverted logic. The cart has been put before the horse. It as sumes that silver has fallen 30 per cent, through natural causes, and that therefore the mints are closed to it, while the truth is that the mints were closed first, and that silver fell as an inevitable result. If we are to consult natural con ditions only, it ought to be very much easier to maintain the ratio now than at [ any for 300 years before it was demcne tized. So much is being said about the overproduction of silver that it may surprise many people to learn that silver, relatively to gold, instead of having enormously increased, has very greatly diminished. When America was discovered the quanti ty of silver in Europe was forty times as great as the quanttiy of gold. I am speaking of the metals by weight. From that time until the year 1800 the quantity of silver ex ceeded that of gold in the propor tion of at least 45 to 1, taking the period as a whole; and for a large portion of the time it reached 60 or 65 to 1, never falling below 30 to 1. In 1803, according to the En cycopedia Britannica, the annual production was 53 to 1. From 1800 to 1810, according to Dr. Soetbeer, the product by value was in the ratio of 77.2 to 22.8, about 5t to 1 by quantity, while Dean Horton states that in 1810 the total quanti ty by weight in the hands of man was about 45 to 1. The quantity of gold then gradually increased until 1850, when the relative quantity as given by Mullhall was 32 to 1. So that from 1492 down to 1850, three hundred and fifty-eight years, the weight of silver never exceeded that of the gold less than 30 to 1, some times reachiug, as I have said, 65 to 1. In 1885, according to Mullhall again, the proportions of the two metals were 19 to 1, the change having been brought about by tre mendous yield of the California and Australian gold mines. Other in vestigators estimate the relative quantity at 16 to 1, and this seems to be just about the relation of the gold and silver coms. Now, if France could sustain the raito of 15.1 in the face of a supply of 45, how much easier ought it to be for us to sustain the ratio of 16 when con fronted with a supply of very nearly the same ratio. It is said though that silver has increased greatly in quantity sinee 187®. True. It has more than doubled in annual production, but the agregate quantity relative to gold in 1885 was, as 1 have stated, from 16 to 19 to 1. Short periods of production are an unsafe guide, because the precious metals have always been produced by spurts. From 1850 to 1870 the production of gold increas ed nearly 400 per cent., but open mints absorbed it, and there was no appreciable fall in value. ***** EFFECT OF FREE COINAGE UPON THE CURRENCY. My friend from lowa, [Mr. Dol liver,] wishes to know whether this will be depreciate the currency. The “70 cents” that is talked of so much here as the value ©f the silver dollar is merely the price of the uncoined and uncoinable bullion. After we establish free coinage, will not that silver possess every quality which it possesses now, and, in addition, the power of paying debts? Hence, it must be more valuable than the uncoined bullion of today. My judgement is that the first effect will be to bring silver bullion and silver coin in an abso lute parity. Then the silver coin having exactly the same functions that the gold coin has the silver coin and the geld coin will have the same value with reference to each other. (Applause.) But the restoration of silver to the position of full standard money will multiply the number of units of standard money, and thus bring down the value of every dollar both gold and silver. Just how much of course no human being can tell, because questions of this kind can not be solved upon mathematical lines, but that is my theory. (Ap plause. Mr. Doliver. How far does the gentlemen think this proposed leg islation will expand the volume of the currency? Mr. Bartine. I do not think it would add very much to the number of dollars except as by taking the bullion at its coining rate instead of its bullion value, we would get this difference into our currency. The report ©f the majority shows that this difference would be about $22,- 000,000, but the effect overreaches that completely. By the legislation which demonetized silver it was re duced to the grade of token money, not only in America, but in Europe as well. Now, if we restore the silver bullion to a parity with the coin, ipso facto we substantially re store the character and value of silver money, not merely in our own country, but all over the continent of Europe. At the present time every great banking centre looks to its gold reserve as the support of credit, and it is estimated that nine-tenths of the business of the world is transacted on a credit basis At this time there is about $1,500,- 000,000 of silver coin in Europe and America. If it is no longer a sup • port of credit it has been deprived of nine-tenths of its power as money; that is to say, it has lost $1,350,000,- 000 of its value. That estimate though goes too far, because silver certainly does support credit to some extent, especially in the smaller transactions of the people. But if we assume that it has been deprived of its power, as a support of credit then the effect of remone tizing it would be to re-enforce the currency of the two continents by substantially $900,000,000 of stan dard coin. Money thrown into the circulation of Europe would bene fit this country also, because by in creasing the circulation in Europe it would increase the power of for eign countries to buy our commodi ties and in that way would raise the prices of American products. [Ap plause.] AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. This is the latest fad with every body who is opposed to free coin age. The minority of the commit tee present a measure looking to such an agreemant for the consider ation of the House. It is peculiar to this controversy that our op ponents always have some counter proposition which they claim to be in the interest of silver. For my part, I have no confidence whatever m the good faith of a large majori ty of those who are shouting for an international conference. We do not look for safe advocates of protection in the ranks of the freetraders; neither do we turn to the cohorts of protection to find the reliable champions of free trade. We who are urging free coinage may be fanatics and cranks, but, thanks be to God we are not fools enough to believe that the only true friends of bimetallism and silver are to be found among those who des troyed the double standard, and who have been denouncing, deriding, dis crediting, and disparaging the silver dollar ever since its ceinage was re sumed in 1878. [Applause.] If silver is ever restored it will be by its friends and not by its ene mies. If they are sincere, then it is a complete abandonment of every essential principle for which they have been contending for the last fifteen or twenty years. You may rake the whole broad field of econo mic literature and not find a case in which the advocates of a particular policy have so ingloriously surren dered. What becomes of the den unciation of the “infamous and thieving silver miner, trying to arti ficially enhance the value of his pro duct?” If silver be restored by interna tional agreement, will not such agreement be a purely ’artificial thing? And if silver be thus restor ed, will it not benefit the miner as much as if it be done by the United States alone? Because if there should be an international agree ment, it is almost certain to be upon the ratio of which would make silver worth 3 per cent, more than at the ratio of 16, which we propose to give it. What becomes of the time worn argument that values can not be controlled by legislation? What is international agreement but legislation in which two or more countries of all the twaddle about the importancy ®f fiat and the government stamp? What be comes of the claim that there is an abundance of gold for the business requirements of the world, and that we only need silver for small change. If there is an abundance of money, why have an international agree ment give us more? What becomes of the “intrinsic unchangeable value of gold?” If that value be intrinsic and unchangeable, how can it pos sibly be affected by an international agreement? What becomes of the great economic principle recently discovered that silver has depreciat ed because it only costs 40 cents an ounce to produce it? Can it be that an international agreement is going to increase the price of producing silver? There is not, I repeat, a single substantial argument going to prin ciples involved in this problem that is not totally abandoned when our opponents declare themselves in favor of an international agreement. The whole question resolves itself into one of quantity or force; and the ability of the United States alone to restore the parity is the only real issue between us. Now, then, if our opponents have been wrong upon every question of princi ple, is it not possible that they may also be wrong as to the question of quantity? In all the speeches or writings that I have heard or read, I have never yet seen a systematic attempt by facts and figures to prove the inability of the United States to solve this problem by its own unaided action. Those speech es and writings consist mainly of glittering generalities, worn-out platitudes, and passionate appeals to prejudice, which would be entirely devoid of weight in discussion of a great economic question like this. The silver men have no objections (Concluded on sixth