Newspaper Page Text
8
f-yggg ..■.■i-’ J* r }Yom the Selma Times. u
Living and Crowned.
&GBP*Wk?ii wP*sj —'
TO SELMa’s SErULOIIRRED SENTINELS.
OY 8. K. PHILLIPS.
i-wwgy
They are not dead, however cold,
-v*V And mute their lips may be;
Tliey are not gone, tho’ they have cross’d,
The confines of life’s sea,
They have not ceas’d their noble work,
Tho’ o’er the silent breast,
Their pulseless hands are folded fast.
In pure, unconscious rest.
They live, thank God, in ev’ry breeze,
That sweeps o’er peak and plain.
Live scepter’d lives; no miter’d king,
Hath such triumphant reign.
Back from the emerald strand they tread,
Upon each breeze is borne,
Impmal accents, bidding hope,
Tho’ hope seems most forlorn.
They walk the earth, tho' all unseen,
But we do feel them near,
In the accruing strength that comes,
In moments of desj^air.
Then we arise, oh, God, how strong 1
With what sublime a faith
We grasp the thought that life is reach’d,
But thro’ the gates of death.
How so ? within these sepuleres,
The dormant germ doth lie,
Whose golden fruitage time shall come:— *
The birth of Liberty.
Live 1 yes, for ev’ry Southland soul,
That hath not bent the knee—
That dares to stand erect and face,
The frown of tyranny.
Doth in those deeper undertones,
That 6weep his inner life,
Feel their strong hands have touched the cords
To notes of patriot strife.
Go ask the Polish heart to-day
If Kosciusko’s dead ?
'Twill say that it doth ever hear,
His martial voice and tread.
Among old Scotland's rock-ribb’d hills,
W here’er your eyes may ti r,i,
The answer comes; Death cannot touch,
Nor Bruce nor Bannockurn.
And Erin fetter’d to the earth,
Doth ever hear and see,
The voice and forms that were her pride—
O’Brien and McGhee.
Such never die. If no where else,
In tree, and fruit, and flower
Their spirits go—are reproduc’d,
When God appoints the hour.
Living and crown’d, and looking down
From far off pearly globes,
(Some in the soldier garb they wore,
And some in priestly robes.)
They are pillars of clouds by day,
And pillars of fire by night—
Unerring guides for Southern souls,
To honor, truth and right.
Selma, Ala., April 2d, 18(i9.
Iltc Jest
GENERAL LEE AT GETTYSBURG
FROM A YANKEE STANDPOINT.
An Unpublished Chapter of War
History—Gen Lee's Report of the
Invasion of Pennsylvania and Battle
of Gettysburg.
The forthcoming number of the His
torical Magazine will contain a document
of marked interest to all who concern
themselves with the history of the late
w r ar. This document is Gen. Lee’s full
official report of the. “Invasion of Penn
sylvania and the Battle of Gettysbury.”
It has never been published and is com
miunicated from the original manuscrip
tion in the possession of Mr. Win.
Swinton.
It was the habit of Gen. Lee to pub
lish brief premiminary accounts of his
military operations as speedily as possible
after the occurrence; and subsequently,
at his leisure, to prepare full official re
ports. Such a brief preliminary account
of the great Pennsylvania campaign
of 1863. was made public on the return
of the Confederate army to Virginia,
after that campaign. Gen. Lee, however,
never found opportunity to write his
complete and final report till the winter
of 1864—5, when he lay within the lines
of Petesrsburg, beseiged by Grant During
the retreat from Petersburg and Rich
mond in April, 1865, all the papers be
longing to the Confederate commander
were burnt in one of the headquarters’
wagons, which was fired by the persons
in charge, under the anticipation that
it would fall into the hands of the Union
force. It happened, however, that the
manuscript report of the invasion of
Pennsylvania and the battle of Gettys
burg was on the person of one of Gen-
Lee’s staff officers. Thus preserved, it
now sees the light for the first time.
The report is very elaborate and much
too lengthy for any other than a brief
digest here. It begins with an account
of the manoeuvres put in practice by
Gen. Lee with the view of drawing the
Union army under Ilooker 'from its de
fensive position nlong the line of the
Rappahannock, and then proceeds to
sketch the subsequent operations of the
Confederate army up to the time of cros
sing the Potomac. The general object
ot the campaign is thus stated:
“1 pon the retreat of tiie Federal army,
commanded by Major. Gen. Hooker,
from Chancellorsville, it occupied the
ground north of the Rappahannock op
positc Fredericksburg, where it could not
be attacked except at a disadvantage.
“It was determined to draw it from
this position, and, if trans
fer the scene of hostilities bevond the
Potomac. The execution of this pur
pose also embraced the expulsion of the
force under Gen. Milroy, which had in
fested the lower Shenandoah Valley
during the preceding winter and spring-
If unable to attain the valuable result
which might be expected to follow a
decided advantage gained over the
enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it
was hoped that we should at least so far
disturb his plans for the summer cam
paign as to prevent its execution during
the season of active operations.”
It appears that the initial movements
of the campaign begun, as early as
the first week in June, 1863, at which
time the commands of Gen Longstreet
and Gen. Ewell were secretly transferred
to Culpepper Courthouse. After a while
Hooker became suspicious that something
had taken place, and accordingly he
threw a reconnoitering force across the
Rappahannock below Fredericksburg;
but, says Gen. Lee, “Hill’s corps was
left to watch these troops, with instruc
tions to follow the movements of tho
(Confederate) army as soon as they
should retire. Under this mask, Ewell
shot rapidly across into the Shenandoah
Valley, and marching quickly northward
overwhelmed Milroy at Winchester, and
opened the gateway to the passage of the
Potonax The result of these preliminary
operations in the Valley is thus summed
up by Gen. Lee:
“These operations resulted in the ex
pulsion of the enemy from the Valley,
the capture of four thousand prisoners,
with a corresponding number of small
arms, twenty-eight pieces of superior ar
tillery, including those taken by Gen.
Rodes and Gen. Hays, about three hun
dred wagons and as many horses, to
gether with a considerable quantity of
ordnance, commissary and quartermas
ter’s stores. Our entire loss was forty
seven killed, two hundred and nineteen
wounded and six missing.”
At the time that Ewell was operating
in the Valley, anther role was assigned
Longstreet “In order to mislead Hooker
as to our intentions/’ says Gen. Lee,
Longstreet left Culpeper Courthouse on
the 15th of June, and advancing along
the eastern side of the Blue Ridge oe*
cupiod Ashley’s and Snicker’s Gaps.”
The effect of this manoeuvre was to at
tract Hooker’s attention toward the Blue
Ridge and leave him in grave doubt as to
whether his enemy designed crossing the
Potomac into Maryland, or
the rear of the Union army in case it
should cross. While Hooker was thuskept
in suspense, the van of Gen. Lee’s army
under Ewell, passed the Potomac, and,
traversing Maryland, reached Cham
bersburg. The situation of the Union
army is thus depicted by Gen. Lee:
“The Federal Army was apparently
guarding thej approaches to Washing
ton, and manifested no disposition to as
sume the offensive. In the meantime the
progress of Ewell, who was already in
Maryland, with Jenkins’ cavalry, ad
vanced in Pennsylvania as far as Cham
bersburg, rendered it necessary that the
rest of the army should be within sup
porting distance; and Hill having reach
ed the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn
to the west side of the Shenandoah, and
the two corps encamped near Berryville.
“Gen. Stuart was directed to hold the
mountain passes with part of his com
mand, as long as the enemy remained
south of the Potomac; and with the re
mainder, to cross into Maryland and
place himself on the right of Gen. Ewell.
Upon the suggestion of the former officer
that he could damage the feneiny and
delay his passage of the river by get
ting in his rear, he was authorized to do
so; and it was left to his discretion
whether to enter Maryland east or west
of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed
to lose no time in placing his command
on the right of our column, as soon as he
should perceive the enemy moving
northward.
“On the 22d Gen. Ewell marched into
Pennsylvania with Rodes’ and Johnson’s
divisions, preceded by Jenkins’ cavalry
taking the road from Hagerstown,
through Chambersburg, to Carlislet
where he arrived on the 27th. Early’s
division, which had occupied Boonsbor
ough, moved by a parallel road to
Greenwood; and, in pursuance of instruc
tions previously given, Gen. Ewell
marched toward York. On the 24th,
Longstreet and Hill were put in motion
to follow Ewell; and on the 27th he en
camped near Chambersburg.
From the above extract from the
report of Gen. Lee it will be seen that
Longstreet and Hill were at Chambers
burg on the 27th June. Meanwhile how
ever, Ewell has moved northward to
ward the Susqueliaitnah, where Early
was operating at Fork and Carlise. The
purpose of that move will be fully dis-
Milli ng ffEl gOTOSL
closed in the following passage which
throws an entirely new light on the pur
poses of the Confederate commander in
the invasion, and also explains a great
deal of manoeuvring that is otherwise
quite incomprehensible.
“It was excepted that as soon as the
Federal army should cross the Potomac,
Gen. Stuart would give notice of its
movements; and nothing having been
heard from him since our entrance into
Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy
had not yet left Virginia. Orders were
therefore issued to move upon Harris-
burg. The expedition of Gen. Early to
York was designed, in part to prepare
for his undertaking, by breaking the rail
road between Baltimore and Harrisburg,
and seizing the bridges over the Susque
hannah at Wrightsvilie. Gen. Early
succeeded in the first object, destroying a
number of bridges above and below
York; but on the approach of the troops
sent by him to Wrightsvilie, a body of
militia stationed at that place, fled across
the river and bnrnt the bridge in their
retreat. Gen. Early then marched to
rejoin his corps. The advance against
Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence
received from a scout, on the night of
the 28th, to the effect that the army of
Gen. Hooker had crossed the Potomac,
and was aoproacliing the South Moun
tains, In the absence of the cavalry, it
was impossible to ascertain his intentions,
but to deter him from advancing further
west and intercepting our communica
tions from Virginia it was determined to
concentrate the army east of the moun
tains.’'
From this passage the following re
markable facts appear:
1. That Gen. Lee, owing to the
bsence of the cavalry of Stuart, (who,
making a bad botch of his work, had al
lowed the Union army to interpose itself
between him and Gen. Lee’s army during
the whole march northward from the Po
tomac, and had therefore not been able
to follow out his instructions of “placing
himself on Ewell’s,”) was on the night
of the 27th of June, at which time he
was at Chambersburg, not aware that
the Union army had crossed to the north
side of the Potomac. In point of fact,
this move had not only been made, but
on that day, 27th of June, a concentra
tion of the entire Union army had been
effected at Frederick.
2. That Gen. Lee's purpose in his
march into Pennsylvania was to cross
the Susquehannah and move upon Har
risburg, and probably Philadelphia.
This is a stretch cf audacity far beyond
what has been supposed to have been
entertained by the Confederate comman
der. Yet it is rendered manifest by his
own avowal: “Orders were issued to
move upon Harrisburg.” The expedi
tion of Early to Y< r : had been designed
to prepare for this undertaking. The
vistas of possibility opened up by this
bold design heighten our conception of
the magnitude and importance of that de
cisive action of Gettysburg, which
checked Gen. Lee in his invasive ardor,
and compelled him to seek safety in a
retreat into Virginia.
3 That lie was prevented from cary
ing this plan into execution bv a curious
error. He heard through a scout, on the
night of the 27th of June, that the Union
army, having crossed the Potomac, “was
approaching the South Mountains.”
This was a movement that would menace
the line of communication of the Con-
federate army; and, in consaquence, Gen.
Lee “determined to concentrate the
army east of the mountains.’, This re
quires a word of explanation. When
Hooker had concentrated his army at
Frederick on the 27th, lie from that point
threw out a force to advance westward
through the passes of the South Moun
tain to Harpers Ferry, at which point he
expected to have this force joined by the
local garrison often thousand men, when
he designed moving this special columu
up the Cumberland Valley to menace
Gen. Lee’s rear. But Ilallcck would not
consent that the Harper’s Ferry garrison
should i tin this force, so it was drawn
hack to Frederick by Hooker. Next day
Hooker was relieved by Meade, who
moved his entire army northward on the
east side of the mountains, toward the
Susquehannah. It thus appears that
by the time when, on the night of the
29th of June, Gen. Lee received the in
formation of this movement, which threa
tened his communications, the move
ment had been entirely abandoned!
The manoeuvres just pointed out make
plain the train of accidental circum
stances which brought about the decisive
conflict of the campaign which took plac
at Gettysburg—a place which certainly
was the objective of neither army, and of
which, indeed, neither the Union nor the
Confederate commander had ever heard.
Mead was moving northward without
knowing scarcely anything of the where
abouts of his enemy, and without very
definite aim save that lie would move
northward tili he should cause Gen. Lee
to unloose his hold of the Susquehannah.
His left flank on this march naturally
skirted Gettysburg. Gen. Lee wrongly
fancying that the Union army was
moving on his line of communication to
wards Harper’s Ferry, resolved, as a
counter move, to march eastward from
Chambersburg to the east side of the
mountains. This line of march inevita
ble brought him to Gettysburg. Thus
it was'that the respective lines of march
of the hostile armies intersected each
other, and it was a matter of fate that the
opposing forces should meet. The point
of deadly encounter was Gettysburg.
Gen, Lee’s description of the three
days action at Gettysburg is ve - y detai-
led, but fragmentary extracts would be
of little value. It is well known that the
action was precipitated unknown to each
commander—it was, in fact, the acciden
tal meeting of two heads of columns. The
enemy was successful on the first days’
attack, and it seems to have been only
after Gen. Lee came on the field, after
this flush of victory, that he seriously
entertained the idea of giving battle,
for he had promised his corps comman
ders that he would not assume atactical
offensive, but would so manoeuvre as to
compel the Union army to attack him.
He says:
“It had not been intended to deliver
a general battle so far from our base
unless attacked; but, coming unexpected
ly upon the whole Federal army, to with
draw through the mountains, with our
extensive trains, would have been
difficult and dangerous. At the same
time, we were unable to wait an attack,
as the country was unfavorabl for collec
ting suplies in the presence of the enemy,
who could rest! ain our foraging parties
by holding the mountain passes with
local and other troops. A battle had,
therefore, become in a measure unavoid
able; and the success already gained
gave hope of a favorable issue.”
Gen. Lee’s plan of battle tor the 2d of
July stands thus in his own words:
“It was determined to make the prin
cipal attack upon the enemy’s left, and
endeavor to gain a position from which
it was thought our artillery could be
brought to bear with effect. Longstreet
was directed to place the divisions ot Me-
Laws and Hood on the right of Hill,
partially enveloping the enemy’s left,
which lie was to drive in. Gen. Hill
was ordered to threaten the enemy’s
centre, to prevent reinforcements bemg
drawn to either wing, and co-operate
with his right division on Longstreet’s
attack. Gen. Ewell was instructed to
make a simultaneous demonstration upon
the enemey’s right, to be converted into
a real attack, should opportunity offer.”
The manner in which this plan was
carried into execution is well known but
this report reveals a multitude of facts
which throw now light on the events of
the day. Thus the failure of Early to
carry the position on the Union right
(Gulp’s Hill) is accounted for by the
failure of expected support on his right.
“Gen. Ewell,”' says he, “had directed
Gen. Rodes to attack in concert with
Gen. Early, covering his right, and had
requested Gen. Lane, then commanding
Pender’s division, to co-operate on the
right of Rodes. When the time to attack
arrived, Gen. Rodes, not having his
troops in position, was unprepared to co
operate with Gen. Early, and before he
could get in readiness, the latter had
been obliged to retire from want of ex
pected support on his right.”
This second day’s action was on the
whole, favorable to the Confederates, or
at least it seemed so, for they had suc
ceeded in disrupting and driving from
its position the entire right wing of the
Union army. Anyhow, the result was
such that Gen. Lee resolved te make an
other attack on the morrow.
“The result of this day’s operation in
duced the belief that, with proper con
cert of action and with the increased
support that the positions gained on the
right would enable the artillery to render
the assaulting columns, we should ultima
tely succeed, and it was accordingly de
termined to continue the attack.
“The general plan was unchanged.
Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett’s three
brigades, which arrived near the battle
field during the afternoon of the 2d, was
ordered to attack the next morning; and
Gen. Ewell was ordered to assail the
enemy’s right at the same time. The
latter, during the night, reinforced Gen.
Johnson with two brigades and on e
from Early s division.”
The grand attack of the thrid day
(July 3) is given with great minuteness
of tactical detail; and this description,
taken in consideration with the official
reports of our own officers, renders the
whole course of the battle unusually in
telligible. We have room, however, for
no more than the following concise ac
count of Pickett’s famous charge on
Hancock’s line:
“The troops moved steadily on, under
a heavy fire of musketry and artillery;
the main attack being directed again.st
the enemy’s left centre. His batteries
reopened as soon as they appeared.
Our own, having nearly exhausted their
ammunication in the protracted cannon
ade that preceded the advance of the in
fantry, were unable to reply or render
the necessary support to the attacking
party. Owing to this fact, which was
unknowing to me when the assault took
place, the enemy was enabled to throw
a strong force of infantry against our left,
already wavering under a concentrated
fire of artillery from the ridge in front,
and from Cemetery Hill on the left. It
finaly gave away; and the right, after
penetrating the enemy’s fines, eutering
his advanced works and capturing some
of his artillery, was attacked, simultaneou
sly in front and on both flanks, and driven
back with heavy loss. The troops were
rallied and reformed, but the enemy
did not pursue.”
“THE EDGEFIELD MONUMENT AND
CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION”
LET THEM NOT PERISH FROM OUR HEARTS.
Last week we gave notice of a Meet
ing of the citizens of Edgefield District,
to be held in the grove of the Male Aca
demy, on Saturday next, 17th inst, for
the purpose of organizing the above
named Association.
And in that notice, we said, as we had
been requested to do: “The object of the
Association will be to raise funds, by a
general contribution, to erect a suitable
Monument in the Public Square to all
who perished in the late war, with their
names inscribed on the Monument, — and
to the mO't prominent citizens who
hare died in the District. The further
object will also be to extend aid to the
indigent orphans and widows of deceased
soldiers-”
Now as regards the placing upon this
Soldiers' Monument the names of
“prominent citizens,’’ it would be, incur
humble opinion, a complete marring of
the beauty and individuality of the de
sign. Within the least fifty years, how
many prominent citizens have died in
Edgefield District? We are proud to say
their name is legion. Quite enough to
require a sole and separate monument.
But without arguing the case further,
wc hope we may be allowed to suggest
that this monument be in memory of all
the Soldiers of Edgefield District who
perished in the late war; and of them
alone. Os those men who were once“ as
tameless as the winter flood.” It is meet
that we should wear away our hearts
in thinking on their glory and their fall.
The weary marches, the hungry bivouac,
the scanty blankets wet witli driven
sleet, the sleepless outpost, the listlqss
ness of camp, the vain longings for the
loved at home, the noble strife, the hope
less, unavailing, but stili glorious death!
“And Oh! to think how bright and
swift they were, And now how cold and
still!”
And what glory has the South now
save that which is past and gone? Her
childrens’ heads are bent beneath the
yoke in bitter silence!
Edgefield’s glory in the heroes fwh >
poured out their wasted lives in a noble
but broken causes, is proud and great.
Let them not perish from our hearts!
And let their names not perish lioni
our gaze!
And let their widows and orphans not
perish from our memories and sympa
thies!
Edgefield (S. C.)Advertiser Ap. lb
True to the Cause. —The following
is the reply of General Early to th
citizens ot Lynchburg, Va. :
Gentlemen The honor to which yen
have done me, by proposing to welcome
my return to my native State by a com
plimentary dinner, has been most grati
fying to my feelings, and had my return
taken place under more happy auspices,
it would have afforded me great pleasure
to accept your invitation; but in view
of the condition of our unfortunate corn
try, and for reasons which I am sure you
will understand without a particular
specification of them, I am constraine t
to decline the proposed entertainment.
In doing so, 1 desire to express to you
my most heartfelt thanks for the cordi a:
greeting you have given me, individual!'
and collectively, and to assure you that
neither in wandering abroad, nor on my
return, have I seen any cause to abate
in attachment to the land of my birth
or to waver in devotion to the principle-'
which actuated us in our late struggle
for all that was dear.
It is the hour of defeat and adversity
that really tries the hearts and soms y
men, and those who shall have pa-"* 1
through all its temptations without an
abandonment of honor or principle
be entitled in the end to be regarded y
the true heroes of our cause. \ cry tiul t .
and respectfully yours.
J. A. Early-