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[PRICE 5 CENTS.] IT! ,- HAYES,Kditok and Proprietor abtebtising. insertion; 50 cenfc for each ^M.f-S'soShundred; eubecripdon (by mall 1 ‘ 4in ixir annum; single copies, 5 cents. p: ST. ivcrti^eiSSte must be paid for at the Counting rim D«vi008 to Insertion, and if handed in by 8 p. -5if nmxmr in the moruing edition. A V ANNAH, GEORGIA. i « *■ « FI)M> PAY OCT - l3th ? T.wm MATTES ON EVEBY PAGE. y JOB GSNERUS SHERMAN AND BUELL. TSI first gamfaiq-n THE WEST- OF "Who Should Have the Credit of Originating the Plan ? Letter irom General Buell. THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GtNERALS IIALLECK, M’CLELLAN, AND BUELL, AND THE PRESIDENT. Interesting Ac., Official &C.,~ ' Documents, Ac., \j, r , r (lateral IK. T. Sherman and the Spring Campaign of 1802 in the West. Major Genera! Sherman, in a recent dis course at an entertainment given to him in 8t. L.uis lias undertaken to settle the question as to who originated the plan of campaign which resulted in the capture of Fort Iftnry, Fort ] lonelson, Bowliog Green, Nashville, and oth er important points in Kentucky and Tennes see, in the spring of 1862. He explained the matter in these words : _ ■ i remember one evening, np in the old Plan ter's House, sitting with General Halleek and General Cullum, we were talking about this, that, and the other. A map was on the table, and I was explaining the position of the tjoops of the enemy in Kentucky when I came to this State. General Halleek knew well the posi tion here fin Missouri,) and I remember well the question he asked me—the question of the school teacher to bis child—“Sherman, here is the line; how will yon break that line?”— “ Physically, by a perpendicular force."— “Where is the perpendicular?" “The Ten- ne-see river.” General Sherman then adds: "General Halleek is the author of that first beginning, and I give him credit for it with pleasure.’’ Whether, according to this statement, the credit should attach to Gen. Halleek or to General ShermaD, I do not care to enquire; hut I think proper to notice the general prop osition, and I here transcribe official dispatches relating to the question which General Sher man has undertaken to solve. I should pre mie by saying that about the 27th and 30th of November, 1861, two weeks after assuming cummaud in Kentucky, I wrote to General McClellan, then General-in-chief, two letters, of which I have not copies at hand, but which he can, doubtless, produce, sketching a plan of campaign for Kentucky and Tennessee, in which the gunboats and land force under General Halleek were to take part—the same plan as that which I subsequently proposed at less length to General Halleek, and which af terwards was executed. The present provost- marshai-general, General J. B. Fry, then my chief of staff, can testify in regard to those letters, and the following dispateh has nefer- enceto the plan submitted in them : Central McClellan to General Buell. Washington, Dec. 5, 1861. General BueU, Ixmisville : I have again telegraphed Major General Halleek for information as to his gunboats and disposable troops. As soon as I receiver reply, will arrange details with you. Send me draught of water in Cumberland river to Nash ville, and in Tennessee river. Your letter of 3l)th received. (Signed) G. B, McClellan. The plan was approved by General McClellan, and as last as troops and materials were re ceived for as yet I. bad neither army, ordnance, tor transportation-—they were organized and placed in positions-to enter opon its execution, tamely, on.- column at Mnnfordville, on Green river, on the direct road from Louisville to Bowling Green ; one coiumn at Green river on the turnpike from Bardstown to Glasgow ; one at Columbia, and one at Lebanon; while an- tother guarded the lower Green river, and threatened the left flank and rear Of the enemy at BowliDg Green. The columns at Lebanon and Columbia also had reference to . other eventu- alu.es, viz : the movements of Zollicofler’s army, and a possible movement into £q#t Tennessee, *h>ch, from the first, was urged upon me from ” tshington with importunities that almost amounted to orders. : $ - - - - - - While General McClellan was waiting for certain preparations ia the force which was to ^-operate from Missouri, especially the gun- p ats, he was taken ill, and I received the fol- *° w 'ug dispatch from the late President: President Lincoln to Gen. Had 1. Washington, Dec. 13,1801. Major General McClellan is sick. Are Major General Halleek and yourself in concert ? - When feu move on BowliDg Green what hinders it reinforced from Columbus ? Answer, iSigned) A. Lincoln. General Buell to President Lincoln. Locisvillb, December 31, 1862. There is no arrangement between General Hal- and myself. I have been informed by Ma- General McClellan that he would make suita ble disposition for concerted action. There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being rein forced from Coiubus, if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place. D C. Buell. President Lincoln to General BuelL . Washington, January 1, 1862. Major General McClellan should not be dig. „ eil wi, h business. I think you better get in oncert with Major General Hailcck at onoe. I "<= you to-night. I also telegraph and write ,L r General H. W. Halleek. ;;'« Ded i A. Lincoln. consequence of these dispatohes, the follow* 1 ^correspondencepassed between General Htl* B.h i r mjself - M? first dispatch to General inav n • r 0&nnot now Pot my hand on. Its tenor “ay be inferred from the reply; General Halleek to General Buell. Cm* in „ „ St. Loom, Jan. 2, 1882. General Buell, Louisville: tio “ a ?„ had oo instructions respecting oo-imera- „ ’ f' 1 “J available troops afein Tbafleld [ j' th " ! « *t Cairo and Padueah, which are te. E r nt h o,rwt ! B co, ^«. *~k. hence I bopwto bq,*Wf to rtfoiv jou very material assistance, but now useless with- drawgLof sny troops from this State is almost impossible. Write me fully. . v (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General Buetl to General Ffalledk: Head’qbs Dept, op the Ohio, ) Louisville, Jan. 3,1862. j General;—I received your dispatch, and, with more delay than I meant, proceed to the sub ject of it, in compliance with your request, and I may add also at the wish of the President. I do not underrate the difficulties int Missouri, bit I think it is not extravagant to say fh^t fee '■great power of the rebellion in the West is array ed on a front, the flanks of whioh are Columbus and Bowliog Green, and the center about wbtie the railroad between those paints crosses the T«b- nessee and Cumberland rivers; ineludiag Nash ville and the fortified paints below. It is, T have no doubt within bounds to estimate their force on that line at eighty thousand men—including a column about Somerset, Ky., in rear of their right flank, it is more Of this force, forty thousand may be set down as at Bowliog Green; twenty thousand at Colum bus; though you doubtless hare more information on that point than I have; and twenty thousand at the oenter. Considering the railroad facilities which enable the eDemy to concentrate in a few hours on any single point of this front, you will at once see the importance ef a combined attack onjits centre and flanks, or .at least ot demonstra tions which may be converted into real attacks and felly occupy the enemy on the whole frdnt. It is probable that yoa may-have giren the *ub- jeof, »v far ea^olnmbus' aJflfitlC'-peejiir aje eon* corned, »ptcatufatlon tbihtf Khava. With,Infer ence to the former, at least, I can make no more than the general suggestion already; -expressed, that jt should bo fully occupied. f The attack upon the centre should be made by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should say, twenty thonsand men on the two rivers.— They should, of course, be organized with reference to the depth of water in the rivers, and whether they should be of equal or une qual strength would depend upon that and other considerations, and can hardly be deter mined until the moment of departure. The mode of attack must depend npon the strength of the enemy at the several points and the fea tures of the localities. Jt will be of the first importance to break the railroad communica tion, and if possible that should be done by columns moviog rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland apd Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some 31 miles above the first principal battery that I know of at Dover. The other i«TS miles above Fort Henry—the first I know of on tbe Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do the work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the near est possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that reinforcements from nay columns or some other source would not reach them. By uniting they could establish them selves permanently under the protection of the gunboats. I say this much rather to lay the subject be fore’you, than to propose any- definite plan for your side. Whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days. The work will become more difficult every day. Please let me hear from you aj once. Very truly ypurg, ' (Signed) D; fj. BnRLt, Brig. General Commanding. General II. W. Halleek, Commanding De partment Missouri. Not'receiving any reply to my communica tion, on the 7th I telegraphed to General Hal leck, as follows : “I am telegraphed by the President. Can you fix a day for concerted action ?” To which he replied the game day : “Designate a day for a demonstration. I can do nothing more. See my letter of yesterday.” The letter arriyed subsequently, and is as fol lows : GeneraI Halleek to. General Buell. Headq’bs Dkf’t of; tub Missouri,7 St. Louis, January 6, 1862. j Brig. Gen. D. C. Buell, Louisville, Kg : General : I have delayed writing to you for several days, in hopes of getting some favora ble news from tbe Southwest. The news re ceived to-day; however, is unfavorable, it being stated that Price is making a stand near Springfield, and that all our available fdrees will be required to dislodge and drive him outr »• y.' My last advices from Columbus represent that "the enemy has about 22,000 men there.-— I have only About 15,000 at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and after leaving guards at these places I could not send into the field over ten or feleven thousand. Moreover, many of tbtie are very .imperfectly armed. n , .. 1 Under these circumstances it would be mad ness for me to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbiis.— Probably in the course of a few weeks I will be able to send additional troops to Cairo and Paducah to co-operate with you, but at present it is impossible j and it seems to me that if you deeA such uo-operadiop necessary WyW sir- cMfttyoaijf movemeiifcolL Bowling Graeu should be delayed. I know nothing of the plan of campaign, never having received any informa tion on the subject; but it strikes me that to operate from Louisville and Paducah or Cairo against an enemy at Bowling Green is a plain case of exterior lines, like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each, of the ex terior columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times iu a hundred. Very respectfully, your ob’t sKt, H. W. Halleck, Maj. Gen. And here my reply to the remarks quoted from General Sherman might rest; but other state ments in his speeoh make it proper for me to continue, My correspondence with General Ha’leck ter minated for the time, with his reply to my letter of the 3d of January, and the movement upon’ Bowling Green and Nashville was necessarily deferred. I had not the ordnance and other ma- teria-s necessary for a direct attack upon Bowl ing Green, which was strongly fortified on both sides of Barren ri^r, and the part which I originally contemplated for mvseif in the pro which wa* that General Hal leek should gain a footing at some point on the Cumberland with whichTooHtf A»P«n communication on -W ar rival. There w« np reasonable dpubt of his being able to do that with a smtoMe tdree, tor as vet tfie enemy’s, .works on the Tennessee and ’Cumberland ware ahVsfJ/fng. In tbe mean time I became involved in opera tions agrinst.GuroiffireyM,^ ern Kentucky, ana Zolhcoffer at Mill Spniig, and in other important fiJovSments, which di verted a large portion of my force from tne Nashville line. The roads fieoam* almost im passable from the snows and rains of winter, which suddenly set in with great TijOTK these circumstances, the abrupt couaaeesOmWP of General Halleck’s movement, 'without pre- monitioc, was a source ot anxiety, because I be lieved that strong support was necessary to make it successful, and celerity of movement over the roads on which my troops bad to mareh had, by that time, becume impossible. Tne following dispatches, commenced witboat any warning, Will explain what occurred; General Halleek to General Buell. (By Telegraph.) St. Louis, Jan. 80,1862. Brigadier General Buell, Louisville; I bare ordered an advance on Fort Henry and Dover. It wifi be made immediately. (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General Buell to General Halleek. (By Telegraph.) Louis viqLa, J an. 30, 1882. General Halleek, St. Louis; Please let.me kwow your plan .and fores, and the.time. . , no\ ,1 t"'tu ' (Signed) P. 0. Buell. General Halleek to General Buell. (By Telegraph.) St Louis, Jan. 31, 1882. General BueU, Louisville•• Movement already ordered to take and held Fort Henry, and eut railroad between Columbus and Dover. Force about fifteen thousand. . 1 till be reinforoed as soion as possible. Witt telegraph tbe day of,'investment or attack. (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General Buell to General Halleck. (By Telegraph.) Louisville, Jan. 31, 1862. General -HaUcphf St. Louis; Do you eoamtfar active corporation essential to your (access ? Because in that case it would bWascesswy fcv sadKh- fcaaw whs* (be ether' has to do. It would be several days before I could seriously engage the enemy, and your operations ought not to fail. The operation which was suggested in my letter of yesterday would be an important preliminary to the next step. (Signed) - D. C.' Buell. The letter referred to, with its enclosures, suggested in some detail, that the gunboats should endeavor to run past tbe forts and destroy the bridges over the Cumberland and Tennessee; General Halleck. to General BueU. (By Telegraph.) St. Louis, Feb. 1, 1862. General Buell, Louisville t Co-operation at present not essential. Fort Henry has been reinforced, but where from I have not learned. The roads are in such hor rible condition as to render movements im - possible on land. Will write you folly my plans as soon as I receive your letter of the 30th ultimo. Write me your plans, and I will ry to assist you. (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General Halleck to Gen. Buell: (By Mail) Headq’rs Department of the Missouri,! * ' St. Louis, February 2, 1862. / Brigadier-General D. C. BuSU, Louisville, Ky.; General: Yours of the 30th ult., is just received. At present, it is only proposed to tafcefand occupy Fort Henry and Dover, and. 8f ‘ possible, cite the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green. The roads are in such a hor rible condition that troops cannot move by land, dow far we may venture to send the gunboats np the river will be left for after con sideration. The mortar boats are a failure; they cannot be taken up the river, and it re mains to be determined whether the gunboats are worth half the money spent on them.— Only a part of them have yet received crews. The garrison of Fort Henry, at last accounts, was six thonsand; it may be farther reinforced jfrora Columbus. Keep me informed of your forces and plans apd l will endeavor to assist you ns much as possible. If we take Fort Henry and concen trate a)l available forces there, troops must be withdrawn either from Bowling Green or Co lumbus to protect the railroads, ff the forr mer, you can advance; if the latter, we cap take New Madrid and cut bff the river oom- mnnication with Colnmbns. But it will take some time to get troops rosJj *o advance i* 1 sontn ot ran Henry. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. Halleck, t M»j. Gen. General Buell to GineratHalleck. [By Mail.] Headers Dep't of the Ohio, ) Louisville, February 5, 1862. ) General: My plan of operations was sketched in the letter which I wrote you on the 3d ultimo. You have, I learn from your letter and dispatches, entered upon what would have concerned it on your side, and that is a very important part of it. I regret that we could not have consulted upon it earlier, be cause my work must at first be slow. Besides, since 1 wrote you, those plans have been changed, or at least suspended, in consequence of the diversion of a large part of my efficient force for other objects which the General-in- Chief urged as of primary importance, name ly, an advance into East Tennessee. I have, however, in consequence of the want of trans- ponation, and more than all, the impassable condition of the roads, urged him to allowme to resume my original plan, and, if 1 am not ■restricted, shall enter On its execution at once. My troops have, however, been thrown some what out of position, and it will take some dgys to get them ipto place. My pcogtear, too, 'must be slow, for we are dependent on the railroad for supplies, and that we must re pair as we fco—the driemy having”very much damaged it between Green river and Bowling (jroen—forty miles. That, will take ten or twelve days. I must go provided with a siege traiD, because the enemy is strongly intrench ed with heavy artillery, behind a river, and the’condition of the roads will, I fear, effectu ally bar any plan.of attack which will depend on celerity of movement, I think it is quite plain that the centre of the enemy’s line—that part which $bu are now moving against—is tbe decisiie point ot bis wholn tront, as it is also the mast, vulnerable.— If it is held, - or even the bridges on the Ten nessee and Cumberland rivers destroyed, and your force maintains itself near those points, Bowling Green wilt rapidly fall, and Columbus Will soon follow. Tbe work which you have undertaken is, therefore, of the veir highest im portance, without reference to the injurious effects Ot a failure. There is notiu the whole field of opei aliens a point at which every man you can raise can be employed with more effect, or with the prospect of as important results. YerT.respMtJuUf, your obedient servant, D. C. Buell. General H, W. Halleck, Brigadier General, St. Louis Missoari. General Halleck to General Buell. .(By Telegraph.) St. Louis, February 7, 1862. General Buell, Louisville t Your letter of the 5th met. received. I agree with you entirely. Bowling Green must be given op it we hold our position: The enemy will concentrate at Nashville, Clarksville or Paris, or will attempt to regain his lost advant age at Fort Henry or Dover—l think the latter. It is all-important that we hold our position, and advance toward Nashville. I fear I may not be able to do this without more troops. If, from the coudit on of the roads, you can neither threaten or attack BowliDg Green, or follow him to tfie Cumberland, I advise the sending of every man not necessary to sustain your lines on Grepn rirer, down theObio, to operate up the Cfmber.khd or Tennessee. If we can bold Fort Henry anfi move up these rivers, you yyill have do further difficulty about Bowling Green. The pnemy must abandon it and fall back. If he move j all bis forces against me on the Tennes see. I may not be able to resist him, but will do ?W*#ti»«* i« my power. 1 have mniy fifteen thousand men at Foit Henry and Dover. I throw on - , these suggestions for your considera tion. If yo° can help me still further 1 know yon will do so. _ . (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General Halleck to General Buell. (By Telegraph0 St. Lome, Feb. 7, 1862. Gen. Buell, Louisville: Port Henry is oars. The enemy ,i»,»treating on Paris, pursued by our cavalry. He has been eOQpeUpd to abandon part of bis artillery. The gunboat, will proceed up the river at far a* imay be sa'e. It is bettered tbe enemy is concentrating his forces at Paris to operate on our Hank. It will require every man we can get to hold him in cheek tkbca while a oolumn it lent «p the Tennessee or Cumberland, or both, to destroy_ bridges. We many light batteries a. you can spare. General Grant expects to take Fort Donelson at Dover to-morrow. If troops »re sent up the Cumber land they will be preceded by gt nboats. (Signed) H. W. Halleck It ie unnecessary to enonmbei Ibis article with more extracts from tbe official record of the first ant of this important eanpatgn. leant four or ganised brigades with artillery,and eight separate regiments, in all twenty four regiments, by water, to Teinibree Gen. Hiellefr's oolomhs on the Ten nessee and Cumberland, and, hi the apprehen sions of hi. failure iaertssed, wss in the not of reinforcing him still fhrther when the news of the fall-of Donelson was received. I .hail per mit myself to meke soaa reflection.' on the fea ture. of the campaign-" Fer«'lfebry»hmi!d*fc**o tbe gunboats, under Commodore Foot, on the 7th of February; Gen. Grant appeared before Fort Donelson on the afternoon of the 12th; my troops came in front of Bowtiog Green at daylight on the morning of the 14tb; found tbe bridges in flames and the place evacuated; commenced crossing the river and demonstrating toward Nashville. Owing to the great difficulty of crossing the river, whioh was swollen oiit of its backs at Bowling Green, I did notarrive opposite Nashville until the 23d, but the effect had been produced, and I had been expected at Nashville for a week. Fort Donel son surrendered on the 16th. ■ A-glanoe at the map of Kentucky and Tennes see will show what effeot these several movement, had on each other. First, the movement np the Tennessee and Cumberland not only prevented the enemy from concentrating against tbe move ment through Bowiiug Green, but caused him to divide bis force to such an extent that he deemed it impracticable to offer successful resistance to my advance, bat it did not directly cause the evacuation of Bowling Green, because that occur red four days before the surrender of DonelsoD, before, indeed, the attack commenced, and when the enemy had unfaltering confidence in his abili ty to defeat it. Second, my operations against Bowling Green and Nashville prevented the enemy from concentrating upon General Grant and de feating him. As it was, and notwithstanding the twelve .of. my regiments, say 10,000 men, which helped'tb'make np General Grant’s force <f 30,- 000 or 35,000, General Halleek declared to me in an official communication that he had been sorely pressed. Again, the advance through Bowliog Green rendered the reinforcement of of Donelson perilous, and its defense beyond a certain period hopelesg, and must have exerted a decilive influence upon the character of the strag gle to hold it. There was nothing else to preveot as protracted a defense there as was made at Vicksburg and Port Hudson later in tbe war, for the enemy had both the troops and the supplies; nor at tbe worst was there any thing e ss to pre vent the escapo of at least a large part of the gar- rUoo, since they commanded the river above by fortified positions on both sides, and bad large steamers at their disposal. Thus it is to be ex plained that when the enemy evacuated BowliDg Green, four days betore the surrender of Donel ■od, and, while he was yet confident of suc cess at this point, we see him moving directly for the defense of Nashville, where he commenced to throw up works on both sides of the river, instead of going to the rescue of Donelson, iu doing which he would have been out off from all supplies and ail retreat by my movement upon Nashville. In the same way is it to be explained that after the fall of Donelson the enemy gave up the contest for the command of the river, instead of coDtinu- '“S •» — o,i«iee»llie Hus „rher nninte —L.— >— had fortified. Bnt while the operations up tbe Tennessee and Cumberland were not tbe most arduous, nor essentially the most valuable, yet it is not denied that they possess a more fascinating interest; for there the enemy undertook to give battle, and the conflict of arms will always, to the popular mind, be regarded as the brown ing glory of all military operations. I am constrained to notice another passage in General Sherman’s St. Louis speech. He says: “Gen. Hallepk's plan went further—not to stop at his first line which run through Co lumbus, Bowling Green, crossing the river at HeDry and Donelson, hut push on to the sec ond lino which rqns through Memphis and Charleston but troubles intervened at Nashville, and delays followed; opposition to the last movement was made, and I myself was brought an actor on the scene.” Although Gen. Sherman does not mention my name, yet the feet of my being in com mand in Kentucky and Tennessee at the time alluded to. is sufficiently notorious to make his charges of “troubles,” delays,” and “opposi tion,” at Nashville, bear plainly npon me; and in order, therefore, to show on what founda tion they rest, I shall give official dispatches relative to further operations south of -Nash ville. My letter of the 30th of January to General Halleck, and the inclosures accompanying it, which are too long to be inserted here, pro posed that a gunboat expedition should be directed against the bridges on the Tennessee as high up as Florence and Decatnr, so as to sever the communications of the enemy be tween the North and South sides. That sug gestion- was also communicated to General McClellan. There is no doubt that it could hare beep accomplished, but General Hallecks’ letter of the 2d*of February, shows that up to that time he bad not definitely contem plate! more than “to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover, [Fort ’Donelson] and, if possible, cat the railroad from 1 Columbus to Bowling Green.” On the 15th, however, I received the following dispatch: St, Louis, Feb. 15,1862. General Buell, Louisville; Telegram snout division relieves me greatly. To move from Bowling Green on Nashville is not good Btrategy, Come and help me take and hoIiKFort Donelson and Ctarkmlle, [then] move to Florence, cutting the railroad at Decatur, and Nashville must be abandoned precisely as Bowl ing Green has been: ' All we want is troops in mass on the right point, and the enemy is de feated with scarcely a blow; but I fear I have not forces enough for tips new strategic moye, qnd at the same time observe Colnmbns. Come and help me and all will be right. We can olear Ten nessee as we have clearedKentucky. (Signed) H. W. Halleck. Although it is a digression from the qaestion I now have in hand, that is, as to whether Genera' Halleck’s asserted designs upon the enemy’s “second line” wtre thwarted, yet I shall here transcribe a dispatch of precisely the same date as the foregoing, to show how two distinguished officers differed in rega.’d to the movement 1 was then making: Washington, Feb. 15, 1862. General BueU, Louisville : Yours of to-day is received. Tbe movement on Nashville is exactly ri^bt. If Gen. Grant’s safety renders it absolutely necessary, of course reinforce him as you propose, but tbe great ob ject is tbe occupation of Nashville. If that is gajped, or eyen when your advance from Rowl ing Green is well marked, they will abandon Donelson if the way is open for it. Do yon need more rolling stock on tbe railroad and how (Signed) G, B. McClellan. The result proves that General McClellan was certainly right, though it does not neces sarily follow that General Halleck was ia all respects wrong. I now return to thB original Of course the dispatch of General Halleck shadows a plan. It was written before the fall of Donelson, and contemplated that the ene my would, even after that event, hold on to the line of the Cumberland—a very reasona ble supposition, if my movement against Nashville had not precluded it, B«t it is evir dent that tfie idea of moving upon Florence must have been abandoned in almost tbe same breath, for there it in existence a dispatch dated about the 2Qth, from General Halleck to bis subordinates oti. the Cumberland, calling am much M "ty f* »«tro«gb in th* tiwly of Nashville, such, he predicted, a* this con-' tinent had never witnessed; and I myself re-' ceived the following dispatch : 1 St. Louis, Feb. 20, 1862. General Buell ; we are in possession of Clarksville in large force,-with plenty of sup plies. Move to that place rapidly by forced- marches and effect a junction. Send all avaii-j able troops around that can reach there by- water sooner than by land. Don’t hesitate a: moment. If you will come, we are sure of Nashville and Columbus, and perhaps Mdm-! phis also. Answer, yes or no. (Signed) H. W. Halleck. Bnt white at one moment general HaHeak wan proposing to me that we should move conjointly upon Florence to compel the eraenatten ot Naslk ville, and at tbe aext moment was raHyiog hie forces for a terrible struggle on tbe Cnmbenand' itself, I was actually taking possession of Nash ville and his plans were unnecessary ter either, object. Bo tbe only opposition to his plans in that instance was in the current of events, which flowed on and left his plans behind. 1 do not impute this to General Halleck as a folly, bnt it may serve to teach General Sherman, if be can; find no lesson in his own experience, that in fallibility ia the business ot war is ot very rare attainment. The truth is that tbe “enemy’s second line,” of which General Sherman talks, did not exist un til the first was destroyed. It is immaterial who originated tbe idea of ’pushing on” to it It waa tbe D&tural sequel of tbe first step. Tbe deteose was organizing in the vicinity of Corinth, and to that quarter the attack would naturally teed. The following dispatches will show the history of the consultations with reterence to it: General BueU to General McClellan. Nashville, March 1, 1862. Mojor-General McClellan, Washington T Yours of yesterday and to-day received. I have two divisions—say eighteen thousand men and thirty-six pieces of artillery. McCook’s division will cross to-morrow. Wood will close upon him, I think, by the day after. I have sent the troops back to Clarksville. John ston will not stand at Murfreesboro—in fact, is preparing to get out of tbe way. I hope to be able to crowd him a little. Th&ir plan seems to be to get in rear of the Tennessee, and in positions to concentrate either on Hal- Jeck or me. I will say more about this when my information is clearer, and until then I can not weffl determine my movements. You are aware that, for reasons given some time ago, Carter’s is the only column moving toward Hast Tennessee. I have not heard of iris be ing beyond Cumberland Ford. (Signed) -D. C Buell. General McClellan to General Buell. Washington, March 2,1862. General BueU, Nashville : 1 have telegraphed General Halleck that it is important to seize Decatur, and thus cut General A. S. Johnson from Memphis and Columbus, Of corn se you must hold Nashville firmly, and Chattanooga is a very important point to gain. Arrange details with Halleck. Co-operate fully together, and give him all assistance, yoa can. Push Carter forward as rapidly as possible. What is Garfield doing ? (Signed) G. B. McClellan. General BueU to General Me Clel/au. (By Telegraph.^ General McClellan, Washington: Dispatch received. 1 have tour divisions up—r three and a half on this side of the river—those coming by land. I can’t get exactly at Wbkt Halleck: is doing, and therefore can’t see how to assist him at this moment if be should Deed it. I have proposed an interview with him, and would like you to be present. He has to defer tt a few days. I sent Garfield to chsse Marshall en tirely oat of Kentucky. Have not beard from him recently. It wiil bring him down toward Cumberland Gap, and I will unite him with Car ter, whom, in the mean time I hope will have gained some advantage at the Gap- Use all your persuasion against the appoint ment of a military governor for Tonnetsee. It will do infinite harm. Beg the President to wait. (Signed) D. C. Buell. I bad on the 1st suggested to Gon. Halleek that we should meet and ooosult with reference to futnre operations. General Halleck to General Buell. St. Louis, March 3, 1862. Gen. Buell, Nashville: Columbu- is nearly tamed. The mortar-boats will bombard it tbis afternoon, and Pope will at tack New Madrid io»morrow morning, * * * I will make an appointment to meet yon as soon as the Columbus movement is ended. (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General Buell to General Halleek. Nashvillb, March 3, 1862. General Halleck, St /.emit,- ; • What can { do tq aid your operatiens against Columbus ? Remember I am separated from you by the Tennessee river. Johnston is moving toward Decatnr and burning the bridges as be goes. (Signed) 9. C. Buell. General Halleck to General Buell. St. Louis, March 4, 1862- Generaf BueU, Nashville: If Johnson has destroyed the railtoqd and bridges in his rear be cannot setnrn to attack you. Why not come to the Tennessee and opera ate with me to cat Johnson’s line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid, Columbus has been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concen trating at New Madrid and Island No. 10. I am concentrating a force of twenty thonsand against him. Grant, with bis available force, has gone up tbe Tennessee to destroy connection at Cor inth, Jackson and Humboldt. Estimated strength of enemy at New Madrid, Randolph, and Mem phis is fifty thonsand. It is ot vital importance to separate them from Johnston’s army. Come over ta savannah or Florence and we oan do it We then oan operate either on Decatur or Mem phis, or both, as may appear best (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General BueU to General Halleck. Nashville, MgrcR a, 1862, General Halleck, St. Louis ; Your views accord with my own generally, but some slight modifications seem to me ne cessary. At least there are details about which we ought to be able to consult freely. Can we not meet at Louisville iu a day or so ? I think it very important. The concentration of my troops and transportation cannot be completed for some days. We have had two formidable rivers to cross, aud have forced ourselvea here without transportation or baggage. The thing which ( think of vital importance is that you seize and hold the bridge at Flor ence in force- Johnston is now at Shelbyville, some fifty miles south of this. I hope you will arrange for our meeting at Louisville. (Signed) D. G. Buell. General Halleck to General BueU. St. Louis, Mo., March 6, 1862, General BueU, Nashville: I cannot positively leave here at the present time. Events are passing on so rapidly that I mast be all the time in telegraphic communica tion with Curtis, Grant, Pope, and Commo dore Foote. We mast consult by telegraph-— News down the Tennessee that Beauregard has twenty thousand men at Corinth, and is rapid ly fortifying it. Smith will probably not-be strong enough to attack it. It is a great mis fortune to lose that point. I shall reinforce Smith as rapidly as possible. If you could send a division by water around into too Ten- nessee it would require only a small amount of transportation to do ifc Would -raoeive all its supplies by the river, fSigned ] H. W. Halleck. General BueU to General Halleck. Nashville Mareh 9,1862. General Halleck, St. Louis; . I did not get your dispatch of tha 6tb until yesterday—that 0 t the 8th today. I suggest the fallowing: Tha ensmy «an move from on* aide, of tha river In tbe other at pie star*, and if wg attempt to operate on both rides without tha samefaeilitir of transit we are liable to be t*ateS in detail. Tim point which I previously suggest ed is the only one from which w* can operate centrally. TOW secured, we Can set according to; circumstances either way. t If yon oosupy point, I will reipforpe you by water or imayou by land. Otherwise I may detach. too little to serve yon, or else so much ss to endanger Middle Tennessee, tbo -impoflance of #hfcb I need not allude to. If we con&meftKl think we ooatd better.understand each other. . ' (Signed) ' ' D. C: Buell; General Halleek to General Buell. Sr. Lows Mareh JO, 1862. General Buell, Nashville My force* are moving.up tjbe Tennessee river as rapidly as we can dbtara transportation.— 1? and Humboldt, it is deemed bestto land at Savan nah, and establish a depot. The transportation -will Serve as'forries. The selection is left to C. F. Smith,, who- commands the advance. Pope baa turned Island No. 10, bnt the enemy shows no disposition to evacuate. Curtis ia, asking for reinforcements in Arkansas. I must send him some troops intended for tbe Tennessee. Yon do not say whether we are to expect aar reinforce ments from Nashville.) . (Signed) H. W. Halleck. General BueU to Gen . Halleck. • Nashville, March 19,1862. General Halleck, St. Louie ; . The possession and absolute security of the co on try, north at the Tennessee river, with Nashville as a center, fa of vital Importance, both in a political and military point, of view. Under no circumstances should it bo .prolonged. It enables as, with the Tennessee as a base, to operate east, west, and sonth. All our ar- rangements should look to a centralization of our force for that object. W« cannot tell now which direction to take when we get within reach of the enemy. You cannot well tell eF’-ha • e e e • i 'V e • i • • e Hkadquartebs Sub District or Oskichm, > Savannah, Ga^ Oct. IS, 1865. j Circular, I No. 28/ f On and after Urns date artwlee in the Public Market of this city will he prices. Prisons violating (ho arder, lyill bs re ported to this Office and summarily dealt ,wit£* By command of ‘ ° ‘ h P Br *’V *?J- M-iBRANNAN. W» H Folk, lat h*#; » w-feKMeE" Country Dried Beffi.*_. Coftry Cured Beef.-V-V J «rked Beef .... f»*fc::::::::: £•::£ Baas, per lb..,.. Drum, per lb FYeab Water Tront Salt “ « Sheephead || * HuHet, large sixe, per bunch, | Mullet, amaU size, per bunch Brim, per bunch of five.....-^ Perch, per bunch ol five Suckera, ** Whiting « Codfish,per lb Shrimp, per quart Crabs, each Sturgeon, per lb Sausages, fresh pork.... Bacon, per lb, from Butter, perlb;. Clams, per bushel what force you may meet at the West; still 1cm can I teU what may come in the direction of Stevenson. With this view, the establishment of your force on tbis side of tbe river, as high up as possible, i* evidently judicious; and with the same-view it would be unnecessary and unad- visible to change the line on which I propose to advance. I ran join you almost; if not quite, as soon by water, in better condition, and with greater security to your operations and mine. I believe you cknnot be too promptly nor too strongly established on tbe Tennessee. I shall advance in s very few days—as soon as our transportation is ready. (Signed) D. C. Buell. President Lincoln to General Buell. Washington, March 10,1862. General BueU, Nashville ; The evidence is very strong that the enemr in front of us here is breaking np and moving off. Gen. McClellan is after him. Some of tbe torde may be destiDed to meet yon. Look and be pre-. pared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to as sist yon if needed. (Signed) A. Lincoln. The foregoing dispatches are sufficient to show the gist of the consultation which preceded tbe operations against tbe enemy’s “second line."— They do not betray any opposition—they scarce ly present any great difference oi conviction— they show merely a discussion, while we were preparing ear forces for action, in regard to Bain* pewftnkl" consultation, but wh'ch occu pied a number ot days by the tedious and unaat- lSfoctory means of telegraphing. Ifris.no part of my present purpose to criti cise Gen. Halleck’s views in regard to those points or to enforce my own. We were indepen dent commanders. We owed no apology for any opposition which we deemed it our duty to make to the views pf each other; and the charge ot op position cotrtd as well be made against one as against the other. - Squally unfounded is tbe imputation of un necessary delay, resulting from opposition or any other cause. My army moved as soon as it was ready to move. It made its movements from the &Tst through the snows asd floods of winter and spring by actual marching; and from that time to tbe present, daring the war, no movements have been made by as large a force, under similar 'oireumstanees, with greater promptness and celerity,: General Halleck carried his troope up the Tennessee river on steamers, without the maans *t meviag twenty miles front its bank*, and of course, to that extern, he moved so much more rapidly, as stumers can ran faster. than men can w*ikj bnt when it came to marching by land we do not find more alacrity in starting, or celerity in overcoming’distanoe than other armies have exhibited. It took-one month after the bat- tie of Shiloh to prepare for a oampaign whioh the enterprise of the enemy precipitated, and nearly a month longer (o overcame the sixteen miles which separated the opposing armiu. What had the pretended delays at Nashville to do with this oousuuiption of time in as General Sherman expresses it-r-‘‘pushing on to the second line ?” Nothing. The truth is, Generri Halleck bad not on tbe ground the m«an* of moving away from the river earlier than be didq and if i»» derived to move on tbe river, there certainly would not have been mope temerity in throwing himself between the widely divided columns of the enemy than in placing himself within arm’s reach of their united force. I’ am not now criticising Gen. Halleck. I am exposing the indiscreet pre tensions and unfounded assertions of bis friends. When more responsible persons than General Sherman shall avoir these imputations of delay, I shall have further to say on that subject. D. C. Buell. New Yoritj August 31, 1865. 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