Newspaper Page Text
By R. ELLIS & CO.
Volume XVIII.
Cimts avti Sentinel.
THE TRI-WEEKLY TIMES & SENTINEL
Is published every TUESDAY, THURSDAY and
SATURDAY EVENING,
THE WEEKLY TIMES & SENTINEL
fs published every TUESDAY MORNING.
Office on Randolph Street , opposite the P. O.
TERMS:
TRI-WEEKLY, Five Dollars per auuurn, in advance.
WEEKLY, Two Dollars per annum,in advance.
Advertisements conspicuously inserted at One Dol
lar per square, for the first insertion, and Filty Cents for
every subsequent insertion
A liberal deduction will be made for yearly advertise
ments.
Sales of Land and Negroes, by Adminisirators,Execu
tors and Guardians, are required by law to be held on the
first Tuesday in the month, between the hours of ten in
forenoon and three in the afternoon, at the Court House in
the county in which the property is situate. Nostices of
these sales mu-t be given in a public gazette lorty days
previous to the day ot sale.
Notice for the sale of Personal property must be given at
least ten days previous to the day of sale.
Notice to Debtors and Creditors of an Estate must be
published forty days.
Notice that application will be made to the Court of Or
iinary for leave to sell Lana or Negroes, must be published
veekiy for two months.
Citations for Letters of Administration must be published
nrty days—for Diawiesion from Administration, moomiy
• k months—for Dismission from Guardianship,forty days.
tales for Foreclosure of Mortgage rnusv be published
ionthly for four months—for establishing lost papers for
lull space ot three months—for compelling titles from
Executors or Administrators, where a bond has been giv
-311 by the deceased, the full space of three mouths.
Publications will always be continued according to
these, the legal requirements, unless otherwise ordered.
BUSINESS OA-iIDS.
POINTING AND BOOS BINDING, j
£vVl;Nvi connected with our Printing Officf a full
and complete assortment ol Book Binder’s toolsand
tocs.and also added to our Fritting materials, we arenow
rropared to execute,in good stylo and with despatch,every
tind ot work m either branch of tha business, on thebest
erms.
BLANK WORK, of every description, with or with
>ut printing, made to order, in the neatest manner.
WARK lIOOSH PRINTING, Receipts, Drafts,
Notes, Bills of Lading, &.C., &e., executed neatly and
tromptiy, and hound in any desired style.
It UhRSUi) AM) STEAMBOAT BLANKS,
ilall kinds got up,with accuracy and dispatch.
Bill fends, arils, Circulars. Hand Bills.
Posters, Programmes, &c.,&c.,printedin thoshoi j
est notice and in the best style
tfitgazino and Pamphlets pat np in every style cf
binding.
Bookso all kinds rebound strongly and neatly.
B. Y. MARTIN. J. J. MARTIN.
MARTIN & MARTIN^
Attorneys at Law,
eX,TCTM2JUS, GA.
Office on Broad Street—OverGunby & Daniel.
Columbus, Jan.‘J, 1857. WvYtwlv.
MARION BETHUNE,
A TTO RN E Y A T L A W ,
TALBOTTON, Talbot County, Ga.
October 24th, 1856. wtwtf.
W. S, JOHNSON,
ATTO RN E Y A T LA W .
CUSS E T A,
Chattahoochee County, Ga.
(Jivosliis mtirc attentionlo the practice in Chattahoochee
adjoining counties. ap2fi—wtwiy*
BAUGH & SLADE,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
COLUMBUS, GEORGIA.
fTTt LL practice law in Muscogccaml the adjoinim-countics
W of Georgia and Alabama.
f'y* Office over flank <>f Oolumbua, Broad Street -
ROBERT BAroil. J. J- BI.APE.
Ooiumbus,Ga. March 27 1857. wtwtf
MOBLEY & FARLEY,
ATTOR NE Y S A T LA W,
II AM ILTON, GEORGIA.
Hamilton, Geo. Feb. 4. 1858. wtwy
WILLIAM TAYLOK,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
Cutlibert* Randolph County, Georgia.
WILL practice in the counties of Randolph, Calhoun,
Terrell, Early, Clay, Baker, Dougherty, Miller and
Stewart.
REFERS TO
Wellborn, Johnson & Sloan, Attorneys at Law, Colum
bus, Georgia.
All business intrusted to his care will receive immedi**
ate attention. June 6, 1858—wtw tl
HOWARD k WEEPI3,
ATTORNEYSAT LAW,
CRAWFORD, ALA.
Robert- n. Howard. Walter h- wee .ms.
Crawford, Ala., June B—wtwtf.
T J. GU NN,
ATTORNEY AT LA W,
HAMILTON, GA.
WILL attend promptly to all busiueess entrusted to him
January 26, 1858—wly.
REDDING Jfc SMITH,
Attorneys at Law,
PRESTOS, WEBSTER COUNTY. GA.
practice in Pataula Circuit and adjoining counties.
La. K. RfcDDING. A. J. SMITH.
Pres cr, February I, 1858—wlim,
WILLIAM GORDON,
A TTO RN E Y A T L A W*
NEWTON, ALA.
VVdLL attend promptly to ail business confided to his
’’ care in the counties of Dale, Henry, Coffee and Pike.
■February 27,1858—w6m.
.TAMES A. CLENDEKInT
ATTORNEY AT LA W,
AND SOICITOR IN CHANCERY,
\BBEVILLE, Henry County, Ala.
July 20, 1858 wly. ,
W. A. BYRD,
attorney at la IV,
CUTHIIERT— Randolph County, Ga.
a\T ILL pract : .* a the Pataulaand Southwestern Circuits
VV All busiuess entrusted to his care will received promp
ttention. mayl9—wly,
\VM. M. CHAMBERS. WM.M. ROBBINS. J. A ROBBINS.
Chambers, Robbins & Robbins,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
EUFAULA, ALABAMA.
WILL practice in the counties of Barbour, Pike, Henry
Cotiee, Pike, Dale and Russell. fob I—wlv
W. ©033,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
PRESTON, Webster County,Ga.
W'ILL practice in the counties of Clay, Chattahoochee,
Webster, Early, Randolph, Stewart and Sumter.
Particular attention given to collecting and remitting.
January 27,1857 —wtf.
PARKER & PARKER,
ATTORNEYS A T LA W,
COLQUITT.
Miller County, Georgia.
YUIbL uive their entire attention to the practice in South-
VV western Georg! a; will also uive prompt attentton to the
collection of all claims entrusted to thei? care in the ‘ollowing
counties- Baker,Calhoun.<"lay, I>e:atur, Dougherty, Early,
Lee,Miller, Mil hell. Randolph, Terrell and Worth.
February 1, 1858 wtf.
ELAM & OLIVER,
ATTORN EY S AT LA W,
BUENA VISTA,
MARION COUNTY,GA.
I ITlMipracticeinthecountlesof Marion, Macon, -"lewart
>Y Payior, Chattahoochee, Kinchatoonee. and any of the
“Jjoiningjountiefiwhentheirservicea mav berequired.
WM. I). ELAM. TI!ADKUS OLIVER.
November 10. wtf
GRICE & WALLACE,
AWQIEIHg'yS Air
BUTLER, GEORGIA.
\TTILL give prompt attention all business entrusted! jo
\\ them.
W L GRICE. WM.S. WALLACE.
December f —wtf
R. A. TURNIPSEED,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
CUTUBERT,
tt.tmiolph County,Ga.
HAVING removed from Cusseta, to Cuthbert Ran
dolph county, will give prompt attention to ail busi
ness entrusted to his care. &p27—wtf.
S. S. STAFFORD,
ATTORNEY AT LAV’,
BLAKELY,EARLY COUNTY, GA.
ap2 wtf.
H. BAENAED & CO.,
COLUMBUS. GA.
WIIOLE SA L E AN D ltE TA I L
GROCERS AND PROVISION DEALERS,
-1 ‘ 7'v II \VE on hand, and will constantly keep, a large
-f ’aiid well selected Stock, embracing every article in
line, which are offered to their friends aud the
public, at the lowest market prices. Come and see us.
Columbus,Sept. 29, 1857. w&twtf.
To our Customers!
j TXROM and alter the first January next, we shail adopt, as
l I 1 nearly as possible, the < ASii SYSTEM. Necksshy
compels us to this course. From that day all articles will
be priced as cash. Where credits are given (which will only
be extended to those whehave promptly paid ns) an addition
will be; made to the price named according to the time requir
ed by the purchaser. JE. BARNARD &CO.
Dec. 31, 1857—w&twGm.
MACKEREL.
-j A A PACKGES, Halves, Quarters and Kits, all num
-1 Uv* hers, lor sale at small advances for Cash, by
Jan.t9—wtwtf K. D.SKWAKD it CO.
PLANTING POTATOES
f I \i \ Barrels Pink Eyes, for saleat small advance
JV J\ ) for Cash by
Jan 19—wtwtf h. BARNARD & CO.
LONG AND SHORT SWEETNING,
j tj BBLS. and halfbbls. Clioico Syrup.
; fOU 30 fihds. N O. Sugar, nil grade? lor sale at small
advances for Cash, by
| Jan 19—twtf E. BARNARD & CO.
FANCY ST. LOUIS FLOUR.
4 / A BARRELS Planters’s Extra Union, and Diamond
TV/ Brands, lor sale at small advance lor Cash, by
Jan 19—twif E. BARNARD is CO,
1 PALACE MILLS TOUR.
A CONSTANT supply kept on hand, and for salo at
Mill prices, for Cash by
Jan. 18 —wtwtf E. BARNARD &. CO.
CIGARS DIRECT IEPORTATION.
-|AA BOXES Havana Cigaas oivarious brands lor sale at
11/U small advances for Cash by
Jan 19—wtwtf *E. BARNARD & CO.
GR EAT AIT ii ACT ION !
Bargains ! Bargrins ! Bargains !
SMSU
z'A- WISHES to inform her friends, and tho public
generally of Columbus and the vicinity, that slio
is now offering for sale a complete assortment ol
GOODS, consisting in part of—
NEAPOLITAN BONNETS, from S2 00 to $2.50.
MIS SE S GIPSIES SI.OO
BLOOMERS, from 8%; to $1.25.
Handsome Gause R ) BB ONs, 25c per Yard.
And a large lot ot Swiss Trimmings at 20e por yard.—
Call and see. Cheap for Cash.
July 23.1857. w&twtl.
THU LIVES
PREPARED BY
D 11. SAND FO R D,
COMPOUNDED ENTIRELY FROM GUMS.
IS one oil be best Purgative and Inver Medicine now before
the public, that acts as a Cathartic, easier, milder, and
more effectual than any other medicine known, it is not on
ly a cathartic, but a Liver Remedy, acting first on the Liver
to eject Us morbid matter then on the Stomach and Bowels
t;> carry of! the ‘matter, thus accomplishing two purposes et
fecMially, without any of the painful feelings experienced in
the operation of most‘Chathartics. It strengthens the system
at the same time that it purges it; and when taken daily in
moderate doses, will strengthen and build up with unusual
rapidity.
The Llvcris one of tb( frrjjprincipal regulators of the
human body; and when LfVJ-*{performs its functions well,
the powers of the system ar | tully developed. The stomach
is utmost eniirely dependents [on the healthy action ofthc
Liver for the proper peforin -jliiince of its I unction s.when the
stomach is at fautttheboweh i I are at fault, and the whole
systemsuffersinconsequences *H|of one organ—the Liver—
having ceased jto do its dut) ; _ j For the disease of that or
g:.n, one of the ?proprietor (jhas made it his study, in a
practice of more than twent:( years, to find some remedy
wherewith to counteract tho T ‘many derangementato which
it is liable. . 1
To prove that this remedy in ft. at last found any peraontrou
bled with Liver in any of its forms,
has but to try a bottle, am conviction is certain.
These gums remove “al ‘morbid or bad matter fiom
the system.supplying in theii| a healthy flow of bile,
i ivigoratir.g the Bto much '•.>{ causing food to digest well,
purifying the blood.J tone antihealth to the
whole machinery, removing j’T •he cause oi the disease
effecting a radical cure.
Biitous attacks arC .;cured, and, wbat is
better, 'prevented, occasional use ot the
Liver In vigor a. tor. ‘
< me dose after eati r.g issuf t f™ ■ Jficient to relieve the stomach
and prevent ihe tood fromj U Rising and scuring
Only one dose taken before; .retiring, prevents Nlght
m arc.
Only one dose taken loosens the bowels
geotlv. and cores
< )ne drse taken after eacl |Jf-* .meal willcure Dyspepsia
of two tea-/ (spoonsful will always relieve
Side Headache. ) !
One dose taken for fe-.male obstiuction remove the
cause of the disease, anci[ jlmakesa per ect cure.
. ;nsy onedose immediately sHf; relieves cholie, while
One dose often repeated iV t sure cure for Cholera
Morbn,andapreventaiiv< t j jofCbolera.
>6s’- Only one bottle if needed to thiow out of the
system the effects of rnedi-J, ,(cine after a long sickness.
One botile taken removesailsal
lowness or Jimatural the skin.
One Dose taken a before eating fgives vi
gor to the appet ileandmakcG ‘food digest well.
one dose often repeated! w 'cures Cferonic Dlar
rhopa, in its worst #orms.f, while SI T M MER and
Bowel complaints yield)(almost to the first dose.
One or two doses cures ‘tacks caused b> *W ormsin
Children; there is no surer.) I safer, or speedier remedy in
the world,as lt*never fails s^;
A few bottles curet!^; Dropsy, by exciting the
abeorbants. 2 u*
We take pleasure in recom s this medicine as a
preventive for Fcver[and( Ague, ‘ bill, Fever,
and all Fe versos a BlU{i_j;ftou Type, It operates
thousa::df!TO*are willing to testify to its
wonderlui virtues. t • •
All who use it are giving their unanimous testimony in its
favor. , .
Mix water in the mouth with the Invigoratoi and swallow
both together.
THE LIVER INVIGOR ATOR,
ha sciontlt!cM(V:iea! Discovery, and is daily working cures
almost too jrreal forbelief. it cures asit by magic, even the
first .lose giving benefit, and seldom more than one bottle is
required to cure any kind ot I.ivcr Complaint, from the worst
jaundiceor dyspepsia to a common headache, aliol which are
the result oi a diseased liver.
Price Ono Dollar per Bottle.
SANFORD 4s CO. Proprietors, 345 Rroadway,New York.
WIIOLKSALE AGENTS.
Barnes A-. Park New York; T. \\\ Doylt & Sons, Philadel
phia; M.S. Burr 4-00. Boston; H.H. Hay & Cos. Portland;
John D. Park, Cincinnati; Gayiard & Hammond, Cleveland;
Fabnstock & Davis Chicago; b. J. Wood &. Cos. St. Louis
Geo.H. Keyser, Pittsburg; S. S, fiance. Baltimore. Andre
tailed by all Druggists.
Sold Wholesale and Retail by
J. S. PEMBERTON & CO.,
BROOKS & CHAPMAN,
DANFORTH 6s NAGEL,
May2o “trtwly and all Drugggista.
“THE UNION OF THE STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF'tHE STATES.”
COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, TUESDAY MORNING, AUGUST 10, 1858.
The “Scene” in the Supreme Court —Letter from Win-
Dougherty, Esq.
Columbus, July 24th.
To the Editor of the Savannah Republican:
Dear Sir—l noticed iti your paper of the 2Cth
•intant, a letter written from Macon, purporting to
give an account of a “scene” which transpired
before the Supreme Court, on Saturday last. The
statement of your correspondent is made, avowed
ly, on the information of others; and to that cause
may be aitributed its inaccuracies and omissions;
and which it is my purpose to correct by this com
munication.
Your correspondent gays, “that the objections
•‘to Judge Benning were that he had been coun
sel in one of the cases brought against the banks
No such objection was urged. Another
was “that he had made promises when in Milledge
“ville during his election, that lie would not sit in
“any case he had been counsel in in the lower
“courts: and that he, Judge Benning, indignantly
“denied ever having made any promises of any
“kind to anybody whereby his conduct as Judge
“rniaht be influenced.”
The objection urged, was that Judge Benning
had pledged himself not to preside in any of the
bank cases in which he had been engaged as
counsel.
The denial was, that he had made no pledge
whatever, not to preside, in any particular case
or class of cases. The difference between the iwo
is, I admit, not very important. In the objection
as stated by your correspondent, he makes the
promises applicable to ail cases; as made in
court it was confined to a particular class of cases,
to wit: Bank cases, as they are termed. The term I
promise is used in one and pledge in the other. I
do not think this at all material, for I think, as here
used, they are synonymous.
But the great error of your correspondent, or his
informant, is, in omitting to state what occurred
afterwards. One would suppose from reading the
account given in your paper, that the matter clos
ed with Judge Benning’s denial, &c. Such was
not the case. A conversation between Judge Ben
ning and myself, immediately followed, in which
was disclosed facts, showing, as I think, that the
charge that Judge Benning before his election had
made pledges, &c., is substantially, if not literally,
true.
In that conversation Judge Benning was under
stood to admit, and sucli is the fact, that during his
canvass before the Legislature objections were I
made to his election, on ihe ground ofhis connec- j
tiou with these Bank cases, as counsel. That he j
came to the determination not to preside in any
in which he had been employed, and that he an- J
nounced in Milledgeville, before his election, that j
determination,and that his position and course, if
elected, m regard so these cases was well known
and understood then. Does not this, under the
circumstances, amount to a pledge! 1 then thought
and yet think that it does—Judge Benning thinks
that it does not.
Our difference was not as to what transpired in j
Milledgeviile before the election, but as to the name
by which it ought to be called. For the purpose
for which it was introduced into this controversy,
it is wholly immaterial whether it be called a pledge
promise, agreement or understanding, or by any
other name. It is evident that these things were
done with some purpose—that they meant some
thing—that expectations were raised which would
be disappointed if Judge Benning was to preside
in that class of cases.
1 then proceeded to show—and think I did so
conclusively—that by Judge Benning’s presiding in
the case then before the Court, lie would as effect
ually decide that class of cases, to wit: the Bank
cases, against former clients, as if he presided on
their trial. This is also entirely omitted in tho
statement given by your correspondent.
This is not all; three out of five of the objections
to Judge Benning are not mentioned at all. It
was slated asan objection to him, that whilst at the
bar he united with the other counsel for the stock
holders, in the preparation and defence of their
Bank cases generally. That he, or Jones & Ben
ning, aided and contributed largely in constructing
the long argument, used by Col. Ilolt at Americus
some years since in one of their Bank cases in the
question ofthe Statute of Limitations, the main
question in the case before the Court. And also,
that the case called had been tried in the Court be
low, and brought to this term of ihe Supreme
Court, with the avowed purpose that Judge Ben
ning might preside in it; and that a similar case
against the estate of Daniel McDougald had been
tried at the same term in the Court below, and it
carried to the Supreme Court would be retained to
the next term, whilst this case, although tried last
is brought to this term. It would have been fair
and just'to all parties that the grounds of objection
should have been§ given as they were urged, and
more especially when not one of them was denied
or controverted except ftiie one in regard to the
pledges ol Judge Benning.
In thisjrespect the statrnent made to your cor
respondent, resembles that made by tire editor oi j
the Georgia Telegraph , and tends to confirm the
suspicion that the information given him and your
correspondent, came front the same source. It is
to be regretted that he, occupying so important a
position as to become the source of inform ation
for the press, was not more fortunate in compre
hending and recollecting that which he attempts to
communicate.
In regard to the gremark of your correspondent,
as to the manner and extent which Judge Ben
ning’s course is sustained by the Bar, I know no
thing, and can iiave nothing to say. But without
intending in the least to impugn the correctness of
the statement, I would suggest that it mav be pos
sible, that that portion of the Bar with whom your
correspondent was thrown in communication,might
have been counsel for the stockholders, as they are
numerous, and generally about the court when
their cases are up for a hearing.
My connection with this affair will, I hope, be
deemed a sufficient apology for suggesting the er
rors and supplying the omissions in the account
given of it by your correspondent, and that you
will as cheerfully publish the corrections as you did
the original statement.
Very respectfully, yours. &c.,
W. DOUGHERTY.
JUDGE BENNING’S REASONS.
When tliis case was called up, Mr. Dougherty,
one ofthe Counsel for the plaintiff, objected to my
presiding in it on three grounds—First. That a
case or cases like this was pending in the Superior
Court of Muscogee eourvty, m favor ofthe plaintiff
in this case, against Mrs. McDougald, as the exe
cutrix of Daniel McDoughald, deceased, and that
at the time of my being elected a Judge ot this
Court, I was of Counsel for her in the case or
eases.
Secondly. That cases like this were pending in
that Court in favor of other persons than this
plaintiff, against Coi. Seaborn Jones, as a stockhol
der in another bank—the Chattahoochee Rail-road
& Banking Company, and that Col. Jones was my
father-in-law, and had been, at the time of my elec
tion as Judge, my clitnt in those cases.
Thirdly. That the Counsel for the defence, in
eaclt of the eases commonly called the “bank
cases,” to which eases belonged this, had agreed,
among themselves, to make, or had made “com
mon cause” in the defence of all the bank eases ;
and so, that ail ot those Counsel were to be consid
ered as substantially engaged in the defence of
each and every one ofthe cases; that, consequent
ly, I was to be considered as having been, at the
time of my election, substantially one ofthe Coun
sel for the defendant in this very case
Tliese grounds I did not think sufficient to sup
port the objection, and therefore notwithstanding
the objection, I presided in the case. Was I right
in this ? That I was, 1 will state my reasons for
thinking.
First, then, as to the third ground. That ground,
as far as it concerns me, has no foundation, in fact.
I never made any agreement with anybody, to make
common cause in the defence ol the bank cases,
generally, or of this case, in particular. I never
took part in the defence of the cases generally,or in
the defence of this.
As to the other two grounds, I shall admit them
to be substantially true, although I might say, if I
pleased to say it, that Col. Jones, as to all the cases
of any consequence against himself viz : those in
favor of the Bank of Columbus, has defences differ
ent from any which this defendant, Harris, appears
to have, or as I think can have, and that in mv
opinion these special defences are, of themselves,
for him, sufficient.
1 take this to be a true principle of law—that it
is the duty of a .1 udge to preside in all cases in
which he has had given him authority to preside.
This principle, it seems to me, necessarily results
from the relation of principal and agent—that rela
tion in which the State and a Judge stand toward
each other. The State delegates to a citizen au
thority to decide cases. Why ? I can conceive of
no reason why, except that tiie State, wishes him
to decide the cases. As to the purpose of the
State, in the delegation of the authority to him,
there are but three things that occur to me as sup
posable —one, that the State wished the authority
to be used—one,-that the State wished the au
thority not to be used —one that the State was in
different whether the authority should be used or
not. To say that the State wished tho authority
not to be used, is to say that the State is so foolish
as to do an act which is not merely superfluous,
but an act which can have no result, whatever, ex
cept a result which defeats tho State's wishes. To
say that the State was indifferent whether the au
thority should be exercised or not, is to say that
the State is both so foolish as to do a superfluous
act, and is indifferent whether wrongs done by one
of her citizens to another shall go unredressed—
whether wrongs done to herself shall go unpunish
ed—whether right public or private, shall be left
j without a guard: and to say this, is to say that the
State lias prepared the whole body other taw, both
civil and criminal, without an object ; for it’ the
Slate be indifferent whether her laws be executed
or not, what motive can she have had for prepar
ing those laws ? To say that the State’s purpose
was, that the authority should be exercised, re
mains the only thing supposable.
Now, what is the will ofthe principal, is the law
of the agent; and the more especially, if the prin
cipal be tho sovereign, and the agent a subject or
citizen. And whatever is the law to a man, he is
bound to obey. A Judge being the State’s agent,
and having had the auihority given him by the
State to preside in certain cases, and thus having
been notified of the will ofthe State, that he should
preside in those cases, it follows that lie is bound to
j preside in them—bound to preside in all. the
j cases.
i It is not for the Judge to elect one sort of case
for presiding in, and to reject another. If anything j
[ofthe kind is to be done, it is to be done by the
State. As to the Judge, the eases all stand upon
the same footing.
If, when the Judge has been authorized to sit in
all cases, it is not his duty to sit in all, which are
to be the excepted ones—and what is to be ground
of exception ? Are they to he cases in which, for
some reason or oilier, it would be disagreeable to
the Judge for him to preside I If so, whether the
Judge shall preside in any case whatever or not,
will depend upon the Judge’s pleasure. Are. they
to be cases in which, for some reason or other, it ;
would be disagreeable to the parties, or to any par- j
ty, for the Judge to preside ? If ss, whether the
Judge shall preside in any ease whatever, or not,
will depend upon the pleasure of any party in the
case. And what cases remain to be the excepted
cases ?
But as to the Judges ofthe Supreme Court, this
duty, it seems to me, has been prescribed to them
by the Act organizing that Court. That Act, in its
third section, says, “It shall he tho duty of all tho
Judges of said Court to attend, at each term; but
if, from Providential cause, any of said Judges can
not attend a Court, such Court may be holden by
two Judges.” Why is it made the duty of each
Judge to attend at every Court ? There can be
but one answer—that each may sit and take a part
in deciding the cases returned to every Court —in
deciding one of such cases as much as another,
provided that the authority to each Judge to sit in
one, is the same as it is to sit in another. When
the authority to sit in one case, is the same as it is i
to sit in another, is not tho duty to sit in one, the
same as it is in another? If the intention was not j
this, here was the place to say so, and to specify j
the cases on which it was not to be any Judge’s
duty to sit. And here is specified one single case,
in which a Judge is excused from sitting—and j
that case is, when he is kept from being in atten- J
dance, by Providential cause. No oilier is spect-1
tied. And inclusio unis exclusio allerius.
Consider it, then to be true, that it is the liuty
of a Judge to sit in ail cases in which lias been
given him authority to sit, I proceed to ihe
question—what cases are they in which no author
ity to sit has been given a Judge? What cases
are they which a Judge is disqualified to preside
in? These being seen, those which a Judge is
qualified to preside in will also be seen.
It is a maxim of the Common Law, that a man
cannot be judge in his own cause. “Aliquis non
debet esse judex in propria eausaT (1 Coke Lilt.
141 a )
Within this maxima number of cases have been
held to fall, although not cases in which the Judge
was a party, viz: cases in which the Judge,
though not a party, hail an interest.
(14 Vin. Abr. 584-6 )
Then there have been a number of other cases,
in which individual Judges have held themselves
disqualified to sit, although they were neither par
ties in the cases nor interested in them. A Judge
lias declined to sit on account of “being connected
with the parties,” (5 Maitle 4’ SeL 2i.)or being
connected with one of the parties,” (5 Dunford
cp East 5,) or for having, when at the bar, been
“Counsel in the cause,” (1 Barn Adolph. 605.
1 Ilrod. cjj- Bing. 161,) or for having been “con-
in the cause, ( Barn <\- Cr. 566. 3 Barn
A Adolph. 2.) or for having been “concerned” in
the cause, (2 East 272, do. 389, do. 478, do. 520,
do. 555, 3 do. 245, do* 393, 2. Bos. Pul. New. R.
451“ There have been cases in which two out of
four”judges have declined to give any opinion, “as
they had been engaged in the case while at the
bar,” ( Maule■ dp Set. 103.) In Doe ex item.—
Early of Jersey vs. Sm ith, 5 Maule dp Set. -175, ;
a case of this sort, Lord Ellenborough said “that
only two Judges were in a situation to pronounce
any judgment, the other two having, when at the
bar, been engaged in the case.”
The example of these English Judges has been
followed by the Judges of this Court. Instances of
that are to be found in 1 Kelly , 25, 275, 348, 365,
402, 466, 481, 513, 525, 598, 639.
To bring all of these cases within the maxim,
that a man shall not be a judge in his own cause,
it is necessary, it must be confessed, to read that
maxim most liberally, according to its spirit and not
to read it according to its letter. But if they cannot
be brought within it, they have to stand without jus
tification, for there is no other maxim or law, of
which I am aware, within which they may be
brought.
Admitting them to be within the maxim, it may
be doubted whether the maxim, itself, has not been
repealed by the part of the Constitution of the
State which provides for the establishment of this
Court, and by the Act ofthe Legislature which es.
tablishes the Court.
In the Constitution are these words: the Su
preme Court shail consist of three Judges,” &c.—
“And the said Court shall, at each session in each
district, dispose of and finally determine each and
every case on the docket of such Court, at tho first
term,” &c
The expression “each and every case,” is broad
enough to include all casesoi the kinds above enu
merated. And all cases which it includes, the
Court is required to determine; and the Court is
declared to be a something which shall consist of
three Judges , and it is not clear that what consists
of but two Judges does not consist of enough to
constitute that something ? Did not the Constitu
tion intend that it should take ail three of the
Judges to make a Court? If it did, then, when it
required the Court to determine “each and every
case” on its docket, it required each of tho three
Judges to sit in each an every such case; for the
sitting of each Judge is essential to the making of
the Court, and so is essential to a determination of
any case by the Court. In short, if the Constitu-
tion intended it to take all three of the Judges to
make a Court, then when it said the Court should
determine “each and every case” on its docket, did
it not repeal the maxim, a man ought not to be
a judge in his own cause ? The notion that this
pait of the Constitution intended it to take all three
ofthe. Judges to constitute a Court, derives sup
poit from other parts ot tiie Constiutiou.
The third section of the iiist article lias these
words:—“The Senate shall be elected biennially”
“and shall consist of forty-seven members,” &c.
Tiie seventh, these: “The House of Represen
tatives shall be composed of one hundred and tiiirty
members,” &c.
The twelfth, these: “a majority of each branch
shail be authorized to proceed to business, hut a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and
compel the attendance of their members in such
manner as each House shall prescribe.”
In the old Constitution, that of 1777, are to be
found provisions similar to these, and also a pro
vision in there words: “All causes” shall be tried
in tiie Supreme Court,” “which Court shall consist
ofthe Chief Justice and three or more ofthe Jus
tices residing in the county. In case ofthe absence
ofthe Chief Justice, the senior Justice on the bench
shall act as Chief Justice,” &e.
This language in the third and seventh sections,
which the Constitution applies to both branches ol
the Legislative department, is tiie same, or the
same in substance, as that in another section, which
we have seen it to apply to as much of the Judicial
department as is constituted by the Supreme Court.
Tho Supreme Court shall consist of three Judges.”
The language, therefore, it is to be presumed, was
applied to the Supreme Court in the same sense in
which it had been applied to the two branches of
tiie Legislative department. But as to those
branches, is it not clear that the Constitution con
sidered the language as saying, that to make a
senate, it should take full forty-seven members; to
make a House of Representatives, full one hun
dred and forty ; for if tiie Constitution did not con
sider the language to say this, what reason had it
lor inserting the provision contained in the twelfth
section. The provision that “a majority ol each
branch shall be authorized to proceed to busi
ness”?
Now this provision in the twelfth section, is con
fined to tiie two branches ofthe Legislature. It is
not said of the Supreme Court tlsat a majority of
its members shall be authorized to proceed to busi
ness. And rrchtsio unius exciusio allerius.
Indeed, an argument of the same sort is to be
drawn from the 6th section of tiie 3rd article which
concerns the Inferior Court, in which it isaaid,“the
Inferior Court shall have power to vest Ihe care of
the records and other proceedings therein, in the
Clerk, or such otiier person as they may appoint,
and any one or more Justices of the said Court,
with such Clerk or other person, may issue citations
and grant temporary letters,” &c.
Tiie Act of the Legislature for organizing the
Court is, in this particular, stronger in some re
spects, perhaps than the Constitution. It uses this
language: “the said Court shail consist of three.
Judges,” &.c. “It shail be the dutv of all tiie
Judges of said Court to attend at each term of said
(Join t: but if, from Providential cause, any one of
said Judges cannot attend a Court, sucli Court may
be holden by two J udges. If only one Judge shall
attend a Court, it shall be his duty to open the
Court and to adjourn it to a day not more than two
days beyond the regular term, at which time, if two
Judges do not attend, tho Court shall, in that case,
he adjourned to tiie next regular term.” (Sec. 3.)
“The Supreme Court shall proceed, at the first
term, (unless prevented by Providential cause) to
hear and determine each and every cause) which
mav, in manner aforesaid, be sent up,” &c.
“If, from Providential cause, any one of said
Judges cannot attend a Court, such Court may be
holden by two Judges.” Is not the implication this:
that if the cause which keeps a Judge absent be
Providential, then the other two Judges may hold
the Court: but it the cause be any thing else than
Providential, then tho other two may mil hold it.—
If so, again inclusio unius exclusio allerius.
And if the idea was that a majority of the
Judges might, in general, be sufficient to make
a Court, it may be asked why was imposed
upon each Judge tiie duty in terms so peremptory,
“to attend at each term.” Why was not atten
dance left to tiie discretion of each Judge—to the
sense which each might entertain ofhis own duty,
in tiie same manner as the attendance of members
of tiie Legislature is left to each members sense of
iiis duty ?
In other respects, tiie Act is like the Constitu
tion—like that, it requires tiie Court “to hear and
determine each and every cause which may be sent
up” to the Court.
All tliese tilings taken together, not to mention
the rules ofthe general law, as to the strict con
struction ot naked powers, and as the manner of
of executing powers delegated to more persons than
one, I think there is enough to make it most doubt
ful whether both ofthe following propositions are
not true: First. That it takes all three of’ the
Judges ofthe Supreme Court to make that Court,
on all occasions, except those on which Providen
tial cause prevents one ofthe Judges from sitting.
Secondly. That the Court, thus made, has to hear
and determine each and every case before it.
If it bo assumed that botli of these propositions
are true, then it follows that the rule, a man ought
not to be a judge in his own cause, is repealed,
unless the words “each and every case” be restric
ted in their meaning.
Let it be assumed that both of tliese propositions
are true, then it follows that tiie rule,- a man ought
not to lie a judge in his own cause, is repealed, un
less the words “each and every case” be restricted
m their meaning.
Let it be assumed, that these words are not to
be restricted in their meaning, and that with these
words, in their unrestricted meaning the ptoposi
tions are true.
This assumed, let us apply the propositions to a
possible case, and see how they will work.
Suppose tiie case before tiie Supreme Court to
be a case in which'one ofthe Judges ofthatCourt
is an actual party —say tiie defendant in error.—
What would be the effect, of these propositions, if
true, on such a ease ? This : First. Al! three of
the Judges would have to sit in the case. Second
ly. Tiiere would be a chance for reversing the
judgment. Two of tiie three Judges would be dis
interested, and they, if the other dissented, could
render the judgment ofthe Court. The other might,
himself, after hearing argument, come to concur
with his associates. It is at least certain, that there
would be a chance for the judgment to be reversed
—a better chance than there would be if all three
of the Judges were tiie defendants in error. And
there is Common Law authority to the effect, that
when all of the Judges of a Court are parties
defendants in tiie ease, they must neverthe
less sit in the case “for necessity.” (14 Yin.
Abr. “Judges ” (A ) 7 Grant on Corporations,
281.) It does not, it seems, take all oftlio Judges
of the King’s Bench or Common Pleas, to make a
Court. Arid so, if only one of the Judges of those
Courts is interested in a case, his fellow Judges
may decide it.
The effect, then,of these propositions, if true,
upon the case supposed, would be to give the plain
tiffin error, the party opposed to the Judge, a
chance for a judgement in his favor—a chance for
a reversal.
Suppose, now, the plaintiff in error to object
that the Judge who happens to be the party de
fendant in error, ought not to sit; and that that
Judge yields to the objection, what is the effect of
that ? It amounts to an affirmance of the judg
ment below. Tiie Cffect jis to make tiie Judge
certainly gain the case, and the objecting plaintiff,
his adversary, certainly lose it.
Now, the only difference between this supposed
case and the real case is, that in the real case, the
Judge, j.against whose sitting the objection was
made, was not all a party in the case. Ho was
only of Counsel in a like case—only the connex
ion of a paity in a like case.
But suppose the words, “each and every case”
in the latter ofthe two propositions, are to be re
stricted in their meaning—restrictedto such cases
as by the law existing at tiie time when those
words were {used by the Constitution and the
Statute, it was lawful /or a Judge to preside ip,
viz: cases in which he was not a party and so
forth, then what would be the effect ofthe propo
sitions upon the case supposed ? The certain
affirmance of the judgement of tiie Court below.
One ofthe Judges would be the defendant in er
ror. He could not sit. The other two would not
bo sufficient to make a Court—and without a Court
no judgment, of any sort, could bo rendered in the
case; and therefore, the judgment of the Court he
low would have to stand good—that is to say, the
effect of tiie law’s not allowing tho Judge to sit
in ills own case, would be to make him gain it to
a certainty. This being ihe law, whether sitting or
not sitting would be to tho interest of the Judge,
would depend simply upon whether he was plain
tiff in error or defendant in error.
The difference between ibis supposed case and
the real case has been above stated. The effect of
yielding to the objection, that the Judge ought not
to preside in the real case would, these proposi
tions, in this restricted sense of tho words, “each
and every easo,” considered as true, iiave been to
make the party objecting certainly lose his case.
The effect of not yielding to the objection, was to
give him a chance to gain it—a chance which, as
it happened, resulted in success.
Now 1 have not said that I consider to ho true,
botii or either of these propositions, viz : first, that
it takes all three of the Judges ofthe Supreme
Court to make a Court, on ail occasions, except
liiose on which one Judges is, by Providential
cause, kept from sifting. Secondly, that ilia
Court, thns made up of all three Judges, must de
termine “each and every case” before it. What
I say is, that it is very doubtful to my mind wheth
er they are true.
If true, and the words, “each and every case” in
tiie second, rre to have their literal meaning, then
I think it clear that the iaw expressed by the prop
ositions, repeals the maxim, that a person ought
not to be a judge in Ids own cause.
If true, and these words are not to have their
literal meaning l but are to have a meaning restric
ted to cases in which, by law, it was lawful for
Judges to preside, viz: in which they were
not parties orthe relations of parties, or in which
they bed not been of Counsel before they became
Judges, then tiie law expressed by tiie proposition
does not repeal that; but it is capable of produc
ing, in some cases, an effect which it was tiie ob
ject oftliat maxim to prevent from being produced
in any case—the effect to make it certain, that it
the case be that of a Judge, who is defendant in
error, his not silling will amount gaining of
his case.
The questions involved in tliese propositions
have never, as far as I know, received any consid
eration from the Supreme Court. The Judges of
the Court, however, have, from the liegiiiing, acted
upon tiie notion that two Judges could make a
Court and render a judgment, not only in cases in
which the cause that kept the other Judge from
sitting with those two was Providential, but also in
cases in which tiie ‘ause was other than Provi
dential, as in cases in which the Judge was a re
lation of one of the parties, or had been of Coun
sel lor one of them.
It has frequently happened that one Judge has
declined to sit iri a case for one of the reasons
afoesaid, and the other two have rendered a judg
ment in the case. The example thus set by the
other Judges, I have felt myself, not without some
difficulty, at liberty silently to follow. The prac
tice, as far as I know, lias not been complained of
by those on whom it lias had direct operation—
the parties in such eases, or by any others—still,
I must say that I have never yet made up my
mind, as to whether a judgment pronounced by
two only of the Judges of that Court, in a case
in which the third didnot’sit—did not sit for some
reason that was not Providential, was valid.
Admit, therefore, that the old maxim—a man
cannot be a judge in his own case, lias not been
repealed or at all effected by tiie parts ot the Con
stitution, and ofthe Statute organizing the Supreme
Court, to which I have referred, yet, it is certainly
true that by those parts, the maxim lias not been
enlarged. It is certainly true, that no reason can
be found in those parts ofthe Constitution, and ol
the Statute, to multiply the variety of cases to ho
subjected lo that maxim.
This maxim, then, being to be taken as in force,
to its full extent, what is that extent? It is what
we have already seen. The extent is to disqualify
a Judge from sitting in al! cases in which he is a
party or the relation of a party; or in which he
has been concerned as Counsel, and in no others.
The maxim does not extend to a case which may
happen to be* like some case in which one of the
parties may be tiie Judge’s relation, or be a person
who was the Judge’s client, when the Judge be
came Judge. Not a case—not a dictum—not an
opinion of any law writer or other was cited, to
show that the maxims does. Not a thing ofthe
sort, as far as I knew or believe, exists. To make
the maxim go this length, it would iiave to be read
as saying that a person not sit as Judge
iri anyjjcase in which was involved a question which
was also involved in another existing case, wheth
er in suit or not, which might possibly, ome time
or otiier, come before him to be ad judged, or might
not, in which he or some relation of his was party,
or in which lie who was a party, was one for
whom the person, before he became Judge, had
been Counsel. And to read it as saying this, would
be to read it as disqualifying a man to sit as Judge
in cases of the following kinds:
Say the Judge is a stockholder in a bank or in
a rail-road or has a relationßhat is one; or at the
time ofhis election as Judge, was Attorney for
the bank or the rail-road, or for some stockholder
in either. • The case is against another bank or
rail-road, or stockholder, in one or llie other, and
is such as to involve the questnn, wh r r a bank,
as the indorser ofa biilof exchange, . liable, on
notice of dishonor given to tiie picsideutor to t lie
casher, or to tiie teller, or to a director; or liable
without any notice at all;, or liable if the indorse
ment is not made by signature and counter-signa
ture of president and chasher ;or liable if the in
dorsement is not directly and expresely authorized
by tlie board of directors, &c. &c.
Or such as to involve tiie question, whether
the rail-road is liable, as a common carrier, dec. &c.
Or sucli as to involve, any question as to wheth
er either the bank or rail-road is liable, under the
general law applicable to corporations.
Or such as to involve the question, whether a
failure to do something required to be done by
some provision which is common to all bank char
ters and rail-road charters, does not amount to
a forfeiture, or to cause for a forfeiture of the
charter.
Or such as to involve the question, whether the
Legislature has not power to repeal a charter.
Or in short, say the case is sucli as to involve
any ofthe thousand possible questions which are
common to all banks and all rail-roads, and all
stockholders in either.
Or say that the Judge happens to be a land
holder, by grant, from tiiejState, or is a relation to
a person that is such landholder, or was, when
e'ected Judge, Counsel for a man whose case
turned on tiie validity of aggrant fiom tho State
for land, and the case before him is that of some
other man, which involves tho question, whether
the Legislatuie can annul a grant or make a
young grant take precedence over an old one ; or
whether a grant carries with it mines and miner
alt, or any of the possible questions which are
common to all grants.
Or say the case is one which involves tiie ques
tion, whether one ofthe parties to it is bound to pay
the poll-tax imposed by the general tax law on ail
persons, ttje Judge included, he insisting that the
Legislature has no power to pass such a law.
In ttiis case—ill all these cases, and in others
indefinitely of similar character, this
reading ofthe maxim makes it illegal for the Judge
to sit.
Tiie result of sucli a reading would be, or come
near to being, to make the cases in which a Judge
is disqualified to sit, as numerous as tiiose in which
lie is qualified to sit. And sucli a result I know
of nothing sufficient to bring about, except a law
made by the law-making power—a law sufficient
ly enlarging the maxim, a person ought not to be
a judge in his own cause, to bring it about.
The case in which tliis objection to my sitting
was made, is, in some respects, a peculiar one—
PEYTON H. COLQUITT, ) Fditor<l
JAMES W. WARREN, s iaitor3 ’
Number 31
On one side of it, the party is’the holder of bank
bills; is therefore one of a class, which, for all
practical purposes, may be said to include in it
all the people ofthe State, not even excepting the
Judge objected to, for every man holds, or expects
in hold, the bill of some bank ; and so, lias an in
terest in preserving a sound bank-bill currency.
File bills of which ttiis party, thus belonging to
tlih powerful class, is the holder, are the bills of a
broken bank—of a bank which, perhaps, a great
linjority of that class may have come to believe
>r suspect to iiave been broken by its stockholders,
or purpose 10 defraud them—ofa hank, the bank
ruptcy of which, unless those stockholders should
bo compelled, individually, to make good the
mnkruptcy, that whole may consider calculated
to have, as an example, a bad effect on all the
other banks of the State—those other banks whose
bills constitute almost the entire money of the
class. On ono side of Ihe case, such is the party;
on tiie otiier, tho party is one of the stokholders in
that broken bank. The Judge objected to, has,
lor father-in-law. one who is sued as a stockhol
der in another broken bank, in a suit similar to
(hat against this stockholder, in this broken
■ bank.^
Question—which party to tliis case, is it most to
the Judge’s interest to decide in favor of? If he
decides against the bill-holder, and can get one or
botii ol the otiier two Judges to go with him, it is
possible tiiat the decision may, in the long run,
work to the benefit of his father-in-law, by having
some influence, in fact, on the decision of tiie case
against him. If he decides against the bill-holder,
but cannotget either of the ofher two Judges to go
wiih him. it is not posible for his decision to work
at all to the benefit of his father-in-law, because
a dissenting decision or judgment counts for noth
ing.
From this is to be seen the degree of interest
which the Judge has to decide against the bill
holder.
If he decides in favor of the bill-holder, it is
possible, perhaps not improbable, that he shall
please nearly every man in the State, as every man
is the holder of the bill of some bank, or is contin
ually expecting to be; if, in so deciding, he puts in
possible peri! one who isjj as near to him as
father-in-law, and also one or more who were as
near to him as clients*it is possible—is it not prob
able—tiiat he shall give nearly every man iii the
State exhaited pleasure—fill him with a proud rap
ture at the idea of having to preside over him a
Judge of such magnanimity—sucli purity—such
love of justice.
If, therefore, he thus decides, he stands a good
chance, not only to retain all ofhis old popularity,
but to add to tiie old much that is new. Is popularity
worth any thing to him ? is it prized by him ? He
wished to be a Judge—-popularity made him a
Judge. Does lie wish to be made Judge again,
or to be made any otiier dignitary? It is only
popularity tiiat can gratify his wish.
Behold what the Judge stands a chance to gain
by'deeiding in favor ot the bill-holder.
By deciding against tiie bill-holder, may the
Judge lose anything > The Judge, by deciding
against any bill-holder at all, risks offending the
whole, or nearly the whole ofhis fellow bill-holders
—a class co-oxtensive with tho people of the
State — by deciding against one, when it is possi
ble that such, the Judge’s decision, may operate to
the benefit of a person who stands to the Judge
as father in-law—oi another who stands to him as
a former client—tiie Judge risks not only offend
ing tiiis proportion so large—of this class so ex
tensive—lie also risks inspiring it with the horri
ble suspicion that lie is a corrupt Judge. The
Judge risks more than his popularity,
See, then, what the Judge, by deciding against
the bill holder may lose.
A dissenting decision against the bill-holder—a
thing tiiat counts for nought—has not the Judge
every thing to lose—nothing to gain by making
tiiat ? If yet lie will sit and make such a dissent
ing decision, does it not seem certain that he is
actuated, in his conduct, by some motive stronger
than that of personal loss or gain ? Does it seem
impossible that tnat motive can be a sense of
duty ?
The only reason given in support of tiie objec
tion lo the Judge’s sitting in tliis case was, that tho
decision ofthe case would be, in law, a decision of
the other cases. It was said that this case would be a
precedent for those, and that Courts are bound by
precedents
This is a mistake. Courts are bound by nothing
blit !atv, and nothing is iaw but something that is
made law by the law-making power. Courts are
not this power. They are expressly forbidden, by
the Constitution, to exercise this power. “The
Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments of
Government shall be distinct, and each department
shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy;
and no person or collection of persons, being of one
of those departments, shall exercise any power
properly attached to either of the others, except in
the instances herein expressly permitted.” (I.
See. 1 Art.)
In a case between A. and B.,say as to what is
lawful interest for money. The Court decides it
to be ten per cent. Are all future Courts, in all
future cases, to say it is ten per cent I or are
they to go by the word of the law-making power,
which says sucli interest is [seven per cent.—
In the case supposed, however, say the decision,
is, that the interest is seven per [cent. Are
future Courts, when they too say seven per cent,
to be considered as saying so because of tiiat de
cision, or because of tiiat law on which that de
cision rests ?
What, then, is a decision worth ? It is, to tho
parties to it, worth all that a law would be worth.
To the parties to it, a decision may, indeed, with
out any great departure from propriety of
language, be said to be a iaw. To A. and 8., the
parties to it, tiie decision is a law—to the rest of
tiie alphabet it is none. Are previous decisions,
then, worth nothing, to opererate on future decis
ions? Decisions are evidence to show the opin
ion which tiie Judges making them iiave, as to
what the laws is on the question decided. They •
ar>- evidence of opinion, and they are worth what
opinion is worth. What opinion is worth, depends
upon many tilings. It is wintli nothing, when it
stands on one side, and the law stands on the other.
When it is doubtlul on which side the law stands,
then Judicial opinion, as to tiie side on which the
law stands, if it boos good quality, and especial
ly if it be also of good quantity, is worth much.
But in no case does it govern —in no case is it few.
The respect which is paid to it, is paid voluntarily.
Tiio Courts, if they choose to depart from it, and
go by their own original opinion ot what the law
is,always do so.
And what respect is it likely that Courts
would voluntarily pay to a decision made by a
Court, one of the members of which was, say a
party to tiie decision ? And what if the Legislature
were to come in, and by a declaratory Statute, say
that the law was not such as the decision made it
out to be, but was so and so; and that the decision
was not to count as any evidence of what thd law
was ?
Be tho influence of precedents, however, what
it may, there is no law which says a Judge is dis
qualified to sit in a case, tiie decision in which may
chance to be claimed as a precedent in some other
casein which lie or some connection ofhis, or some
person whom he was Counsel forattbe time when
lie became Judge, may be a party. And there is
a la.w, as 1 think 1 have .shown, that he must sit in
ail cases in which he has been authorized to sit.
“Mr. Jones, don’t you think marriage is a means
ot grace?”
“Certainly , anything is a means of grace that
leads to repentance.”
Exit Jones, working in the lead of a broom
handle. _
Western editor having published a long
leader on “Hogs,” a rival paper in the same vil
lage, upbraids him for obtruding his family matters
upon the public.
-Mr. Clark, formerly a citizen of Memphis and
at tiie time, the carpenter ofthe steamer Sam Hale,
lost his life by accidental drowning from that boat,
in White river a lew days since.