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iftf I gainst the States ih*o»a-tivt». a hat a larg*l M>r -*°” ,,» people of thp Upitej Slates thus r»S ;,n * *‘ ie „ lieivi,.-to the :Viiie and the ger^ral gevcrn- mdudin* nuiiv who call itemsclves the ; ii,! s ni state rights am! oppone» ,,; 4, l consolida tion, can scarcely he doubled. a* * l "* "“'i 1 on that supposition, it can be explained. that aw many of that description, shtrttlil denounce the tlorinne tor which the state :. r ontcn<r», m soabsurtl. But fortunately, the r ipiiosition is entirely destitute of truth. So ’i.ir tram the ( 004111111100 being the work <>t the A- merican people collsctirely, no such political body, eiihc r now, or ever did exist. In that character the people of this country never performed a single political act, nor indeed can, without an entire rev olution, in all our political relations. I challenge an instance. From the beginning, ami in nlf the changes of political existence, through which we have passed, the people of the United States hare been united, as forming politi cal communities, and not as individuals. Keen in the first stage of existence, they formed distinct colonies, indepemleniof each oilier, amJpolitically united only through"the finish Crown. In their •irst 1 formal Union, for the purpose of resisting the encroachments of the Mother Country, they united as distinct political communities; and, passing from (heir Colonial condition, in the act announc ing their independence to the world, they declared themselves, by riarac and enumeration, free and independent slates. In that character, they form ed the oldrconfcderation ; and, when it was propo- .. :d tc supercede the articles of the confederation, by the present constitution, they met in conven tion as states, acted and voted, as states; and the constitution, when formed, was submitted for rati fication to the people of the several states; it was ratified, by them as states, each state for itself, each by its ratification binding its own citizens ; the paits thus separately binding themselves, and uot the whole, the parts; to which, if it be added, that it is declared in tlto preamble of the constitution, to iie ordained by the] people of the United States, and in the article of reification, when ratified, it is declared “to be binding between the states so rat- ifying," the conclusion is inevitable, that the con stitution is the wotk’of the people of the states, considered as sep arate aud independent political communities—that they a/e its authors—their pow er created it—their voice clothed it with authori ty that the government it formed is in reality their agent—and that the Union of which it is the bond, is an Union of states, and not of individuals. No •me, who regards bis character for intelligence and truii. has ever ventured directly to deny facts so certain; hut while they arc too certain for denial, they arc also too conclusive in favor of the rights of the states for admission. The usual course has been adopted to elude what can neither be denied nr.r admitted, and never Ins the device been more successfully practised. By confounding slates, with statu governments, and the people of the states with the American people collectively, things, as it regards the subject of this communication, to- tally dissioiilar, as much so as a triangle and a square, facts of themselves perfectly certain and plain, and which, when well understood, must lead to a correct conception bfthe subject, have been involved in obscurity ahd mystery. i will next proceed to state some of the results which necessarily follow, liom the facts which have been established. The first, and in reference to the subject of this Communication, the most important is, that there is no direct and immediate connexion between the individual citizens of a State and the General Government. The relation between them is thro’ the State. The Union is an Union of States, as communities, and not an Union of individuals. As members of n State, her citizens were original ly subject to no control, but that of the State; and could be subject to no other, except by the act of the State itself. The Constitution was ac- cotdingly submitted to \ho Stntes fbr ihctr sejm- rato ratification; aud it was only by the ratification of the State that its citizens became subject to the control of tho General Government. The ratifi cation of any other, or all other States, without its own, could create no connexion between them and the General Government, nor impose on them the slightest obligation. Without the ratification of their own State, they would stand in the same re lation to the General Government as do the citi zens or subjects of any foreign State; and wo find the citizens of North Carolina and Rhode Island actually bearing that relation to the Government, for sour* time alter it went into operation, these States having in the first instance declined to ral- ily. Nor had the act of any individual the least influence in subjecting him to the control of the General Government, except as it might influence the ratification of the Constitution by his own State. Whether subject to its control or not, de pended wholly on the act of the State. His dis sent had not tho least weight against the assent of his State, nor his assent against its dissent. It follows as a necessary conscqucnee, that the act of ratification bound tho State as a commOnity, as is expressly declared in the article of ratification above quoted, and not the citizens of the States as the former. Another, and a highly important con sequence, as it regards the subject under investi gation, follows with equal certainty; that on a question, whether a particular power exercised by the General Government, be granted by the Con stitution, it belongs to a State as a member of the Union, in her sovereign capacity, in Convention, to determine definitively, as far as her citizens are concerned, the exti-nt ol the obligation which she contracted, aud if. in her opinion, tho act exercis ing the powci be unconstitutional, to declare it null and void, which declaration would bo obliga tory On her citizens. In coming to this conclu* ston, it mav be proper to remark,-to prevent mis representation, that I do not claim for a State the right to abrogate an act of the General Govern incut. It is the Constitution that annuls an un constitutional act. Such an act is of itself void, and of 110 effect. What I claim is the right of n State, as far as its citizens arc concerned, to de- idare tiio extent of the obligation, and that such declaration is binding on them—a right, which lim ited to its citizens, flowing directly from the rela tion of (lie State to the General Government, on the one side, and its citizens on the other, as al ready explained, and resting on the most plain and solid reasons Passing over, what of itself might he consider ed conclusive, the obvious piiuciplc, that it be longs to the authority which imposed the obliga tion to declare its extent, as far as those are con cerned on whom the obligation is placed, I shall present u single argument which, of itself is de cisive. I have already shewn that there is no immediate connexion between tho citizens of a State and tho General Government, and that the relation between them is through tho State. 1 have also shown, that whatever obligations were imposed on the r.tiz.cns, were imposed by the declaration of ih- '*•:<> , ratifying the Constitu tion. A similar «b i.(ration, by the same autlior- Dor „l hv analogy. The case of a treaty be tween sovereigns' is strictly analogous. 1 here, as in tli.J case, the State contracts for the CJti- zen or subject;—there, as in this,tue obtig is imposed by the State; and is independent Ids will; and* there, ns in this, the declaration of the State determining the extent of tlie obliga tion contracted, is obligatory 011 him, as much so as tho treaty itself. Having now, I trust, established the very im portant point, that the declaration of a State, as in the extent of the power granted, is obhgamry on its citizens, I shall proceed to consider the et- fects of such declarations in rcfcrctirc to the General Government; a question which neces sarily involves the consideration of the relation between it and the States. It lias been shewn, that tlm people of the States, acting as distinct and independent communities, arc the authors ot the constitution, and that the Gcucral Govern ment was organized and ordained by them to ex- ositiou to grant power, “to negative all laws con trary, in tlie opinion of the National Legislature, to the articles of the Union, or any treaty subsist- th'is'\ 1 w obligati011 ! i.tg under the authority of the Union; aud to call 1 u indenendeut of forth the force of the Upton against any of the Union tailing to fulfil its duty under the arti clcs thereof.” Thp next project submitted (Charles Pinckney’s) coiitaiued a similar provision. It pro posed “that the Legislature of the United *-<atcs should have the power to revise the laws of the several States, that may be supposed to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this consti tution to Congress, and to negative mid annul such as do.” The next was submitted by Air. Paterson of New Jersey, which provided, “if auy State, or body of men in any State, shall oppose • * * T _ — cVin l» fiptc cento its powers. Tho Government then, with kU 113 . . . f ^ all its departments, is m fact tho agents of the States, constituted to execute their joint will, as expressed in the constitution. . . In using the term agent, I do not intend to de rogate in any degree-, from its character, as a Go vernment. It is as truly tod properly a Govern ment, as are the State Governments themselves. I have applied it, simply because it strictly be longs to the relation between the General Gov ernment and tho States, as, in fact, it docs also to that between a State and its own government. Indeed, according to our theory, Governments are in their nature but trusts, and those appomt- to admiuister them, trustees or agents to execute the trust powers. The sovereignty resides else where; iu the people not in the govcruniont. And with us, the people, mean tho people of the several States originally formed into 13ylistiuct and independent communities, anil now into 24. —Politically speaking in reference to our system, house assent to the same ;’ w mea, ; there arc no other people. The General Govern- ftetti d attempt to commit, was will ment, as well as those af the States, is but the or- . I ‘lo not deem it necessary to trac * - . . si..* irmrnnk nf tl»ft rnnrfttitinn t!i« fate c gan of their power; the latter, that of their res pective States, through which arc exorcised sep arately that portion of pdwer not delegated by the constitution, and in the exercise of which, each State has a local and pceuuliar interest, the for mer, the joint organ of all the States confederat ed into one gcueral community, and through which they Jointly aud coucurriugly exercise the delegated powers in which all have a common in terest. Thus viewed, the constitution of the U- nited States, with tho Government it treated, is truly and strictly the constitution of each State; as much sO as its own particular constitution aud Government, ratified by the sarno authority, iu tho same mode, and having, as far ns its citizens are concerned, its powers and obligations from the same source; differing only in the aspect, un der which 1 am considering the subject, in the plighted faith of tho States to its co-itntcs, and of which! os far as its citizens aro considered, tho State, iii the last resort, is the exclusive judge. Such then, is the relation between the State and the Gcucral Government. Iu whatever light WC may cousidcr-the constitution, whether as a compact between the States or of the nature of a legislative enactment by the joint ami concurring authority of the States, in their high sovereignty. In whatever light it maydi'c viewed, I hold it as necessarily resulting, that in the ease of a power disputed between them, the Government, as tho agent, has no right to enforce its construction a- gniiist the construction of the State, ns one of the sovereign parties to the constitution, any more than the State Government would have against the people of the State in their suvereign capaci ty, the relation being the same between them.— That such would be the case between agent and principal in the ordinary irananvii^ua i;r v , .. u will Jonbt, ..or will it bo possible to assign a reason, why it is not as applicable to the case of j government as that of individuals. The priu.t ! plo in fact, springs from tho relation itself, and is applicable to all its forms and characters. It may however, bo proper to notice a distinction between the case of a single principal and his a- geut, and that of several principals atid their joint agent, which might otherwise catfse some confu sion. In both cases as between the agent and a principal, the construction of the principal, wheth er he be a single principal or one of several, is equally conclusive; but, in tho latter case, both the principal ami the agent bear relation to the other principals, which must he taken irito'the es timate, in order to understand fully all the re sults which may grow out of the contest for pow er between them. Though the construction of the principal is conclusive against the joint agent as between them, such is not the case between him aud his associates. They both have an e- qual right of construction, and it would bo the duty of the agent to bring the subject before the principal to be adjusted according to the terms of tlie instrument of association; ami of the princi pal to submit to such adjustment. In such ca ses the contract itself is the law, which must de termine the rclativo rights and powers of the par- imlivi Inals, the latter being bound through their . , " ate, and ,n consequence of the ratification of ties tott. Iho General Government is a case of i.iUo with tty, ir tent of tlm obligatii : couceru^d. be of « | 1 course, on the itippo-i been transferee.!, a., that it has not. A • right to question the o other declaration i’ tli irity ; ami ;is In: w of ins Siam tissr uting or he assented or U. itrd, so e hiring the ex- fnr as they aro 1 speak, of te right has not •after he shown have no more would have the :!:o same nu ll.c dec.araiion ‘■'utioii, whcdi- uld i-i he equal ly buuud by a dm l.irutiou declaring the >xtentof |j'il asset) t. whether oppose.) to, or 10 fnv,^ 0 j- «uch declaration- Iu this conclusion I am su f . joint agency—the joint agent of the twenty-four sovereign Statos, It would he its duty,-accord ing to tho principles established iu such cases, in stead of endeavoring to enforce its construction of its (rowers against that of the State, to bring the subject before tlie States themselves, In the ouly form which,- afccording to the provisions of the constitution it can be, by a proposition to a- meud, in the manner prescribed 111 the instrument, to be acted on by them ill the only inode they can rightfully pursue, by expressly graining or withholding tho contested power. Against this conclusion there can be raised but bno objection, that the States have surrendered, or transfer red the right in question. If such be the fact, there ought to lie 11a difficulty in establishing it. Tho grant of the powers delegated is contain ed iu a written instrument, drawn up with great care, and adopted with tho utmost deliberation. It provides that the powers not granted aro re served to the States and the people. If it he sur rendered or transferred, let then tho grant be shewn, ami the controversy terminated i and surely it ought to be shewn, plainly and clearly shewn, before tho Stntes aro asked to admit what, if true, would not only divest them of a right, which, under all its forms, belongs to the princi pal over his agent, unless surrendered, but which cannot be surrendered, without in effect, and Ibr all practical purposes, reversing the relation be tween them; putting .the agent in the place of the principal, ami tho principal in that of the a- gent; and which would degrade the States, from tho high aud sovereign ceudition which they hare over held, under every form of their exist ence, to be mere subordinate and dependent cor porations. But, instead of shewing any such grant, not a provision can be found in tlie con stitution, authorising-the General Government to exercise any control whatever over a State by- force, by veto, by judicial process, or in any form —a most important omission, intendoiL ami uot accidental; and as will he shewn iu the course of these remarks, omitted by the dictates of the pro- foundost wisdom. I’ho journal and proceedings of the conven tion which formed the constitution, afford ahuu- dant proof that there was in that body a power-* ful party, distinguished for talents and influenee, intent on obtaining for the G'encral Government a grant of the vt-jy pow er iu question, aud that they attempted to effect this object in all possi ble ways, hut fortuuately without success. The first project of a constitution submitted to tho convention (Gov. Randolph's) embraced a prop- or prevent the carrying into execution shell acts, or treaties" (of the Union) “tho Federal Execu tive shall be authorised to call forth the powers of the confederated stntes, or so much thereof, as shall be necessary to enforce or compel the obe dience to snch acts, or observance to such treat ies.” Gen. Hamilton’s followed next, which pro vided that “all law's of the particular States, contrary to the constitution or laws of tho Unit ed States, to he utterly Void; and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Govgm- oror President of each state shall be appointed by the General Government, and shalUmvo a nega tive on tho laws about to he passed, in the state of which he is Governor or President.” At a subsequent period, a proposition was raoV' ed and referred to a committee, to provide that “the jurisdiction of the supreme court shall ex tend to all controversies between the United States ami any individual state;’’ am! at a still later period, it was moved to grant power “to negative all laws passed by tho several stntes, in terfering, in the opinion of tho Legislature, with the general harmony atad interest of the Uuioil, provided that two-thirds of tho members of each nurao tn tlxt'caine!” which, after ait inef- hdrawu. trace through the journals of tho convention die fate of these vari ous proposition^. That they were moved, and failed is sufficient to prove conclusively, iu a man ner never to lie obliterated, that the convention, w hich framed the constitution, was opposed to granting the p'otVer to tlie General Government iu any form, through any of its departments, leg islative, execuiivo or judicial, to coerce or control a stale, though proposed in all conceivable modes, and sustained by the most talented and infliten- tial members of the body. This, 011c would sup pose, ought to settle forever the question of the surrender, or transfer of power, under considera tions ; ami such ut fact, would he the ease, were the opinion of a largo portion of the community not biased, as in fact ills, by interest. A majori ty have a direct interest in enlarging the power of tho Government, and the interested .adhere to power with a pertinacity which bids defiance to" truth, though sustained"by evidence, .as conclu sive as mathematical demonstration; ami accor dingly, the advocates of the powers of the Gen eral Government, notwithstanding ttc- iihpreg- uable strength of the proof to the contrary, have boldly claimed bit construction, a power, tho grant of which was so perseveringly sought, and so sterhly resisted by the convention. They rest the claim on tho provisions in the Constitution, which declare, “that this constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the su preme law of the land,” and that, “the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the nited States, ami treaties made, or which shall he made, under their authority.” I do not propose to go into a minute examina tion of these provisions. They have been so fre quently and so ably investigated, and it has been so clearly shown, that they do uot warrant the ns- •mrnptioii of the power claimed for the goveru- mrnt, that I do not deem it necessary. I shall ftv •» ft.ii tit, laclictl rC- marks. I have already stated, that a distinct proposi tion ivas made to confer the very power in con troversy on the Supremo Court, which failed; which, of itself, odght 16 overrule the assumption of the power by construction, unlesssustained by the most conclusive argt; ncuts; but when it is added, that this proposition was moved (20th August) subsequent to the period of adopting the provisions, above cited, vesting the court with its present powers, (18th July.) and that an effort was made at a still Inter period, (23d August,) to invest congress with a negative on all state laws, which', iri its opinion, miglit interfere with the ge neral interest ami harmony of the Union, the ar gument would seem too conclusive against the powers of tho court, to be overruled by construc tion, however strong. Passing by, however, thi*, and also tho objec tion, that the terms cases iu law ami equity, are technical, embracing only questions between par ties amenable to tho process of the court, and, of course, excluding questions, between tile States and the General Government; an argmftcut which has never been answered; -there remains another objection perfectly conclusive. The construction, which would confer on the Supremo Qourt the power iu question, rests on the grobtfi! that the constitution has Conferred on that tribunal the high and important right of deci ding 011 tho coitfs'thutioijality of laws. That it possess this right I do not deny; hut I do utterly, that it is conferred by the constitution, cither by tho provisions above cited, or any other. It is a power derived not from tho constitution, hut from the necessity of the case; and so far from being possessed by the supreme court exclusively, or peculiarly, it not only belongs to every court of tho country, high or low, civil or criminal, blit to all foreign courts, before which a case may be brought, involving the construction of a law which may conflict with the provisions of tho constitu tion. The reason is plain. Where there are two sets of rulers prescribed hi reference to the same' subject, 0110 inr a higher am! another by an infe rior authority,* the judicial tribunal eallod in tixdo- cidc on the’easo, thuA unavoidably determine, should they conflict which is the law; and that necessity compete it to decide, that the rule pre scribed "by the inferior power, if, in its opinion, inconsistent with that of ihc fiightr^ is void; be tho conflict between the constitution imd a law, or between a charter ami the bye-laws of a cor poration, the principle aud source of authority are tlto same iu both cases. Being derived from ne cessity, it is restricted within its limits, and can not pass an inch beyond its narrow confines of deciding in a caso before a epurt, (and, of course, cr source, from the states. There arc thousands, influenced by these impressions, without being conscious of it, and who, while they believe them selves to be opposed to consolidation, have infu sed into their conception of our constitution,-al- limits of the state, to execute legally, Iho act nul lified, or any other passed with a view to enforce it; while on the other hand, the state would be able to enforce legally and peaceably its declara tion of nullification. Sustained by its court and most all the ingredients wiliqb enter into dial form juries, it would calmly and quietly, but success- . -ri.„ difference between I fullv. meet every ellort of the general government the coufeder; ffiKSgsarV^sswimisra-> •**?«<““°J their governments, the present constitution a as the court or some other device {\vhie&, however, far removed from consolidation, and is as strictly guarded as it is by the ramparts of the co ut. u- an d : ,s purely a confederation, as the one which , tion, would, I hold, be impossible, f he attempt . * I to elude, should it be made, would itself be un- * Like tho old confederation, it was formed and j constitutional, and iu turn, would be annulled ratified by state authority. The only difference by the sovereign voice of the state. Nor would iu this particular is, that one was ratified by the 1 the right oT appeal to the supreme court, under neople of the states, the other by the state govern- the judiciary, avail the general government. If ments; one Tunning more strictly a l niou of the “ ' state governments, the other of the states them selves; one, of the agents exercising tho'powers taken it would but cud in a new trial, and that, iu another verdict against the government; but whether it may be taken would be optional with The court itself has decided, that a ^sovereignty, and tho other ofthe sovereign them- the state. The court itself has decided, that a selves • but both were unions of political bodies, 1 copy of the record is requisite to review a judg- -.jfioInVt from a union ofthe ncoplc individually, i tnent of a state court, ami tt necessary, the state if in that of a repeal of the acts establishing ports of entries in the slate, the legality of the seizure must be determined, and that would bring up the question of the constitutionality of giving a pref erence to the ports of one-state over those of ano ther ; and so :f we pass from water to land, we will find every attempt there to substitute force for law must in like manner come under the review of the courts of the Union, aud the unconstitution* ality would be so glaring, that the Legislative ami Executive Departments, in their attempt to coer.c.e, should either make an attempt, so law less and desperate, vould be without tlto support of the judicial departn^nt. I will not pursue the question farther, as 1 hoiu it perfectly clear, that so long as a state retains in'er Federal relations, so long, in a word, as it continues a member o? the Uuiou, the contest between it and the general government must be before the courts and. juries: and every attempt, in whatever form, whether by land or water, to substitue force as the arbiter, in their place must fail. The unconstitutional- ity of the attempt would be so open aud pal pable, that it would he impossible to sustain it. There is indeed one view, and one only of the the address of the convention, laving the coustitu- I nounced and executed before the possibility pi tion before congress, speak of consolidating and J reversal; and executed too, without rcspotisibih- Iti considering this aspect of the controversy, I pass over the fact, that the general government j has no right to resort to force against a state—to j codrcc a sovereign member of thq Union, which, I r . I trust, I hayc established beyond all possible ! such too must be its effect, which presents tup mga- doubt. Let it, however, be determined to use important question, are they in fact the same, on force, and the difficulty would be insurmountable, ; tho dcr : siort of which depends the question, wh?- place the stale beyond the paltf cf all her Feder al relations, and thereby, all control on the part of the other states over* her. She would stand to them simply in the relation, of a foreign, state, divested of'all Federal connexion., and having none other between them, but those belonging to the laws of iiatio’us. Standing thug towards 011c another, force might indeed he employed against a stale, but it must be a belligerent force, precc: ded by a declaration of war, and carried on with all its formalities. Such would be the certain eft feet of secession ; and if nullification be secession if it be but a different name for the .same tldnp conception, has been the principal cause of the ability).ofwhich, would very soon fully manifest impression so prevalent of tlie inferiority of the ! itself, should folly or madness ever make the at- suites to the general government-, aild pt the con- tAipt sequent right ofthe latter to coerce tho former. Raised from below the state governments it was conceived to be placed above the states them selves. -r I have now, I trust, conclusively shewn that a state has a right iu her sovereign capacity, in con- lararions woSl.l be obligatory on her citizens, as | the constitution, and to Subvert the system to its I that may^be exercised^ WithoiH tumma m 0 0 highly «o sis.the constitution itself, and conclu- foundation sice against the general govornmeut, which would have no Against whom would it he applied? Congress Federal relations of the State or net. 1 am aware that there is a considerable and re spectable portion pf our state, with a very large portion of the Union, constituting in fact a great majority, who are of the opinion that they .are the same thing, differing only in name, aud who, under that impression, denounce it as the most dangerous of alL doctrines; and yet, so far from being the same, they are, unless indeed I am greatly deceived, not only perfectly distiuguisha* blc, but totally dissimilar in their liatiirc, their ob ject and effect; and that so far from deserving tin; denunciation so properly belonging Jo the act with whichitis.cpiifcauded, itis in truth, the high land the eiicroactiments 01 me .government; 1 nuuuo nwiuw treaspn ; (“levying est and most precious rights of all til-spates, a.n and Veto, as arresting or inhibiting its author-I war against the United States, adhereing to their essential to preserve that very ^ ni j n ’. f ?'' t ^ t s, X ized acts within tho limits ofthe state. enemies, giving them aid aipl. comfort! ) or any posed effect of dcstrojin 0 \ih.ch, it bituilj The practical effect, could the right lie co.nsld- ! other prime, made penal by the constitution or the j anathematized., . „ f . erod as one fully recognized, would be plain.and : laws of.the U. States. I I ^all now proceed to make good my assertion simple, ami has already ill a great infcasiiro been j To suppose that force could bo called iu, un anticipated. If the State lias a right, there must i plies indeed, a great mistake, both as to the 11a- ofnecessity be a corresponding obligation on the j turcof our government and that of the coutro- part of the general government, to acquiesce in : versy. It would lie a legal and constitutional its exercises; and of course, it wouliT be its duty j contest, a conflict of moral and not physical foice to abandon the power, at least as far as the state ! —a trial of constitutional not military power, to 1 “ . .» ' be decided before the judicial tribunals of the powers of the"'excrcisVof'this* high and important right, j it he called resistance for the juries to refuse to which is tho great conservative principle of qur J find, and the courts to render judgment, in con- system is know under the various names of Nul- ; fortuity to the wishes of the gcneial.go\ernmeut; location, Interposition, and State Veto, in refer- no insurrection to suppress ; no armed force to .euce to its operation viewed. Under different as-! reduce; not a sword unsheathed : not a bayonet pects. Nullification, ns .aAutUliug an unconstitu- i raised; none, absolutely none, on whom force tionai actof the geriera! government as far as the ! could be used, except it bo on the unarmed citi- statc is conccnTed; Interposition, as throwing j zens, engaged peaceably and quietly in their dai- thc shield bf. protection between the citizens of a ; ly occupations, state,ail'd the encroachments of the government; j No one would-be guilty of ti t tr nutlmr. ! wm* nirainct'thn TT»*it#*H Stnfps. ;i is concerned, and to apply to the states them selves, according to the form prescribed in the constitution, to obtain it by a grant. If granted, acquiescence then would be a duty on the part of the state; anil iu that event,, the contest would terminate iu epuyerting a doubtful constructive power, into one positively granted ,.but should it not be granted, no alternative wouia retnniu for the general government btn its permanent aban donment- In either event the controversy would be closed, and the constitution fixed; a result of the utmost importance to the steady operation of the Government, and tho stability of the system, and which can neverbe attnined under its present country, and not on the field of battle..' In such contest there would be tio object for force, but those peaceful tribunals—nothing on which it could be.employed, but in putting down courts and juries, and p’reventing the,execution of judi cial process. Leave these untouched, and all the militia that could lie called forth, backed by a re gular force of ten times the number of our Small, but gallailt arid patriotic army, could not have the slightest effect on the result of the controver sy; but subvert these by an armed body, and you subvert the very foundation of this, our free, con stitutional and legal system of government; and operation, without the recognition of the right, as : rear in its place a military despotism, experience lias shewn. 1 Feeling the force of these difficulties, it is pro- f’rom the ndoption of the constitution, we have posed with the view, I suppose, of disembarrass- iug the operation as much a&possible of the trou blesome , interference of courts and juries, to change thesccue of coercion from land to water, as if the government could have one particle more right to coerce a state by water than by laud, but, unless! am greatly deceived, the difficult}’ on that element would not be much less than ou the other. The jury trial, at least the local jury tri al, (the trial by tho viciuagc,) may indeed be c- vaded there; but la its place other aud not much less forriiidable objects must be encountered. There can he but two modes of coercion resort- had hut one continued agitation of constitutional questions, embracing some of the most important powers exercised by the government; arid yet, in spite of all the ability aud force of argument displayed iii the various discussions, .backed by the high authority, claimed for the supfefne court, to adjust such controversies, not a single consti tutional question, of a political character, which has ever been agitated during this long period, has been set tied iu the public opinion, except that of the uuconstitutionality of the alien anil sedi tion law; and, what is remarkable, that was set tled against the decision of the supreme court.— The tendency is to increase, aud not diminish this Conflict for power. New questions are yearly of their total dissimilarity. First, they are wholly dissimilar in their natinje. One has reference to the parties itaettiServes, and the other to their agents. Secession a with drawal from the Union, a separation from part ners, and as far as'depends ou the member with drawing, a dissolution of the partnership. It pre supposes an association; an Union of several states, or individuals, for a common object. V, herever. these exist, secession may; aud where- they do not.it cannot*. Nullification, on the contrary, presupposes the relation of principal and agent) the 011c granting a power to be executed, the other appoinfed by him with authority to cse:uto it :.aiid is simply a declaration on the part of the principal, madia in due form, that an .act of then- gent transcending his power, uuli and avoid. It is a right belonging exclusively to the relation be tween, principal and agent, to lie found w herever it exists, anil iu all its forms, and theirjoint agents, as well as between a single principal aud his a- gent. Tiie difference in their object is no less striking than iu llieir nature. The object of secession is to free the withdraw ing member from the obligation of the association or upjQu, aud is applicable to cases.where file in tention of the association or union has failed, eitner by an abuse of power ou the part of its members, or other causes. Its direct aud immediate object, as it concerns the withdrawing member, is the dissolution of the association or union. O11 the contrary, the object of nullification is to confine the agent within the limits ofhis powers, by arres ting his acts transcending them; not with the view of destroying the delegated or trust power, hut to preserve it, by compelling the agent to fiil- aud growing unCerfa’inty as to its power, in rela tion to the most Important subjects of legislation; aud cquallyjip, that this dangerous state can ter- Biinatc, without a power somewhere to compel, in effect, the government to, abandon doubtful constructive powers, or to convert them into pos itive grants, by an amendment of the constitu tion; iu a word, to substantiate the positive grtmts of the parties themselves for the-construc tive powers interpolated by the agents. Nothing short of this, iu a system constructed aS ours is, wgtti a double set of agents, one for local ami tho dthcr Tor general purposes, can ever terminato tho conffietfor power, Qr give uniformity and sta bility to its action. Sueli would he the Practice and happy opera tiouv were the right 'recognised; but the ease tnay he far othenyiso; and as the right is not only de nied, but violently opposed, tho general govern ment.'so far from acquiescing in its exercise, and- nbaudc/uiug the power, as it ought, may endeav or, by nil the means within its. command to en force its construction against that of the State.— ft is under tins aspect of the question, that I now proposoto consider the practical effect of the ex orcise of tho right with the view to determine which of the two, tho state or the general govern ment must prevail in the conflict; which compels mo to revert to some of the grounds already es tablished. I have ah-endy shown that the declaration of nullification would he obligatory ou tho citizens betwecu parties amenable to its process, cxclu- of tho stato, as much so, in fact, as its declaration ding thereby political questions,) which of the 1 ratifying the constitution, resting, as it docs, on two is iu reality the law, the act of congress, or) tlios’ame basis. It would, to them, he the liigli- thc constitution, when on their face they arc In- : est possible evidence, that the power contested ed. to by water, blockade, arid abolition of the ports of entry of the state, accompanied by po- lial enactments, authorising seizures for entering I fil the object for which the ageucy, or trust was idded, without diminishing the old, while the | tho waters of the state. If the.former bo attemp- I created; and is applicable only to cases where the contest becomes more obstinate as the list in- \ ted, there will be other parties besides tlie gen- ; trust or delegated powers arc transcended on the creases; and, what is highly omnious. more sec- j oral government and the state. Blockade is a part of the agent. Without the power of sece*- tiortal. It is impossible, that the government cau | belligerent right. It presupposes a state of war, last under this increasing diversity of opinion, ' and unless there he a war (war iu due form as prescribed by the constitution,) the order for consistent; and yet, frorri 1 this resulting, limited power, derived from necessity, and held in com mon with every court in tba world which by pos sibility may take cognizance of a case involving the interpretation of our constitution aud laws, it is attempted to confer ou the supreme court a power wiiich would work a thorough aud radical change in our system; and which power was po; sitivelyrefused by the convention. TJie opinion, that the General Government lias the right to enforce its construction of its powers against a state, Iu any mode whatever, is, in truth, founded on a fundamental misconception of our system. At the bottom of this, and in fact almost every other miscuuceptiou as to the relation be tween the states aud the general government, lurks the radical owor, that the latter u a uational, and uot as iu reality it is a confederated govern ment; and that it derives its powers from a high- was uot granted; And, of course, that the acts of tho general government was unconstitutional.— They would be bouud in all the relations of life, private aud political, to respect aud-obey it: and when called upon as jurymen *0 render their ver dict accordingly, or, as Judges', tc pronounce judgment iu conformity to it. The right of jury Trial is secured by the constitution (thauks to the jealous spirit of liberty, doubly secured and for tified ) and with this inestimable right—inestima ble, net only as an essential portion of the Judi cial tribunals of the country, but infinitely more so, considered a a popular, and still more, a local reortiseutation, inthatdepartmoutof government, which, without it, would be the farthest removed from the control of the people; and a fit instru ment to sap the foundation of tho system; with, I repeat, this inestimable right, it would be im possible for tlie general government, within the sion, an association, or union, formed for the. common good of ail the members, might prove ruinous to some,.by tlfc abuse of power, 011 the blockade would not be respected by other na- j part of the others; and without nullification, tho - tious or their subjects. Their vessels would pro- agent might under colour of construction, assume need iTi’rcctly for the blockaded port, with certain a power never intended to be delegated, or to con- prospects of gain; if seized underthe order of I vert those delegated, to object* never intended to blockade, through the claim of indemnity, against! be comprehended in tlie trust, to the ruin of tho. the general government; and if nut, by a profit- ; principal, or., iu case of a joint agency, to the rn*. able market without tlie exaction of duties. j in of some of the principals. Has each, thus its The other mode, the abolition of the ports of; appropriate object; but objects iu their nature re entry ofthe state, would also have its difficulties. \ ry dissimilar; so much so, that iu case of an as- Thc constitution provides that “no preference i sociation, or union, where the powers arodelegri'-. shall be given J»y any regulation of commerce, or j ted to he executed by an agent, the abuse of pow- revenue, to the ports of one state over those of j er, on the part of the agent to the injury of one, another; nor shall vessels bound to or front one or more ofthe members, would not justify seccs- state be, obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in sinn, on their part. Tlie rightful remedy in that another,;”, provisions too clear fo be eluded even case would be nullification. There would be by the force of'construction. There will be ano- ; neither right, nor pretext, to secede; not right, ther difficulty. If seizures ()0 made iu port, or ! because secession is applicable only to the acts of witliin the distance assigned by the laws of na- : the members of the association, or union, and not tious, as the limits of a state, the trial must be in to the act of the agent; nor pretext, because there the state, with all the embarrassments of its courts I is another, and equally efficient remedy, short of and juries; while beyond tho ports’a'liit the dis- ' the dissolution of the association or union, which taucc to which I have referred, it would be diffi- j can only ho justified by necessity; Nullification cult to point out any principle by which aforeigu ! may, indeed, he succeeded by secession. In the vessel at least could he seized, except as an in- case stated should tlie other members undertake cident to the rightof blockade, and of course, with - to graut the power nullified, and should the na- all the difficulties belonging to that mode of coer- turo of the power be such as to defeat the object:, cion. j of the association, or union, at least, so far as tho But there yet remains another, and I doubt not, member nullifying is concerned; it would then bc- insupcr.able barrier, to be found in tho judicial come an abuse of power on the part of the princi- tribunals of the Union, against all the schemes of | pals, aud thus present a case, where secession using force, whether by land or water Though j would apniy; but in no oilier, could itbejustified, I cannot concur iu tlie opiuion of those who re-*’; except it be for a failure of the association or un- gard the supremo court as the mediator, appoint- ion, to effect the object, for which it was created, ed by the coiistitutioH, between the states aud the ; independent of any abuse of power, general government; and though I cannot doubt I It now rfimaiusto shew, that their effect is as there is a natural bias on its part towards the ; dissimilar, as their 11atare, orobject. powers ofthe latter, yet. I must greatly lower my i Nullification leaves the members of the assoei- opinion ofthat high and important tribunal, for 1 ation, or union, in the condition it found them, sub- intelligence, justice and attachment to the con- j ject to all its burdens, and entitled to all its ldvan- stitntion, aud particularly of that pure and up right Magistrate, who has so long, and with such distinguished honor to himself and the Union, pre sided over its deliberations, with" all the weight that belongs to an intellect of the first order, uni ted with the most spotless integrity, to believe for a moment, that au attempt so plainly and mani festly unconstitutional, as a resort to force would be, ia such a contest, could bo sustained by the sanctionofits authority. Iu whatever form'force may be used, it must present questions for legal adjudication. If in the shape of blockade, the tages, comprehending the member nulliij-ing well as the others; i(s object being, not to destroy, but to preserve, as has been stated. It simply ar rests the act of the ajieut, as far as the pi iucipal is concerned, leaving in every other respect, tho operation nfifle joint concern, as before, seces sion 011 the contrary, destroys, so hit as the with- drawingmenibpr is concerned, tho association, or union, and restores him to the relation he occupi ed towards the other members before the existence ofthe association or union. He loses the benefit, hut is released from thmj>urden aud control; and vessels seized under it must he condemned, and I cau no longer he dealt with, by his former associ- thus would be presented the question of prize or j ates, as one ofits members. no prize, and tylih it, the legality of tho blockade: | Such aro clearly the differences between them