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\,\rh T] c from il.o cartli,! self govemmep* a a f UD ,ument« principle in onr | general confederated community, and in which , , , sv^tfm i , of which, the trtantof power rc- tho majority is estimated, not tu reJercnce to the ' - T I T:,r KdVt consent 0f all theses, while to with- ' ' ‘ * —• * ~ , : -‘- i .: i ction, in l.i ' ‘ > | j, 0 m (f ovf ir the dissent of a single state was sulli- f»i crentives power; lie f j t is trne, that this original and absolute fells, md look* into the po , V crof self government has been modified by •'xpaivlod hi. ss.»m,'deHphts in its ri- h tints and | ^ constitution, as already stated, so that tlirce- lra"rant smell, hut nb.iVe aii, he .'i els a rltnriu'lourtlis of the states may now grant power, ami , . . in Vontethnlntiue tmivcmnl* Kud reirulatioliS | consequently « requires more than one-fourth to opposed to the principle, that a majority ought to ! „ \ Jiu'i, .11,1, , a,;.., of man withhold. The boundary between the reserved govern, he who waives the objccuou must mean . % l |. .*** * % ’ l aucl iho delegated powers marks the limits of the the absolute, as distinguished from the concur- tPto njUungncss. i Xho states arc united to the extent of noiM vs the ‘the lifli ' of their util rfal work : hud as jt « whole, hut "to each class or community of which it is composed, the assent of each taken separate ly, aud the concurrence of nil constituting the ma jority. A majority thus estimated, may he called the concurring majority. When it is objected to nullification, that it is . . Unimi. nnn , .,ov'nrvM' I tl»c latter andseparated beyond that limit It is f ORfiEefUMlfcAt.t. I t j JCU c | e;ir jij at j r was not iutcudcd that the states should be more united, than the will ofonc-fourth of them, or rather one more than a fourth would permit. It is worthy ef remark, that it was pro posed in the convention to increase tho confcder- ative power ns it tv as called, by vesting two- thirds of tbo states with the right of amendment, so as to require more than n third, instead of n m ... . foul til to withhold power. The proposition was I.ra.—Uoknoiv lhat the convcniion which formed f r< ,j c rted, and three-fourths uuaniinously adopted, the constitution and the various slate conventions , j t j s t j, cu morc hostile to the nature and genius of which adopted it, as far as we are informed of their I our ,y S tcm, to assume powers notdelcgated, than proceeding*, felt the deepest solicitude on this , 0 resume those that nre, anil less hostile that a ,Jt ! state, sustained by one-fourth of lier co-states, should prevent tho exercise of power really in tended to be granted, than that tho general gov ernment should assume the exercise of powers not intcuded to be delegated, lathe latter case, the usurpation of power would be against the fun damental principle of our system, the original right of tho states to self-govermqeut; while in tlio former, if it be usurpation at all, it would be, if so bold an expression may he used, an usurpa tion in the spirit of the constitution itself—the ' spirit ordaining lhat the almost extent of our •[•Inion should bV limited by the will of any num ber of states exceeding a fourth, bud that most Iti a country having so great, a diversity CCflUUTOED. I propose next to consider this important modi fication t»t' the sovereign powers of tho states, in connection with tho right of Nullification. It is acknowledged on all sides*, that thedi.ration iind stability of oar system depends on maintaining the equilibrium between the states and the general u.-ient—the reserved and delegated pow point. They saw and felt there would be an inces sant conflict between them, whieh would menace \hc existence of the system itself unless properly guarded. The-contest between the states and ••cneral girvcrnment—tho teserveJ and delegatee ■rights, wiil in truth lie a conflict between the great ITtedominanl'intcrests of the Union, on one side, controlling and directing fhc movements of the government, and seeking to enlarge the delegated powers, and thereby advance their power and pros perity : and, on the other, the minor interests rally ing on protecting themselves against the encroach ment and oppression of the other. In suclracon teSt, without the most effectual check, the stronger will absorb tho weaker interests; whilenn tho oih- CXtcuiioD of these powers (delegated only because all the states had a common interest in their exer cise) tbe union, is no longer regarded,.in reference to its parts; but as forming, to the extent of its deloguted.powers, one great coimmroity, to be gov erned by a common will, just as the states arc in reference to their separate interests, and by a gov ernment organized on principles similar to (heir’s. By ti •is simple, but fortunate arrangement, we have engrafted the absolute on the concurring ma jority, thereby giving to the administration of the powerful. If, indeed, oucroachmeuts have been reigaty, exerted in the choice of their Reprcsen made, the fault is not in the system, hut iu the in- I tatives. should, in tho first instance, have an on attention and uoglectof those whose interests and Lportunity of passing judgment on the final resuh duty it was to interpose the ample means of pro- | 0 f the proceedings of that session, which claims m t n m t« /\n *1 1/1,1 l.t* til,, L'f af lift Aft il /" J - 1 - ^ tection afforded by tho constitution To sum up in few words, iu conclusion, what appears to me to be the entire philosophy of gov ernment, in reference to the subject of this com munication have fixed on a permanent basis, as far as ft can he effected by Federal legislation, the settled pol icy of the country. As the cauvais, whieh pre. ceded our recent elections, was conducted in al most exclusive aud absorbing reference to the ill Two powers arc-necessary to the existence timato result Of this legislation by Congress, your and preservation of free states; a power on the powers of the” government, where they were requi- part of the ruled to. prevent the rulers from abus- red, all the energy and promptness belonging to [ ing their authority, bycompdlingthemtobefaith- the former, while we have retained in the-power ful to their constituents anil which is effected granting and organizing authority, (if I may so express myself,) the principle of the concurring majority, and, with it. that justice, moderation, and full aud perfect representarion of the interests of the community, which belongs exclusively to it. through the right of stiffrag-e-; and a power to compel the parts of society -to he just to one a- uolher, and compelling them to consult the inter ring. It is ouly iu the sense of the former, ilie objection can be applied. In lhat of the concur ring^ it would bo absurd, as the concurring assent of all the parts (with us all the states) is of the ve ry essence of such majority. Again, it is mani fest that iu the sense it would be good against nullification, it would be equally so, against the constitution itself; for in whatever light that in strument be regarded, it is clearly not the work of the absolute, but of the concurring majority.— It was formed and ratified by tho concurring ab sent of all the states', and not Jj the majority of tlio whole taken iti the aggregate, as has been already slated; Thus the acknowledged right of each state in reference to the constitution, is un questionably tho saino right which nullification attributes to each, iu reference to tho unconstitu tional acts of the government; and if the latter be opposed to tho right "of a majority to govern, tho former ii equally so. I go farther. The objee- T „ r . ... . . tlon might with equal truth be applied to all free ! majority, which controls tire miAements ol tiic jecls for which governments arc instituted, into states that have ever existed : I mean states tie - i government, from usurping the place of that more selection may be taken as the exponents of this judgment. I cordially congratulate yen. and our State at large, not only on the auspicious and el- evated decision which.our people, by infallibe to- kens have thus made, but also 0 n 'the chceriu- indications of our having already reached a u na _ nimity of sentiment, ncariy as great ns the inevi- tof each other, which cau only be effected, j table'diversity of human opinions wifl permit" whatever may be the desire lor the purpose, by . a s „bj ec t vitally affecting our dearest rights on' requiring the concurring assent ot all the great liberties. Tlius convened ' b Nor is it less clear, that this can only be effected j the community. Both powers aro indispensable, by the right of a sltito to annul the • nc&nstitulioo- I Tho one as much - so as the other. The rulers worthy of the occasion and of those iueStimnhle principles of constitutional iiberty, which it willbo uions to nl nils of the government—a right confounded nre not more disposed to encroach on tho ruled, I ( . llc i| )e lllost impressive of our oblfeaiioi with ilic idea of a minority governing a majority,! than the different interests #f the Community on j )r0Jervc om ] forever defend. hut which so far from being the case, is indispensa- one another, nor would they more certainly con- j t ; s known to yoil, fellow citizens, that but wlncli so tar irom ucmg tnc case, is muispcnsa-, one aiiuuiur, nor wuu.u u»o» ... w .o cciwuuij cuu* . Jt is known to you, fellow citizens, that the ble, to prevent the moic cucigetic, but imperfect j vert their power from the just and legitimate ob- ; most anxious hopes of the «-(*»! people of this *”* M ‘" jecls for which governments arc lustitutcd, into Sta tc, were directed to the proceedings of the last an instrument of aggrandizement, at the expense Congress of the Uuited States. Tho necessity of of the ruled, unless made responsible to their con- j providing for a large reduction of Federal ta'sn- stitupiits, than would the strouger mterests theirs,; consequent -oil the proximate oxtiuguisli- at the expense of the weaker, unless compelled to lncllt 0 ■ a i a .. ec public debt, the strong and well serving tho name, and excluding, of course, those i perfect and just majority/’ which formed the con- whichaftera factious and annrehial existence of 1 sfitutjjnn, and ordaihed government to execute its , jiowtft. . - * ... . _ f nvu t , Nj|r need we apprehend, that this check, as consult them, in the measures of the government, ; f ou ,ided complaints of a respectable and patriotic powerttil as if i§, will prove excessive.' Thcdistipc- Ijy takingyheir separate and concurring assent. ! p or ,i 011 of the States in ibis confederacy, the solid lion between the constitution and the law-making The same cause operates in both cases. The ^ j, romu | s 011 vHiich, as a matter of constitutional On iho side of the reserved powers, no cIicck more effectual can be found or desired, than nuUi- lication, or the right of arresting within the limits of a state, the exercise by the general government of any powers, bill the delegated—a right, which if the state bo true to themselves and faithful to phe constitution, will ever prove on the side of the reserved powers, an rjfectual protection to both. Nor is the check on the side of the delegated, less perfect. Though less strong, it is ample to ? ^ guard against encroachments: and is as strong as Jjoeper dread, the assumption tho nature of tho s\stcm*would bear, as will appear, j,y ,j, e a g en j appointed in Iho sequel.—It is to be found in the amending ’ th 3 resumption of power. Without the mndifieation, which it con - ! thority winch graced the rains of tlio rights of self-government, «»n tno jMf ( }, e a g CIlt to administer uf the states, as already explained, the cbnsent of j ; n ,i e ,.j to |, c a great aud each state would have been requisite to any nddi- j ten ,j s t0 pi ac0 tfip j c ] e; the parts will equal timpires, an tiujen more intimate than that ordaiued iu tlic coustittuion aud so iu-> tinutc of course, that it mig’.ii he pjrmaueiuly hostile to tJ|C fe;li' u gs of niqre than a fourth of tho State?, instead'of strengthening, wou d have exposed tho system to certain destruction.— There is n deep and profound philosophy,, which he, who best - knows our nature, mil the tacrat highly appreciate, that tytfuJd make tho intensity df tlic Faiou, if I may so expfess myself, inverse ly to the extent of territory and the population of a country, aud the diversity of its interests geo graphical and political, and which would hold in a few years, havo sunk uuder the yoke of tyrrau- j powtft. ny, or the dominion of sotile foreign power," > • There ii hot; with this oiceptioit,. it siffgle n State, whose instlUitfeits Uere not based on the i HHHH, t ^ pr'nicip!e of tbo concurring majority—not one Ip ; nowers SO Strongly marked in our institutions, may ; constitution of our nature, which would impel the ■, pi„| lt , these complaints rested, as well as our jnst which the community was not regarded in refer- y c t be considered as a new and untried experiment, rulers to oppress the ruled, unless prevented. c i a ; IM to a reform not only in the abuses of the ex it can scarcely be said to havn existed at all, he- would iu like manner, and with equal force, impel 1 C rci£c of the power of taxation on the part of-the fore our syktein of government. We have much the stronger to oppress the weaker interest, io; General Government, hut in the abuses of the ap- to learn, as to its practical operation, and among vest tho right ol government in tile absolute m.i- ' nropriatinu of the public treasure after it is levied, - mistake, we are far (rnm jority, would he, in fact, but fo embody the will m S pir C j even those prone to despond, in spite of great diflVuliics olholding of (he stronger interest, in the operations of t.ic ] inauspicious omens, with some faint expectation; _l C t . _ . ■ I It J .... + ,,,,.1 tir.J tSwi V'lll uf llln tl'l.illri /a/iltl- % i % ■ • • i - • cnco to its different political ir.Urcsts, aad which did not, iu some form or other, take the assent of each in the operation of the government. Iti eitpport of this assertion I might begin with our own government and go back to that of Sparta, aud shew, conclusively, that there is not one-on tho list, whose institutions were not organ ized oh the" principle of thi concurring majority, and in the operation of which, tho sense of each great interest was # not separately consulted.— The various devices whieli havo been contrived for this purpose, with the peculiar operation of each, would bo a curious and highly important subject.of investigation." Fean oniy allude to some of ihejnosi prominent. Tho* principle of the concurring majority lias other things, ff I do not realizing the many and „ ; .i, —is a, - .... , .. .. , —- - -— ,— —, the Jailer subordinate to ilic former, anil ^iihoul j govenyncut, ana not the will ot me whole com- that these great ami alarmin'; (jucalioiis of political whieli, it.is obvious the entire scheme of^-onstilu- | luunity: tp^ leave the others unprotected, prey | power would be settled iu. a spirit of imp^tiaj tibual gevemment, at least ill oursedsc, must prove to. its ainbitioti aud cupidity^ju^t ns would he the * j Asticc ami with a consider ale regard to that amii* abortive. Short, as Iras baen our experience, J case between rulers and ruled, if the right to go\- an( j utiicouccssjou, so csseutioi to tlie prestr- smne of these, of a very formidable character, liave »Tru was vested, exclusively iu the hands ot the vation at* a confederacy composed of co-equal and begun'to disclose thcoiselvcs; pnrlicuhirly between . former, fhey wotad both be. in reahtv, absolute co-oulinate sovereigns. « • the cohsiiiuiion and the government ot the Fnion. j and despotic governments; tlio one as much so i jj j s scarcely, necessary tliat I should iiiforTn The two powers there, represent very different in.-^; as tho other. .f you iu detail, w hat li.-.s been ll)o final result of tereiys; the one. that ol all the states, taken sejia- ■ i hey wo fid both become mere instruments of < -|, e3e delusively clterished expectation-, for you ratrHr; aud the other, that of.a majority oftlic states, i cupidity aud anihiuon, iu the hands ol muse ttho are posicssiou of an authority on this subject. No one doubts that such weald tional grant of power, or oilier amendment of the constitution. U'hile, then, nullification woulden- nble n state to arrest the cxetcisc oi” n power not delegated, the rifiit ol self government, il.untr.odi- tied would enable her to prevent tho grant of a jiowcr not delegated': and, thus, her conception of what pofirer ought to be granted, would be as con clusive against flic co-states, as her construction of the powers granted, against the general govern ment. in that case, tiie uanger wnold he on the side of tho states ot reserved powers. The amend- fug power, in effect, corrects this danger. In vir tue of the protisions which it contains, the resis tance ofa state to a'powcr, cannot finally prevail, unless she be sustained by one-fourth of the co- states; ami,'in the Same degree, that her resistance is* weakened, the power of the general government, on the sideTif tho delegated powers, is otrengthen- >-d. It is true that the right of a state to arrest an unconstitutional act, is, of itself, comjilcto against the government; but it is equally so, that the con trovers/ may, in effect, hr terminated against her, hv a gr ;mt of the contcstcil powrrfl, by lUrco fourtha ci'the states. It is thus, by this simple and •appar ently incidental contrivance, the right of a state to nullify an unconstitutional act, so essential to the reserved rights, but which unchecked, might loo riiueh debilitate the government, is counterpoised, dot by weakening the energy of a state in her direct resistance to the encroachment of the government, or by giving to the Jailer a direct control over. the slides as proposed in the convcniion. bat in a man ner infinitely more sale, and, if 1 may be permitted to express myself, n'cienlific, by strengthening the amending or repairing power—the power of cor reeling all abuses or derangements by whatever cause or from whatever quarter. To sum all in a few words. The general govern tnent has the right in the first instance of construing •Its ow - n powers, which, if final and conclusive, as supposed by many, would have placed the reserved pon ers at the mercy of tho delegated, and thus, de stroyed the equilibrium of the system. Against that” a state has the right of nullification. This right on tho part of the state', if not counterpoised, uifeht teod too strongly to weaken the general gov ernment and derange the system. To correct this, the amending, or repairing pow er is strength- fit-il. The former cannot be made too strong, if ilie latter, be proportionably so. The increase ot the latter is, in effect, tho decrease of the former. Give to a majority of the states, the right of amend ment, and the arresting power on the part of the state, would in fact ho annulled. The amending power and the powers of the government would, in that case, ho, in reality, in the same hands. The aamo majority that controlled tho one, would the uthsr; and tlio power arrested, ns not granted, would he immediately restored, in the shape of a grant. This modification of the right of aell gov ernment, on the part of the si;n#3, is, in fact, tho pivot of the system. By shifting its position, the preponderance is on the one side or the oilier, or, to drop the simile, by increasing, or diminishing thU energv of the repairing power, effected by di minishing or increasing the oumlier of states nc- ce?'arr to omenri the constitution ; the equilibrium between the reserved and tho delegated rights may be preserved, or destroyed at pleasure, j am aware, it is objected, that according to this view, one fourth of the states may in reality change the constitution, and, thus, take away powers, which have been unanimously granted by all the states, 'l ire objection is morc specious than sol id. The right of a state is no: to resume delega ted yowers but to prevent the reserved' from .being assumed bv the government. It is, however, cer tain tire right nuy be abused, ami, thereby, powers Ire resumed, w hich were in fact delegated; and it is also true, if sustained by one fourth oflhe co-stalcs, such resumption may be successfully and perrna- r.uriiV - made by tire 'state.' - This is the danger; J(ntlthe»utmo!i extent of ihe danger'from the side d'the reserved powers/ It would, I acknowledge, to the delegating; the created, to tiie creating j (an governments arc by far the most, memorable The constitution, while it grants powers to the power. Th'e earliest pages of sacred history rc- I and perfect examples. Iu others, tho right of government, nt the same 7 time imposes restrie- coril the rebellion ol'tlic'Arch' Angels against the ; acting—of making and executing tho latvs—was tions on its action, with tin? iutcntiou of confin- high authority of ileavcu itself, aud aneicut my- | vested iu one interest, aud the right of arresting,' jug it within a limited range of powers', and of the tholog^, the war of the Titans ngifinst Jupiter, | or*nullifying, iu another. Of tl .which,” according to its narrative, menaced tho j Roman government is ifutch' {lie most strikin universe with tlcstruction. This all pervading stance. Jn others, the right of organizing or in- principle is at work in our system—the,created i trodueiug projects of law, was iu one, aud of c- tvnring against the creating power, aud unless j nacting them iu another, ns at Atheus, tvhere the the government bo'boltcd and chained down with | Areopagus proposed, and the General Assembly links of adamaut by the haud of the states which created i t, the creature will usqrp the place of the creator, ami universal political idolatry over spread thd laud. ■ If the views presented b'e correct, it follows, that on tffe interposition of a state, in favor of the reserved rights, it would 1/e the duty of the gen eral government toabaudon thc/tonlcstcd power, or to apply to the states themselves, the sonrec of all political authority, for the power, in one' of tlio two modes prescribed in the constitution.— If the case be a simple one. tu.Ur..h B .. power, mid that In its uature, easily adjusted, tho more ready and appropriate mode, would be an amendment iu the ordinary form, on' a propo sition of two-third# of both houses of Congress, to be ratified by three-fourths of the states ; but on tho contrary, should the derangement of the system be great, embracing many points difficult to adjust, the states ought. t«/ be convened in a general convention; tho most august of all assem blies, representing the united sovereignty of con federated states, aud having power and authority to correct every error, and to repair every dilapi dation or injury, whether caused by time or acci- , dent, Or the' conflicting movement of the bodies which compose the system. With institutions j of tho pcoplo enacted Jaws These devices were all resorted to with the in tention of consulting the separate-interests of which tlio-several communities tvcro composed, and against of all which, the objection to nullification, that it.is opposed to the nillofa majority, could be raiseit With eqiial'force—as strongly, and I may sav more so, against theuuliinitcd, unqualified, and uncontrollable veto of a single tribune out of tea at ICrfme, on all laws mid the execution of laws, as against the Same right of a sovereign state, (one Of this description the means ,of executing tiic/rt. The object of ilie ! power is, to protect the rights, and. promote the interests of all, and of tbo restrictions, to prevent the inajority or the dominant interest of the gov ernment, from perverting powers, intended for the eo'inmon good, into the means of oppressing the’ uri£o? interests of the community. Thus cir cumstanced, the dominant interest, iu possession of the powers of tho government, and thcu.vinor interest, on whom they are. exercised, must re gard these restrictions in a very different light— the latter, as a protection, and the former as a restraint, and of course accompanied with all the' im'patiept feelings with which restrictions ou cu pidity aud ambition are^cver regarded by those unruly passions. - : Lmder their influence, the con- rod .by the majority, not as lirtrifr nc tt T d - «* . w . <. iiii-Tmuiiuiitii Jiuunv, m o fatally repeated, that tn expel a despot is ; tJlu peop | e of Soinh Carol!on abhsji hbcrtv—a tntstrxe to which we may . wo rid. -That whatever hopes * ul( l gettet'otts id- dulgcd at tho commencement i I he error consists, in a returning sense of justice on tip - part oi the mn a*' formed tri interests ^ jority, would remove or materially lyitigntc the aud so to est; trace tho failuro’of many t'.olile and generous id- forts’iti. favor of liberty, considering coinmuDli'.ej! strictly identical th.-cughout, instead of beiug com posed, as they i’i reality are, of as many distinct j haro.so Ion interests ns th-.-re nre individuals.. Tho interests! of no two persons arc the snnic^ 1 regarded iu ref-! , iu the face of the pcs may have been in-, dulgcd at the commencement of the session, that the novons load of- oppression tinder which yon labored, and of which yon have so justly complained, they aro reluctantly constrain ed to declare that these.liatteri/i hopes, too long ly passions.- stitution will be uf tire twenty-four tribunes oil his Onion) limited, j the source of their authority, as it should he, but a «t»nyinht i«. tn the inidnqsiiititioqal acts of the j C3 suackles ou their power. To.tlient it will .government, orid liable, as in effect It is, tu be con trolled by three-fourths of the co-states; and yet the Roman Republic, and the oilier statos to which 1 have referred, are the renowned among free states, whose examples have diffused fife spirit of lib erty over the world, and which, if struck from die list, would fcavs behind but little to be admired or have no value as the means of protection. As majority, they require none. Their number and crcncc to each other; though,they mby lie view- I deferted, and too fondly cherished,” have finally cd in relation to the rest of the community. It j U m! forever vanished.”.”lu proof of this disas”- is this diversity; which the several portions of tbe | t rous couinmuiatiou, they could not better havd community bear to. cacl] otfier, in rcfereuco to , relied oil any testimony tVan that on which they the xhole, that.renders tHe .principle oftho ecu- . j;,i rc ] Vi t i, e Tariff, act of 1332, which by aper- cu^ring majority necessary ; to preserve liberty.— ■ version of every principle of common sense and Pisco the poper in the liqntls ot tiie alisolutu ina- I common justic't, has been called a compromise jority, and the strongest .of tlicse would certainly j between the. conflicting interests of the inanafnc- pervert the govermpent trom the object Foe which turing and plantation States, ou principles^ of c- ' qth. It is unnecessary, gen- piform you, who are so well . B -poti tiie true grounds ofthc controver- this abuse of power uo remedy, cun he devised, ' sy, that this imputed compromise is tfestituto of but that of-th§ concurringinajori'.y. Neither the every feature of that 51181100 and equality that right of suffrage, nor. public opinion cau possibly ought to characterise n measure bearing such an check if They in fact, but torn! to aggravate the appellation. Wc might well iu advance havedis- pervert the govcrniiicpt irom tuc oDjectroc '\vliicli turing uiuJ plantritioti £?ta it tvns instituted, tho equal protection of the^fights j quivnlent benefit to both, of all; into an. instrument of advancing itself, at | tlenicit, that I should ltifot thoexpenseofthercstoltllBCOmmuP.i’.y. Against; instructed itpoti tlietrtlegi cv«:y way so fortuuate, possessed of rneaus so states, which have blessed the world with examples well calcnlatcd to prevent disorders, and so a<l-j of well regulated liberty, and which stand, as so mirablo to correct them, when they cannot be 1 man y cases in tho midst of the desert of oppression , .. . _ —„ p ... . „g r ‘jv.iu, ure appellation, tv.c migiit well 111 advance navcois- streugth aud imt the constinpjou, are their pro- j disease. It seems really sut-prising, that truths trusted the compact for this adjustment, in t\ hich lection; and, of course, if I may so spea'i, their ; so obvious should be so iraporfcctly understood. ; t , V as found expedient not to consult, nt any po- inslinct will ho, to wenkrn aud destroy the re- i There would appear, indeed, a feebleness in our 1 r iod of tho negotiation, our Senators'and two- strictions, iu order to ei.inrgc tho power, lie ' intellectual powers on political subjects, when di- I t jiirels of our Representatives, and which bore up- . must have a very imperfect kuuwl.-dge of the hit- reeled to large mass^a. We readily sec.-, why a ou iu fgcfc the signs of its' being iu some respects imitated. There indcednould remain one cliss : man •heart, who does dot see, iu this stntq.tff things 1 single individual, as *i ruler, would if not prevent- ;i stthile contrivance, to bend tin pecuniary inter- deserving from us paiticolar notice, as ours bcloigS ' an incessant couflier between the |overnnicut, <^r cd, oppress the rost of the community,,lmt are j csts !uu i constitutional liberties of the people, to to it; I moan confederacies, hut n'sa class Hereto- the law-making .power, aud the cOirstitiffiou ma- j at a loss to und'-j-statnl, why 7 millions would, if: n Ftrntfgle for the executive power of the country. king power. Nor is it'less certain, that iu the j “<>t also prevented, oppress ri millions, as if the j £} ut npart from these extrinsic objections, the ad- contest, the ^vantage will lie exclusively with relative nurjbers on either side cofdd, in the least! justmentis intrinsicallv not a mutual, but an ex ilic former. , : degree va - .y the principle. 1 elusive eomproiuisc of”all the ju .t claims and in- 'Ihe htw-inakiug power is organized, and in In sta'.tug what I have, I have but repeated j tcrCsts ortho South. The Tariff act of 1332is, constiiut ftetion, having the control of the honors j the experience of aj^es, comprehending all free j n puiut of fact, a law hy wiiieh the coasuniptioa and emoluments of the country, and armed with i governments preceding ours, aud ours as far as 0 f t he nianufacturing States is nearly relieved of the peivcr^o punish ffdcl fcwarel;. the other, on jit has progressed. The practical operation of all sort of burden ou tliosc articles" which they fore far less distinguished for power and prosperi iy, than tliosc already alluded to, though 1 trust, nith the improvements wc have made, destined to he plqccd at the veiy head of the illustrious list of tions of this, and all future generations. I have now finished what I had! to say; on the subject of this communication, in its immediate connexion with the constitution. In the discus sion I havft advanced nothing but ou flic authori ty of the constitution itself, or that of recorded and unquestionable facts, connected with tho his tory of its origin aud formation; aud have made no dp(Tuct7oov but such as rested on principle, which I bclfcve to be unquestionable; but it ratio. The law bears the the public mind, n favorable reception oflhe con clusion to whicii I Itr.vd beiii carried. There arc too many misconceptions to encounter, too many prejudices to coinbat, and. nbovc,all too great,a weight of intcrcst'to resist. I'do not propose to investigate thcscgrc.it impediments to the recep tion of the truth, though it would be an interest: ing subject of enquiry to trace them to their, causcj and to measure the force of their Impending pow er; but there is one among them of so jinked a character, and which operates so extensively," that I cannot coucludo without making it the sub ject of nfew remarks, particularly.as they wiU'ba calculated to throw much light jpn what has al ready been said. Of all the impediments, opposed to a ju«f' con ception of the nature, of our political system, the impression, that the right of a state to arrest an unconstitutional act of the general government is inconsistent with the great aud fundamental prin ciple of all free stales, that a majority has the | r right to govern, i» tlio greatest. . Thus regarded n nullification is, without further reflection, denoun ced ns the most dangerous and monstrous of all political heresies, as iu truth it would be, were the objection as well founded, as iq fact it is des titute of all foundation, as I shall how proceed to shew. Th*sc who make tho objection, seem to dcgeneraTe info the worst of all possible forms, | cre-siuguo*patroiiage. having neither the fncultv non or check; and though many circumstances sumption to au equivalent niuonut, aud the ex- a consolidated gorcrnmcnl swayed by the will of j to. reward nor to p-.inisH, but o.rdowdU simply have favored us, and greatly impeded the natural changeable value ofour products in a mi ch more au absolute majority. But to proceed. ‘ with the nttributc.To grant powers mid ordniu thp ; progress of events, tin dec such an operation of! aggravated rat Viewing a confederated community, as composed i authority to'execute - them, 'i'hr result is inevi- the system, yct ?.c already see, in whatever di- ; t i„; legislation 1 of as many distinct political interests as there arc table". With so sffiung an r.i/tiuct on the part of j rectioh wc turn our eyes, tbe growing symptoms , stalds, and as requiring the consent of each to its 1 the government, to throw off iho restrictions of of disorder and cecay—the growth of faction, cu-. measures, no govdrnmcnt nan be conceived, in rihe coffimUrttoti, and to vnln;-ge its powers; and i pidity aud corruption ; and ihodecay ot'patriot- which the sense of the whole community, can be with such powerful ficu?*jes > to gratify this in- ! ism, Integrity and disinterestedness.' in the midst more per'fcitly. taken, anil aH its interests be more ’ stiuclive impulse; Vro laiy makipg tnustiiecessa- i of "youth, tie see tho flushed' check and the short | *■" —i — i —-t, ..... .. —• ■ ,-cr,} and feverish broatb, Hint mark the; _ . . at ; the fatal hatir; and come it will, unless there be ; of wise and beneficial taxation, which has ever just anrfpcrfcct pohtic.il adininistration through the lenst as strong ;is that for which avc Contend. It :l speedy and radical Change—a return to the ■ existed among any people on the face of the earth dgenev ot the statos, nnu combined with the cajm- | fi worthy of rc(U ? rd;,*thjit nil other, circumstances ^rcat conservative principle,- which brought the having the shadow of a claim to civilization or city ol embracing uiibin its Jirnita tbe "rcelest ex- 1 being equal, the more dissimilar the interests rep- Republican party into-authority, but which, with :l just knowledge of finance. Articles of luxury tent of territory and variety of. interests,-if k liable • resented k.y ihe two, the more powerful will be.j the possession of power-and prosperity, it has are selectCHlns the objects of comparative cx- moro impress of of nu independent sovereignty to a techie and distant colony, and oauablNkcs the re-, yoking discrimination that the labor of tire South is less entitled to the paternal regard of this Gov ernment than that of a more favored section of , r - - , 1 • 1 • . 1—I —« • —. -.y. ,mn, J- ,, - . , the Uuiott. The provisions of the act nre, more-. „ . . - : fully represented and protected. But-* with tiiis , rily cucybaeh on ihu to.istitution making.power, ■ and feverish breath, riiat'mark the approach ol over, at war with everv acknowledged principle would bo idle to expeej. in the present state ol great advantage, united with the means ofthe most , tmlqfe*restrained ’jy i’jc most efficient check; at the fatal hour; and come it will, unless there he | of wi: " ... •mrTnnrrnrt nnlifiml ntlmintcf rnf ir.n llirmi .lit tl.n 1 t.. ... . t . r *•» 11. great desideratum in political science, - and Mn l %r v 3r ai states. most difficult problem within thC eircIc. lu^usj That tho framors of the constitution were a- belotigs the glory ofits solution, it indeed our ex- ( war© of the danger which I hare .described, we periments (for such it must be called) shak provvj j have conclusive jiroof in the proviri di to which in wuica you iiavo yarn ;i p in long to ne remein- f ec9l the silks and the wines ot the rich which that we have overcome it, as I sincerely believe (I havo so frequently alluded. .1 meau tbat which 1 bored by the friends ot freedom, 1 shall feel am- principally exh'nustcd for the productions of in I, n n/t It iri! 1 rtn nr r'ni) nt rtf rtnr tr .. ... > r . • » r r . .rfV .*. . • * I,.. tima 7.. — * - . * - * * , 1 • » . , ‘ .... ... agricultural, pro merit, or to furnish an additional argument cal- j fabrics, sal: and sugar arc burthened with ;i tax ciliated to maintain the state in her noble • and ' nnito equivalent to au average of seventv-five per patriotic struggle to revive (tod maintain it, ami, cqjjjtt^ their prime cost, whilst the teas”, the cof in which von have acted jt part long to he remem- fees, the silks and the wines of the rich which are he d/siraflle to avoid, or I riirn it; but neither can j pose, "that the right of a inajority to gov effected, without incieasing a greater_and ojipo- ^ing danger. * I ’ ” ' ff the right be denied to the state to defend her reserved powets lor fear she might resume the del egated, 1lV.1t denial would, in effect, yield to the gaiwr.d gorernnieiit the power, under the color of constrnQtioD. <o assume at pleasure afffho reserv- «d power". It is in fact a question between - tl>e (l.tnger of tti" states remming the delegated powers, on one side, and the geneial government assuming the resejrcj on die other. I'assing over the far 1 ,st summer, 1 *h.,tl criaflnt mjr remarks to the stri king diflbr» hce'lVii*«eh them, viewed fa connec tion wjih th5 gyniu principle too simplo to admit of any distinction: combining tor the first ’.mac In a confederation, the power, as it regards the states, it imposed intped- itbsOlntc with the co^corting majority;' and ihos j urients qii’ it, so far as tho government is corfcerh- uniling the justice uftke one with the energy ot| e<l. Th; power of acting, as a general rule, is the other. ■ . • . - 1 invested iu tho ma' government was reared on the founiJa- of permitting.a ma .filin' o()the o) d, strengtltened but .apt qjianged. , It | provisionr/qot m U> sup- .stands on t’.io same solid basis of the concurring j of both houses, r.ie over 11 is n majority, petiectqd by/jlie Mnctioo of. ^!ie- peopled a barrfer agailist 1 and yet, jf I do not mistake, it is susceptible. of< phroogh tho state govcrnmenis, as tWr ■repfesen- tbe most important distinction—entering deeply info the construction of',our.?yst#a, the perfection of their institutions,' aud is esscAtial to the very existence of liberty. When, then it is said, that a majority has the right to govern, there aro two inodes of estima ting the majority, to either of which the express'. ... . win is applicable. The one in which the £hole greater prohajiiliry.of, the laSter, than the former, com«, uo ity j s regarded in tho aggregate aori the which I endvavoroif tt> iHastrafc rq the iddrets of majority estimated k> reference Vo the entire mass. This may be calculate^ the the whole, or the absolute majority. The ot «nUi« and rhyosy of out govern- in which it U regarded in reference to its different ujent. * . ' * * Tjolhieal intere»»s. whcther^ompoMsd of different The ti$tt *t 1 *>rIgiflalfy. hi eqmpFelc classes pr difforew coujt D mj{tie», formed- iofo ooh f " and hope it will, on account of onr or. n, as well - provides for amendments to tHe .constitution, as thn liberty and happiness of our rr.ee. ,i I I have already remarked on that portion of this Our first experiment .h government w:;s oh the | provision, which, with, the view of strengtheuing old lorm cd a simple confederacy^ unmodified, and j tho confederated power, conceded to three-faurths extending the principle of tho e.jncurring majority of thn states a right fo amend, which otherwise alike to the constitution (the /nicies of Union) and : could ouly have heeff cxercisctl by tljc uuanim- ro the government which it constituted. It failed, ■ ous consent of aff.' It is reinarkahle, that while an-1 the present stsuctuie was roared in its place, this provision thus strengthened the amending combining tor the first s'-—> > » ■ r •-*- ... - - -• - b ply compensated for the time occupied in so long ufacturing or Northern labor, enjoy, as it regards a communication. believe the cause to be, the these articles,-.i most unjust discrimination in cause of truth and justice, of Union, liberty, and j their flavor. Operating thus heavily on.thecx- the constitution, before which the ordinary party changeable value of our products, the net pro- struggles of the day, sink into perfect itisignift- ; %-idcs for nothingshort of the monstrous injustice cauce; and that it will be regarded by the tuost ; of levying, a: least, three-fourths of the t\ hole n- distant posterity, I have not the slightest doubt. With great, and,sincere rej/ard, I ani votirs, &.c. &c. JCflfN C. CALIIOl’N. Ills Ex. James HAMtr.To.v, Jun. Governor of South Carolina. dm states directly- given, -*and not indirectly* :atices, ns in the olj confoderntiOn: tVidi tilat dift'CVtacc. the ‘authority whieh madejh'e tivo coii- .... ... — ... vi.vv B tlUlllul il* •’•tii.ll 111 |\U XT A llv. inu Lilli add, into that of all freo. states, m propoiuou tfl 'stittitionS—.which granted tTicir powers aud urdain- * Wi and Organized their respective gortrnineiits to e -xte*.,re then). i« die saihe. But, in passing" from e donstitntion ttl thd government, *(tli« law-ma king and the latv-adrainiStcring powors.) the differ ence between the two becomes radical an4-<e*»en- tiali. There, in the present^the concurring major ity is dropped, and the absolute substituted. In determining; then, what powers ought to be gran ted; Ihd how the government appointed fbr their vtfkccMion ought to be organized, the separate affd concurring voice of the atater was required, tbe Union being regarded, fat ifeio purpose, in refer-, cnce t6 its various ao^dtsrtltfct'irrterwts; but in tho of the goveiument'for the acquisition df/ po’wer. But it would have been folly iu tbe extreme, thus carefully to guard the passage fo the direct acqui sition, ’had the .wide door of construction been loft opeu to jts indirect; and hence in the same spirit in which, two-thirds oFboth bouses were required to propose amendments, the conven tion that franred Ae constitution, rejected Jho many propositions which were moved in that body, with the intention of divesting the states of the right of interpesiug, ami thereby of tho only effectual means of preventing the enlargement of the powers of tuO government by construction. It is thus that the constitution making power has fortified itself against tlio lawmaking; uud that sr> *-tTi':-runJ!y, that however strong the disposition aud capacity of the latter to encroach, the means of resisrancfl on the part of tho former'is not lw» Columbia, South Carolina, October 22. this day his Excellency the Governor, transmit ted to both Houses of "the .Legislature the follow ing . MESSAGE; Fellow Citizens of the Senate, and House of Rep resentatives : In convening yon at art earlier moment than the period fixed by the constitution for your usu al moftiug, I have checffolly assumed whatever responsibility may attach to this exercise of my prerogative, under a belief that after our general elections, yoa could not too soou lie brought toge ther, to deliberate on the best means of promoting (he interests of those, whose rights, wtjofO liber ties, and - whose public honor are confided to your earo * . M .; u rshould indeed have convoked yoiir predeces- sb;s immediately after the adjournment of the last session of Congress, if I had not deemed it iii eve ry respect desirable that our people,' in the exer cise of one of tho highest functions of their gov©- - mount of the federal revenue, on the industry ol the Southern States. Nor does the gross ine quality of the law stop here. It effects jrfter all, the subtle artifices of exaggeration respecting a diminution ofour burdens have been dispelled, a reduction from the amount of duties levied under the act of 1828 as modified hy rfiat of 1830, ot three millions seueu hundred thousand dollars on the unprotected., articles, and onlv^he pitiful sum of somewhere about cigh»f>undred thousand dol lars on the protected, (which purchase tho sta-. 4 pics of the South.} making in all a reduction oi Only four million and a Jiaif, instead of twelve, which last reduction was essential to the accom plishment. of the desirable and highly conserva tive object of bringing the revenue down to tbe standard ofthe legitimate wants of the Govern ment. As it is, nine millions of surplus revenue will, in all probability, result frqm tfie impost! of this act, over and above the necessary and con stitutional expenses of rnc gounifry, to he distrib uted by a majority irresponsible to us, in corrupt largesse j or unconstitutional appropriations to those States which, without possessing an inter est i» the Tariff, are made to feel that they have an interest iri high taxation, when by an unjust provision of the,,Government, tEey reccivo more than thej are made to pay.