Newspaper Page Text
Th.e Greorgjia, SV^ee-kly Telegraph..
THE TELEGRAPH
MACON, FRIDAY, JUNE 25,' 1859.
NaeonandBrannilek Railroad.
A note from Mr. Ma gander, at No.C, Atlantic
and Gulf Railroad, where the two roads will
intersect, announces the rapid progress of the
Macon and Brunswick Road. £he note is dated
the 14th instant and says:
“The work on. the Macon and Brunswick
Railroad is progressing very favorably and rap
idly. The contractors'expect to have every
thing in condition for trains from this point to
Brunswick by the 4th of July, and from here to
Macon before the bolding of (he State Fair in
November.”
Night Scenes in Scriptnre.
The canvassing in this city for subscriptions
to the “ Night Scenes” having been delayed by
the illness of the former agent, the work will
now be resumed by Mr. Eaton, from Savannah,
the agent for the State of Georgia, who, in the
interest of his beautiful work, will call on our
citizens, among whom we trust he will secure
a subscription quite equal to that in Savannah,
which was the rise of 300.
We invite attention to the notice of this ad
mirable work By Bishops Pierce and Beckwith
and the clergymen of this city,to be found in our
local column. '
The Macon Post Office.
A Washington special, of the 14th inst., to
the Louisville Courier-Journal, says the Repub
lican delegation from Macon, who came on to
secure the removal of Turner, the colored Post
master at that place, telegraphed home that they
were successful in their mission, but the under-
standing is just the reverse here. The Presi
dent, whatever he may have pronised, gave no
order to the Postmaster General to make the
change. Letters from Macon say that the feel
ing against Turner is growing very strong, es
pecially among the Republicans.
From Lee, Worth and Dooly.
Rht. -4vti.tt-, Lee Co., June 14, 1869.
Editors Telegraph : I have seen crops in the
counties of Lee, Worth and Dooly. They are
as good os they ever were at this season of the
year. Some have not suffered at all for rein.
It has been raining all the day. Crops are very
dean. Corn and cotton both small, but have a
good appearance. I find some blooms on my
cotton—fuller of forms I never saw it I have
COO acres in cotton. Before the war it would
have made 300 bales—200 bales will now satisfy
me. Laborers doing as well or better than last
year. The rain that has just fallen was one of
the best I ever saw, not too hard but raining a
longtime and a great deal of it. Every thing
now looks fresh and promising and the hearts
of the planters have been made glad. T. M. C.
From Crawford Connty.
Kxoxnuuc, Ga., June 15,18C9.
Editors Tdegraph : This vicinity was visited
yesterday by a refreshing rain, commencing
about 11 o’dock, and falling slowly and beauti
fully until 9 o’clock last night. Oar crops were
never in better condition, and everything bids
fair at present for a bounteous yield. Most of
the farmers are through harvesting, and the
yield is very flattering indeed. Cbawtokd.
“Imperialism."—The only sensible suggestion
we have seen, in connection with imperialism,
comes from Illinois, to the effect that General
Robert E. Lee should be the Emperor. That
would, at least, put the country, for a time, un
der the guardianship of a gentleman, a patriot,
a scholar, a Christian, and a man of genius;
but as General Lee would not accept the posi
tion, and could not hold it long if he did, we
had better potter on as we are, and take the
chances.
Christianizing the Chinamen.—The Journal
of Commerce suggests the importance of im
porting the Chinamen in order to christianize
them. The Middle Georgian says the idea is a
good one, but we are afraid they will put John
Chinaman into the com and cotton field instead
of sending him to a theological institution.
— i
Solemn Appointment.—The Cortersville Ex
press says: Rev. C. W. Howard will deliver
an address on the brevity and uncertainty of
Human Life in it3 connection with Life Insur
ance, at the Academy, Thursday, at 8 o’clock.
The ladies are especially invited to attend.
Atlanta is believed to bo the greatest manu
facturing place on earth. The Slander Mill
turns out more work and is busier than any
other known establishment. The art of mixing
colors is also pushed night and day with great
indefatigability.
Chops in Sumter.—The Americas Courier
says: Since the glorious showers which re
cently visited these parts we are having most
delightful weather. Our farming friends look
more cheerful than for some time—the un
iversal report being “cotton coming out bully.”
The corn is growing rapidly.
Tennessee.—A dispatch from Knoxville to
the Nashville Banner announces that the Knox-
Tille Whig is about to change front and come
out for Stokes and no enfranchisement. Thus
Brownlow’s oldnewBp3per will be against him—
for Blownlow is a Senter man, and in favor of a
partial restoration of suffrage.,
Whissy too Much.—Old Hancock should shut
up the doggeries on circus days. It is a pity
her good name for peace and order should be
sacrificed to whisky—which must have been
the cause of the fight in Sparta on Wednesday.
Notice to Deauheads.—The gentleman for
tunate enough to receive a pass over the Pacific
Railway is informed for his encouragement that
it only costs $10 a day for sleeping and eating
accommodations on the route.
By the way what business is that railroad
doing!
Hon. Joshua Hill and his son-in-law, CoL
J. Bowles, says the Constitutionalist, will re
move to Stone Mountain as soon as their dwell
ings can he erected.
What is Going on in Cocbt ?—The Atlanta
New Era has cut us two days in succession—
mad, we reckon. We mourn the absence of the
Court Journal.
To Correspondents.—The pressure of the
Negro Eligibility rulings of the Supreme Court
forces U3 to lay aside several communications
for a fnture occasion.
The First Train over the Columbia and
Augusta Road entered Augnsta last Tuesday.
The Supreme Court on Wednesday closed
with No. 6. Southwestern Circuit.
" Cannot the North Georgiafpapers give us
wheat quotations ?
Weather and Crops in Terrell.—Since our
last, says the Dawson Journal, the rains have
been general and plenty, and the com is now
out of the “toast,’’(as the Telegraph quotes
us) and prospects for bread are good indeed.
From information we have as relates to the
crops of oom and cotton, we are inclined to the
opinion that our section will be favored with a
good crop, provided we are not visited by the
worm or caterpillar. We congratulate our
fanners upon their good luck.
A colored man, named James Washington,
has brought suit in Quincy, Illinois, against the
Keokuk Packet Company, to recover damages
' in the sum of $2000—the officers of one of that
company’s boat* having refused to allow him to
sit at the table with white passengers.
Negro Eligibility to Office. V; *
Our columns, to-day, are packed with the
dicta of the Supreme Bench upon the eligibility of
negroes to office. We shall not add to the con
flict of ratiocination, by volunteering any views
of our own, but will content ourselves with a
few practical suggestions upon the status which
these rulings have called into existence in Geor
gia. It is of rip use to inveigh against the
court—to impeach its intelligence or its morals.
Let us consider what it has made law and fact
in Georgia, rather than what ought to be law
and what ought to be fact.
What, then, does this decision make as the
law of Georgia? Simply this: that negroes are
just as eligible to all civil offices as whites.—
Most of our Georgia contemporaries, who have
so "far .spoken upon this subject, frankly con
cede this position; but a notion to the contrary
(and we think but a notion) has been thrown
out by the Augusta Constitutionalist That
paper says:
Let ns see what will be the effect of such
decision as we have foreshadowed.
It will be to put White in the office he claims
and all othernegroesin the State offices to which
they have been elected, except members of the
Legislature. It can have no bearing upon that
matter. That qnestion has been settled by the
only courts having jurisdiction of it—that is by
each House of the General Assembly. They
alone have constitutional jurisdiction of the sub
ject, so far as their respective bodies are con
cerned. They have decided, so far as this Leg
islature is concerned. Their decision, when
rendered, was a judicial decision, which can not
now be reversed by themselves. All that could
come of such decision of the Supreme Court,
in the future, so far as relates to holding the of
fice of legislator, would be to use it as an argu
ment in the next Legislature, if the question
should again come up in either House. It could
not bind the Legislature; for, by the Constitu
tion, each House is the sole judge of the elec
tion and qualifications of its members. No other
court can control that judicial judgment in the
matter.
Similar ideas to these were frequently thrown
ont in Legislative debate in Atlanta last winter;
but they are not only groundless—they are mis
chievous. It is in virtue of just such an arbitra
ry and unwarrantable interpretation of its pow
ers as this, that the United States Congress have
practically assumed to unseat so many of its
members of minority politics, that the common
belief is that Congress means to perpetuate a
Radical majority in that way.
The Constitution, it is true, makes each House
the judge of the qualification of its own mem
bers, but only in subordination to law. The
Legislature is the creature of the Constitution,
and the subject of law. It is not endowed with
judicial powers of any kind. The Constitution,
on the contrary, vests judicial powers exclusive
ly in the Courts. True, it declares that “each
House shall be the judge of the election returns
and qualifications of its members, and shall
have power to punish them,” etc., etc., but this
merely arms them with the power of self pro
tection against fraud, illegality, and disorder;
and it is no more intended to make the Legisla
tive Department superior to law, than the Exec
utive or the Judicial.
All are co-ordinate, and no one of them moie
independent of law than the other. All are sub
ordinate to the Constitution and laws made in
pursuance thereof, and if either can trample
upon the rights of the citizen in defiance of law,
so con all; and if one can do it in one particular,
all can do it in all particulars. Any interpre
tation of law which makes its creature irrespon
sible and lawless, is bound to be false, and to
lead to the most absurd and disorganizing con
clusions. Consequently, it is plain to our minds
that the Legislature of Georgia is legally and
properly the subject of this decision and any
attempt to assert independence of it, will be as
illogical as unavailing.
A word or two, next, upon the precise char
acter of this decision. Negroes are declared el
igible to civil office in Georgia by two of the
Justices, but on different grounds. Justice Me-
Cay affirms it as an original political right, com
ing into existence with tho organization of an
entirely new body politic in 18C8, in the forma
tion of which the negroes exercised equal pow
ers and privileges with the whites. Chief Jus
tice Brown locates the right inferentially in the
Code of Georgia, which was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention, and ho admits that
this right would be forfeited by the repeal of
that provision of the Code, unless it should be
authoritatively declared that the words “privil
eges and immunities of citizens,” used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, and in the Constitution
of Georgia, wero intended to, and do embrace the
right to hold office. Thus it will be seen that
the decision itself would be void, should these
provisions of the Code be modified or repealed.
But we come now, in the last place, to the
facts as they existed and are modified by this
decision. What the Northern radicals claimed
to be law in Georgia is now made so. The ex
pulsion of the negroes they called a second act
of rebellion against law by the Georgia rebels,
and they have by no means yet abandoned the
idea of punishing it by putting the State in the
bands of a dictator. Indeed, Mr. Forney in
one of bis lato occasional bulletins proclaims
Georgia as hopelessly lost to the radicals, un
less she can be again ran through the Congress
ional crucible and purged by disqualification and
disfranebisbment.
No well-informed man can have a doubt that
the Federal Government is determined to reseat
the negroes in the Legislature at all hazards,
and that all our opposition will be fntile. The
refusal of the Legislature to respect this deci
sion of the Supreme Court, will only bring about
a legislative purgation by bayonets; but we
should care less for that, than to see the Legis
lature assume an indefensible and untenable po
sition, against an authoritative, though unsatis
factory, exposition of the law; or adopt any
temporary expedients which would be practical
ly unavailing against the the dominant despot-
In the midst of all our troubles let us pre
serve a respect for law. Let us arm ourselves
with patience and look forward in hope to bet
ter days.
-| y ■ ■ ■ i >WB > — ■—
Will Mann res Pay ?
A well-known citizen of this place has shown
us two stalks of cotton taken from his field on
the edge of the city—one from a row not ma
nured, and the other from a row manured with
about three hundred (300) pounds of Schley’s
Georgia Fertilizer per acre. He assures us that
they are about the average of the field, the one
of the manured, and the other of the unma
nured portion.
The specimens are of interest mainly in show
ing the difference between cotton on the unas
sisted land, and that properly fertilized. _
The manured cotton is a very fairspecimen—
considering that it is the average of the field—
being abont ten inches high, above the ground
and having seven well developed forms on it—
The nnmonured stalk is not quite half as high
and has but one form. Being weighed careful
ly, the manured stalk is found to weigh just
four and a half times as urach as the unmanured
—the one weighing nine sixteenths of an ounce
and the other two-sixteenths. Should the same
difference obtain in the weight of the lint, it is
easy to see whether fertilizers will pay or not.
[Americas Courier.
“Fence or not to Fence.”
The Macon Telegraph wants tho Georgia
press to give expression to their views as to
fencing stock in or out. It may suit the con
venience and wants of Middle Georgia to fence
in their cattle and hogs, but will not do for this
section. If the people of Middle Georgia wish
a law passed to make every man fence in his
stock, let them say so; we will not say a word,
but as for us, we want the benefit of our broad
acres of pine land covered with rich grass.—
Dawson Journal.
A note was found in the pocket of a recent
suicide in England, saying, “Dear friends don’t
believe my wife when she says she has not got
money to pay for my coffin.”
CAM A NEGRO HOLD OFFICE IN
y GEORGIA ?
Decision and Opinions of the Justices of
the Supreme Court of tht Utate.
From the Atlanta Intelligencer.']
Mr. JUSTICE H. K. McOAY.
The case of Richard W. 'White, plaintiff in
error, against the State of Georgia on the rela
tion of Wm. J. Clements, defendant in error,
comes before this Court on the following state
of facts :
Wm. J. Clements applied to the Judge of the
Superior Court of Chatham connty,alleging that
at an election which had been held in that coun
ty for a clerk of the Superior Court, he and Rich
ard W. White were the sole candidates. That
Richard W. White had got a majority of the'
votes, bnt that he, Clements, had also got a good
many votes and that no other persons were run
ning. The petition further stated that Richard
W. White had been declared elected, and had
been commissioned and was in the actual per
formance of the duties of the office, and that
Richard W. White was a person of color, having
one-eighth or more of African blood in his veins.
That therefore under the laws of Georgia he
was ineligible to office, and further, that under
the laws of Georgia, as White, the person hav
ing tho majority of votes was ineligible, he,
Clements, having received the next highest
number of votes was entitled to the position.
Ho prayed the Court for leave to file an infor
mation for a quo warranto. To that petition,
of which White was notified, he (White) filed a
demurrer. Subsequently, however, he with
drew the demurrer to that petition, and the in
formation issued in the name of the State of
Georgia. The Court passed an order directing
the Solicitor General for that circuit to make
out an information in the name of the State, re
citing in effect the facts which had been recited
in Clements’ petition, and calling upon White
to show cause why a mandamus absolute should
not issue against him, depriving him of the of
fice and putting Clements in. White, at the
proper time fixedby the information for answer
ing, filed a demurrer to the information and at
the same time filed an answer denying that he
was a person of color, or that he had one-eighth
or more of African blood in his veins.
On this the court summoned a jury for the
purpose of trying tho issue. When the jury
had been sworn, the defendant below—the plain
tiff here—called np his demurrer to the infor
mation. It is stated in the record that the plain
tiff in the information made no objection to
taking up the demurrer at that time, bnt con
sented; and the court heard the motion as an in
dependent motion before the case was sub
mitted to the jury. The Court decided that in
the argument upon that motion—that demurrer
—Clements, the movant in the general proceed-
ing.was entitled to open and conclude tho argu
ment—that the matter being before the jury the
general rale which gives to the party moving
in a demurrer the right to open and conclude
did not apply.
The Court heard the argument on the demur
rer and overruled the demurrer. The case
then went to the jury on the issue of fact wheth
er or not White had one-eighth or more of
African blood in his veins. On the trial there
were various questions made as to the testi
mony. One witness testified that the defen
dant, White, was reputed in the neighborhood
to be a colored person. Another witness testi
fied tnat he, (the witness) was a registrar of
voters; that when White registered, he, the reg
istrar, had affixed opposite White’s name the
letter “C,” to denote that he was a person of
color; that he subsequently posted the lists in a
public place, and that they had remained there
two or three weeks without any application hav
ing been made to him to have that letter “O"
erased or changed. It did not appear, however,
that there was any notice to White that this let
ter “0” had been placed opposite to his name,
nor did it appear that it was*the law or the prac
tice that if he had applied to have it corrected,
that they would have corrected it; in other
words that it was the part or the duty of the
officer at all to make that entry. At least it has
not so been made to appear to us.
This evidence was objected to by tho defense
but admitted by the Court. The Court also ad
mitted ns evidence the statement by a physician,
an examining physician of an Insurance Com
pany, that at a previous time he had examined
White and had pronounced him a mulatto.
There was no testimony by the physician of
what his opinion was at the time of the trial
The testimony was that at some previous time
he had examined him and was, at that previous
time, of opinion that he was a mulatto.
In the further progress of the trial they pro
posed to introduce a copy of an application for
a Life Insurance on the life cf White in favor
of his wife, which application purported to be
signed by White. The application does not
seem to have had a word in it as to whether
White was a white man or a black man—it gave
no indication as to bis color, bnt on the back of
it there was an entry by a person who purported
to be an examining physician, that White was a
mulatto. The witness swore at first that he
thought White signed the paper, but swore af
terwards that he didn’t know whether White had
signed it or whether his wife had signed it for
him. Objection was made to this paper on
three grounds; one, thatitwasa copy : paper,
though it was proven that the original was in
New York; the other that there was no proof
that the original had been executed; and third,
that in any event the paper amounted to noth
ing.
Another witness, also a physician, swore that
he was a practicing physician, and that he had
studied tire science of ethnology; that that
science taught men the rales by which the race
of a man was ascertained, and this witness gave
his opinion npon the point The Court admitted
his opinion, that White was a person of color,
as being the opinion of an expert The case
went to the jury on this testimony. There were
some objections to the charge of the Court
which we, however, have not noticed, because
we didn’t think the point very material. The
jury found for the plaintiff in the information.
Thereupon tho Court passed judgment, depos
ing White from his position as clerk of the Su
perior Court, and declaring that Clements was
entitled to hold that office.
This case has been argued before us with a
great deal of learning and ability.
This Court bas agreed upon the jndgment
which it will deliver in this case, bnt not upon
the reasons upon which this judgment is found
ed. The Court will agree that the jndgment in
the court below ought to be reversed; this Court
being unanimously of opinion that the Court be
low erred in various of its rulings on the trial
and on the question of the argument on the de
murrer.
A majority of the Court, the Chief Justice
and myself, agree in the judgment that the
Court below erred in over-ruling the demurrer,
it being our opinion that under the Code of
Georgia a person of color is eligible to office in
Georgia. My brother, Brown, however, and
myself, do not exactly agree npon the grounds
npon which we base that judgment. The stat
utes of the State of Georgia require that the
Court shall agree in the decisions which it
mokes—the principle npon which it puts the
case which it decides, and as my brother, War
ner—whilst he agrees to the general judgment
—puts his opinion upon one set of grounds,
and my brother, the Chief Justice, puts his
upon another, while I put mine upon a third,
we are unable to agree upon a statement of the
general principles upon which we put our judg
ment. Hence, under the statute, we shall each
give a statement of the general principles upon
which we assent to the jndgment of this Court.
I will, therefore, now read the grounds upon
which the whole Court bases its decision, and I
shall, also, announce the principles npon which
I, myself, hold that the Court below erred.
As this is a case of a good deal of public im
portance, involving not only the rights of the
defendant, and this plaintiff in error, but of a
very large portion of the people of tiiis State,
and one in which there is a great deal of inter
est taken, I have reduced to writing, in detail,
my opinion; and I will preface the reading of
the judgment of the whole Court, and of the
majority of the Court, with some written re
marks—preferring to do that rather than make
a parole introduction.
_ Whatever may have been under the Constitu
tion of the United States, the abstract trath as
to the political condition and status of the peo
ple of Georgia at the close of the late war, from
the stand-point of a mere observer, it seems to
me perfectly Conclusive that the several branches
of the present State Government are shut np to
the doctrine that the Constitution and frame of
civil Government in existence in this State on
the 1st of January, 1861, with all its disabilities
and restrictions, was totally submerged in the
great revolution which from 1862 to 1865 swept
over the State. Early in June, 1865, the Gov
ernor of 1860 was in prison at Washington, and
there was not in the whole State a single civil
officer in the exercise of the functions of his
office.
The whole body lately acting had been chosen
under the laws of the Confederate States, and
the incumbents of 1860 had all either died or
resigned or renounced their positions as offioers
swearing fealty to the Confederacy and repudi
ating the Government of the Union.
The people of the State were, in the language
of the President, without civil government of
any kind—in anarchy. The State, as a State of
the Federal Union, still existed, but without any
frame of civil government regulating, restrain
ing and directing the exercise of its functions.
From that time until the present State Govern
ment went into operation, the government cf
the State was with more or less completeness in
the hands of the military authorities_ of the
United States, and the entire ancient civil poli
ty of the State, was totally ignored. Directly
in the teeth of the old Constitution, the people
of color were recognized as freemen, and as en
titled to equal legtd and political rights, with the
whites. The Convention of 1857 met under the
laws of the United States, and was elected and
composed in total disregard of all the j) to visions
and presumptions, qualifications, disqualifica
tions, and distinctions of the old organization.
The black people participated in its election,
and in its composition, on equal terms, in theory
at least, with the white, and nothing can to my
mind be plainer than that by the whole theory
then acted upon, they were recognized as form
ing an integral part of the sovereign people,
then assembled in convention to form for their
common benefit a constitution and frame of
civil government.
Such being the facts of the case, it appears to
me that this court, deriving its whole authority
from the constitution then framed, and sworn to
support it, is, from the very nature of the case,
absolutelyprohibited from recognizing as then or
now, in force, either the constitution of 18G0 or
1865, or aqy of the legal or political disabilities
or distinctions among the people, dependent
upon them or either of them.
The convention met under the laws of the
United States, to form a constitution for a peo
ple without civil government.
It had nothing to repeal, nothing to modify,
nothing to grant. None of the old constitutions
of the State were at the time in operation—the
Convention met under entirely new ideas and
new presumptions. It represented a new peo
ple—a people among whom slavery had ceased,
and among whom black people as well as white
were recognized as forming part of the political
society, and entitled to equal participation in its
rights, privileges and immunities.
It is not necessary, for the purposes of this
argument, that this theory shall be proven to
have been a legal one under the Constitution of
the United States. It is sufficient to state that
it is true as a fact, and that the present State
Government is based upon it.
If, wheD the Convention met in December,
|]867, the ancient Constitution of tho State, or
any of its legal or political disabilities or dis
qualifying distinctions upon persons of color
were in force, then the Convention was itself
illegal, the present State Government is illegal,
this Court is illegal! His Honor, the Chief
Justice, has his proper place in the Executive
Chair, my respected associate and myself are
private citizens, the plaintiff in error is a slave,
and the whole political history of the State since
the imprisonment of Governor Brown in June,
1865, a gigantic illegality.
I am aware that a very large class of our most
intelligent people, so, at this moment, honestly
believe: to them this argument is not directed;
but, it seems to me, that to a Judge bolding
bis office under the present State Government,
forming an essential part of its machinery,
these views must be of overwhelming force. If
he assumes the power to decide at all, he must,
it seems to me, base bis judgment upon prin
ciples which do not, if adopted in his own case,
uttterly subvert bis own authority.
I make these remarks with the greatest Refer
ence to the integrity and to the sound legal
accumen of my associates. Honest men see
things in different lights, and it is as presump
tuous as it is uncharitable, for one man to set
up his convictions as the necessary guide of
the conscience of another. These are my con
victions, and, as a matter of course, I must act
upon them, and accordingly, under the rales
prescribed by the Statute ; I announce in the
general principles controlling my judgment in
this case, the following:
By the whole Court.
First, The statement of a registrar of voters
that he had marked a registered persons name
with a “ C ” to denote that he was colored and
had posted his lists for some time in a public
place, and that no application bad been made
to have the said “C” erased is no evidence that
the person is a colored person, it not being
shown that the person knew of the entry, and
that it was the subject of correction.
2d. Although a copy of a paper proven to be
beyond the jurisdiction of the court is good
secondary evidence of its contents, yet it must
be shown that the original was duly executed.
3d. An application for a life insurance,
though signed by the applicant, upon the back
of wrnch was an entry by the examining physi
cian that the applicant was a mulatto, is no evi
dence nnless it be proven that the person signed
the paper after the entry on it was made by the
physician and with knowledge of the entry and
with intent to adopt it, or that he used the paper
after the entry was made with a knowledge that
such entry was there.
4th. The statement by an examining physi
cian, that he had at a certain time examined a
person and had then been of the opinion that
the person was a mulatto, is no evidence. If
the physician is an expert he must give his pres-
sent opinion, and if not he must state the facts
npon which he bases bis opinion. Whether or
not one is a person of color, that is, bas African
blood in his veins, is matter of opinion, and a
witness may give his opinion if he states the
facts upon which it is based. But whether the
fact that he has one eighth or more of such
blood, be matter of opinion or not—Query ?
5th. One who testifies that he has studied the
science of ethnology may give his opinion as an
expert on the question of race. Its weight is
for the jury.
Pedigree, relationship and race may be proven
by evidence of reputation among those who
know the person whose pedigree or race is in
question.
The whole Court agree upon those proposi
tions.
The majority of the Court agree upon this
proposition. Where a quo warranto was issued
charging that a person holding an office was in
eligible, when chosen, because of his having in
his veins one-eighth or more of African blood,
and there was a demurrer to the information as
well as an answer denying the fact, upon which
denial there was an issne and a trial before the
jury: held that by the Code of Georgia, a per
son having one-eighth or more of African blood
in his veins is not ineligible to office in this
State, and it was error in the Court to overrule
the demurrer and to charge the jury that if the
plaintiff proved tho defendant to have one-
cighth or more of African blood he was ineligi
ble to office in this State.
DECISION OF COURT AS RENDERED BY
JUSTICE McCAY.
"Whilst I agree that the Code of Georgia—the
law of Georgia, as separate from the Constitu
tion—does make persons of color eligible to
office, my opinion is that eligibility is guaranteed
by the Constitution of the State, and I announce
these propositions as the general principlesupon
which my opinion is based.
1st. The Constitution of Georgia, known as the
Constitution of 1868, is a new Constitution, made
by, and formed for, a people who at the time
were, by the facts of the case, and by the laws
of the United States, without any legal civil gov
ernment and as the people of Georgia, without
regard to past political distinctions, and without
regard to distinctions of color, participated on
equal terms in the election for the Convention,
and in its composition and deliberations, as well
as in the finnl ratification of the Constitution it
framed—in the construction of that Constitution,
and in the investigation of what rights it guar
antees or denies, such distinctions are equally
to be ignored.
2d. The rights of the people of this State,
white and black, are not granted to them by the
Constitution thereof. The object and effect of
that instrument is not to give, but to restrain,
deny, regulate and guarantee rights; and all
persons recognized by that Constitution as citi
zens of the State have eqnal legal and political
rights, except as otherwise expressly declared,
3d. It is the settled and uniform sense of the
word “citizen” when used in reference to the
citizens of the separate States of the United
States, and to their rights as snch citizen#, that
it describes a person entitled to every right, le
gal and political, enjoyed by any person of that
State, nnless there be some express exception,
made by positive law, covering the particular
person, or class of persons, whose rights are in
question. ;
4th. Words used in a statute, or Constitution,
have their ordinary signification, unless they
be words of art, when they have the sense
placed upon them by those skilled in tho art, or
nnless their meaning be defined and fixed by
law—in which latter case the legal meaning
must prevail.
5th. By the 1648th and lG49th Sections of
Irwin’s Revised Code, it is expressly declared,
that among the rights of citizens is the right tp
hold office, and that all citizens are entitled to
exercise all their rights as such, unless express-
of 1868 expressly adopts said Code as the law of
the State, when that Constitution uses the word
“citizen,” it uses it in the sense put npon it by
the express definition of the Code it adopted.
6th. Article 1st and Section 2d of the Consti
tution of 1868, expressly declares that all per
sons bom in the United States, or naturalized
therein, resident in this State, are citizens of
this State, and as the Code adopted by the Con
vention, in express terms declares that among
the rights of citizens is the right to hold offioe,
a colored person born in the United States, and
resident in this State, is by that section of the
Constitution guaranteed eligibility to office, ex
cept when otherwise prohibited.
7th. • Nor would the repeal of those sections of
the code, or their alteration, deprive a colored
person of tho right guaranteed. Since it is a
settled rule that it is not in th6 power of the
Legislature to divest a right or change a consti
tutional guarantee by altering the legal meaning
of the word by which that guarantee was made.
8th. The right to vote involves the right to be
voted for, unless otherwise expressly provided,
since it is not to be presumed without an ex
press enactment that the principal is of less dig
nity or rights than the agent.
9tb. There being in the Constitution of 1868
various special disqualifications of electors for
particular offices, and four separate sections de
tailing disqualifications for any office, and a
black skin not being mentioned as one of these
disqualifications, under the rale that the ex
pression, etc., of one thing is the exclusion of
others, persons of cojor, electors, are not dis
qualified from holding office.
10th. There never has been in this State, at
any period of its history, a denial in terms of
the right to vote or to hold office, to colored per
sons as such. By the old law, they were either
slaves or frea persons of color, and these rights
wero denied them by declaring that they were
not, and could not be citizens of the State, and
when Article 1st, Section 2d of tho Constitution
of 1868, recognized them as citizens, the right
to vote and to hold office, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution, was, ex vi termini,
also guaranteed to them.
11 th. Ineligibility to office involves not only
the denial to the person claiming the place' the
right to be chosen, bnt what is of far greater
moment, the right of the selecting power to
choose; and to make out a case of ineligibility
there most be such a state of affairs as estab
lished not only the want of power to be chosen,
but a denial of power in the'selecting party to
choose. ’ . 1 1 ■'
12th. The people of a State, in their collect
ive capacity, have every right a political society
can have, except such as they have conferred
upon the United States, or on some department
of the State Government, or have expressly de
nied to themselves by their Constitution ; and
as the right to select a public officer is a politi
cal right, the people, or that branchy of the
Government clothed by the Constitution with
the power to choose, may select whomsoever
it will, nnless the right to* choose a particular
peison or class of persons, is expressly taken
away by the Constitution.
OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE BROWN.
The view which I take of the rights of the
parties litigant in this case, under the Code of
Georgia, renders it unnecessary for me to en
ter into an investigation of the question:
whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con
stitution of the United States, or the Second
Section of the First Article of the Constitution
of Georgia, which, in substance, is identical with
the 14th Amendment, confers upon colored cit
izens the right to hold office. If the respond
entia this case acquires the right by grant found
in either of the said Constitutions, or in the
Code of this State, it is sufficient for all thepnr-
poses of the case at bar, and entitles him to a
reversal of the judgment of the Court below,
which was adverse to his right.
The third paragraph of the 9th article of the
Constitution of this State adopts, in subordina
tion to the Constitution of the United States,
and the laws and treaties made in pursuance
thereof ; and in subordination to the said Con
stitution of this State; the “body of laws known
as the Code of Georgia, and the acts amendatory
thereof, which said Code and acts are embodied
in the printed book known as Irwin’s Code”
‘except so much of the said several statutes,
Code and laws as may be inconsistent with the
supreme law herein recognized.”
The Code, Section 1646, classifies natural
persons into four classes: 1st. citizens ; 2d. res
idents, 3d. aliens, 4th. persons of color.
Section 46 of the Code declares that, All white
persons bom in tbis State, or in any other State
of this Union, who are or may become residents
dictated by Congress in the formation of her
Constitution. She has stopped nothing short,
and gonenothingbeyond. The highest jndicial
tribunal of the Union, will, no doubt, finally
settle the meaning of the terms “privileges and
immunities” of the citizen, which legislation can
not abridge; and the people of Georgia, as well
as those of all the other States, most conform
to, and in good faith abide by, arid carry out
the decision. All the rights, of all citizens, of
.every State, which are included in the phrase
‘ privileges and immunities” are protected
against legislative abridgement by the funda
mental law of the Union. Those not so em
braced, unless included within some other con
stitutional guaranty are subject to legislative
action. The same rights which the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United
States confers npon, and guarantees to, a col
ored citizen of Ohio, are conferred npon and
guaranteed to every colored citizen of Georgia,
bv the same amendment, and by the Constitu
tion of this State, made in conformity to the re
construction acts of Congress.
Whatever may or may not be the privileges
and immunities guaranteed to the colored race,
by the Constitution of the United States, and of
this State ; it cannot be questioned. that both
Constitutions make them citizens. And I think
it very clear that the code of Georgia upon
which alone I base this opinion, which is bind
ing upon all her inhabitants while of force, con
fer upon all her citizens the right to hold office,
unless they are prohibited by some provision
found in the code itself. I find no such prohi
bition in the code, affecting the rights of this
respondent. I am, therefore, of the opinion
that the judgment of the court below is errone
ous, and I concur in the judgment of reversal
JUDGE WARNER’S DISSENTING OPIN
ION.
Warner, J., dissenting.
The defendant is a person of color, having,-
as the record states, one-eighth of negro or
African blood in bis veins, who claims to be law
fully entitled to hold and exercise the duties of
the office of Clerk of the Superior Court of
Chatham county, and the question presented to
our consideration and judgment is, whether a
person of eolbr, of the description mentioned
in the record, is legally entitled to hold office in
this State, under the Constitution and laws
thereof?
The 14 th amendment to the Constitution of
the United States declares that “Allpersons bom
or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States, and the Stats wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of cit
izens of the United States. ”
The Constitution of this State declares that
“All persons bom or naturalized in the United
States and resident in this State, are hereby de
clared citizens of this State, and no laws shall be
made or enforced which shall abridge the privil
eges or immunities of citizens of the United
States or of this State.”
From the time of the adoption of the 14th
amendment, and the adoption and ratification of
the Constitution of this State, in 1868, the de
fendant became, (notwithstanding his color and
African blood,) a citizen of the United States,
and of this State, and is entitled to have all the
privileges or immunities of a citizen.
Does the fact that the defendant was made a
citizen of the State with all tho privileges or im
munities of a citizen thereof, confer npon him
the legal right'to hold office in this State as such
citizen ? When yon take into consideration the
deflation and object of creating an office, and
by what authority it is conferred upon a
citizen, the distinction between the privileges
and immunities of a citizen as such, and his
right to hold office will be at once apparent. It
will be seen that the privileges and immunities
of a citizen as such, is one thing, and that his
legal right to hold office as such citizen under
the authority of the State, is another and quite
a different question. What is an office? “An
office,” says Bacon, “is a right, to exercise a
public function or employment, and to take the
fees and emoluments belonging to it. An officer
is one who is lawfully invested with an office.
It is said that the word ofiicium principally im
plies duty, and the next word place the charge
of such duty; and that it is a rale that where
one man hath to do with another’s affairs against
his will, and without his leave, that this is an
office, and he who is in it is an officer. By the
ancient common jaw, officers ought to be honest
men, legal and sage, ei qut mditis seiant vt pas-
sint ofiicis illi intendere ; and this, says my Lord
Coke, was the policy of prudent antiquity, that
of this State with the intention of remaining ! officers did ever give grace to the place, and
herein; all ichite persons naturalized under the not the place only to grace the officer.” 7th
laws of the United States, and who are, or may
become residents of this State, with the inten
tion of remaining herein; all persons who have
Bacons Ab. 279—title offices and officers. Black-
stone says the King, in England, is the
fonntain of honor and of office, and the reason
obtained a right to citizenship under former given is that the law supposes that no one can
under the Constitution of the United States, by ly prohibited by law; and as the Constitution
laws, and all children wherever born, whose
father was a citizen of this State at the time of
the birth of such children ; or in case of post
humous children at the time of his death, are
held and deemed citizens of this State.
By the Code the distinction is therefore clear
ly drawn between citizens who are white persons
and persons of color.
In other words, none are citizens under the
printed book known as Irwin’s Code” bnt white
persons. Having specified the class of persons
who are citizens, the Code proceeds, in section
1648, to define some of the rights of citizens, as
follows:
I “Among the rights of citizens are the enjoy
ment of personal security, of personal liberty,
private property and the disposition thereof, the
elective franchise, the right to hold office, to ap-
; ieal to the courts, to testify as a witness, to per-
I orm any civil function, and to keep and bear
arms.”
Section 1649 declares that, ‘‘All citizens are
entitled to exercise all their rights as such unless
speciall prohibited by law.”
Section 1650 prohibits females from exercis
ing the elective franchise or holding civil office.
Section 1651 prohibits minors from the exer
cise of civil functions, till they are of legal age.
Sections 1652 and 1653 prohibits certain
criminals, and persons non compos mentis, from
exercising certain rights of citizens.
Article 3, chapter, 1 title, 1, part 2,of the code
defines the rights of the 4th class of natural per
sons, designated as persons of color; giving
them the rights to moke contracts; sue and be
sued, give evidence, inherit, purchase and sell
property; and to have marital rights, security of
person," estate, etc., embracing the usual civil
rights of citizens, but does not confer citizen
ship. Thus the code stood prior to its adoption
by the new constitution.
As already shown, it was adopted in subor
dination to the constitution, and must yield to
the fundamental law, whenever in conflict with
it In so far as the code had conferred rights
on tho colored race there is no conflict and no
repeal. The constitution took away no right
then possessed by them under the code, but it
enlarged their rights as defined in the code, by
conferring upon them the right of citizenship.
It transferred thorn from the 4th class of natural
persons, nnder the above classification, who
were denied citizenship by the code, to the 1st
class, os citizens.
The 46th Section of the Code limited citizen
ship to white persons. The Constitution struck
out the word white, and made all persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and resident
in this State, citizens, without regard to race or
color. It so amended Section 46 of the Code,
as greatly to enlarge the class of citizens. Bnt
it repealed no part of Section 1648, which de
fines the rights of citizens.
It did not undertake to define the rights of a
citizen. It left that to the Legislature, subject
to such guarantees as are contained in the Con
stitution itself, which the Legislature cannot
take away. It declares expresslyj that no law
shall b6 made,or enforced, which shall “abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, or of this State.” It is not ne
cessary to the decision of this case to inquire,
what are the “privileges and immunities” of a
citizen? which are guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and by the Constitution of this State.—
"Whatever they maybe they are protected against
all.abridgement by legislation. This is the full
extent of tho Constitutional guarantee. All
rights of the citizen, not embraced within these
terms, if they do not embrace all, are subject to
the control of the Legislature.
Whether the •‘‘privilege and immunities” of
the citizens embrace political rights, includ
ing the right to hold office, I need not inquire.
If they do, tho right is guaranteed alike by the
Constitution of the United States and the Con
stitution of Georgia; and is beyond the control
of legislation. If not, the right is subject to the
con iro! of t he Legislature as the popular voice may
dictate ; and in that case the Legislature would
have power to grant or restrict it at pleasure, in
case of white persons as well as of persons of
color. The Constitution of Georgia has gone
ns far as the fourteenth amendment has gone,
but no farther. An authoritative construction
of the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme
Court of the United States upon this' point,
would bo equally binding as a construction of
the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which
is in tho same words.
be so good a judge of an officer’s merits, and
services, as the King who employs him.
“From the same principle also* arises the pre
rogative of creating and disposing of offices;
for honors and offices are in their nature con
vertible and 8ynonimons. All officers under the
Crown carry in the eye of the law an honor along
with them; because they imply a superiority of
parts, and abilities, being supposed to be always
filled with those that are most able to execute
them.” 1st BL Com. 271,’2. Offices (says
Blackstone) are a right to exercise a public or
private employment and to take the fees and
emoluments thereunto belonging, and are also
incorporeal hereditaments. 2d Bl. Com. 36.—
All citizens of the State, whether white, or col
ored, male, or female, minors, or adults, idiots
or lunatics, are entitled to have all the privileges
and immunities of citizens, bnt it does not fol
low that all of these different classes of citizens
are entitled to hold office nnder the public au
thority of the State, because the privileges and
immunities of a'tzens are secured to them. The
State in this conntry, as the Crown in England,
is the fountain of honor, and of office, and she
who desires to employ any class of her citizens
inher service, is the best'judge of their fitness
and qualifications therefor. An officer of the
State as we have shown, “hath to do with an
other’s affairs against hit will, and without his
leave," and such officers must have the authori
ty of the Slate to perform these public duties
against the will of the citizen and without his
leave. This authority must be conferred upon
the citizen by some public law of the Slate, from
that class of her citizens, which in her judg
ment, will best promote the general welfare of
the State.' The right to have and enjoy the pri
vileges and immunities of a citizen of the State,
doe3 not confer npon him the right to serve the
State in any official capacity, until that is ex
pressly granted to him by law.
Mr. Justice Curtis, in his dissenting opinion
in the case of Dred Scott vs. Sanford (19th
Howard’s Rep. 5 and 3)says: “So in all the
States, numerous persons, though citizens, can
not vote, or cannot hold office, either on account
of their age or sex, or the want of the necessary
legal qualifications.’’ Corfieldvs. Corvell, 4th
Washington0. 0. Rep. Sand 1, to the same
point.
The defendant, therefore, cannot legally
claim any right to hold office either under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States, or the Constitution of this
State, which make him a citizen, and guarantee
unto him the privileges and immunities of a
citizen, for he may well have and enjoy all tho
privileges and immunities of a citizen, in the
State, without holding any office, or exercising
any publio or official duty under the authority
of the Stale. The privileges and immunities of
a citizen of the State do not confer the legal
right to hold office nnder the publio authority of
the State, and receive .the emoluments thereof.
Does the public law of tho State, recognized and
adopted by the Constitution of 1868, (known
as Irwin’s Code,) confer npon the defendant the
legal right to hold office in this State ? The
Code took effect, as thepnblio law of this State,
on the first day of January, 1863. By the for.
ty-sixth section thereof, it is declared.: “All
white persons born in this State, qr in any other
State of this Union, who are, or may become resi
dents of tbis State, with tho intention of remato-
ingherein; all white^persons naturalized nnder the
laws of the United States,and who are or may be
come residents of this State, with the intention
of remaining hereto; all persons who have ob
tained a right to citizenship nnder former laws,
and all children wherever born, whose father
was a citizen of this State at the time of the
birth of such children, or in case of posthumous
children at the time of his death, are held and
deemed citizens of this State. Persons having
one-eighth or more of African blood to. their
veins are not “ white persons to the meaning of
this Code.” The 1646th section declares, that
“Natural persons are distinguished according
to their rights and status, into 1st citizens, 2d
residents not, citizens; 3d aliens, 4th persons of
color. The persons to whom belong the rights
of citizenship and the mode of acquiring and
losing the same, have been specified to a former
article (referring to article 46 before cited.)
Among the rights of citizens are the enjoyment
of personal security, of personal liberty, private
property and the disposition thereof, the elec
tive franchise, the right to hold office, to appeal to
the courts, to testify as a witness, to perform
— w — any civil function, and to keep and bear arms.
Georgia has complied fully with the terms All citizens are entitled to exercise these right 1 --,
as such, unless specialty prohibited hTT"
Sections 1647, 1648, 164*, 1650,16 5L {ZJ*»■ j
of the Code. V > 1662 .I^|
It will be remembered that at the tana -j \
adoption of the Code, in 1853,the def»a.5 ^
root a citizen of this State and wasnotrecnZ.* 1, i
by the Gode as a citizen thdtmf. By thav
section, the status of the defendant is deffo"?
be that of a person of color, and not twfj
citizen. The Revised Code, adopted bv fil ?
stitotioa of 1868, includes the Act of u i
which declares that “All negroes, 4l
mistizoes, and their descendants, bavin™
eighth of negro or African blood in their •
shall be known, in this State,aspcrxonoofj^*
and especially defines their legal rigWlvA'
right to hold office is not' one of them ’p -
Code, Section 1661. ae ™
It is true that since the adoption of the r
the defendant has been made a citizen, h
the legal rights conferred upon citizens h
Code, were confers!? upon that class of
sons only, who weajfiedared and recossi, £a
the Code, ascitizenWof the Stale at
itsadoption. When the Codes declares that it ■ V
be the right of a citizen to hold office snch s2
is confined to that class of persons who
cognized and declared thereto, to be Ht’Jf'''
the State, and not to any other class of ner
who might thereafter become citizens
-where the Code declares that “All
entided to exercise all their rights as'sni**
less prohibited by law," it is applied), r’,?
class of persons only, who were declared * 'V
citizens of the State at that time, and not* *
other class of persons who might durtJu
made citizens of the State : such as fy'-
Africans, or persons of color. The '
that the publio 'will of the State has neveru
expressed by any Legislative enactment
vor of the right of colored citizens to ta A;
to this State since they became citizens
Although these several classes bfpenour
be made citizens of the State, with the
ileges and immunities- of citizens, stilL
could not legally hold office under the autlm
of the State until that right shall be comvl
upon them by some public la wot the State ~
sequent to the time at which they became ™-
zens, so as to include them in its provision!
The public will of the State, as to the jl
right, of that class of her citizens to hold o~',1
has never been affirm,it icily expressed; hr,
the contrary, when the proposition was dista J
made to the Convention, which formed the t
ent Constitution, to confer the right upoa
ored citizens to hold office in this State, it ,
voted down by a large majority.. [Beti'-I
nal of the Convention, page three hundred^
twelve.] So far as there has been any em
ion of the public will of the State as to
legal right of that class of citizens, knoix
colored citizens, and since they became s-Jb
hold office to this State, it is against tint ‘
now claimed by the defendant The j
mountable obstacle to the way of the defe_.
olaimtog a legal right to hold office in this j
under the provisions of the Code, is the fact
he was not a citizen of the State at the tin*
its adoption.. The class of persons to which;
belongs were not recognized by it as eiiti
and therefore he is not included in any c;
provisions which confer the right to hold
upon the class of citizens specified in th
The Code makes no provision whatever for
ored citizens to hold office to this State; ij
provisions apply exclusively to white cife
and to no other class of citizens. The Cota
tion which framed the present State Coi
tion and declared persons of color to be cit
could have conferred the right upon thee
hold office, but declined to do so by a raj;
cidedvoteof that body, and went before
people claiming its ratification, upon the gr
that colored citizens were mot entitled, t*
ofiice under it, and there can be no doubt
the people of the State voted for its ratine
af the ballot-box, with that understanding,
noicit is contended that the defendant,^
a colored person, is made a citizen of the Si
and of the United States, and that no ei
act has ever been passed to allow a natt
citizen to hold office in this State—when la.
sessed the other requisite qualifications a
scribed bylaw; that the defendant, having'
made a citizen of the State, is entitled to
office in the same manner as a naturalized!
zen could do. The reply is, that natal
citizens were white persons, and as such, Uj
common law right to hold office, a right fosri
upon immemorial usage and custom^ which b
existed so long that the memory of man rrnc
not to the contrary. The 1644th section oi
Code simply affirms the common law as to
right of a ichite citizen to hold office in t
State.
No such common law right, however, cis
claimed in this Stale, to favor of persons of i
or, to hold office. They have but recently a
come entitled to citizenship, and have m
held ofiice in this State. In 1848, in the cas
Cooper and Worsham vs. the Mayor and All
men of the city of Savannah, (4th Ga. Et|
72,) it. was unanimously held and decide!
this Court, that free persons of color wett
entitled to hold any civil office to this State
naturalized white citizen can claim his coe
law right to hold office in this State. Re
ored citizen cannot claim any such commx
right, for the reason that he has never eier'
and enjoyed it, and that constitutes the ’
ence between the legal right of a n»to
ichite citizen to hold office in this State,
person of color who has recently beenn
citizen “since the adoption of the Cou».
who is not embraced within its pr&zidm"^
one can claim his common law right to fcoBj
fice in the State,- the other cannot, and ecu:
State shall declare, by. some legislative a
ment that it is her will and desire thath:
ored citizens shall hold office under hit ■
ity, they cannot claim the legal right to &
for we must not forget that the State 2
fountain and parent of office, and may ca
or refuse to confer the right to hold
any class of her citizens she may think F
and expedient™
When a new, clctss of persons are ini
into the body politic of the State and nui
zens thereof who cannot claim u contra
right, to hold office thereto, it is incumbs*
them to show, affirmativdy, that suchng- 11
been conferred upon them by some
of the State since they were made citizens-* 1
of, to entitle them to have and enjoy
In other words, they must show the
of the State, enacted since they became ff 1
thereof, which, confers the legal rift w
before they can demand the judgmed J
Court, in favor of such legal aight.
All male white citizens of the State, *
native bom or naturalized citizens
necessary legal qualifications) have a ^
law right to hold office to this State;
der to deprive them of that common
a prohibitory statute is necessary.. h ff
ized citizen . had the common law right.
the office of President of the Unite! -,
hence the prohibition to the Constituto 3
United States. But as colored oitizeLS -
State who have' recently been made
not claim a common law right to
the State, as no prohibitory statute
to deprive them of a right -which they ne
under the common or statute law e* “ •’
when, therefore, it is said that
have the right to hold office to the
specially prohibited by law, it must be "‘■'j
firmatively that they YwAprctiouf 'J ™
right If they cannot show their rl §“‘
office to the State, either under tbs
law, the Constitution or statutes of ^
the fact that they are not speem f
from exercising a right which they
amounts to nothing, so far as inctfa'*
with the right to hold office JS , < ?,irf
When, and where, and by what pnbtt
the State was the legal right to hold offl
in conferred on the colored ^ti*®? 8 .
If this question cannot be answered » j
firmative, and the legal autfuority Ma
the right is daitned can not be show®)
argument that, inasmuch as there is J.
prohibition in the law against the ng
ored citizens to' hold office, they c® J
falls to the ground. If there was vo
legal right to hold office to be I, iff
fact that there in-no prohibition Aoesf ^
such legal right. There was no leg®
to prohibit that which did not exist.
Itis not the business orduty of
the laws, but simply to expound an .rjjht
isting laws, which havo been P res . C !’ 1
supreme power of the State.
careful examination of this question, ,
ly of the opinion that there isno e3a frr,v 1
this State which confers the right up-
ored citizens there to hold office the.
consequently, that the defendants® ,
right to hold and exercise the duties o a
which he claims under her authority, j
judgment of tho Court below overmin 1 * |
murrer should be affirmed.
“In the distress and anguish of
I confess that I see no light ™
fcat** r -
not one ray of light to disclose tej-r
came into the world, why ^e earth
with the dying and the dead, and wn
far to all eternity. When I feel th* jti 1
can save them, and yet He does not a .
struck dumb. Tt is all dark to my ■
cannot disguise it.”