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THE 8UNNY SOUTH ATLANTA. GEORGIA* OCTOBER 14 1893
(irayd™ Jl^e Blue.
TO SOUTHERN MEN AND WOMEN*
To the generation of people who
have sprung to maturity in the South
since the war, we put this question .
Are you indifferent toward, or forget
ful of,the Confederate soldier? Search
TOUR HEARTS AND ANSWER! The mis-
sion of this page is to emphasize the im
portance of keeping alive in the South
ern breast the emotions of sympathy
and gratitude due to the ‘‘Veterans of
the South.” Is there a true Southern
man, woman, or child, who will not
zealously aid this cause by increasing
the circulation of The Sunny Sout^?
This page is designed in addition, as a
depository of detached historical inci
dents of the war between the States.
It is a standing, and one of the most
highly valued departments of The
Sunny South. Historians cannot
spare space or time to record the min
utiae of marches, battles and sieges
They must be gathered and preserved
in a fragmentary manner by the scat
tered survivors of the strife, or be lost
to posterity forever. Therefore to all
men and women who from experience,
or recital ef veterans, know of inter
esting happenings of the war,a cordial
invitation—-yea more—an earnest s
licitation is extended to contribute to
The Gray and The Blue. Ex-Federal
veterans are included within the pur
view of this paragraph, and good short
poems are desirable as well as prose
sketches. Ed. Sunny South.
“THE OLD TIME SOUTHERN DIRT.’
For The Sunny South.
I went to hear the speaking, wife,
Down at the hall today,
And though I could not understand,
all that they had to say,
This much, I do remember,
And it’s news to me and you;
’Twas this: “The old time South, my friends
Must give way to the New.”
He was a handsome man that spoke,
With voice of silver tone;
But seems to me, ’twere better far,
To let the South alone.
Our grand old land is fair enough,
Our people mostly true;
Then say, wnat alls the Jid South, wife,
That they should want a New?
We donned the Gray at bugle call,
My bonDy boys, and I,
And on Manassas’ bloody field,
I saw brave Johnny die:
But, ’twas for Home and Country,
And I tried to bear my pain,
Only to learn at close of day.
That Ben, too, had been slain.
I know I’m old and feeble now,
My mind, it wanders some,
The years that lie behind me,
Have left but few to come;
But treasured in my inmost heart;
With our dead boys, and you,
Is the Old South that I fought for,
I don’t want any New.
Don’t think I mourn their gallant death,
God knows, 1 loved them well;
For this old land they bravely fought,
And for the same they fell.
The long, sad war was o’er at last;
Four years of martyrdom,
When childless, sick, defeated,
I turned my footsteps home.
Home, did I say? Nay, wife, I found
A heap of ashes gray,
It marked the place where home once stood
Grim war had passed that way.
Well, never mind, ’tis over now,
But oh I I can’t forget.
But for this dear Southland of ours,
We’d have our children yet.
The thing that troubles me, is this;
When soldiers loved it so.
Why should the speakers of today,
Say, this “Old South” must go?
Well, let it give way if it must,
But when I’m laid to rest.
Please take the old time Southern dirt,
To heap above my breast.
—Mrs. Marshall Martin.
Fort Valley, Ga.
STRATEGIC POINTS.
Their Value In the War and How
Fiercely They Were Fought for.
Fob This PaghT~
In reasoning from cause to effect we
must not conclude that accident was the
reason why great battles were more than
onoe fought over the same fields during
the great civil war in this country.
Examining carefully for the cause, we
arrive at the conclusion that such points
must have had within them some special
value, and an analysis of this, deducts the
conclusion that these places were "Strate
gic Points.”
♦J™ e £ re 86veral objective points, in
the Old Dominion, over whose bosom the
pendulum of war oscillated for four cruel
y ® a ™’ yhere the contending armies crash-
bad in them this strategic value,
and the fact that battles were fought more
than once on these fields proves that the
dimt 68 Gett colli<ie npon them by acci-
G««y»burg was a battlefield of ac-
i i 1)6611 in touch with
“iAt» Confederate commander fur
nished with the information the cavalry
are supposed to acquire, it is now consid- ,
»*red more than doubtful that this little I ands of brave
Pennsylvania town would have assumed
conspieiouB prominence in American his
tory.
But strategic points is the subject of this
paper, and it will be best to treat them in
the order of their dates.
Beauregard’s selection of Bnll Ban
his line defense showed his wisdom as an
engineer. His ontposts extended from
Leesburg, through Drainesville, Fairfax
and Wolf Bun Shoals, to Acquire creek-
with reserves at Centrevilie. This w““ 4 "
the early summer of 1861.
McDowell was organizing the Grand
Army around a splendid nucleus of regu
lars This army was not for the defense
of Washington solely, but also for aggres
sive purposes.
There was a supreme authority in the
federal states which became director gen
eral, which gave orders to commanders
and moved armies. This power was pub
lic clamor, and all through the four years
of carnage, this influence was dominant.
McDowell moved out of Washington an
der its orders. Burnside assaulted Lee'
line at Fredericksburg under its arbitrary
demand. Meade moved upon the army of
Northern Virginia at Mine Bun at the dic
tation of this same power.
But pardon this degression, so back to
Strategic Points. McDowell moved out of
Washington with the Grand (Army and
developing Beauregard’s outposts, soon
pressed them back upon the reserves and
precipitated the indecisive battle 18th of
July 1861.
Pausing then, McDowell took advan
tage of his information, to study the situ
ation and plan accordingly.
Beauregard, finding his force inadequate
appealed to Johnston, then at Winches
ter for assistance. His prompt response is
too well known to detail here: how Bee
and Bartow died; how Kirby Smith
coming into line almost on the
run, npon McDowel’s flank, and "Jack-
son standing like a Stonewall” snatched
victory from defeat, and turned the tri
umph of tbe foe into an utter rout. The
Plains of Manassas drank in the best blood
of the South, but victory laid her crown
of immortelles upon "the banner of the
stars and bars.”
Manassas, heretofore an insignificant
railroad crossing, became the base of the
Confederate army. Boads, both dirt and
rail, radiated and crossed here, and its
strategic worth, and the fierceness for
which its possession was contended, dem
onstrated its value.
After McClellan had been paralyzed be
fore Bichmond, a year later, a new and
powerful Federal army was being massed
in northern Virginia, cansing concern to
the Confederate government.
To check further advance, Lee trans
ported his army from its intrtnehments
before Bichmond, first to the line of the
Bapidan, then to the banka of the Bappa-
hannock. The summer rains had swollen
the river and thus gave the Federal com
mander a strong position. The fords were
unavailable, and Pope held the key to the
situation.
But the genius of Lee could not be neu
tralized by an obstacle like the roaring
Bappahannock. He sent the energetic ana
phenomenal Jackson to secure Manassas
in Pope’s rear.
Silently and steadily the Stonewall corps
tramped by a circutuous route, and before
the Federal commander was aware of his
absence from his front, Lee’s great lieu
tenant had seized Manassas with its vast
■tores of food, clothing and ammunition
These were utilized to the extent of Jack
son’s ability, the excess given to the
flames. He knew that Pope would resent
this poaching upon his presences, so after
applying the torch he moved from the
J unction to the neighborhood of the old
battle*field, where a year before he had won
his title and his spurs. He wanted elbow
room, space to manoeuvre, and as he had
to call upon Pope, he determined to se
lect his own battle ground. -
The desperate battles of the 28th, 29th
and 30th of August testify of Pope’s anx
iety to retain and Lee’s determination to
wrest from him this stragetic point.
Forty-nine thousand and seventy-seven
worn but superb Confederates, after days
of battle, defeated Pope’s army, which,
with McClellan’s reinforcements, num
bered 120,000, and forced them back into
the works around Washington.
Thus the stragetic value of Manassas,
drinking to satiety the blood of brave
men, assumed conspicuous prominence in
American annals.
In the late spring of 1862 McClellan en
vironed Bichmond with an army of 115,000
men. His immense works are monaments
to his genius as an engineer. Of the
points fortified by him Cold Harbor was
the key to his right.
When the signal gun from the left of the
Confederate fortifications announced the
assault upon McClellan’s lines, the brant
of the attack was upon his right. Fierce
assaults followed and some of the strong
holds yielded, but Cold Harbor, naturally
strong and intensified by splendid works,
resisted fiercely. Southern blood flowed
like water, bat as long as this point held
out, McClellan maintained his right in
tact.
Jackson sent imperative order to storm
the works, and though 14 heavy fiela guns
and three lines of battie hurled shot, shell
and bullets upon them, the gallant Hood
with his splendid Texans finally carried
the fort by storm, and doubled McClellan’s
right back npon hie centre.
Successively Mechanicsville, Ellisons
Mills, Cold Harbor, Game’s (Mills, Frazers
Farm, Savage Station and White Oak
Swamp were torn from McClellan’s group,
and these names blazoned in martial glory
upon the star crossed flag, while Mc
Clellan’s beaten army sought protection
under the guns of the federal fleet in James
River.
A lapse ol two years brings ns back to
historic Cold HarDor. The war had now
progressed more than three years. Other
commanders had failed and Pablic Clamor
wasdemanding better results for the money
and blood so liberally and lavishly spent
in the Old Dominion.
Grant was summoned from bis su;c:
in the West, and the government assigned
him this terrible task. Unlimited re
sources were placed at his disposal; when
he broke camp early in May, 1864, 141,160
splendidly equipped and veteran soldiers
followed his standard- Against this host
Lee could oppose, but 52 625 illy fed and
poorly-clad, yet snpnrb troops.
Tben followed the Spottsylvama the
North Anna written in the blood of thous-
men A month of almost
incessant battle followed, the two armies
gravitating toward Bichmond. In Jane in
tbe coarse of these Bid e, movements, Cold
Harbor was again reached, bat circum
stances and positions reversed. L*e now
held the intrenchments and acted on the
defensive. Grant massed his army for the
assault. Up to this time the genius of the
great Confederate commander had every
where matched the enormous preponder
ance of the enemy.
Grant made three desperate assaults on
Lee’s works; the attack was made in the
forenoon. Each attack was repelled with
appalling slaughter. S') terrific had been
the Confederate fire that in one hour
Grant’s losses had amounted to more than
13-000, while he inflicted a loss of bat 1,200
npon Lee.
History records General Grant as a man
cf great determination and tenacity. Ha
was unwilling to yield his point, so deter
mined was he to renew the assanlt in the
afternoon. The order for attack descend
ed in proper gradation from the lienten-
ant-general down to reg-mental command
ers; bat when the bugles sounded the
onset there was no forward movement,
and the immoble lines of the army of the
Potomac thus silently rebuked its com
mander for his butchery. Its inactive at
titude spoke plainer than words: "Show
ns a possibility and no troops will more
loyally and promptly; respond, but to again
hurl ns against certain defeat and direful
slaughter, we must refuse to obey.”
Thus for the second time Cold Harbor
became tbe scene of the fiercest of con
flicts and established its value as a strate
gic point.
It is worthy of note to mention the great
disparity of numbers engaged, and how,
in the two battles, conditions were re
versed. In the battles of Bichmond, Mc
Clellan’s army numbered 115,102 men, and
in this engagement fonght on the defen
sive Cold Harbor, next to Malvern Hill—
the strongest position in his line. Lae's
forces were 69,762, and in this, as in others
of the Bichmond battles, were the aggros-
ors, yet he wrested this stronghold by one
of the most daring assaults history re
cords.
In the second battle of Cold Harbor con-
defenses, his army about 49,000 Grant
was to attack with 140,000 men. He hurl
ed his immense weight upon Lee, but to
no effect, except to destroy nis men. This
leads up to the inquiry, "Was either the
better soldier?”
The spring of 1863 found Lee’s army at
Fredericksburg watching bis powerful
antagonist across the Bappahannock.
Longstreet had been detached for service
near Suffolk and the army of northern
Virginia thus weakened.
Hooker had succeeded Burnside in com
mand of the army of the Potomac. New
hopes inspired the Federal army. Hooker
was jabnlant; he announced to the world
"the finest army on the planet” was about
to exterminate its enemies. So sure was
he of this, he dispatched to Gen. Hallock
at Washington:
"The rebel army is now the legitimate
property of the army of the Potomac.
Rejecting Burnside’s plan of direct as
sault, he divided bis army of 132 000 men,
40,000 under Ledgewick|crossed tbe Bappa
hannock on pontoons below Fredericks
burg and threatened Lee’s right; with the
remainder Hooker crossed the upper fords
and menaced the Confederate left
Lee’s army numbered 57,117. Matters to
others than his master mind would have
seemed gravely critical. Leaving Early
with 9,000 muskets to hold his works be
hind Fredericksburg, with the remainder
he moved ont to give battle to Hooker.
Before developing the Federal battle
line, for the protection of his flank and
rear, he detached Wilcox with 6,000 men
to guard the fords behind him.
Just as he struck Hooker’s line he de
tached Jackson with about 24,000 men to
place himself npon Hooker’s right and
rear.
Silently and swiftly the old foot cavalry
of the Stonewall corps traversed the se
cret by-paths of the wilderness, and late
in the afternoon of the 3d May he steathily
approached the unsuspecting federate.
Wiih a rash and a roar the Stonewall
corps broke cover, and with one crash of
musketry, then with the bayonet, swept
the works.
Howard’s 11th Corps was just partaking
of its evening meal when the storm swept
npon it. Hooker's left wing was thrown
into utter rout and rushed in confnsion
npon the centre. Night alone saved it
from destruction.
Bat details are too volnmnious. The
world knows of Hooker’s terrible punish
ment and defeat. How Lee, with one
third of Hooker’s forces, crashed the fed
eral army and threw it beyond the Bappa
hannock.
Jnat one year later on a balmy day in
early May, 1864, Grant broke camp at Cul
pepper with the finest army ever organized
upon the western continent. Without
hindrance he placed 141,160 soldiers on the
■oath bank of the Bapidan and threw him
self across Lee’s road to Bichmond.
It must have been apparent to the eye
of the most ordinary soldier in Grant’s
amry that his commander had blun
dered.
He saw at a glance how impossible to
manoeuvre 141000 men in the dense jangles
and scrubs of the wilderness. Therefore
it is not to be wondered that the genins of
the great Confederate chieftan mastered
the situation.
He broke cover with 52,626 ragged but
veteran troops, and not waiting to be at
tacked, moved at once npon Grant’s battle
line and for three days fiercely assailed
his overwhelming antagonist.
Finding it impossible to make any im
pression npon Lee’s line, the night of the
third day’s fight the federal commander
silently moved his army by the left flank,
trusting with the morning sun to envelope
the right and rear of Lee’s depleted army.
The genius of Lee seemed to have been
inspired, for by some means he divined
his adversary’s plans and moved parallel
to him, and as Grant ohanged from flank
to front and moved forward, the battered
but defiant Army of Northern Virginia
was before him. Thence followed the
fierce battles around Spottsylvama, North
Anna and Cold Harbor.
So ended the terrible Battle of the Wil
derness. On nearly the same ground Lee
and Hooker had fought two years before,
and now the first captain in the federal
army was sent with the finest army to
crush Lee, yet be failed and Chancallors-
ville and the Wilderness became famous
in history as strategic spots. Here in each
battle genius and unsurpassed courage
more than matched numbers and splendid
appointments.
Thus in succession Manassas, Cold Har
bor and Chancellorsville and the Wilder
ness, heretofore unknown, became lumin
ous in history and the terrific battle fought
on these fields demonstrated their value
as strategic points.
Less only in the number of troops en
gaged. Winchester in the lower valley
became conspicuous in Confederate annals
as a Strategic Point. Early in 1861 John
ston recognized its value and so held it.
Later Jackson made a vigorous attack on
Shields at Kernstown for its recovery, but
for paucity of numbers and exhaustion of
his troops from rapid and severe march
ing would have wrested it from federal
grasp.
In the spring of 1862 this same Stone
wall made a suuden rush upon Banks and
drove him from the town and across the
Potemac. So greatly did the federal gov
ernment appreciate its worth that two
armies were dispatched one under Mc
Dowell from Fredericksburg and the oth
er under Fremont from Franklin, each
largely superior to Jackson, to drive him
from Winchester.
Again the town became headquarters
for federal occupation of the Vahey dis
trict, and again after Second Manassas
was evacuated. On the retirement of Lee’s
army to Fredericksburg iu the fall of ’6.
again the town became the federal head
quarters for that section of Virginia. Af
ter Chancellorsville, in the order of Lee’s
combinations, Ewell burst through the
gaps of the Blue Mountains and suddenly
swooping down upon the little city, threw
Mllroy and the remnant of his garrison
across the Potomac. After Gettysburg
Winchester again fell to the federal occu
pation. Gen. Jube Early once again
wrested it from the troops of thetlinted
States and again forced back, federal oc
cupation followed, and once more partial
success almost put it again in his pos
session. Thence to the close of the war, it
remained in posession of the federal
troops.
No other place of similiar importance so
ln xr««. 00naitl0n to meet *n attack
a K un fired during these an-r
eight hours, no troops molested h, ° Us
ers and before five o’etoSk te1.* riid ’
struck the J. mejRUr oVthVnvTr
Somfles below Richmond r road »
Rating men and horses until
nightfall, the column was again nn^'
motion, and shronded byjthe fried?* 10
tain of night, without further
proceeded through McClellan'sffSS
atdaybght reached the Confederate’oS*
port. In moving along the river r S
the J allies river, where federal
constantly pal ' '
four gunboats
constantly patroled that stream.
ditions were reversed, Lee was behind the bften changed hands as did the little city
>f Winchester; and while not contended
for by so large iorces as the other points
mentioned, yet the ‘ frequency with which
its occnpation was fought for, testifies its
value in the estimation both of the Con
federate and federal forces.
The places enumerated are points
which should the blasting misfortunes of
war ever oscillate over the Old Dominion
again, will become the scenes of similar
battles. Let us trust no more in the his
tory of this country, this curse shall ever
again come upon this fair land and pray
that "men may learn to war no more.”
Pert.
TRAPS.
How Stuart Led Hit Trooper* Into Dan
ger and Safely Brought Them Out.
In the quietude which settles around us
in the sear and yellow leaf, we look back
over the stirring scenes and times of the
early sixties, and wonder at the endurance
of human nature, the strains we could sus
tain u nder certain conditions, and marvel,
"in these piping times of peace,” at the
narrow escapes and close calls of indi
viduals and the commands to which tney
were attached. Tne stereoptican of
memory throws these recollections upon
the canvas with great vividness and bold
distinction. We realize now the extreme
perils of those occasions.
It was a bold and audacious act on the
part of Stuart, to break through McClel
lan’s right flank with but 1,100 horses and
three guns of his horse artillery, and place
himself in rear of the army of the Po
tomac, 115,000 strong.
This immense army environed Bich
mond, extending from the James to the
Pamnnky rivers, its left resting upon the
former, its right touching the latter.
Desperation might have justified this
audacity; but no such conditions obtained.
It is even now an open question whether
Stuart started this expeaition with other
intention than simply an attack upon Mc
Clellan’s right flank, really a reconnois-
ance upon that wing of the Federal
army.
However, having pierced the Federal
right and penetrated well upon its rear,
one of two influences determined Stnart’s
purpose; either he feared a heavy force
had been promptly dispatched to intercept
him if he attempted to retrace his steps,
or the hope of inflicting great damage
upon McClellan’s line of commu
nication, and destroying his great stores at
his base cf supplies. Be this as it may
he promptly moved upon the line of com
munication and destroyed everything he
could not utilize. Arriving at Tanstal
station on the York River R. R., he did
not have time to intercept a train, moving
from the army to its supply base at the
White House.
Its escape warned and alarmed the troops
at the river, and an attack by surprise
thus defeated. Stuart then moved with
rapid speed destroying and capturing as
he rode.
Supposing the federal pontoon was in
tact at the Long bridge on the Chicka-
hominy, he made for that crossing. To
his disappointment, this had been moved.
Tne river was unfordable, Thence he
marched to where the Forge bridge for
merly spanned the river. This had been
destroyed on Johnston’s retreat up the
Peninsula.
The situation was exceedingly grave,
but gravity lent energy to Stuarts fertile
brain. An old barn or warehouse about a
quarter of a mile away, was soon demol
ished, the sills and weatherbording trans
ported by hand, and with improvised tools
and material, the bridge rebuilt. Nearly
all the horses had swum tne river, the
balance, together with the three guns,
the men and their accoutrements were
then soon passed over and the bridge
again destroyed. It took eight hours of
valuable daylight to build this bridge,
and the troops, under the circumstances,
a ^ au<i transports wer
ed without detection. Tue fruits of SS
raid were several of the ene my kUlsri
wounded, 165 prisoners, 260 horses ctol
tured and Drought into the Confederiu
lines. Milhous in stores were turned h»
cause he could not impede his rapid inarch
with plunder. Stuart’s only loss was in
the death of the gallant Captain
whilst leading a charge upon the regulars
Stuart and his troopers seemed like Mac!
beth, to bear charmed lives.
Sharpsburg had been fought, and history
recorded an indecisive, though exceeding
ly bloody battle. 35,255 battered, out veE
eran Confederates received the impact and
repulsed the onset of nearly 90,000 feder
ate. Looking through the haze of three
decades, it yet remains an unsolved pro
blem, why McClellan failed to destroy the
army of Northern Virginia. We are not
sroing into details to expl .in the mystery.
Crossing the P.itomac, Lse rested his army
in the lower Valley. Stewart allowed his
troopers a brief respite, when he planned
another audacious foray npon tue ene
my’s communications. Selecting about
1,800 troopers and fortr guns from Hamp
ton’s, Fii z Lee’s and Robertson’s brigades,
under command of Hampton, Fnz Lee
and Jones, ti e artillery under the‘‘Gal
lant Pelham,” the column of attack ren-
devoured near Hegesville. Oa October 10,
18<)2, the troopers were in thesa Idle before
dawn, with the gallant Butler, of the 2ad
South Carolina, in advance. Into the Po
tomac the advance plunged, and quickly
secured the approaches to the foru on the
Maryland side.
Before sun-up the column and guns had
passed the river and were moving upon
the National Turnpike. Upon this high
way Gen. Cox’s division of federal infant
ry had just passed. But'er was so close
upon Ms heels that he picked up several
stragglers. To prevent detection, Stuart
now endeavored to capture the signal sta
tion at Fairview, situated upou an emi
nence commanding the country for miles
around.
This attempt was only partially suc
cessful, as the two officers in charge es
caped, while the enlisted men, with their
implements and other property, fell into
the Confederate hands.
Soon after effecting the crossing of the
river, the movement was reported to Cap
tain Logan, 12th Illinois Cavalry, by a
farmer, and Captain Logan remained in
observation of Stuart until 9 A. M.
Logan at once advised Gen. Kenly at
Williamsport, and Gsn. Brook at Hagers
town, of the presence of Stuart’s column
in Maryland. While thus McClel
lan or his officers had been ap
prised of Stuart’s presence, his purpjse
and objective point was still a mystery
Before leaving Virginia, Stuart apprised
his men of the great danger and severe
exactions required of them. Stringent or
ders were issaed regarding the actions of
the men. Private property was to be ap
propriated only by authorized officers.
Pablic property which could not be util
ized should be destroyed. No plundering
would be permitted, but strict submis
sion to orders enforced.
Pushing on rapidly ana without obstruc
tion, the column passed through Mercers-
burg and reached Chamberaburg, Pa.
about 8 P M.
After passing the Pennsylvania line, de
tachments were sent scouring the country
for horses.
No resistance was offered at Chambera
burg ; the town promptly surrendered and
was placed under military rule, with Gen.
Hampton as military governor. Amongst
those captured in the town was Col. A K.
McClure, then as now, editor of the Phila
delphia "Times.”
A graphic account of the capture and oc
cupation of the town was written by this
distinguished gentleman, which bestowed
credit upon Stuart and bis troopers.
Prompt intelligence had been wired Gov.
Oratain, also Gen. Wool at Baltimore, of
Stuart’s presence at Chambers burg. The
wires repeated this to McClellan’s head
quarters.
A safe return with his valuable cap
tures was now a subject of deep concern
and anxiety to Stuart. A. heavy rain-storm
prevailed all through the night and added
weight to bis anxiety. Should be reach
the Potomac could he ford it? Had not
the torrents rendered the river so high,
crossing would be impossible? Also when,
where and how to break through McClel-
Ian’s army ?
Fortunately Stuart had provided him
self with the best of guides and scouts and
to their familiarity of the country, he
trusted he would evade the troops posted
to intercept him.
Capt. White of his staff had resided near
Poolesville many years, and the country
around it was entirely familiar to him.
Three times daring the night did Stuart
wake him to question him regarding the
effects of the tstorrn npon the Potomac.
Dawn found his column on the move
with W. H. F Lee in the advance, and
Butler at the post of danger guarding the
rear. Leaving Chambersburg, the column
took the road for Gettysburg, thence de
flecting reached Emmetsourg about sun
down.
Under the guidance of his excellent
scouts, Stuart moved so as to mystify the
enemy. Ac Emmetsburg he was forty-
five miles ^rom the Potomah. Letving
Emmetsburg he started f r Frederic*
Md. Shortly after resuming the march he
captured a courier bearing dispatches to
Coi. Rash, 6ch Penn, regiment, which
gave Stuart information of the dispoai ion
of the troops posted, or moving to inter
cept home. This was an exceedingly for
tuitous accident. Speed was now essen
tial. So rapidly did he move, he *vaa
forced to change horses in his battery
three or four times during the nig ht ‘
There were plenty of horses in his cap-
tares. So thoroughily posted was Mc
Clellan that he made ample disposition to
trap Stuart, So sure was he that it **
was