Below is the OCR text representation for this newspapers page.

4 T II K I’.annev of th jl cnrtli A N O IJhmtrr’s Journal, jE\i >TEJ)TO AGRICULTURE, HORTICULTURE, NEWS, MEMORIES OF THE LOST CAUSE, LITERATURE, SCIENCE and ART. HENRY MO OR E, A. R. WRIGHT. PATRICK W AESH. TERMS —$3.00 per Annum, in Advance. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1870. THE BANNER OF THE SOUTH AND PLANTERS JOURNAL ITS CONTRIBUTORS. ‘Tt will give me great pleasure to aid iu promoting the success of the Banner cf the South and Planters’ Journal, and when I have more leisure will try to furnish such papers as are asked for. Wade Hampton. Columbia, Oct 19, 1870. “Your purpose is most commendable, and I wish it success with all heart. While I cannot undertake to be a regular contributor, it may be that I shall And it m my power to contribute an occas : onal paper. M. L. Bonham.” Edgefield , Oct 20, 1870. ‘lt would afford me very great plea sure to lend my aid to your meritorious enterprise, and I most earnestly wish suc cess to the Banner of the South and Planters’ Journal; but my time is, I fear, too much occupied, at present for me to think of any regular contributions. Geo. Frederick Holmes.” Uniuersity Va. } 17 Oct., 1870. “I wiil with pleasure contribute some articles on Historical and Political sub jects. Z. B. Vance.” Charlotte, N. C., Oct. 19, 1870. “I will checfully give all the aid in my power to promote the success of the Banner cf the South and Planters’ Journal. W. Pope Barrow.” Maxey's Oct. 18, 1870. “It will be gratifying to me to be come a frequent contributor to the Ban ner of the South and Planters’ Journal. R. K. Meade.” Wilmington, Oct. 14, 1870. “I am so enthusiastic in my admira tion of the plan for the Banner of the South and Planters’ Journal, that it fills me with regret that I will nor be able for some time to aid you as a regular contributor. I hope, however, to be able to contribute from time to time. J. E.Willet.” Professor Mercer University. “It will give me great pleasure to res pond to your request in behalf of so meritorious au enterprise, Charles U. Jones, Jr.” New York City, Oct. 5, 1870. “1 have long thought that a well con ducted journal on the plan you propose, would meet with eminent success and be productive of great good. It can be come a powerful auxiliary in educating the poople and awakening the dormant thought in the South. I accept your proposition and will endeavor to furnish you with articles fortnightly. Wm. Leroy Broun, Prof. of Georgia.” “I shall take great pleasure in con tributing to the columns of the Banner of the South and Planters’ Journal. W. T. Brantly, D. D.” Atlanta, Oct. 10, 1880. “My occupation is such as to preclude my becoming a regular contributor, but I will fi\»m time to time send you articles which may- be worthy the columns of the Banner us the South and Planters’ Journal. R. Ransom.” Wiminglon, N. C., Oct. 8, 1870. “I accede t§ your terms and do here by make myself responsible for one arti cle per week for the Banner of the South and Planters’ Journal. You have my heartiest as well as my most sanguine wishes for your success. You will suoceed. Ist. Because you will be absolutely without a rival in the South. 2nd. Because of the perfect X BANNER OF THE SOUTH AND PLANTERS’JOURNAL. novelty cf the project: no Southern pa per has ever before offered to pay its contributors; and contributions not worth paying for, are not—commonly speaking —worth printing. Wm. Henry Waddell, University of Georgia.” Athens, Oct. 6, 1870. ‘ I fear that I shall not be able to write as often as you indicate, owing to my somewhat precarious health. If how ever. I find the thing impracticable, I can wit! and aw. E M. Pendleton, M. D.” Sparta, Oct. 3,1870. “A paper established on firm ground and edited with ability, on the plan pro posed for the Banner of the South and Planters’ Journal, is much needed in the South, and I believe Augusta is a good point at which to establish it. I will contribute some “War Papers.” Jos. A. Englehard.” Wilmington, Oct. 6, 1870. -‘I shall hasten to show you that I am with you heart and hand. Your plan is right; you cannot fail. The South wants a plain scientific paper. Hereto fore our papers have been too much on ex tremes. One class has been so learned that ordinary people could make nothing out of them, while the other class has been so unlearned that nobody would have anything to do with them. J Parish Stelle ” Waynesvillc, 30iss, Oct. 11; 1870. SWINTON’S HISTORY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC- The right of Secession was not the only question debated in battle dui ing the recent “little unpleasantness” between the North and South; and Patriotism was not the only sentiment which recruited the ranks of the “Defenders of the Union” and inspired their efforts to replant the flag where defiant hands had torn it down. Had the one been the only ques tion, many- public men at the North, who either admitted the right as unquestiona ble, or in thmr hatred of the South want ed her “kicked out” of the Union right or wrong, would have been earnest op posers of the war, instead of being, from the very outset, its most active advocates and abettors. Had the other been the only sentiment, not only might even Butler have es caped the infamy of his Order No. 28, and Sherman have burned fewer dwel lings, and have allowed the women and children of Atlanta and the wives of Confederate officers in Savannah, to dwell in such peace as they could; but the close of the war would have witnessed some ef fort put forth by the North to restore good feeling between the sections, instead of five years spent in devising legislation to insult and more effectually to injure her prostrate and disabled foe. It was not to prevent such injury as Secession would have wrought, but to avenge the insult, that the North honored the heavy drafts for men and money made upon it. And the insult lay in the simple fact that the South dared to secede. The political historian and philosopher will make a long story of the events which brought about the war, and may trace its causes back through centuries to the bitter hatreds of the Cavalier and the Roundhead ; but the man who was otneng the Northern people during the twelve months preceeding the war—the man who not only read, but heard and saw, and more especially, who felt the temper of the day, can give a briefer ac count of how it all befel. Uneasy at the progress and attitude of the Radical party, the Southern States, in 1860 began to agitate the propriety of Secession ; a minority, however, only favoring it in the beginning, for the Union was dearly loved at the South in days gone by. Tins agitation of the question was free ly commented upon at the North in a way which tended to increase its popu larity at the South. Openly declared by individuals in conversation and more or ier-s plainly apparent in the tone of the press, Democratic and Republican, religious and secular—agreed on this however differing otherwise—the senti ment of the North pronounced the South a cowardly braggart that did not dare to fulfil its threats; and, in a sort of defi ance of them, the Radical party became more and more radical, and openly pro claimed the “irrepressible conflict.” To all this the Southern States replied, as might have been expected, with increas ing warmth, and finally, with Secession, which they begged leave, however, to make peaceabhu The North was for a while dumfound ed with surprise, and, fer a few months, seemed unable to realize that it was not all a sham, and that the seceding States had no idea of returning. As the real attitude of the South, became ap preciated the North began to threaten. Not that they wanted the South back, but they were over twenty millions to the South’s seven millions. They had the Navy, the Army, the Treasury, the workshops, and the granaries of the whole country. They had education, talent and industry. The South was indolent and ignorant. The South, moreover, “slept on a volcano” and it only needed a word from the North to wrap its land in flames and poison the very food in its people’s mouths. As the North recounted its ad vantages, its valor grew and its sense of the insult offered by the South, in not be ing afraid of it, deepened every day. And then it was proposed to “give our South ern cousins a little lesson.” Dixie, mean while, kept up its courage very well and, while its newly inaugurated Government male many efforts to adjust peaceable terms of separation, and only asked to be “let alone,” the press and people did : not hesitate to declare publicly that, should circumstances demand the effort, they felt little doubt about being able to whip—they stated the odds variously— from three to ten times their number of Yankees. This was certainly not so modest a self estimate as the one which inspired the courage of our Northern brethren but the South did no hesitate to back its words by deeds. The very moment that the North commenced the first hostile movement she stood not on ceremony, and without any care for the looks of the thing, “she struck her adversary and drew the first blood at Sumter.” In doing so she fell into the deep-laid trap for putting upon her the odium of the first blow, and the act was, moreover, not necessary, and therefore, in her situa tion not wise, for Anderson might have been starved out nearly as quickly as he was shelled out. But the question was now one of being bullied, and the pluck of the action is the best offset for its lack of prudence. The North was really the aggressor in attempting* to hold and to reinforce the Fort, and that being eqiva lent to a declaration of war, there was no use dickering about who should fire the first gun. Then the whole North flew to arms not to restore the Union—but to show that twenty millions of Yankees, well equipped, with such sinews of war as money, arms, ships, and an organized army, could whip four millions of Southern whites without any of these appliances, and with three millions of negroes among them, who could be turned against them also. Had its odds in its favor been less the North never would have provoked the war, but would have allowed the “erring sisters to go in peace.” It was under taken in pure hatred and spite, simply to show that they could whip the South, and the history of the country since 1865 de monstrates the fact as conclusively as the story of its beginning and progress. We read in scripture of a good woman who recovered by much sweeping a piece of silver, which had been lost, and of a shepherd who hunted up, at some trouble, a seceding sseeph e ep and brought it back to the fold. But did the pious lady spit cr stamp upon the recovered coin or devote her leisure for years afterwards to scratch ing out and defacing “the image and superscription of Caesar,” which it had borne ? Or did the gentle shepherd hasten to shear the re-captured lamb— 1 did he confiscate its long forage—tie it outside the bars and put it under mili- ' tary government ? No so. These typi cal individuals ivanted what they sought so assiduously, and when they found, they rejoiced over the missing treasures and celebrated the occasion with sumptuous fare. But the Yankees were guilty of no such extiavagance on winning back their “erring sisters” and restoring a broken ! Constitution and a lost Union, for the sim I pie reason that this was not that for wh'eh’ they had fought, On the contrary, the close of the war put them in a more truculent mood than ever before, because they felt that the true wager of the battle J had been lost. In short, the gist of the whole fight ' was to see who could whip, and the North is apparently much dissatisfied with the j result. She certainly crushed the South | in her campaigns, and starved her with her blockades, but did she whip her in fair and equal battles 7 Which has the greatest reason to be proud of its war record ? We say, let History decide. Such questions have been in her line, since the days of Epaminondas, and in fact since then the Goddess is popularly ap preciated and supported principally to de cide such issues. The object cf this article is to appeal to her, and the occasion of the appeal is this: A gentleman named Swinton has written a history of the (Federal) Array of the Potomac, in which, we must do him the credit to say that, he is unusu ally candid and unusually accurate. As an illustration of both his accuracy and candor, in a single short sentence, he states, of Mdj. Gen. John Pope, that “he had the misfortune to be, of all men, the most misbelieved.” As ano ther: he says of Sheridan’s incendiarism in the Valley of Virginia, that “it was unjustifiable and indefensible;” and, as a third, he points out, (on page 505) some discrepancies between well established facts, and Gen. Grants official repoit of them, with the remark that he “leaves the reconciliation of this descrepancy to those better equipped for the task.” Mr. Swinton is therefore a witness, to whose testimony history will attach much weight, for few contemporaneous histo rians write with so little fear of individu als before their eyes. But when the question involved is the ability of the Yankee army to defeat anything like its equal number of the Rebels, Mr. Swin ton has by no means shown himself an impartial writer. In short, while his hero is not any individual, but the “Army of the Potomac” as a whole, he is none the less a partisan, and his whole book is but an effort to explain away and excuse the patent facts, which he feels have shed much lustre upon the Confederate arms at the Federal expense- He indeed pre faces that many of these facts are * 'seem ingly unancountable,” and that he pur poses offering explanations, which must “modify the conclusions of those at a dis tance”—a very fair admission that he feels the verdict of the world to be against him. And at the close of the narrative he makes the admission ex plicitly in the remark that the credit due the Army of the Potomac “has not yet been accorded it.” Now, it is not our purpose toseik to detract from any positive credit that has been, or may be, accorded that array, for much is doubtless due: but the com parative credit, as we have already stated, was the principal question of the four years bloody debate, and this is the ques tion we refer to the Goddess of History and respectfully urge her—as she has lit tle else to do—to settle it for us, and we object to the issue being changed into simply “who was good ?” when we fought to know, “who was best V* Mr. Swinton would modestly insinuate that neither was best, and he uses for the purpose a very artful expression much in vogue among Northern writers when they wish to appropriate Rebel renown, to patch up the deficiency in Yankee glorv. For this purpose a phrase, wonderful in its cunning and sublime in its impudence, has been devised, and the North cries to the world that she has made a diseoverv —that the terrible character of the war was due to the fact that it was “Ameri can against American.” and there is there fore no question of comparative pluck in volved. Now, with many thanks for the compliment implied, we object to the change of issue. In 1861 the cry was “Yankee against Rebel” and “twenty againts four,” with a gcod many cutside odds additional, in favor of the twenty. These odds we were willing to meet, and the idea of its being “American against American” would have onlv discouraged us then, and the national adjective is rather too comprehensive for our taste now. We fought it as Rebels against Yankees, and four against twenty. We did it in part to see who could whin. * & ■ and now as Rebels, (though happily re constructed) we would like to know who did whip. And as Mr. Swinton’s book will be largely read with this question in view, and as we consider him a very unfair witness we propose to review him briefly from a strictly Rebel (but as above, and always to be understood, happily recon-' structed), point of view. His great task is to account for the “seemingly unaccountable” fact that with its greatly superior numbers, arms, equipments and discipline, the Army of the Potomac wrs so often defeated and never decisively victorious. He does this not on any broad princi ple, but in various ways, on various occa sions, some of which we shall illustrate 1 and remark upon. First. The ill success of the Federal Army is frequently attributed to bad generalship in its commander, an i the . freedom with which this is dune, is so great, that scarcely one of those unfortu j . ■' nate officials, from McDowell to Grant, j escapes with a reputation which can be called decent. | Tills nat only seems to relieve the ! army from all blame in many eases, but it gives an air of candor to the r.arative J ° ■ which does not properly belong to it upon other points. The harsh criticisms j upon il e generals commanding may, | indeed, be always deserved, but when . the opposing lines are at last face to face , and under each others fire, if the largest . and fullest ranks fiinch from it first, cr fail to advance upon and overwhelm their numerically inferior opponents. | provided no insurmountable obstruct! n interposes, the fault is not altogether that of the army commander. This was the case at Bull Ran, Second Mana-sis. Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Chaneel i lorsville, Wilderness, Spottsylvania, se ll cond Cold Harbor, Petersburg and on many other minior occasions. In the next place, the features of the ground and the character and extent o: the intrenchments thrown r.i> are fre quently either exaggrated or overlooked ! so as to attribute to them more than | their due influence on the Federal re veries, and less than their influence cn the few victories of which he is able to boast. Many instances of this m:gu: be pointed out but we have only the space for a few by way of illustration. In his account of the battle of Fredericks burg he speaks of the “terraced heights,