Below is the OCR text representation for this newspapers page.

* “These are counsellors “That feelingly persuade the what I am.” V.oixiliull *N Davis i Circuit Court of the vs. > U. S. April Session, YVilliara Wagner. j I—y 1. Present Judges liaidu in and lionldnson. This was an application to discharge the defendant from custody under a ca su., and .tvas.submitted to the Court upon a statement of the frets, as follows : William Wagner, residing in Philadelphia, crew a l3ili ol Exchange upon WooJhull and Davis, residing in New York. It was ac cepted and paid at maturity by the acceptors. Tae late firm of Snowden and Wagner haJ consigned to WoodhuH and Davis a cargo of 1 nrpentine, which was not disposed of at the timeof accepting the bill,at which time the firm was dissolved, and the defendant was carrying on business alone. After winding up the sal _s and crediting the nett proceeds, a balance remained, excluding Wagner’s bill, against the New Nork house. Suit was brought against William Wagner lor not indemnifying Wood ini 11 and Davis, for their acceptance on his account, and the sum claimed, and for which judgment was recovered, was the u mount of the Bill of Exchange, less the bal ance ol Snowden and Wagner’s account. The defendant, being in custody on a ca. sa. ap plied for his release 011 the ground of his dis charge by the Insolvent Law ot Pennsylvania. This was opposed on the allegation that the debt was contracted in New York, and there fore not affected by the discharge here. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Baldwin, J. . 1 lie statement of the case agreed on by the parties presents only one question tor the con sideration of the court, which is—Whether the defendant’s discharge underthe Insolvent law of Pennsylvania entitles him to be dis- from the arrest made under a ca. sa. issued from this Court in execution of ajudg tnent obtained against him eleven mouths be fore his dischare ! The power of the states of this Union to pass bankrupt or Insolvent laws, and the ef fect of the exemption of the person of the -debtor, or property acquired after the dis charge, have been the subject of much dis cussion arid difference of opinion. In the Supreme Court, they have been so fully ex amined by counsel, and the judges, as to make it necessary only to state (he result of ■such cases as hear on the present application. In Sfurges vs. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. i:22,!D, it was decided, Ist. That a state had ■a right to pass a bankrupt law, provided there was no act of Congress in force cstabli/ling a uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting >vith such state law; and provided it did not impair the obligation of a contract, within the .13th sect, ot the first art. ol the constitution. ~d. 1 hat such state law, liberating the per son ot the debtor, and discharging him from liability on contracts made previously to the law, was unconstitutional and void, so far as it is discharged the contract, or attempted to lo so. But 3d. 1 hat it was valid, so far as it l:scharged the person of the debtor from con finement; as imprisonment was merely a rem edy to enforc the obligation of the contract, but no part of the contract itself, a release from i; did not impair the obligation, p. 200-1. Though the Coui t, in the latter part of their opinion, p. 207,confine it tothe second point, yet the first and third having been considered mid their judgment exercised on thorn, it has always been understood (and so we feel it our duty to view it) that the law is settled on these points, according to the reasoning of the court, if not their direct The same }rm nle on the third point was affirmed in J'Uso i vs, Haii ;, 12 Wheat. 370.* This case was decided independently of any cou- Mf.b ration arising from the-Jpculity of the con tract or t? p irtiys. in NI Milan vs. M’Ncil, 4 Wheat. 200, the Court are sai ! to have declared that the cir- c '..stance ot tlie siate law, mid. r which the debt was attempted to bo discharged, having be. n pass' and b<-fore the debt was contracted made no difference in the application of t>... principle. And it; ti... Farmer’s Ba -f vs Smith, 6, Wheat, ini, that the fact ./both parties being citizens of Pennsylvaryt when the contract was made, and tin; defendant was discharged, made no differojde between that and the former cases. From the opinions ot the Ridges in Saun ders vs. Ogden. 12 Whoaj/213, Ac. it seems trrnt the point decided in McMilan vs. Me Neil was not correct/stated by the report, and that it was ny intended to settle the qm s* ton of tlie eQtct of the Isw upon controls made subsorient to its passage. This /‘.us* tisn renamed open till the case of Sa;/crs vs *in wliieii, four of the their that the contract could ,V- discharg ed V> a state law passed befog? (lie contract ivi.s made; putting the ease cm tlie distinction Between bankrupt or i-yolvent laws which wre retrospective, r-atl tliose which were prospect, ein t’mir operation. But these o jiinmns le<. o no Oral judgment on this point, which in strictness may the refore lie eojisid- red as not Uving been adjudicated, though it was the deliberate opinion of a majority of the court. but this opinion does not arise here, and it fs therefore not necessary to the decis ion ■/ f i;is motion to notice it further. A (other point of more immediate applica tion ..ro-e in that case. The suit was brought o i a bill drawn bv Jonlon in Kentuckv, on Ogden, a citizen of New York, resident there, ar and accepted i,y him in favor of Saunders a cit zon of Kentucky. One of the judges who c' the majority on the first question being of opinion that a discharge under the • 1 -S'-U 1 or!; w..s void as to a citizen of Kentucky, four judges concurred in giving judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground of the invalidity of tlie law, p. 309. Jud*o •h Ifßson w. i the only judge, who gave an o pi.i i’i or: fbc second point—the tiiree vvlio concurred with him on the first, dissented on s—-t r thr e'vfo dissented on tlie first, as #< idr-1 to tV judgment -which wasentcrctl for tl.e defrr.'iantjn rror; but without assigning any reasons b-e ond those given in their dis r,- • irg opinion e:i the fret question, p. 332. It the ca a of Ogdon vs. Saunders bad turn mi u; on the me,v point of the citizenship of t.i.' ; I intilf, it would betlifficult to say what was the direct judgment of tho court. Throe TDK MACON’ ADVERTISER, AND AGRICULTURAL AND MERCANTILE INTELLIGENCER. judges thought the law of New Y ork was va-1 lid, having been passed before the debt was j contracted, and that it open.ted on the ca>;. ? the contract having been made, and to bec.v j cautid there. Three gave no opinion on tin j point of locality, it was not necessarr to do | so, as they thought the plaintiff entitled to judgment on the first. Thus considered, this case, standing by itself, directly adjudicate no definite question involved in the one now under hearing; as we are not informed wheth er the three judg- s, \i ho concurred with Judge Johnson in rendering judgment against the party claiming under the law, did it for the reasons assigue'd by them in their dissenting opinion on the first point, or those assigned by him on the second. No question arises here as to the right of the plaintiffro all reme dies against the defendant’s property. The law under which lie has been discharged is not unconstitutional as it attempts to dis* I charge only the person. The only doubts are, Ist, as to the effect of a discharge on a debt contracted in New Y’ork; 2d, with a citizen of that state; and 3d, on process issued from this court. All the judges in Ogden vs. Saunders sta ted that the point decided in McMilan vs. McNeil was that a discharge of the defend* ant under a law of Louisiana could not dis charge or operate on a contract made and to he executed in South Carolina, where both parties then resided. Thus affirming individ ually, if riot by their collective judgment, the principle then settled. In several cases pre ceding that of McAlilan vs McNeil, as well well as in tliat, the Supreme Court have de clared that a discharge by the bankrupt laws of a foreign country was no bar to an action brought on a contract made in this. 4 Wheat, 213; 5 Cr. 298; 302 Robert’s Adm’rs. vs. Bank of Georgetown, January term, 1831.12 \Vheat. 358, et seq. In Buckner vs Finley, 2 Peters, 586, the Court declared that “For all national purposes embraced by tlfe Federal Constitution, the Suites, and the citizens thereof are all united under the same sovereign authority and gov erned by the same laws. In all other res pects the states are necessarily foreign to, and independent of each other. Their Constitu* tons and forms of government being, although republican, altogether different, as are their laws and institutions, 590. This principle seems directly applicable tothe laws of tl.j States discharging the persons arid future ac quisitions of debtors. Such laws are wholly unconnected with if*: Federal relations of the States to the General Government, where they do not impair the obligation of contracts.— Discharges under them, arc, in other States, to be considered as made under foreign laws, within tlie uniform decisions of the Supreme Court, having 110 extra-territorial effect on contracts made beyond their jurisdiction, or with persons not subject to their laws at the time when it was to be carried into elfect.— In tliis light and taken in connexion with these cases, the case of Ogden vs Saunders is im portant, as showing the concurrence of all the judges in the general principle as to the efl’cct of discharges under foreign bankrupt laws It is also important as connected with the case ot Shaw vs Robins, in a note to 12 Wheat. 369, in which the Court decided that a bill of exchange, drawn by a citizen of Massachu setts on a citizen of New Y’ork, and accepted hy him, being a resident there, could be re covered in afitate Court in Ohio, though the defendant had been discharged under the in solvent law of New York. The facts of the ease were those of Ogden & Saunders, tiled decision in which was held applicable, avl governed the one before them. Thus con nected with the preceding case of McMillan vs. McNeill, ami the subsequent one c/Sliaw vs. Bobbins, the caser f Ogden vs. (jnunders must be coi/adcred, at least in tYc Circuit Court, as retting both principles-that a dis charge by the law of a State op .rates only on contracts made between its oyn citizens, and to b/r executed within the Sg.te. The opin io/. of Judge Johnson may fie taken by us as that of a majority of the jCourt on the effect ot their decision of th - .f ease in p. 368-9. lie declares it to bo an adjudication in that ca>e “that as between citizens of the same State, a discharge of a bankrupt by the laws of that State is "valid, as it afl’ccts posterior contracts; t’/u as against creditors, citizens, of other St A s,it is invalid as to all contrasts.” The burned Judge maintains these propo sitions ; Ist—‘That the power given to the Unit A Sates to uass insolvent laws is notex clo>iv.. g—j oaf the fur and ordinary cx ycise of that power by tlie States, does not -necessarily involve a violation ofthe obliga tion of con • cis, a ini/lta fortiori of posterior contracts.” 3.—“But when States pass be .'and their own limits, and the rights of their own citizens, and acton the rights of citizens oi other States, the exercise of such a power is incompatible with the rights of other States, i and tlie constitution of the United States.” In the next case which came before the Su preme Court on t!>e effect of discharges by State bankrupt laws (Clay vs Smith, 3 Peters 111) the plaiutill was a citizen of Ken tucky, the defendant of Louisiana, who was dis barged, “as well his person as his future effects, from all claims of his creditors,” by a law of State passed in 1812. The debt sued for was incurred in 1808. The plain till made himself a party to tlie proceedings under the law, and was thereby held to have abandoned his extra-territorial immunity from the operation ofthe bankrupt law of Louisi ana, which released the defendant from all demands on his person or subsequent acquir ed property. The result then of what w e must consider in this court as (he decision in the foregoing ease is, that a State law, discharging the person of a debtor from arrest for debts con tracted in the State between its own citizens, it effecting only the remedy to enforce not the obligation ofthe contract, is valid and not within the prohibition of the constitution, whether the debt was contracted before or af ter the! iw. Sturgcs vs. Crow-ninshield, Og den vs Saunders, Mason vs Haile.—So is a law discharging both tiie person and future acquisitions ot tin- debtor from contracts pos- j ’■ rior to the law, or from anterior ones, if the j creditor makes himself a party to the proceed-' mgs which lead to the discharge in the Slate I Court. Ogden vs Saunders, Clay vs Smith.— | P-ut such laws have no operation out of the * State over contracts not made and to be car ried into effect within if, or over the citizens of other states. Harrison vs. Story, McMi laji vs. AlcHcil, Ogden vs. Saunders, Shaw vs Bobbins, Robertson's Administrator's vs. Bank of Georgetown. That it makes no dif ference whether the suit is brought in aSta e court or the courts of the United States ; the rule is the same as to rendering a judgment, or issuing process. Farmers and Mechanic’s Bank of Pennsylvania vs. Smith, Shaw vs. Robbins, Ogden vs. Saunders. A state law not repugnant to the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, is, by the 34th sect ion of the Judiciary act, a rule for the de cision of all cases to which it applies in the Federal courts, and we must decide on this precisely as the State courts ought to do. 2d Peters, 650, 413, 14. With these settled principles to control our decision, it only remains to apply them to the contract, on which the plaintiffs have obtain ed their judgment, and issued theii'texecution. The defendant, residing in Philadelphia consigned to the plaintiffs, residing in Neyv YYirk, a quantity of turpentine, to be sold on his account. In anticipation of the sale he drew a bill on the plaintiff, which was accept ed and paid. The sales did not reimburse them, they brought their suit to recover the lialunce, and obtained the judgment 011 which the ca. sa. issued. By the nature of this contract, the defendant undertook in law to pay this balance to the plaintiffs, and was hound to reimburse them at the place where the money wasadvanced. The plaintiffs had a right to draw for the difference between the amount of the bill so accepted and paid, and the proceeds of the sales; we can perceive no difference between this right in the plaintiffs to draw for this balanse and the obligation of the defendant te pay, which arise from tlie nature of the contract; and a letter expressly authorising tlie crafts for' reimbursement.— The case conies within the principle settled in Lanusse vs. Barker, 3 Wheat 101, where Lu nusse having advanced money in New Orleans 011 the faith of letters written by Barker in New York, it was held that tlie money was to be replaced at New Orleans, and Barker was adjudged to pay tho balance at the Or leans interest of iO percent. The undertaking then being to replace the money in New York, that was the place w here the debt was payable, and tlie plaintiffs being citizens of that state, the discharge of the de fendant by the insolvent laws of Pennsylva nia can have no operation on tlie contr; /.t or the remedies to enforce performance. As the decisions of the Supreme Court are rfuthorita tive, we have not thought it necessary to go into a detailed examination of Biosj in tlie Circuit Court. Tiiey will In- found in accor dance with the principles settled by the Su preme Court, on’all tlie points arising in the case, 1 Peters, 404, fk; 1 Wash. 340, 41, 3 Wash. 425, 443, 471 Gall. 169,475, 441; 3 Mason, 88. Defendant remanded to custodv. * The Court.declared that a state law abol ishing iinprisiKiinent for debt would be as va lid as a mcaj'ire regulated by the State Le gislature rating on the remedy and lHat in part only; and repeat the doctrine asserted in the former. />7S. Political. _ _ _ from the ] J endlpfon Messenger. MR. CALHOUN’S SENTIMENS. Mr. Symmes, 1 must request you to permit me toure your columns, as the medium to make known my j sentiments on the deeply important question,! ot the relation, which the States ami General i Government bear to each other, and which is,' at this time,a subject o! so much agitation. It is one ol the peculiarities of the station I occupy, that while it necessarily connects its incumbent, with the politics of the day, it affords him no opportunity officially to ex-1 press his sentiments, except accidentally orr an equal division of the body, over which lie presides. Ho is thus exposed, as 1 have often experienced, to have his opinions erroneous ly and variously represented. In ordinary cases, 1 conceive, tlie correct course to be to i remain silent, leaving to time and circumstan ces, tlie correction of misrepresentations; but there are occasions so vitally important, that a regard both to duty and character would seem to forbid such a course; and such, I conceive j to bo the pres. *.'• The requent allusisns to' my sentiments, will not permit me to doubt,i that such also is the public conception, and that it claims the right to know, in .relation to the question referred to, the opinions of those, who hold important official stations; while on ray part, desiring to receive neither unmerited praise, nor blame, I feel, I trust, the solicitude, which every honest and independ- 1 ent man ought, that my sentiments should be truly known, whether they be such, as may be calculated to recommend them to public tav our, or not. Entertaining thes* imprt ssions, I have concluded, that it is my duty to make known my sentiments ; and I have adopted the mode, which on reflection seemed te be the most simple, and best calculated to effect the object in view. Ihe question of the relation, wliich the States and General Government bear to each other, is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our- system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties, as to” what this relation should be, whose different sen timents, constituted no small impediment in I forming that instrument. After the Gene ral Government went into operation, experi ence soon proved, that the question had not t< imutated with the labors ot theConventiom file great struggle, tli.it proceeded the polit ical revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments oil both sides were e mbodied and ably sustained ; on the one, in the V irginia and Kentucky reso lupous, and the report to the Virginia Lcgis laturu i and on the other, in the replies ofthe Legislature of Massachusetts and some ofthe -te os. lb- r..solutions and this re port, with the decision ofthe Supreme Court j ol 1 ennsylvania about the same tinie, parti, eularly in the ease of Cobbet, delivered by | Chiel Justice M’Kean and concurred in bv| Lie whole bench.) contain what 1 hclieve to be, the true doctrine on this important sub ject. 1 refer to them, in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with trie reasons in support of them, in detail. As my object is simply to state my opin ions, I might pause with this reference to do cuments, that so fully and ably state all of the points immediately connected with thisdeep | ly important subject, but as there are many, who may not have the opportunity, or leisure | te refer to them, and as it is possible however j clear they may be, that different persons may j place different interpretations on their incan i ing, I will in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily the doctrines, which I conceive they embrace. Their great and leading principle is that that the General Government emanated form the people of the several states, forming dis tinct political communities, and acting iu their seperate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggre gate political community ; that the Constitu tion of the United States is in facta compact to which each State is a party, in the charac ter already described ; wul that the several States or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions, and in case of a deliberate, palpa ble, and dangerous exercise of a power not delegated, they have the right, in the last re port, to use the language of the Virginia reso lutions, “to interpose for arresting the pro gress of the evil , and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them This ngli tot interposition, thus solemnly asserted l>v tlie State of Virginia, he it called what it may, state right, veto, nullification, or by any other name name, I conceive to be funda mental principle of our system, resting on facts bistoiically as certain, as our Revolu tion itself, and deductions, as simple and de monstrative, as that of any political, or moral truth whatever ; and f firmly believe that on its recognition depends, the stability and safe ty of our political institutions. I am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, re gardeil it in a very different light, as anarchi cal and revolutionary. Could I hclieve such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be no recommendation. 1 yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our polit ical institutions and the Union of those States. 1 never breathed an opposite sentiment ; but on the contrary, I have ever considered them tlie great instruments of preserving our liber ty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity ; and next to those, 1 have ever held them most dear. Nearly half mv life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquir ed, is indissolubly identified with it" To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my great est political fault. With these stiong feel ings 01 attachment, 1 have examined with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and so far from anarchial, or re volutionary, 1 solemnly believe it to be, the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itsell, and that tlie opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right of pro tecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government, (it matters not through what Department,) the right of determining exclusively and finally the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty oft he States, and of the constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this lanimage is, it is not stronger, than that used by the illustrious Jefferson who said, to give to the General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make “ its d’-. cretion and not the Constitution the mea sures of its powers;" and that “ in all cases of compart bctxrren parties haring no common Judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of redress." Language cannot he more explicit ; nor can higher au thority be adduced. That different opinions are entertained on this subject, [ consider, but as an additional evidence of the great diversity ofthe human intellect. Had not able, experienced Ar patrio tic individuals, for whom 1 have the highest respect, taken different views, I would have thought the right to clear to admit of doubt, i but 1 am taught by this, as well as bv many similor instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may possibly be with me; but, if so, lean only say, that after the most mature and con scientious examination, 1 have not been able ! to detect it. But with all proper deference 1 must think, that theirs is the error, who de ny, what seems to he an essential attribute of the conceded sovereignty of the States ; and whe attribute to the General Government a right utterly incompatible with whet all ac knowledge to be its limited and restricted character; an error originating principally, ■os 1 must think, in not duly reflecting on trie nature of our institutions, and on wliant con stitutes the only rational object of all political Constitutions. It has been well said by one ofthe most sagacious men of antiquity, that the object of a Constitution is to restrain the Government, ns that of lavs ijto restrain individuals. The remark is correct, nor is at less frnc, wnere j the Government is vested in a majority, than I where it is in a single or a few individuals ; m a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the maxim, that the majority ougiit to govern, than l have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitu tion and confined to subjects, in which even i portion of the community have smnlar inter, csts; but it is a great error to suppose, as ma ny xlo, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural and not a conventional right; snd therefore, absolute and unlimited. By na ture every individual has the right to govern I himself; and Governments, whether founded on majorities, or minorities, must dc rive their right trom the assent, expressed or implied, of the govermd, and !><■ subject to such limi tations, as they may impose. W here the in terests me the same, that is where the laws that may benefit one, will benefit all, or the i reverse, it is just and proper to place them un-1 dcr the control of the majority; but where they I arc dissimilar, so that the law, that may ben fit one portion, may be ruinous to another, it would be on ?he contrary unj’ust arid ab?ur I to snbj zt them to its will; and such, I c on ceive to be the theory on which our Constitu tion rests. That such dissimilarity of interests may ex ist, it is impossible to doubt. Tiiey arc to be found in every community, in a greater or I loss degree, however small, or homogeneous; and they constitute, every w here, the great | difficulty of forming, and preserving free in stitutions. To guard against the unequal f action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar i and opposing interests, is, in fact, what main ly renders a constitution indispensi lc; to J overlook w hich, in reasoning on our Constitu tion, w ould be to omit the principal element, by which todeterminc its character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing w ould be more simple and easy than to form j and preserve free institutions. The right of i suffrage alone would be a sufficient guaranty. ! It is the conflict of opposing interests which renders it the most difficult work of man. Where the diversity of interests exists in i separate and distinct classes of the cornmuni | ty, as is the case in England, and was former ; ly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the j Bee Stati s of antiquity, the rational constitu ! tional provision is, that each should be repre sented in the Government, as a separate cs | fate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. In England, the con stitution has assumed expressly this form; ! while in the governments of Sparta and Rome i the same thing was effected under different j hut not much less efficacious forms. The perfection of thc-ir organization,in this particu j lar, was that which gave to the Constitution 1 ot these renowned States all of their celebrity ; which secured their liberties for so manycen ; turies and raised them to so great a height of ! power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitu tional provision given to the great and sepa rate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear to those w ho w ill duly reflect on the . ibject, not less essential tothe preservation of liberty, than the right ot suffrage itself, —they in fact have a com mon object, to effect which, the one is neces sary as the other; to secure responsibility, that is, that those who make and execute the laws should be accountable to those, on whom the laws in reality operate; the only solid and j durablefoundation of liberty. If without the i right of suffrage, our rulers should oppress ! us ) so, without the right of self-protection, tlie ! major would equally oppress the minor inter j ests of the community. The absence of the j former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter, the feeble in j tereststhe victim of the stronger, j Happily lor us, we have no artificial and | separate classes of society. We have wisely i exploded all such distinctions; but we are not | 0,1 that account, exempt from all contrariety 1 ot" interests, as the present distracted and dan gerous conditions of our country, unfortunate ly, but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situa tion, industry and production, but i’re not thereiore, less necessary to be protected by au adequate constitutional provision, than where the distinct interests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests, are more liable to come into conflict and more dangerous when in that state, than I tiiose of any other description; so much so, j that ours is the first instance on record, where [ they have not formed in an extensive territory, ; separate and independent communities, or sub jected the whole to dc.potic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his coun try. So numerous and diversified are the inter ests of our country, that they could not be fairly represented in a single government, or ganized so, as to give to each great and lead ing interest, a separate and distinct voice, as in the Governments to which I have referred. A plan was then adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. 1 he pow. rs of the Government were divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One G< acral Government was form and for the whole, to which was dele gated, all the powers supposed to he necessa ry to regulate the interests common to all ot the States, leavingothers subject to the sepa rate control of the States, being from their local and peculiar character, such that they could not be subject to the will of the majori ty ot the whole Union, without the certain hazzard of injustice and oppression. It was thus, that the interests of the whole were sub jected, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were left under the control of the States sepa rately, to whose custody only, they could be salcly confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all ot the States are parties, coqsti tutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It w truly and em phatically, American, without example or parallel. io realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and the States as a whole, each in its proper sphere, sovereign ! and independent, each perfectly adapted to ; their respective objects; the States acting sep arately, representing and protecting tlie local and peculiar interests; acting jointly through one General Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Consti tution, representing and protecting the inter est ot the whole; and thus perfecting by an admirable, but simple arrangement the great principle of representation and responsibility, without w hich no government can be l'rco or just. To preserve this sacred distribute- , as originally settled, by coercing each te. ’ mov in its prescribed orb, is the great and difiv ..p problem, on the solution of which the i tion of our Constitution, of Union,’ a- jd probability, our liberty dcr ends, n o ,' ' tins to be effected ? ‘ llou ISs The question is new, uhe-., ap p l if . and fo ‘ peculiar po it cal onr.miz.ation, whore the separate and co,.fluting interests of society are represented by distinct, but connected Governments; Intis in reality and old quos soTved■ Wh ~CW form lon sincp Perfectly soLcd Whenever separate and dissimilar interests liave been separately represented in nv Oov, ..b.,,-,. 0r ,b“ power has been divided n, j tß t . x experience and wisdom of ages ffi ve ?’ but one mode, by which such political?,' ' C<l zation can be preserved ; the mode ado?." 1 ' England, and by all Governments * nci , P '? d 111 modern, blessed with Constitutions dr? nd 10 K c;;11: f fr ‘-G to give to each co-estr ‘'' g nght to judge of its powers, with a nuna * or veto on the acts of the others, j„ o f?!' Ve ’ protect against encroach meats, the i„J f ? particularly represents; a principle which M of our Constitutions recognize in the ,1 , but.on of power among their respective iv partmonts, as essentk.l to maintain the’inT' pendcnce of each, hut which to all !,' duly reflect on the subject, must a’pncur V more essential, for the same object j„\, r great and fundamental distribution of ‘ between the States anil the General Gov? ment. * 0 essential is the principle fin . withhold the right from eitherTwLm t ° sovereign power is divided, is in fact ,oT n:d the division itself,and to consolidate in J out let niSne exc.usive possession of tb right, all of the powers #f the Govern.?! for it is not possible to distinguish, ly, between a Government having all and the one having the right ? tak ? power it pleases. Nor does it in the h? vary tlie principle, whether the distribute of power be between co-estates, as j„ laud, or between distinctly organized, £ connected Governments, as with u s . 7 . reason is the same in both eases, while tl necessity is greater in our case, S3 the dan-' ger of conflict is greater, where the interests of a society are div ided geographically, than 111 othcr always been shown. t hese truths do seem to me to be incontro. vertible, and lain at a loss to understand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who has read history, or studied the principles of ib. Governments to any purpose, can call them < l uestl °n* Ihe explanation must, it ap pears to me, be sought in the fact, that in ? cry lreo State, there are those who look ucre to the necessity of maintaining power, than guarding against its abuses. Ido not intend reproacu, nut simply to state a fact, apparent ly necessary, to explain the contrariety 0 f opinions among the intelligent, where the abstract consideration of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true cause, I must think the fear ofvveik emng the Government too much in this ca* to he in a great measure unfounded, or, at least, that the great danger is much less from that, than the opposite side. Ido not deny tint a power, of so high a nature may ne alius ed hy a State; but, when I reflect that the States unanimously called the Geneail Gov eminent into existence with all of its powers winch they freely surrendered on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety and prosperity required it; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the r. collection a common triumph in the great and splendid achiev merit of their indc pendence; and that the strongest feelings if our nature, and among them, tlieleve of na tional power and distinction, arc on the side of the L nion ; it does seetn to me, that the t ar, which would strip the slates of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, tv mere dependent corporations, lest tiiey should abuse a right indispensible to the peacea ble protection of those interests, which they reserved under their own peculiar guardian ship, when they created the General Govern ment, is unnatural and unreasonable, li those who voluntarily created the system, cannot be trusted to preserve it, what power can? So far from extreme danger, I hold, that there never was a free state, in which tlii; great conservative principle, indispensible i'. all, w-as ever so safely lodged. In others, when the co-estates, representing the dissim ilar A connecting interests, of tlie community cme into contact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General Government, and astute come into conflict, we have a higher remedy; the power which called the Genera' Government into existence, which gave it al of its authority, and can enlarge, contract, oi ai ohsh its powers at its pleasure, may be' in voked. The States themselves may be ap pealed to, three fourths of which, in fact, forma power, whose decrees are the Consti tution its-. li, and whose voice can silence ad discontent. The utmost extent then of th& power is, that a State acting in its sovrrcip capacity, as one of the parlies to the Coi.-ti tutionul compact, may compel the Govern inent, created by that compact, to submit a question, touching its infraction, to theparfn? who created it; to avoid tlie supposed dan gers of which, it is proposed to resort to tie novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, Ltd project of giving to the General Governmcfit the sole and final right of interpreting the Constitution, thereby reversing (he whole system, making that instrument the creature ot its w ill, instead of a rule of action imput ed on it at its creation, and annihilating in fact the authority which imposed it, anil Irani which the government itself derive* Us cxi* tence. That such would be the r , s „v w ' ,? )f right in question vested i* the or Executive branen of t>- zj b , 011 . ceded by all. NV JC t ?* mmen ' !,Z . ic n been sa haw/ as o or the President ought nnllv -in 1 * F* 1 -’ Ato deny, that if vestedb" ccs y w |.‘, . j C . luf -vely in either the eonsequ" 1 ' I 7-. ,l * .nve stated would not ; . 0 J ' v j Jfit its advocates have been recon jV uto ~io doctrine, on the supposition. th-t acre ’ . rfonc Department of the GencraH ,flV ' ' rll ' .icnt, w hich, from its peculiar organize *' mi, affords art independent tribunal throng l , which the Government may exercise the big authority, which is the subject of coniitlcra tion, with perfect safety to all. I yield, 1 trust, to few in my attachment ’ the Judiciary Department, 1 am fully sen-h 1 of its importance and would mantain it to 1 j fullest extent in its constitutional powers linl, ndcpcndenco; but it is impossible for believe, that it ever was intended by the* 11 stitution, that it should exercise the powc r . I question,or. that it is competent to do so. m 1 it were that it would be a safe depositoi )' 0 the power. , , Its powers are judicial and not pel and are expressly confined by <be Got - 1 ! 1 fmn “to nil (V’ ts ip |:>vy and cijui*}’ 8