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‘About the Battle of Allatoona.’
AN EXPLANATION MADE.
New Orleans, La., Dec. 22,1886.
Editor Kennesaw Gazette :
I notice in your last issue an article
in reference to the Confederate attack
upon Allatoona, October 5, 1864, and
some remarks by a Federal soldier, to
the effect that he did not think Gen.
French’s course, so far as the conduct
of the attack and its after results were
concerned, was justified by sound mil
itary principles.
Inasmuch, however, as you expressed
a desire for the truth of history, I think
I can give your readers some informa
tion which you appear to be in quest
of.
Without writing an extended article,
I will modestly state that I have been
in position to know some of the facts
about the attack upon Allatoona, and
the reasons governing the movement
thereto.
First, in regard to the matter of
tearing up the railroad track north of
Allatoona. General French was or
dered by General Hood to go to the
Etowah river and burn the railroad
bridge at that point, and till up the
deep cut at Allatoona with logs, rails,
dirt, etc., as he passed by. Not one
word was said by General Hood, in
the order, about Allatoona being for
tified ; not one word about there being
a garrison at that point, and notone
word about its being the storehouse for
an immense amount of army supplies.
All concurrent history proves that
General Hood was in absolute ignor
ance of the fact that there were any
fortifications, a garrison, or a haver
sack full of rations stored at Allatoona.
Furthermore, his sending only one
division of his army to Allatoona, in
stead of sending a corps, was in itself
evidence that he did not know that
Allatoona was fortified, or that there
was anything there worth going after.
His sole aim in sending Gen. French
off on this expedition was to destroy
the Western & Atlantic bridge across
the Etowah river.
General French arrived at Acworth
during the afternoon, and was inform
ed there by two young ladies whom he
met, directly from Allatoona, that that
point was fortified and garrisoned by
certain regiments whose numbers were
estimated at nearly 900 men, which
corroborated the information he
had obtained just before starting on the
expedition.
At Acworth he obtained a boy for a
guide, and, anticipating a probable
movement from the north to reinforce
the garrison, he sent a body of cavalry
to tear up the railroad at a point near
the Etowah river.
The worthless commander of this
squad of cavalry never removed one
rail, because, as he reported, he had no
tools. Had he performed the duty
General French’s forethought imposed
on him, General Corse would not have
reached Allatoona the night of Octo
ber 4, with his brigade. Gen. French
supposed, however, that his ordershad
been carried out, and did not suspect
that the small garrison had been rein
forced until after the attack com
menced, when he learned it from the
prisoners captured.
Arriving at Allatoona at midnight,
in almost Egyptian darkness, in the
mountain woods the guide lost his
way, and there was no alternative but
to halt the command until dawn. Soon
after light the troops were assigned
their positions for the attack, and the
garrison (supposed still to be small)
was summoned to surrender. There
was no time for General French to
seek all the elevations which might
possibly command the redoubts, and
plant batteries thereon, and thus be
siege the garrison in the fortifications ;
besides, it was not necessary, consider
ing his information about the strength
of the garrison.
When the garrison was summoned
to surrender, Major D. W. Sanders,
General French’s adjutant-general, car
ried the note to the fort and delivered
it to the officer, who went inside with it.
He remained some time longer than
directed, waiting for reply, and none
being handed him, he at length re
turned to the Confederate lines.
Therefore, what you term “ the de
fiant answer” which General Corse re
turned to French never reached French,
and French never saw it or heard of it
until after the war; and, as above
stated, he made the attack with the
full belief that he was assaulting only
Tourtellotte’s three or four regiments,
numbering less than 900 men.
His own force, by the way, when he
left Acworth, numbered about 2,200
men, or possibly barely more; but he
had left at Allatoona creek a Texas
regiment and one piece of artillery,
under Colonel Andrews, to capture the
block house which commanded the
railroad bridge. This force kept up a
fire on the block house all day, and it
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did not surrender until it was attacked
on General French’s return from Alla
toona. So you see General French’s
forces scarcely more than equalled the
Federals, who were in their strong for
tifications.
I know that it has been usually
stated by the Federal writers on this
subject, that General French’s force
numbered from 4,000 to 7,000; but
the truth is that his division numbered
but 4,000, in round numbers, when
it joined General Johnston’s army at
Cassville, May 18th, 1864; and the
official reports show that in the fight
ing from that period till the fall of At
lanta, it had lost 228 men killed, 1,059
wounded, and 479 missing—total
1,766. As it had received no rein
forcements, no elaborate figuring is
necessary to proveitsapproximate num
bers in the battle of Allatoona.
The assault was made with great
courage and with persistent energy,
and was kept up from 8 o’clock a. m.
until in the afternoon.
The Confederates were in possession
of the houses containing the stores;
but they had no information of the
amount in store, nor any conception
that they constituted a great depot of
THE KENNESAW GAZETTE.
supplies for the whole army under
General Sherman. Had this been
known, doubtless the troops would
have burned them without orders.
But deeming it only an ordinary de
pot for supplies, the men refrained
from destroying them, as they wanted
some of them badly for themselves.
Even the sutler’s stores were not plun
dered, because they, too, were already
in possession of the attacking troops.
However, when the forces were be
ing withdrawn, General French order- |
ed the stores to be set on fire. Find
ing this was not executed, a party of
volunteers was directed to return un
der the now full fire from the fort and
set the stores on 6 re.
But so destitute were the Confeder
ates of the ordinary conveniences of
life, that only three or four matches
could be obtained, and they were found
in the vest pocket of General Cockrell,
now U. S. Senator from Missouri.
The party reached the stores, the
matches failed to ignite, and thus their
destruction was prevented. The mag
nitude of the supplies in store was a
matter of after information. Had that
been known it would have become an
object to destroy them at all hazards,
as they could not have been removed.
At about noon the Confederates had
expended nearly all the ammunition
which they had upon their persons,
and it was necessary to send back to
the wagon train to get more. This
train had been toiling over the moun
tain roads, and at that time was about
a mile south of Allatoona. While a
detachment of men had gone back to
bring a fresh supply of ammunition, a
courier, sent by General Armstrong,
informed General French, at 12:15 p.
m., of the approach of a column of
Federals from the south to the relief
of the garrison, and stated to him that
this column, heavy in numbers, had
passed Big Shanty at 8 o’clock a. m.,
and was already well on its way to
wards Acworth when observed some
couple of hours before.
General French read the message,
and it was plain to be seen that the
Federal garrison was signaling to Gen.
Sherman or other officer at Kennesaw,
and that nothing prevented Sherman
from coming up behind French in over
whelming numbers.
General French, therefore, took the
boy who was his guide to one side and
said to him:
“ When we capture this place I shal
wish to go to New Hope church. What
road shall we take ?”
His reply was: “You will have to
go back nearly to Allatoona bridge and
then turn to the right, and take the
road to that place.”
General French told him that he
did not want to go back, and wanted
to know if there was any other road ;
but the boy replied that there was not.
He then asked the guide if the
command could not cross the
country, passing over Pumpkinvine
creek. The reply was that they could
not do it with wagons; the men might
ford it, but the wagons and artillery,
would have to take the main road
back.
You therefore see that Gen. French
had no information which led him to
believe that he could get to New Hope
church and comply with Hood’s orders
to joiu him there, unless he went back
from Allatoona towards Acworth. He
had never been to Allatoona Pass, and
it is probable that none of the men in
his command had, unless they passed
that way in falling back from Caseville.
Furthermore, even if he had de
termined to take the Cartersville road,
and see if it did not fork north of Al
latoona, and send off a branch south of
the Etowah river towards New Hope
church, it would have been impracti
cable, because this road led immedi
ately through the Federal fortifica
tions, and it would have been impossi
ble for him to carry his wagon train
through them; and any one who
knows the topography of the country
around Allatoona is aware of the fact
that it is very mountainous; and Gen.
French’s forces had no time to cut a
road outside of the range of the guns
of the redoubts and go across to the
Cartersville road north of Allatoona.
This would have been an all day task f
whereas, it was only one of few hours
to go back towards Acworth, pick up
the command left at Allatoona creek
bridge, and take the road that led to
New Hope church,
One word more : General Corse dis
patched at 2 p. m., after the fight was
over, that he could “whip all h —l yet.”
This is rich ; but the fact is that Gen.
French remained at Allatoona until
about 4 p. m. with the artillery, long
after the infantry had left for the
bridge at Allatoona creek, and during
that time not one human being was
seen to venture outside the fort, and
as he then remarked to another officer,
in words still strong in memory : “A
silence like the pall of death rests over
Allatoona. It is as lifeless as a grave
yard at midnight.”
How easy, yet how unjust it is, to
criticise often, as time throws light on
military movements. The true test is
to judge of them only by the light
and knowledge then before the par
ticipants.
For instance, a prisoner told General
French they had no water in the fort
at Allatoona. That, I presume, was
the truth. A critic would say that the
Confederates should have remained
and the garrison would have been
forced to capitulate. But how was
General French to know they had no
water? Another said their ammuni
tion for the artillery was about all ex
pended. But how was Gen. French
to know that? But adversely—after
the Missouri and Texas troops were
withdrawn from around the fort, we
who were with General French sat
there on the ridge in easy rifle range
quite half an hour before the Missis
sippi troops joined us from the north
side. Why were we permitted to re
main there as quietly as if we were a
“picnic” party ? This was on the ridge
to the west of the fort. I saw but one
man injured duringHhis time. He