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Sliarman and Johnston,
AND THE
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.
BY COL. CHARLES C. CHESNEY.
The publication in quick succession
of the Narrative of General Johnston
and the Memoirs of General Sherman,
afforded the critic such an opportuni
ty as the whole range of military liter
ature has never before offered. Great
commanders have repeatedly written
of their own war-like deeds ; but there
has been no instance before of two
who were opposed to each other in a
campaign of the first magnitude send
ing out to the world their independ
ent records of its whole course. It is
true that there is a French edition of
the Archduke Charles’ grand work on
the war of 1796, with a sort of reply
appended by Jourdan, one of the
generals-in-chief whom he defeated.
But this is avowedly rather a commen
tary on the German history, directed
to show that the Revolutionary armies
were not so very badly beaten as had
been asserted, than an original ver
sion. It is so unimportant as to have
remained almost unnoticed on the
shelves of military libraries, and can
not be said to form a fair exception to
the rule now first broken in the case
of the two commanders in the Cam
paign of Atlanta.
Nor could the full value of such
works have been reached elsewhere.
It needed the complete freedom and
publicity of American life to allow
such a thorough insight as they af
ford into the motives and actions of
the writers to be given unhesitatingly
to the world. The delay which has
occurred before their publication is an
additional advantage; for the condo
nation now granted by the North to
the South, slowly it is true but not the
less surely, for the cardinal sin of
striving to break the great Republic
into fragments, is so far pronounced
that the fair hearing is given on either.
side to what is written on the other
which a very few years ago seemed
hopeless. In 1870 it was still said
that all books on the war to be sold in
the Northern markets, must be perva
ded wholly by Northern sympathies.
And though this sentiment is not com
pletely banished, a more truly histor
ical, as well as a more generous spirit
is coming gradually in, which allows
Johnston’s Narrative of his own cam
paigns to be fairly judged of in the
North; whilst Sherman’s Memoirs
have been actually supplemented by
some very valuable additions sugges
ted by their circulation in the Southern
States, where once his name was exe
crated. To us at this distance, this
remarkable pair of books has an addi
tional source of interest; for in the
style of the writers, and the whole
manner in which the story on either
side is told, we recognize not merely
those national characteristics which
Englishmen have come to know as
American, but even a curious similar
ity of thought and diction, which
shows that Sherman and Johnston were
not only fellow-citizens of the same
great country, but taught in the same
college, and trained in the same ser
vice.
Both are hard hitters, whether wield
ing pen or sword. Unsparing of oth
ers’ feelings, regardless of the cloud
of controversies which must rise on
their criticisms, gifted with strong con
fidence in their own personal infalli
bility, there are points of striking
likeness between the characters of the
two chiefs who were suddenly opposed
to each other in the fierce spring of
1864, when the greatest Civil War of
history rose to its full height. Each
was fired with the belief that the des
tinies of a people were in his hands,
and each, with trust in his own pow
ers of generalship and the fighting
qualities of his men, had a just re
spect for his adversary. And now,
after the lapse of a decade, each comes
forward as much bent as ever on mak
ing the best of his cause. But there
is a wide change in the shape in which
the object is pursued. Each of them
has outlived what still remains with
many of their countrymen of the po
litical passions of 1864, and seeks
therefore to jnstify his actions on the
purely professional ground of a sol
dier, entering into policy no farther
than as it seems to affect the course of
the Atlanta Campaign.
The course of events they trace
may be summarised as follows: On
the 18th of March Sherman relieved
Grant of his special command in the
West, comprising the armies destined
to invade Georgia from Chattanooga,
the great fortified depot on the Ten
nessee, which the latter had rescued
for the Federals in the previous au
tumn. Johnston had been in com
mand of the opposing force from the
beginning of the year, and lay at
Dalton, forty miles southeast of
Chattanooga, keeping strictly on the
defensive. Such was his attitude also
throughout the campaign, for reasons
which will presently appear; and
Sherman, having on arrival “fre
quent and correct reports” of his ene
my’s strength, calculated at less than
50,000 soldiers, but expecting rein
forcements, “had time and leisure,”
(as he tells us) “to take all measures
deliberately and fully.” Numbers
were not this commander’s difficulty
so much as transportation and sup
plies, his actual strength “present for
duty” on the 10th April amounting to
180,082 men. Os these he formed a
field force comprising officially three
distinct armies, and numbering 99,000,
irrespective of two independent caval
ry divisions; and on the sth May
(the day being fixed to correspond with
that of Grant’s movement against Lee
in Virginia) he began his advance.
His object may best be told in his own
words, and was prescribed him in the
instructions of General Grant, now
become Commander-in-Chief of the
whole forces of the Union. Grant,
however, left the details of its execu
tion entirely to the lieutenant in whom
he had just cause, after more than
two years of hard and chequered war
fare, passed through side by side, to
place implicit confidence :
“The army was to be directed against
that of Johnston, lying on the defensive
strongly intrenched at Dalton. I was re
quired to follow it up closely and persist
ently, so that in no event could any part be
detached to assist General Lee in Virginia ;
General Grant undertaking in like manner
to keep Lee so busy that he could not re
spond to any calls of help by Johnston.
Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savan
nah was the objective, but the army of Jo
seph Johnston go where it might.”
As to that commander, his views
can only be explained by referring
briefly to his correspondence with
Richmond. A dispatch received in
March told him that President Davis
intended presently to raise his force of
41,000 fighting men to 75,000, and
urged him to move boldly into Ten
nessee. But the reinforcements thus
promised were only to join him on the
advance, and were at first made
wholly contingent on his adopting this
offensive line of action. Johnston’s
second reply was (and none could be
more proper, the former having point
ed out the difficulties sufficiently : —)
“In my dispatch of the 18th I express
ly accept taking the offensive; only
differ with you as to details. I as-
THE KENNESAW GAZETTE.
sume that the enemy will be prepared
to advance before we are, and will
make it to our advantage. Therefore
I propose, as necessary both for the
offensive and defensive, to assemble
our troops here immediately. Other
preparations for advance are going on.”
But there was no happy union of
thought on this side, where Bragg,
whom Johnston had superseded after
his failure of the autumn, was now
Jefferson Davis’s chief military adviser.
The contrast in this respect is striking
from the very first with the perfect
harmony of Grant and Sherman.
Yet Johnston, it will be seen, had in
no case any thought of running away,
and it only remained for Sherman to
move to bring on the collision both
looked for. Accordingly at daybreak
on the Bth May the opposing armies
were in each other’s presence, and be
gan to engage.
From this time until the middle of
July they never paused in the strug
gle, which took a form unknown here
tofore in modern war. Sherman had
to combine the double purpose of
pressing his adversary back and keep
ing intact in his own rear the line of
railroad to Chattanooga, by which
alone he could subsist his forces.
Johnston had only to do his best to
resist, whether by obstinate opposition
in front or injuring the great commu
nication on which the Federate depen
ded, and which, if interrupted, would
stop their advance at once. His task
might therefore, at first sight, seem
simple. But, on the other hand, his
forces were far inferior. At Dalton,
when the campaign began, he com
manded less than 45,000 men, exclu
sive of a weak division of cavalry, and
though afterwards joined by Polk’s
army corps, which came in by detach
ments, and two more divisions of
horse, he never, according to Sherman’s
admission, had more than about one
half the numberof the Federate, whose
losses were constantly supplied from
their rear. Sherman, indeed, reckon
ed fully on this numerical superiority.
He not only, as he frankly states, was
prepared to lose two to one, if neces
sary, in carrying out his design, but
on finding Johnston covered at Dal
ton, as at almost every halting-place
subsequently, “by intrenchments as
dangerous to assault as a permanent
fort,” he resolved from the first to risk
no open attack. Probably in thus de
ciding he took counsel from those
bloody repulses which in Virginia had
dangerously weakened the Federate
more than once, and almost turned
the scale of war against their cause.
But it was open to him, instead of di
rect assault, to adopt on a grander
scale the old ‘War of Positions,’ of the
days of Gustavus and Turenne, when
both armies protected themselves on
their fighting ground, and sought for
advantage in either outflanking the
enemy or cutting off his supplies. The
former process, though a slow one,
might be called sure with superior
numbers at his command. With a
main force equal to Johnston’s, it would
be always possible to cover and watch
the latter’s front, whilst one or both
wings, steadily extending behind simi
lar works, must in the end get so far
beyond or round the Confederates as
to make their communications unsafe,
if their flanks were not already laid
bare. Either danger must drive them
to a retreat, since the only alternative
would be a sudden passage to the of
fensive, and an attack on the Federal
intrenchments—an error that Sher
man would have been too glad to see
his adversary fall into, but which he
very wisely did not anticipate from
Johnston, who had more of the Fa
bius than the Marcellus in his tactics.
As might be expected from one known
in peace as a skilled professor, Sher
man’s technical description of the se
ries of operations that went on is sim
ple and masterly, and we quote it, very
slightly abbreviated: —
“Finding the enemy’s position covered by
intrenchments, we in like manner covered
our lines of battle by similar works; even
our skirmishers learning to cover themselves
by the simplest and best forms, such as rails
or logs piled to make a simple lunette, cov
ered on the outside with earth thrown up at
night. Both sides used the same model of
rifle-trench, varied according to the ground.
The trees and bushes were cut away for
more than a hundred yards in front, serv
ing as an abattis or entanglement; the par
apet varied from four to six feet high, the
earth taken from a ditch outside and from
a covered way inside, and this parapet sur
mounted by a ‘head-log’ composed of the
trunk of a tree lying along the crest, and
resting on notches cut in other trunks in
clined back in case it should be struck by a
cannon shot. The men of both armies be
came extremely skillful at this work, be
cause each realized its importance to him
self, so that it required no orders. As soon
as a brigade fancied a position, it would set
to work with a will, and would construct
such a parapet in a night.”
And Sherman adds that his own
men had their labors lightened by
corps of pioneers, raised out of freed
slaves, 200 of whom, receiving each
ten dollars a month and free rations,
were assigned to every division.
Now it follows that the ten weeks’
campaign which succeeded can have
but little of the lurid interest that at-
taches from their desperate and bloody
nature to many great scenes in modern
war. The whole mass of 100,000 com
batants led by the Federal command
er hardly lost more men in the two
months of May and June than he had
himself seen struck down or captured
out of only 40,000 on his side in the
bloody affair of Shiloh, where the ar
mies towards its close faced each other
in two rude lines at short rifle-range,
just as the Germans and French did
at Mars-la-Tour. This campaign of
Atlanta, unlike other great contests
which the world has watched in our
ow r n or our grandfathers’ times, re
sembled rather the combat of two skil
ful fencers with the foils, where one by
greater length of arm and almost by
physical weight gradually presses his
antagonist backwards, than the deadly
struggle between two swcrdsmen,
which ends only when one is stretched
prostrate on the ground. Thus it ac
tually took the Federals from the 18th
June to the 3rd July to manoeuvre
Johnston from his one set of positions
about Kennesaw. Yet the pressure
on him never slackened, being as con
tinuous and energetic as his resistance
was obstinate. And so the inevitable
process went steadily forward. From
Dalton the Confederates were forced
back on Resaca, McPherson, who sud
denly outflanked them, losing here
(according to Sherman) the one great
opportunity of the campaign; from
Resaca they fell back to Cassville, and
made as though to fight without cover ;
but from Cassville (where Johnston’s
lieutenants questioned his proposal to
risk a general action) they retired sud
denly to the Allatoona Pass and New
Hope,named by the soldiers Hell-hole,
in remembrance of the hard struggles
which followed for its possession; from
New Hope they again retreated to
Kennesaw and Marietta, whence
Johnston finally fell back on the
broad Chattahoochee, the chief river
of the district, and attempted to hold
its passage; but there turned again,
he retired quickly into the line of
works which had for many weeks been
preparing to give him the means of
protecting Atlanta, the great railroad
junction which the instinct of the com
mander on either side told him was vi
tal to the Confederacy. Here on the
17th July Johnston was suddenly su-