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Major-General P. R. Cleburne.
A Biography,
>Y MAJOR CALHOUN BENHAM.
CHAPTER V.
(As we stated, in the January Ist
number of the Kennesaw Gazette,
when we began the publication of
Maj. Calhoun Benham’s biography of
Gen. P. R. Cleburne, the biography
is in an incomplete state because of
the death of Maj. Benham during its
preparation; but we will continue the
publication of such papers as we have,
as they contain many facts not known
to the public. Our last publication of
the biography closed with Gen. Cle
burne’s official report of his action
during the battle of Murfreesboro’.
The next paper in connection that we
have is the following official report:)
operations about belle buckle.
Headquarters Cleburne’s Division. )
Tyner’s Station, August 3, 1863. j
Colonel: — On the 24th of June last
I was stationed at Wartrace, Tenn.,
with two brigades of my division.
Polk’s brigade was at Tullahoma,
fifteen miles south of Wartrace, and
Liddell’s brigade was at Belle Buckle,
a village five miles north of Wartrace.
A range of hills dividing the head
waters of Duck river from the head
waters of Stone river, separated our
positions from those of the enemy.
There were several gaps or good roads
through these hills, two of which
led directly on Liddell’s position at
Belle Buckle, viz: Railroad Gap, via
New Fosterville, and Liberty Gap.
Both of these gaps Liddell was ordered
to picket; the former was four, the
latter three miles from Belle Buckle.
Two other gaps, Dismal Hollow and
Hoover’s, gave ingress to the country
immediately on the right of Liddell’s
position. These were held by some
cavalry of W heeler’s Division.
On the evening of the 24th of June
I had the information from the corps
commander that
the enemy had suddenly advanced
in force simultaneously on Liberty Gap
and Hoover’s Gap; and had carried
both positions. On the morning of
the 25th, in pursuance of orders,
I advanced Wood’s Brigade to Belle
Buckle. I found Liddell still guard
ing the approaches via Liberty Gap
and New Fosterville. He was holding
two wooded hills, a mile of Liberty
Gap. On the evening of the 25th,
Liddell, supposing the enemy retiring,
advanced on the gap, but after some
heavy fighting, in which he inflicted a
heavy loss on the enemy and suffered
little himself, fell back to his former
position. I was now satisfied
THE ENEMY WAS STILL IN FORCE
at Liberty Gap; that he had there
at least a divison of infantry, besides
cavalry and artillery; so I ordered up
three regiments of Wood’s Brigade
and a section of Semple’s Battery to
Liddell’s support. One regiment of
Wood’s and one of Liddell’s Brigade,
with the other of Semple’s Battery,*
were guarding the approaches via
New Fosterville. On the morning of
the 26th this section of artillery and
the two regiments rejoined their brig
ades in front of Liberty Gap and were
replaced by a regiment of Churchill’s
Brigade of my division, which arrived
at Belle Buckle on the morning of the
26th. The remaining two regiments
of Churchill’s Brigade I moved up as
a reserve to the force in front of
Liberty Gap.
The snafiAy kept up a oonitant firing
all day, the 26th, and advanced twice
with double lines of skirmishers, they
were driven back and at night both
farties held their former positions.
had no ammunition to spfcre and
did not reply to the continual fire,
except with five Whitworth rifles
which appeared to do good service.
Mounted men were struck at dis
tances, ranging from seven to thirteen
hundred yards. During the day the
enemy advanced in overwhelming
force through Hoover’s Gap, forced
back Stewart’s Division almost to Fair
field, thus threatening to cut me off
from Wartrace. At night I received
orders to
RETREAT ON TULLAHOMA,
via Schoef’s bridge at daylight on the
271 h, which I did without any loss,
although my men were much wearied
by the marching and fighting in front
of the gaps, for it rained incessantly
during most of the time; the men had
no change of clothing, no tents and
could not even light fires to dry them
selves. Many had no shoes and others
left their shoes buried in the deep
mire of the roads.
My entire loss in the several engage
ments amounted to 121.
I respectfully submit this general
report of these engagements, for the
details of which I refer you to the
reports of Gen. Liddell and his regi
mental commanders, forwarded here
with. Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
P. R. Cleburne, Major General.
CHAPTER VI.
(Then followed the falling back of
Bragg’s army from middle Tennessee,
the retreat of which to Chattanooga
was covered by Cleburne. The next
connection of Maj. Benham’s papers
is as follows:)
FIASCO OF MCLEMORE’S COVE.
The movement of the two armies
during the few days prior to the battle
of Chickamauga were of critical im
portance. To understand them, it is
indispensible to know the typographi
cal features of the region.
These are very remarkable. The
Tennessee river may be regarded as
the northern boundary of the general
scene of these operations, beginning
at Chattanooga on its left bank, and
following to Bridgeport, about twenty
eight miles below, in a direction
a little west of south.
From a point on the left bank, about
a mile below the center of Chatta
nooga, makes off in a direction a little
west of south the celebrated Lookout
Mountain. It is an isolated ridge up
wards of thirty miles long, about
1,800 feet high above the waters of
the river, with a plateau on the top of
an irregular width. From its base to
within 100 feet of the plaieau-top of
the mountain, its sides steep, yet
sloping, are covered with huge masses
of rock, fallen from above, and are
barely practicable of ascent for infan
try. The remaining distance to the
edge of the plateau above are sheer
cliffs—a precipice like the palisades of
the Hudson river, breaking the plateau
edge around the whole mountain—
only a few rude and difficult roads
ascending to the top. From the east
erly side of the mountain, at a point
about thirty miles south of Chatta
nooga, a large spur breaks off, and,
bend ng sharply around to the north,
runs some ten or twelve miles in an
almost unbroken ridge, parallel with
Lookout. This last ridge is known
as Pigeon Mountain. The valley be
tween Lookout Mountain and Pigeon
Mountain is \
▲ CUL-DE-SAC,
• blind with lidvlmpraotialble
THE fENNESAW GAZETTE.
even for infantry, except at a few
points, about six miles wide, and
chiefly cultivated farms, here and
there clumps of forest trees. It is
known as McLemore’s Cove. This
valley is, for the most part, level, per
fectly practicable for field evolutions,
though perhaps somewhat embarrassed
by the wes- branch of Chickamauga
Creek (river it is called) and by Chat
tanooga Creek, which drains it.
When Bragg evacuated Chatta
nooga, Rosecrans, having information
he confided in, to the effect that Bragg’s
Army was in an entirely demoral
ized condition and retreating in a
disorderly and precipitate manner,
divided his forces. He sent Crittenden
toward Ringgold, McCook to Alpine
and Thomas into McLemore’s Cove —
the three detachments occupying the
three angles of a triangle, not less
than a day’s march each from the
other —Bragg lay between them and
close upon Thomas.
Thomas had about 12,000 men.
As he lay in the cove, Bragg lay just
east of him across Pigeon Mountain —
his whole army in hand —in fine condi
tion —a morale of eager enthusiasm
and firmness. The only passes over
Pigeon Mountain were obstructed by
felled trees and held by advanced
guards from Bragg’s army. These
gaps were three: Callet’s Gap held
by Breckenridge with his division,
Dug Gap and Blue Bird Gap, held by
Cleburne with his division, both in the
corps of Lieut.-Gen. D. H. Hill.
This was the 11th of September, 1863.
During the day Hindman, with about
23,000 men, Buckner second in com
mand,
MOVED INTO MCLEMORE’S COVE
by its mouth and confronted Thomas.
D. H. Hill, with his corps, was hold
ing himself in readiness to aid Hind
man.
Thomas’ situation was critical —
indeed he was lost. Crittenden’s
nearest body of men was fit teen miles
away —a divison of them twenty miles,
at Ringgold, with disposable forces
in Bragg’s hands to delay him if he
undertook to come up. McCook was
at Alpine, upwards of ten miles away,
and Bragg perfectly able to keep him
off. Gordon Granger, with the re
serve, twenty miles away, at Chatta
nooga. Only retreat open to Thomas,
a narrow detile road through Stevens’
Gap, perhaps one through Cooper’s
Gap to the top of Lookout Mountain.
Thomas formed across the cove, his
left resting about Stevens’ Gap, his
right on Dug Gap, pointing towards
Chattanooga. Hindman was coming
in that quarter.
Hindman was expected to attack at
daylight. At half alter 1 o’clock at
night —it was September 11th, Cle
burne was ordered to cut out, before
day, the obstructions which had been
placed in Dug Gap and
HOLD HIMSELF READY TO STRIKE
Thomas in his rear, when he should be
engaged with Hindman; Brecken
ridge, who lay on the front and right
of Thomas, to be ready to co-opeiate
in the battle.
Cleburne, on receipt of his orders,
having not a moment to lose, set
Wood, who actually occupied Dug
Gap with his brigade, to work, and
had the obstructions removed from it
some time before day; and to secure
his debouchment into the cove and
avoid the effect of shell the enemy
might throw into his column while
he went massed down the defile of the
gap, he
THREW TWO BRIGADES INTO THE COVE,
and deployed them at the foot of the
ridge, before it was light. His orders
instructing him to select his own time
for striking the enemy, He then dis*
patched an officer with a number of
carriers along the ridge of Pigeon
Mountain in the direction of Callet’s
Gap to send him instant intelligence
of Hindman’s first gun, whether small
arms or artillery. The officer went
several miles in the direction indicated
and waited until the morning was
far advanced, when having heard
no sound of an engagement between
Hindman and the enemy, he returned
to Cleburne at Dug Gap. Bragg and
Hill were with Cleburne, when he got
back. At this time the enemy was in
plain view in the valley. He had
been since it was light enough to see
him. The day advanced —
no gun of hindman’s.
Soon after noon, Cleburne having
found away little more than prac
ticable for a chamois, conducted Polk’s
Brigade into the valley, and formed it
into a line behind the right of the
enemy’s rear, securing its junction of
its right with the left of the two brig
ades already in the valley—Major
Dixon, his inspector general, making
a daring reconnoisance under a long
line of fire for this purpose.
These dispositions made, Hill’s com
mand stood in eager, but fading ex
pectation of Hindman’s attack.
At length, an hour or two by sun,
certainly very late in the afternoon,
a partial attack was made, seemingly
from the right of Hindman’s right
wing.
IT WAS TOO LATE,
the blow fell upon the last of Thomas’
rear-guard, as it was entering the
defile of Stevens’ Gap. His main
body was safe on Lookout Mountain.
He * had been hours retreating—a
movement he contrived to conceal, or
the occasionally intervening clumps of
forest trees had concealed hiqa from
Bragg and Hill on Pigeon Mountain.
Hill’s corps, every man of which
had realized the enemy’s situation the
day through, was in
ECSTACIES OF GRIEF.
Men and officers swore, some were
almost in tears, many were in despair.
The opportunity of their deliverance
had been lost —an opportunity, such as
a general, making as many campaigns
as Napoleon, could never reasonably
expect to meet with, a golden oppor
tunity, manifest and simple as it was
beautiful, perfectly in season. Rose
crans had better fortune than Wurm
ser, better than Alvinczi.
If Hindman had attacked in front
at daylight, or even much later,
Breckenridge striking the right front,
and Cleburne the right flank and rear
on the reverberation of Hindman’s first
gun, Thomas must have
LAID DOWN HIS ARMS
instanter, or McLemore’s Cove would
have seen the slaughter of Ronces
valles pass. The first blow would have
driven Thomas’ left from Stevens’ Gap,
and his more than doubly outnum
bered force would have had no mode
of escape, as it had no hope of succor.
Behind him no road led out of the
cove, or if so it was neither within
accessible distance, nor available under
his conditions if it had been —the
accepted information at the time was
that there was no such road.
WHOSE WAS THIS FAULT?
It boots little to inquire. Hindman
was arrested. He justified his course,
demanded inquiry. Bragg ordered
no court.
Bragg alleged he had given Hind
man an order to attack at day-break.
Hindman produced the order, and
challenged observation that it was per
missive, not peremptory. Certainly
the fact that Hindman was all this
time accessible to Bragg’s couriers,
and within one or two hours’ ride,
would mm not to dispense with