The Kennesaw gazette. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1886-189?, December 01, 1890, Page 13, Image 13
battery. In other words, exclusive of the battery’s force, the regimental re ports show 55 more than General Corse’s report. Therefore counting these and the art llerists and the offi cers still not counted in four of the regiments, his total force engaged must have been at least 150 greater than he reports, which would run his numbers up to almost if not quite 2,100. The fact that he was severely wound ed in the battle, and compelled there fore to depend altogether on his subor dinates in compiling details for his report no doubt explains this evident inaccuracy.* Now, beginning at the date of the battle, for several years they variously “estimated” the Confederate forces at from 7,000 to 8,000 men. Even Gen eral Corse,himself,reported the“ Texas” brigade as being 1,900, strong, where as it had only four of its regiments in the action, viz: the 9th Texas, 10th Texas, 14th Texas, and the 29th North Carolina, of which one num bered 138 men and officers, another 101, and the third “entered the fight with eighty-seven guns.” The regi mental report of the other is not attain able; but allowing it to have had more than any one of the others, the brigade carried to the assault not more than ap proximately 550 men. They next, when they found that only French’s division was engaged, came down to “about 4,000 or 5,000 men,” and on this stood firm. Driven by the figures of official returns and other tacts, how ever, from this claim, they have settled down on a minimum of 3,386, basing this final guess (as we shall have to term it) on the report of the “aggre gate present for duty” in French’s divi sion September, 20, 1864. After this date there was some skirmishing in which French’s division participated, besides which it is not stated that the entire number was carried on the Tennessee Campaign, as the army was stripped of all but those able to march and fight. But it is officially known that on May, 10 1864, before leaving Mississ ippi, this division numbered 4,413 of ficers and men, and when it joined Gen eral J. E. Johnston, at Cassville, May 18, 1864, just after the battle at Rome, this command was reported at 4,000. The reports are not clear as to whether any of the divi-iou was left in Mississ ippi on garrison duty. The official re ports,however, show that from the day French joined Johnston, until the op erations around Atlanta terminated, his loss was 1,776 officers and men, re ducing his number to less than 2,300 To this number, of course, it is fair to add a reasonable percent for those who recovered from their wounds and went . back into service. Considering the heavy losses at Kennesaw, Atlanta and Lovejoy’s in the recent past, this num ber was not more than, possibly, forty percent. Adding these therefore, we have as French’s total before the affairs at and near Big Shanty, two days pre ceding the expedition to Allatoona, 2- 758 officers and men. Evidence that these figures are ap proximately correct is found in the official report of the “effective total present” in French’s division, shown by the Field Return of the Army of Tennes see, Nov. 6,1864. This total was 1,999. Now, if from 2,758 wc deduct 799, the officially reported loss at Allatoona, we have 1,959, which would only re- It is to be regretted that General Corse’s of ficial report was made while he was suffering from a painful wound, and before certain facts were at tainable by him. As it stands, it does an injustice to that gallant and painstaking officer’s deserved reputation for correctness and care. The following error, lor instance, crept into the report: “Large fires were discovered from the Allatoona heights along the track toward Big Sha nty ; in short, there remained no doubt of Hood s entire army being near the railroad north of Ken nesaw.” gy — i —; ’-Yfi - ..... s .. , tSWta* UVx Mfr IP w ‘" W .fife. ■ -W - ' .- u-->3- v CONFEDERATES CAPTURING THE BLOCK HOUSE, Al the Western & Atlantic Railroad Bridge over the Allatoona Creek, October 5,1861. quire that 40 of the 443 wounded and 234 missing at Allatoona be back at their posts to make the 1,999. These must be close to the actual figures, since from Oct. 5 to Nov. 6, French’s division was in no battle and only about a couple of skirmishes,and its loss with in those dates was therefore very small. But if we discard these facts and concede the Federal claims that French really had 3,386 in and around Alla toona then 1,152 must have recovered from their wounds or escaped from Fed eral military prisons and rejoined the division, because there was no ex change of prisoners or recruiting*during that period. This would allow not one of the 1,059, who were wounded be tween May 18 th and Sept. 20 th to have died, or to have been retired from ser vice by loss of limbs, etc., and 93 must have escaped, as indicated, the first of which alternatives is absurd and the last improbable. And none must have been sick and none must have been killed or wound ed from the fall of Atlanta until French arrived before Allatoona, and none must have been on any kind of detach ed duty that day. Furthermore, even yet we must de duct from the assault Colonel Adaire’s regiment (the 4th Mississippi) and the force manning the one piece of artillery which was left the night before at the Allatoona creek railroad bridge to re duce the block house; and the two reg iments (39th North Carolina and 32d Texas) which were left under the com mand of Colonel Andrews to support the battery on the hill nearly 1,000 yards south of the fort, not a man of whom, General French informs the writer, and as the official reports show, fired a musket during the entire engage ment, except that 40 men with their officers, under Colonel Coleman, were deployed as skirmishers to divert to the south the attention of the Federals on the ridge east of the railroad, while the main assault was being made on the north and west. Furthermore still, we must bear in mind that when the conflict opened the Confederate line of battle, formed out side of musket range of thefortifications, * The Missouri brigade received no reinforce ments. because M ssouri was in possession of the Federate during 1864, and the lexas brigade conld get none because of the Federal gunboat patrol of the Mississippi Biver. THE KENNESAW GAZETTE. extended from the railroad on the south along the south front of the ridge at least a quarter of a mile, thence over the ridge to the valley on the north, thence along the northern front to the railroad and across it and more than a quarter of a mile further, fronting and partly flanking the fort on the eastern end of the ridge where Tourtellotte re mained. Their line therefore was at first, in some parts, a very thin one, at least a mile or more in length, spread overground broken by cross ridges and ravines, while the Federals, al most equal to them in numbers, were within close proximity to and easy supporting distance of each other, the utmost length of their line being less than six hundred yards, on the top of the steep ridge, behind works from four and one half to fifteen feet high, in front of which was a thick timber entanglement and other formid able obstacles, and armed with repeat ing rifles and artillery. Yet the equal number of Confederates drove them from point to point of defense and cow ed them so completely at times that it was difficult, by their own officers’ testi mony, to get them to show their heads above their parapets. The only addition we can possibly find to General French’s numbers was that with Myrick’s battery, which Gen eral btewart added to his command the evening before. These we will estimate, as we did the force manning Corse’s battery, viz: possibly sixty or more men. Finally, as bearing on this point, Cockrell’s Missouri brigade, which con sisted of four (consolidated) regiments, was put down by the Confederates as having about one thousand men, *and its losses in the battle, in killed, wound ed and missing, are reported at 246. At the battle of Franklin, Nov. 30th, it went into action with 696 officers and men. As it met no losses of consequence in the skirmishes between these dates the figures given for its strength at Alla toona seem surely approximately confirmed by those of the later dates. It is therefore just to say that the fight was between an assaulting force of certainly materially less than 2,500 <■ General Cockrell says in reference to his numbers : “I know I had less than 1.000 officers and men, all told, in my brigade at Allatoona.” Confederates * armed with Belgian muskets, on aline of bastioned re doubts defended by 2,100 men, armed with rilles of the most approved pat tern ; and if any one will read Gener al W. T. Sherman’s “Memoirs” and General J. D. Cox’s “Atlanta,” and the reports of other Federal generals, he will see that the statement is made, over and over again, that one man be hind such entrenchments as the two armies threw up during the Atlanta campaign was equal to four or five men in the assaulting party. For instance, General Cox, in refer ring to Cleburne’s magnificent repulse of Howard at Pickett’s Mill, May 27, 1864, says: Since the office of breastworks is to give the de.ense an advantage by holding the as sailant under lire from which the defenders are covered, the relative strength of the two is so changed that it is within bounds to say that such works as were constantly built by the contending forces in Georgia made one man in the trench fully equal to three or four in the assault. Eacn party learned to act upon this, and in all the later operations of the campaign the com manders held their troops responsible for making it practically good. The boasts, on either side, that a brigade or division repulsed three or four that attacked it, must always be read with this understand ing. 2Vte troops in the works would be proven to be inferior to their assailants i] they did not repulse a force several times greater than their own. —(Cox's “Atlanta," page 80.) This is very good, but'justice re quires, iu passing here, that it be stated that these remarks about fortifi cations do not apply in the instance cited, inasmuch as Cleburne in this battle had no entrenchments whatev er. As the Federals came up they yelled to the Confederates, “Oh, yes, you, we’ve caught you outside your head-logs this time I ” It was a stand-up and knock-down fight in the open forest, between one division of Confederates and two divisions and a brigade of Federals, and Cleburne re pulsed Howard very badly. Again, excusing the failure of the assault on Kennesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864, General Cox writes : Each of the opposing armies had tried the same experiment, and each in turn had found that with the veteran soldiersnow ar- <• In his official report of this battle, dated Nov. 5, 1864, General French says: “After leaving out the three regiments that formed no part of the assaulting force, 1 had but a little over 2,000 men.” All tlie evidence seems to sustain this state ment. 13