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14 rayed against each other, one rifle in the trench was worth five in front of it. — Cox's Atlanta, page 129. These remarks were made for the purpose of arguing that the Confeder ates behind breastworks were entitled to no superfluity of glory for repulsing less than five assailants to one defend er of the works.* But how different is the case when the Federals were in the entrenchments and scarcely more than their own numbers assaulted them, and with inferior weapons, and absolutely carried one strong line of the works! By the reasoning of lead ing Federal generals, to equalize the forces the assailants should have been at least 8,000 strong. But the forts at Allatoona were bas tioned work with ditches in front, and were therefore exceptional as to their strength, and were on the crest of a mountain ridge, defensive alike on either side. Concerning the strength of this position from a military point of view, Col. Tourtellotte says, after describing what he did during the night before the battle : In this way I hoped to hold the rebels till daylight, when we should have the full advantage of our superior position. He also adds : Five companies of the 93d Illinois, I sent out to hold a commanding point on the road leading to Pumpkinvine creek. (This was the outer line of works on the west of the railroad.) Further on he states that while the battle was raging, at about nine o’clock, he sent the 12th and 50th Ill inois regiments across to the west side of the railroad to reinforce Gen. Corse, —leaving the 4th Minn. Infantry to con tend against the troops advancing directly upon us from the north. This from our great advantage of position, wa were able to do, and also to assist greatly the troops on the west side of the railroad against rebels charging on them from the north and north west. This exposed the Confederates to an enfilading fire. From these extracts from the report of the commander of the garrison, who from some weeks’ stay there had a thorough knowledge of Allatoona, its natural strength and its fortifications, it will be seen that he considered it a very strong position for defense. Furthermore in front of at least the outer line of works, west of the main fort, (marked R on the map herewith) which the Confederates stormed, oc cupied by the 7th Illinois and 39th lowa, reinforced by a portion of the 93d Illinois, the second of which was almost annihilated, there was, as already shown, a most formidable abatis and chevaux de frise in front of the works. In General French’s official report of the battle he says of this redoubt that its approaches were “defended to a great distance by abatis and, nearer the works, by stockades and other .obstruc tions,” and even so careful an officer as General Cockrell calls it a “fort.” These are also the works which the Federal writers call “hastily construct ed rifle pits.” They are described some what in detail in the first part of this article, and the letters of Messrs. Mc- Daniel and Wilkes, herewith publish ed show the appearance they present ed more than two years after the battle. All of this confirms the fact that obe dience was given to General Sherman’s orders, in June, from which we quote as follows: * General Sherman in a letter to General Hal leck, June 27, 1864, said in a general way ; “The facilities with which defensive works of timber and earth are constructed give the party on the defensive great advantage.’’ General O. O. Howard in reference to the same engagement, goes even further than this and says: “My experience is that a line of works thorougly constructed, with the front well cover ed with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct ASSAULT. Order the brigade left at Allatoona to be provided with tools, and to entrench both ends of the pass very strong. —(Gen. Sherman to Gen. Blair, June 1, 18G4.) The following from the same author ity is also interesting: 1 have been to Allatoona Pass, and find it admirable for our purposes. * ® It now becomes as useful to us as it was to the en emy, being easily defended from either direction. -(Gen. Sherman to Gen. Halleck, June 7, 1864.) Finally, on this point, the writer is informed by one who resided in the neighborhood of Allatoona during 1864 that the Federal garrison was busy all the summer and early fall, constructing and strengthening these works. The average reader will concede that from the first part of June to the end of September a great deal of effective work could have been done by men trained, as these Federal veterans were, in building works for defense and pro tection. ‘ -X y&TT- ~ ~ -...a"”'”’" . '•» be. ■ it ■ ft ■ • ( INTERRUPTING THE SIGNALING. It is strange that the Federal com manders either make no mention at all of this strong work, the stockades and abatis in front of it, or merely refer to it as “hastily constructed rifle pits,” while the Confederate regimental and brigade commanders, and General French also, in their reports, made at that period, speak of the strength of the works and the difficulties in ap proaching them ; and the testimony of citizens of the vicinity is positive and uniform that they were as herein de scribed, and even at the present day, not only the earthworks, but, in some instances, the very chestnut timbers remain as confirmatory evidence. It is also quite noticeable that since the Federal writershave admitted that French’s force was materially less than they first alleged, they now allude to the main fortification where General Corse was, as “a little redoubt,” where as all of their reports of the battle de signate it as a “fort”. The fact that the Confederates im pressed the Federals very decidedly with the skill, energy and power of their assault is proven by such quotations as the following from the reports of the battle: G The enemy’s line of battle swept us back likeio much chaff ® ® * threatening to en gulf our little band without further ado.” “Searsand Young® ■ made their assaults in front and on the Hank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett’s line.” “The fighting up to this time (about 11 a. m.) was of a most extraordinary char acter. The broken pieces of the enemy en abled them to fill every hollow and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket range THE KENNESAW GAZETTE. of the fort. We received their fire from th e north, south and west of the redoubt, com pletely enfilading our ditches and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person about the parapet.” “Officers® ® all that were tilled or wound ed in the fort, met their fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves above, the parapet. “The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us,and rapid ly filling our little fort with the dead or dying- ’ . The above are all from General Corse’s report. “I took possession of the rifle pit in front of the fort, facing west towards the White House, where the enemy was seen thickest, the rille pits then being thinly manned, as the troops of other commands who occupied them were fast seeking shelter inside the fort, leaving the ditch almost empty,”— Capt. Koehler, commanding 12th Illinois regiment. “I drew off the regiment and inarched at double quick off to the left of the hill and under lire of artillery and musketry which I never have seen equalled. ’’ * * “I had quickly formed the regiment in front of the fort next to the railroad, some occupying a position to the left of the fort, ■which they took and held under the most destructive fire of artillery and musketry that has ever in my.opinion been witnessed during this present rebel lion.”— Col. Hanna, 50th Illinois. These extracts would seem to indicate that, the Confederates were proving themselves to be very fine marksmen, and experts in rapid and effective prac tice. Others might be added; but these are sufficient to show the Federal im pression at that time of the mettle of the troops whom the Federals claim to have driven off in confusion. Some extracts from the Confederate reports, however, will emphasize the same idea, and also serve to show how close up to the main fort they pressed their lines: “So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be got in posi tion until about 9 a. m. when I sent a summons to surrender. * * * No re ply being sent to me, the order was giv en for the assault by directing the ad vance of Cockrell’s brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis, formed of felled tim ber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy’s outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and sur vey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column, and in mur derous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the dead did they become masters of the second redoubt. The third ami main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was fur ther crowded by those that were driven out from the captured works on the east side of the road by the attack made by General Sears. They had to cross the deep cut through which our artillery poured a steady and deadly tire.” — Gen eral French' s lieport. (What General French terms the first “redoubt” was a ditch down the hill on the northwest, but the second redoubt was a strong bastioned work, with ditch, across the ridge, and well protected by formidable abatis and sharpened stockades- He was mis taken, however, about the Fed erals having been driven out of the works on the east side of the ridge. The force which the Confederates saw double quicking across the railroad cut from the east side to the west was a portion (the 12th and 50th Illinois regiments) of Tourtellotte’s command which in obedience to orders he sent across the railroad to Corse.) “I ordered my regiment forward, * * They moved into the enemy’s works where they had a hand-to-hand encount er with sword, bayonet, butt of muskets, rocks, etc., killing a good many and capturing 25 or 30 prisoners and the enemy’s entrenchments ; thence the regi ment moved forward to within 20 yards of the foe’s last and strong fort, where they remained, contending with the enemy until withdrawn by order of Ma jor-General French, when they fell back in good order.”— lieport of Major E. 11. Hampton, Com'dg, 2Dth North Carolina. “We captured some prisoners, killed quite a number of the enemy, having them to light until we mounted their works. * * * We then took position, some in the ditches and some in ad vance of the ditches, wherever they could get protection, and sharpshot the batteries and men to the best advantage possible. The light continued from 10 a, m. until 1.30 p. in., when we were or dered to withdraw in small squads, which order was obeyed.”— Report of Major J. 11. Mcßeynolds, Com'dg, tilth Tex as. “We moved forward to within 20 steps of the first works of the enemy and formed again, having our lines broken by the brush and fallen timber which covered the ground. At this point we were ordered to charge the second line of breastworks of the enemy. * * * We moved forward with a yell and car ried the works in front of us in less than live minutes, driving the enemy out of their entrenchments with the butts of our guns and rocks, as we did not have any bayonets, pursuing them to within twenty steps of their last and only work. We then occupied some buildings about twenty-live or forty steps from the enemy, and commenced sharpshooting the enemy in the fort for over two hours, when we received orders to withdraw, which we dul in good order.”— Report of Col. A. Harris, Comd'g, 14th Texas. It is therefore with no degree of chagrin that the Confederates can leave it to the intelligent people of the United States, and all unbiased read ers to say whether their fight at Alla toona was not one creditable to them in every sense of the word. *** It is proper, now, after having stated the facts pertaining to the forces actually engaged in the battle of Alla toona to consider thecauses that led to that conflict. And here comes what, to the writer, is the part of the task of telling the story of this battle in its completeness, that he is most reluctant to enter upon. Zealous in his love for the South, her institutions and her deserved glory, he would gladly see every one who fought for her go down to posterity crowned with the laurels of honor and unselfish fame. He is sorry that such cannot be the record. The main question with Hood after he had taken a position on the flank of Sherman was that of provisions, and no alternative was left after that, than to leave the road for Sherman open to move south, and for him to fall back to Alabama for provisions for his army. But he says in his book, “Advance and Retreat,” written after the war,