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4 i I HftM* IntfUigfBftr. ATLANTA, GEORGIA, Wednesday, June 6, 1866. Return* on Income*. We arc advised that lists of the Returns made on Incomes to the Assessor’s office of this, the 4lh district, will be furnished for publication. Similar lists, we notice, have been elsewhere published. An effort has recently been made in Congress to prevent this, but it proved an unsuc cessful ouc. lulled Slate* District Court In Chamber* nt Savannah. The Savannah News <fc Herald of the 31st ulti mo reports the following case as having been urgued the day previous before Judge Erskine, presiding Judge United States District Court for this State: The State of Georgia, complainant in equity, and James Atkins, Assessor of Internal Revenue lor the Fourth District. An application was made by the State for an injunction restraining the As sessor from assessing a tax on the earnings of the Western & Atlantic State Road. The Judge has the case under consideration. *‘Tl»e Ladle* 1 Home.** The enterprising publisher, and the gifted editress of this new Southern journal, have set forth in its first issue so clear and so interesting an exposition of its “being’s ends and aims”— the establishment in this city not only of a "La-f diet' name," an institution the conception o which reflects credit upon the publisher of the journal and all engaged in furthering his enter prise ; 1ftit devoted also to the varied interests of womanhood—that we will not, in the notice we "now take of this new enterprise in Southern journalism, say much more than to welcome it into afield where it has every opportunity to pro mote the cause of Southern literature, and in which we hope it will prove successful. The “Ladies' Home" has been handsomely gotten out. Its typographical execution will compare favorably with any literary weekly pub lished either at the North or South. Its contents evidence the engagement of a high order of tal ent upon its columns. The salutatory of Mrs. French, its accomplished editress, is a chaste and charming production. The spirit it breathes, we trust, will diffuse itself in the South until it assumes that position in the literary world,which will relieve it from‘that dependency to which it has submitted for so long a period. We commend the "salutatory of this charming lady to the pe rusal of all into whose hands the "Ladies' Home" may fall. Wc are pleased to see that Miss Mary J. Up shur—the popular “ Fanny Fielding ”—is one of the contributors to the “ Ladies' Home." The first chapters of her “ Little History.” are more than sufficiently attractive and interesting-to make the reader eager for the pleasure of perusing the forthcoming ones. Dr. Means’ “Essay on Cultivated Women” is an able and interesting production. The trib ute which this accomplished Christian gentle man pays to woman, is like the most of his pro ductions, profound, philosophical, and eloquent. We arc pleased to see that he, too, is a contribu tor to the columns of this new Southern enter prise. The selections and editorials of The Ladies' Home are deserving of compliment. This jour nal is now fairly launched,and, as we trust, upon the voyage to prosperity. It has a field open to itself, for “ its ends and its aims ” are novel; special in most "respects; and surely commend ing themselves to the benevolent throughout the South. Being an Atlanta enterprise, as well as for other more important considerations, we trust that it will prosper, and not only accomplish the main object of its publisher, but, that accom plished, long continue the advocate of a healthy Southern Literature. The Lawyer’* Te*t Oath. We lay before our readers to-day the argument of the Hon. Henry S. Fitch, United States Dis trict Attorney for the State of Georgia, made before Judge Erskine, at the late session of the United States District Court in Savannah, on the constitutionality of the Test Oath prescribed for attorneys practicing in that court. We have al ready, when publishing the argument of Ex- Governor Brown, expressed our opinions upon the constitutionality, and at other times upon the expediency, or policy, of this test oath, and deem it unnecessary at this time to reiterate them. In these opinions we have not been §liakcn, not withstanding the very able defense of the consti tutionality of that measure, which appears in the argument ot the District Attorney. The legal profession of this State, lor whose special benefit we copy from the Savannah papers this argu ment of the District Attorney, will see that it is the effort of one whose attainments in legal sci ence, skill in its practice, and dignified profes sional courtesy, cannot but command their re spect. Mr. Fitch is a native of Indiana; a gen tleman of high literary, and as he demonstrates in the argument which we publish, of profound legal attainments. Though personally unknown, his reputation as a lawyer, and his eloquence as an orator, have long since been known, to us. We only regret that his professional position called for so earnest a defense of what we conceive to be an unconstitutional and unjust require ment. Con tor the Destitute and Poor. We had the pleasure of an interview, on yes terday, with Colonel Peterson Thweatt, the late very efficient Comptroller General of Geor gia, who, we are gratified to state, has been ap pointed, by Governor Jenkins, agent to distrib ute the corn recently purchased at St. Louis for the poor and destitute of each county in the State. We learn from Colonel Thweatt that he is now en route for Chattanooga, from which point it is deemed advisable to begin the distribu tion—that the Cherokee counties of the State will be the first supplied, and all the others with as much expedition as possible. It is suggested, as the com has been purchased, and is now in course of transportation, and as it is the best white bread corn that could be found in the western markets; and as it will surely be delivered to the agents of the several counties, appointed to re ceive it at the points designated, or agreed upon, where there is suffering among the poor, that parties who have com in these localities, loan to these suffering poor about them a sufficiency of corn, or meal, to supply their present wants. We trust that the suggestion will not pass unheeded. We have also been advised by Col. Thweatt that there still remains thirty-three counties in the State who have made no application for any share of this boon by the State to their poor and destitute. Whether this be the result of negli gence—which would be unpardonable—on the part of the civil authorities of these counties, or that no suffering for bread exists in these coun ties—which would be gratifying—we cannot de termine ; but in order that they may understand what means have been employed to supply the destitute in our State with bread, and the man ner in which the distribution of com will be made, we append the following copy of a circu lar addressed by the distributing agent to the In ferior Courts of the several counties of the State Milledgeville, May 24th, 1866. To the Justices of the Inferior Court County : Gentlemen : His Excellency, Gov. Jenkins having at last succeeded in obtaining the money to purchase com for the indigent widows and orphans of soldiers, infirm and destitute white persons, &c., entitled to receive the same, under the Act of the last Legislature, and as it is now hoped and believed that a portion of this com can be distributed from Atlanta within the next three weeks, I would respectfully ask that you immediately inform me at what depot on any one of the railroads, in this State, you desire the corn for your county forwarded to. The appropriation is insufficient to purchase an adequate supply, and to transport it to such counties as lie off the railroads. I am, there fore, directed by His Excellency to say that the com for each county, will be delivered at such depot, on some one of the railroads, as the Justices of the Inferior Court of said county may designate, or in the absence of such desig nation, to prevent delay, when ready for distri bution, it will be forwarded to such depot as may be deemed most convenient to the author ized agent of such Justices. The General Purchasing Agent has been in structed to purchase the best corn that can be found in the Western markets. We may not be able to send you all the com coming to your county, at one time. At first, we will have to divide out, according to the amount received, and the necessities of the dif ferent counties—will try to send one month’s supply, at the commencement. We expect, however, to send your county, in all bushels. When forwarded from Atlanta, you will be noti fied by mail. But, as mail communication with you may not be very good, it would be well for you to get the agent at the;depot, to which you may order the com sent, to inform you when it comes. Having been appointed by the Governor to distribute this com, as it reaches Atlanta, I can be addressed at this place until the 28tli inst., after that time at Atlanta. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Peterson Thweatt, Distributing Agent Since the issuance of this circular, as will be seen in the foregoing, it has been determined to distribute the com from Chattanooga, and not from Atlanta, as the distribution from the first named point will be attended with less expense and with greater expedition. From Colonel Thweatt we learn also that the number of poor and destitute, among whom this corn is to be distribute#!, is estimated at forty thousand. With his known energy, it will not now be long ere these unfortunate sufferers will be supplied with bread. Hon. J. H. ChrUty. We were pleased to welcome into our sanctum 3 T e9terday, our brother quill of the Athens Watch man, and Congressman elect from the Athens district The genial face and stalwart fomi ot Colonel Christy ftimish ample evidence that time has dealt gently with liim. He visits the city to arrange for the speedy distribution, among the destitute of his district, the munificent dona tion of the Baltimore ladies, this point being more accessible to many of the counties than Athens. As will be seen from the card below, the quota for certain counties bas been deposited at the commission house of M. R. Bell & Co., where the proper parties may send forward and secure it. donation to the destitute women and CHILDREN. To the Justices of the Inferior Courts of Milton, Gwin nett, Forsyth, Pickens, Towns. Fannin, Gilmer, Union and Dawson Counties: Gentlemen—The undersigned, having been appointed by his Excellency the Governor to ap portion to the different counties of the Sixth Con gressional District the provisions donated by the Baltimore “Ladies’ Relief Association,” for dis tribution among the “destitute women and chil dren,” respectfully request you, as guardians ot the poor, to take the matter in charge in your re spective counties, by seuding for the provisions aad appointing suitable agents to distribute the p&me. T For the convenience of the above named coun ties, their quota has been deposited in Atlanta at the store of Messrs. M. II. Bell & Co., who have kindly consented to deliver the same to the | order of the Justices of the Inferior Courts. J. H. Christy, ) J. S. Gholston, s Commissioners. T. Morris, ) The Fenian* Invade Canada. The telegraphic news of this morning embrace accounts of the invasion of Canada by 1 enian forces. To what this invasion, or movement, of the Fenians may lead, we do not pretend to know. The tact that they have planted the “Green Flag” upon the soil of Canada, and that they have thus dared the “ British Lion,” Is, of itself, a momentous one. Whether the Irish forces thus throwing down the gage of battle to old, and by them hated, England, are sufficient to maintain their ground, is doubtful in our mind. We know so little, however, of their strength, and so little of their plans, that we can venture to say but little in regard to them. The one event, that of their having invaded Canada, is sufficient, of itself, to create intense excite ment, not only in this country, but in Ireland and England. What may it not lead to ? The Radical Plan of Reconstruction. In the House of Representatives of the Con gress of the United States, on Monday last, 7 hade us Stevens, the Radical leader ot that body, introduced the following reconstruction bill, which was twice read and referred to the “Com mittee of the Whole.” Our readers would do well to note the provisions of this remarkable bill. It is as follows: Whereas, The eleven States which lately formed the government of the so-called Confederate States of America, have forfeited all their rights under the Constitution, and can be reinstated in the same only through the action of Congress; therefore, lie it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre sentatives of the United States of America in Con gress assembled, That the eleven States lately in rebellion may form valid State governments in the following manner : Sec. 2. The State governments now existing de facto, though illegally formed in the midst of martial law, and though, in many instances, the constitutions were adoptedjunder duress and sub mitted to the ratification of the people, and, therefore, are not to be treated as free republics, yet they are hereby acknowledged as valid gov ernments for municipal purposes, until the same shall be duly altered, and their legislative and executive officers shall be treated as such. Sec. 3. Whenever the Legislatures of said States shall enact that conventions shall be called to form legitimate State governments by the for mation and adoption of State constitutions, the Governor or chief executive officer shall direct an election to be held on a day certain, to choose delegates to a convention, which shall meet at the time fixed by the Legislature, and form a State constitution, which shall be submitted to a vote of the people, and, if ratified by a majority of the loyal voters, shall be declared the consti tution of the State. Sec. 4. The persons who shall be entitled to vote at both of said elections shall be as follows: All male citizens above the age ot twenty-one years, who have resided one year in said State, or ten days within the election district. Sec. 5. The word “citizens” as used in this act shall be construed to mean all persons, ex cept Indians not taxed, born in the United Sates or duly naturalized. Any male citizen above the age of twenty-one years shall be competent to be elected to act as a delegate to said conven tion. Sec. 6. All persons who held office, either civil or military, under the government of the so- called Confederate States of America, or who swore allegiance to said government, are hereby declared to have forfeited their citizenship, and to have renounced all allegiance to the United States, and shall not be entitled to exercise the elective franchise until five years after they have filed their intention or desire to be re-invested with the right of citizenship, and shall swear allegiance to the United States and renounce allegiance to all other governments or pretended governments, the said application to be filed and oath taken in the srrne courts that by law are authorized to naturalize foreigners. Sec. 7. No constitution shall be presented io or acted on by Congress, which denies to any citizen any rights, privileges or immunities which are granted to any other citizen in the State. All laws shall be impartial, without regard to race or former condition. If the provisions of this I section should ever be altered, repealed, expung ed, or in any waj r abrogated, this act shall lose its right to be represented in Congress. Sec. 8. Whenever the foregoing conditions shall be complied with, the citizens of said State may present sneb constitution to Congress, and if the same shall ba approved by Congres, said State shall be declared entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities, and be subjected to all the obligations and liabilities, of a State with in the Union. No Senator or Representative shall be admitted into either House of Congress until Congress shall have declared the States en titled thereto. Here then is the radical reconstruction plan. It is the opposite in its every feature of that pro. claimed by the President to be bis plan, or policy, and is introduced now when a succession of triumphs over the President in Congress has made his enemies, and the enemies of the South, bolder than they ever have been in avowing their designs. This hill ignores all that has already been done in the House on reconstruction, and does so, too, at a time when the Senate is just about to act upon those measures of recons true tion which had gone through all the forms Of legislation in the lower branch of Congress and which had been submitted to the Senate for de liberation and action upon them. Although meant in earnest, it does, as the New York World says, present “an air of burlesque fitted to cover the President’s enemies with derision.” Bat we forbear, as neither denunciation, nor persuasion, neither protestation nor appeal, on the part of the Southern i>eople or the Southern press, will avail anything with this radical Congress and its still more radical leader. The day is their own now, let them make the most of It! Soon there will lie a change when retribution will overtake them. The Lawyer*’ Teat Oatb. We lay before our readers, in another column the argument made by the United States District Attorney for Georgia, the Hon. H. S. Fitch. before Judge Erskine, at Savannah, in favor of the constitutionality of the “Test Oath.” To day, we give the judgment of the Court in the case before it. The reader will perceive that so far as the oath was intended to apply in the case, to-wit: that Judge Law should be allowed to practice in the Court without being required to take and subscribe the test oath—it has been pro nounced by Judge Erskine as “repugnant to the Constitution of the United Btates.” We copy the following from the Savannah News & Herald: We have published in full the arguments of counsel in this cause. On the opening of the Court yesterday, His Honor, Judge Erskine, stated the case as follows: Erparte William Law, Petitioner. On the first day of the term a motion was made by Mr. Law for leave to show cause why he ought to be allowed to continue to practice in this court without being required to take and subscribe the oath prescribed by the act of Con gress, passed January 24, 1865. Leave being granted to show cause, Mr. Law showed that in December, A. D. 1817, he Iras duly admitted and licensed to practice as an attorney, counsellor, proctor and advocate of this court; that he was, since 1859, attorney of a record in a case now pending before this court; that he had taken and subscribed the amnesty oath; and that being within the 13th exception of the President’s pro clamation of May 29,1865, he applied for, and had received from the President of the United States, a grant of pardon and amnesty under said proclamation; that he had duly accepted the special grant of pardon, and had filed in the clerk’s office of this court an authenticated copy of the same. His Honor then remarked briefly that the matter before this court is under advisement in the Supreme Court of the United States—the highest Judical tribunal in the land—and when their decision is pronounced, it will thenceforth govern this court. He said he would merely announce the judgment of the court this mora- iug, and at a future day would deliver an opinion on the questions of law regularly arising in the case. In the course of his remarks the Judge paid a handsome compliment to United States District Attorney, Col. Fitch, and concluded by saying three of our most learned and eminent jurists had contended against the constitutionality of the statute, and those arguments had been re plied to by the District Attorney in an argument, distinguished for its originality, and characteriz ed by the graces of the accomplished scholar, and the unmistakable ability of the thorough lawyer. The judgment of the court was as follows: “Upon argument had on the said motion of the petitioner, Mr. Law, and alter full considera tion of the matters of fact and of law involved in the motion, it is ordered and adjudged by the court that the act ot Congress, approved January twenty-fourth, eighteen hundred and sixty-five, so far as it was intended to apply to this case, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. “Motion granted." Hon. Wm. Law, Ex-Gov. Jos. E. Brown, (of the Northern District,) and Hon. Thos. E. Lloyd argued against the constitutionality of the act. United States District Attorney Col. Henry S. Fitch, in favor of its constitutionality. Colored Spielers In Trouble—Game of Leap Froe at a Negro Faro Rank. Long before the Civil Rights Bill, or the re bellion that produced it, were conceived in the minds of politicians, sporting gentlemen of color were accustomed to gather around the “ sweat doth,” the “ faro spread ” and the rouolette wheel, and venture their “stakes” on fortune’s smiles or frowns And to-day, in every city n the lahdywhereftnere is any considerable nmn ber of colored people, there are “spieler” of safron, saddle and tar color, (vide speech, in Council, of Mr. Glass, of the Fourth Ward,) as ambitious of being considered “sports” of nerve as are any of the heavy betters of milder hue.— Washington Adams Davis, he of glossy ebony face, tight fitting, strapped pantaloons, neatly polished leather, swallow-tailed coat of blue, with buttons ot resplendent brass, extravagantly frilled shirt-front, minstrellike collar, half-a-dozen finger rings, and attenuate rattan, may be con sidered the head and front of the sporting frater nitv of color. And Washington Adams Davis displays just as much nerve in “going down” to the indispensable inside vest pocket tor his “roll” as can be found among any of the “blue-chip” betters of Saratoga, New York, or even the Queen City. But the gamblers ot color have their troubles with the laws as well as their brethren in white. Yesterday afternoon for instance, detectives Colcher and Mitchell, under the authority ot a warrant sworn out bv a loser, visited One ot their faro banks, on Broadway, near Sixth. While Mitchell entered the front door, Colcher and officer McDermott were posted at the win dows in the rear, to cut of retreat. As Mitchell entered, there were to be heard the usual rattling of*“chips” and buzzing of jsucli trifling remarks as “ I coppali de deuce, and play de Jacob card to win; ” “Carry does on de Queen.” “ Who keeps dose cases dar?” “Dah, splits on the turn; ” “ Dat are stuck, goss to dat ar case, six; ” “ Lent me ten dollars; ” “ Can’t, I’m broke,” &c. The officer’s debut produced a remarkably rapid change in sights and sounds. The “ deal er” clapped the box under his coat, and sought the cellar through a trap, the “lookout” “weeded” the drawer, flung a slung-shot into the stove, and played stranger, while those outside the table made a rush for the windows, playing leap-frog with each other in their haste, and displaying eyes of wonderful size as they came through the glass in rapid succession, some head first, some feet first, and some ball style, down upon the heads and shoulders of the astonished officers beneath, who were able to secure only two or three of them. Burning of tbe New York Academy of Mnslc-DIax NEaretzek Implicate* Ren- nett. The following singular statement is copied from the New York Times. The charge im plied against Bennett-is incredible : statement of max maretzek. I am at a loss to understand the cause of the fire, unless it was the act of an incendiary. I am convinced, indeed, after careful examination, and upon a review of all the circumstances at tending the lire, that it was the deliberate act of interested parties. That I was not interested is evident from the fact that I have lost some sev enteen thousand dollars. The fire was first dis covered under the parquette, and almost at once it appeared at the root of the Academy. The place beneath the parquette has not been used, to my knowledge, since the Bal d’Opera, and no fire is ever needed there. Mme. Gazzaniga was, it seems, somewhat tardy in leaving the house after the opera, and while yet in her dressing- room was accosted by two men, who said to her: Come, hurry up, Madame, you are late.” At that time, even, the house smelled, I am told, as it it was filled with brimstone. Last November, Stephen H. Branch met me and said, “My dear Max, before a year is passed, every one of tie managers in the Managers’ As- socation will be assassinated or his house will be burned down.” Well, Mr. Bamum’s Museum was burned, and Butler’s, 444 Broadway,(was burned, and now tbe Academy is gone; so Ste phen, it seems, was a pretty good prophet. At any event, the work was well done—all Ls lost that could be reached but as Webster said, “I still live,” and if any body has a claim against me, let him present iL The arrangements for next year are good as ever, and let him langh who wins. As for myself, let ns wait awhile. For tunately, my insurance runs from June to June, so that I am covered. If any other person, by any chance, should have a grudge against me and the Academy, as, for instance, if I, in com mon with Butler, of No. 444 Broadway and Barnnm. of the Museum, should have taken an active part in a crusade against anybody, in any way, why of course he or it would be glad to have me burned out, as Barnnm was and as But ler was (queer coincidence—wasn’t it ?) But of course there is no such person—oh no—“not for no money/’ It is possible that the fire was ac cidental. but not probable. Quite naturally I look, and so will the public, thank God, at both sides of this affair, and it there are any parties whose interests could be served—personal, pro fessional, or general—by this incendiarism, they will be closely scrutinized, and, if guilty, brought to retribution. .The fire was extinguished on Tuesday at dawn. The flames destroyed the Academy of Music, the University Medical College, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and a number ot other buildings, the damage being likely to amount to nearley two millions of dollars. THE LAWYER’S TEST OATH. Halted State* District Court, Southern District of Georgia. May Term, 1866. A{-Partc William Law. ARGUMENT OF* HON. HENRY S. FITCH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT ATTORNEY May it Please the Court : I am confident that the court will indulge me in a few prffiHunary remarks somewhat person al to myself. The pro-movent in this instance is one of those rare old gentlemen who, through all the trials and vicissitudes lor half a century of professional labor, has, wherever known, com manded admiration for his legal lore, and honor for his private' virtues. He is the recognized patriarch of the Savannah bar—a bar, your Honor, that has generously ex tended me, a comparative stranger, so many acts, not of mere courtesy only, but of genial kindness, as to render my dutj- upon this occa sion as unpleasant as it is imperative. It re quires a peculiar conformation of mind in any one reared under republican institutions and taught to love the liberality of republican laws, to contemplate such a legislative enactment as the one now before the court with any degree of satisfaction. Although not so entitled, it has, with startling unanimity, been christened by both friend and foe the Test Oath Act. This soubriquet is the verdict of the “ consensus homi- num "—one of the cardinal rules of truth. Test oaths have never been very favorably received by any people^much less by a free and enlight ened people. Their brief and fitful existences, whether judicially or historically considered, have not beeqjlattering to either the wisdom or honor of their authors. The most lenient judg ment, I believe, that has ever been enforced by public opinion against test oaths and their advo cates, has been—-oblivion. I doubt now^vhether there lives, in this noon day of civilization, a gentleman who would con sider an ancestral connection with that class of legislation a v^rydesirable heirloom. This is especially true when we reflect upon the class of citizens to which this act applies. The legal profession is acknowledged to be one ot the most derating and ennobling pursuits to which man caimKidicate his intellect. Next to the study of divinity, the study of law fosters that chivalry of mind—that proud submission and dignified obedience to the public weal—that stem, comprehensive sense of duty—that intel lectual strengfkfconscious of its own weakness, by which all stable governments are created and perpetuated. There follows, as a natural sequence, a har mony of thought and sentiment—a perceptible tree masonry and good fellowship in the profes sion—which renders such restrictions as the act imposes wearisome and painful. The encomium of Cicero upon the liberal arts could have been applied with still greater torce to the profession of which he was so splendid an ornament: “ Habent quoddam commune vin culum et quasi cognatione quadam inter se conti- nentur." One feels an irrepressible impulse to say to Government— “Swear priests and cowards, and men cantelous, Old table carrions and snch suffering souls That welcome wrongs; onto bad causes swear Such creatures as men doubt; but do not stain The even virtue of our enterprise, Nor the insuppstssive mettle of our spirits, To think that, or our cause or our performance Did need an oath.” But the question before your Honor is not the policy of this law, but its validity a3 a law, and to that I shall now address my argument. If this law is constitutional, and, after a careful ex amination of all the objections urged by learned counsel, I inn rifiniy of the opinion it is, then it must be respected and enforced until modified or repealed by the Congress of the United States. The objection^gtrayed against the constitution ality of the law are numerous and plausible. They have been urged before this court in ex- tenso, and with'aiarked ability by Judge Law and Governor Brown. They are none the less worthy of serious consideration from having been previously presented on a similar motion before the Supretne Court, in a most learned and exhaustive argument, to which Mr. Garland and Mr. Marr contributed, the result of an elaborate research into both American and European juris prudence, and to the elucidation of which Mr. Reverdy Johnson lent the “full voiced rhetoric of his master mouth.” One of the standard rules for interpreting statutes is to inquire into the exigencies of the times when passed, and the evils against which it was intended to guard. The court will take judicial notice of the fact that this Government has just passed through the most gigantic civil war recorded in the his tory of nations—^a war in which during one cam paign more men were slain than ever raised the pennant of Yorkjpr'Lancaster—a war that has revolutionizad^RMKLfe of war itself’ and un tie court _ tion and territorial eicteiiTbi this conflict, and the legal status of the belligerents under the public law during its continuance and at its termination.— The court, in my judgment, should also take into consideration the fact that this revolution was inauguated to decide the true construction of the Constitution under which this law was enacted.— That construction, although decided by the ar bitrament of the sword, must be received by the courts, as the true one, and all logical deductions drawn therefrom must be by it respected. Yattel has been quoted by Governor Brown to furnish us with a definition of a “good govern ment.” Grotius, Puffendorf, etc., etc., will also supply any amount of these commendable generalities. In Sir Thomas Moore’s Utopia, however, the Court will find this and similar theories of governmental godliness elaborated with a graceful rhetoric that has rendered it one of the most immortal works of—fiction. I con fess myself an irreverent heretic upon the subject of that ponderous mystery known as the Law of Nations. My belief is that the only true defini tion of the Law of Nations is contained in Aaron Burr’s aphorism—whatever is “boldly asserted and successfully maintained.” There is one rule, however, which, whether laid down as the law of nations or not, is the law ot nations, aad that is, that whenever any gov ernment decjdes by the sword a disputed point of its domestic policy, that policy is the supreme law of the land, so far as that nation is concern ed, and all corollaries thereof must be recognized. The cardinal points permanently settled by the late civil war from which we have just emerged, was that the Government oi the United States was to use a solecism, the supreme sovereign in all matters affecting the public weal; that its delegated powers were not restricted to the ex tent many publicists and jurists had previously maintained; and that, above all, it was empow ered to pass any laws, and enforce any measures necessary to perpetuate the national existence.— I deny the right of any court, Federal or State, to dispute this popular judgment—judgment ob tained at the fearful cost of one million men, $4,000,000,000 treasure. Keeping this central fact in view, let ns examine the authorities ad duced in support of the objection urged against this law. ‘The research of counsel has brushed the venerable dust from many a half forgotten folio that else had fallen, despite the pomice- stone of the Socii to ignoble uses. Lone repre sentatives of first editions* grateful to the eyes of antiquarians, have been paraded before the court —a picturesque desolation of moths and black- letter, over which the curious scholar might dream as delightfully as Layard over the foliated capitals and ivy-clad entablatures of a Grecian linn. There is a sweet relish of antiquity in these studies. But, your honor^the Constitution, the instrument now under disenssion, has been interpreted differently, and that by the greatest expounder known to governments—war. We are told, your honor, that certain princi ples have been “sanctioned by the wisdom of ages.” I c»re not if they he found upon the highest shelf of, the Bodleian library/Scorched by the cinders ov Herculeum, or sacred with As syrian mad, if they conflict with'the verdict of the recent revolution they are but as chaff. “The wisdom of ages” is not always the wisdom of to day ; if it were, Sidney Smith’s inimitable pro duction known as the Noodles oration would be a masterly argument. Few men in the country, excepting certain irredeemable fools, but are less wise in their conceit than they were five years ago. We not refer to consular dates for ancient laws or dead opinions—they can be found in United States statutes at large passim. Revolution, like time, “sadly overcometh all things.” A decade hence the student of Ameri can jurisprudence may find himself, like Sir Thomas Brown’s traveler among the pyramids, inquiring of history, “who buiideth them, and she mambleth something, but what it is he hear- eth not” It may be heterodox, but I am firmly of opin ion that this war has settled, and settled forever, one vital principle affecting the entire jurispru dence of the country, and which the judiciary will be compelled to consider, namely—that the spirit, if not the letter of the Constitution, confers upon Congress far greater praters than hare hith erto been conceded by the courts, and that from that standpoint the acts of Congress must be hereafter construed. Now, may it please the court, let us apply to the statute the primary rule of interpretation be fore recited. When was this act passed ? It was passed in 1865* as a supplementary act to the act of July, 1862, at a time when Congress just began to see the glimmering beacon through the midnight of rebellion. What were the evils intended to be prevented ? The re-occurrence of similar dangers. Men holding high trusts under the General Gov ernment—Senators, Representatives, Postmas ters, Collectors had abandoned their offices in the hour of peril, had forsworn their allegiance, had adopted another and different Constitution for their supreme law and had sworn to support and were supporting another and a hostile govern ment to the United States, and although acting in a great majority of cases, from consciencious convictions of duty, were necessarily, under the laws of the United States, criminals, bad citizens, malfeasants in office and unworthy of future confidence. Was it at a time, then, for legisla tive delicacies—for the technical refinements of abstract laws ? Is it astonishing that Congress should have refused to respect the sacredness of mouldy precedents, but like the impetuous Marc- beau have swallowed a few formulas ? Revolutions are not generally suppressed on Lamartine principles. It has been said by Mr. Gar land, in his argument before the Supreme Court, that the act was an act to suppress the rebellion. On the contrary, your Honor, it was an act to prevent the possibility of another rebellion. It is an act passed in evident accord with the first general power, delegated by the people to Con gress in the Constitution, (Sec. VHL Art. I,) “to provide for its common defense and general wel fare of the United States.” It is not a penal act, as has been so earnestly urged; but a declara tory act, and though retrospective in language, intended to protect the Government from future betrayal by its own officers. But it is maintained first, that an attorney is an officer of the court, and not an officer ot the Government—a private officer and not a public officer, and to that extent is beyond the scope of Congressional power. It is difficult to see how an officer within the meaning of that word as understood in American jurisprudence can be anythiug else than a public officer. A clergyman even, wherever he performs an act af fecting the public interest, such as solemnizing a marriage, is a public officer—and to the full ex tent ot all public privileges conferred upon him by his ordination he is a public officer. (Bou- vier’s Law Dictionary, vol. 1, 259—260. So of an attorney, his profession is his private property—his license to practice the profession is his commission as a public officer—subject to certain express and implied conditions—which conditions the original grantor can enforce either directly or indirectly. It will not be asserted, I presume, that any man qualified by course of study for the office of an attorney, has, ipso facto, a right to practice before the United States Courts. If it is not a right, therefore, inherent in the profession itself, it must be a privilege con ceded by some superior authority. Let us see by whom. The first section of the third article of the Con stitution vests the judicial power ot the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. By the eighth section of article one, among the powers delegated to Congress is the powerlo establish interior courts, in ac cordance with these Constituted ii powers, Con gress passed the Judiciary act of 1789, by the thirty-fifth section of which the courts are em powered to admit such attorneys anil counsels, as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein. Does not the very delegation of this power to the court snow that Congress held the original power itself, so far as inferior courts are con cerned, and could place as many conditions upon its exercise by another as it might deem proper? If it could have done so then, could it not do so now ? Is the act of 1789 like the laws of the Medes and Persians, or can it be repealed at pleasure, either directly or indirectly by the pas sage of a subsequent act inconsistent with its pro visions ? Such a theory would abrogate the great principle laid down by Bentham as the foundation of all laws. “Defeasible perpetuity —a perpetuity defeasible by alteration of the cir cumstances and reasons upon which the law was founded.” Does not the power to create a court includa the power to prescribe the qualifications of all officers incidental thereto ? Does not the power to ordain and establish imply the power to abolish ? and if Congress can abolish a court, can it not restrict the extent of its jurisdiction over its own officers ? It not only can be done, but it has been done. In 1802 Congress passed an act entitled “an act for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States.” Under this act new courts were established, new judges appointed, and confirmed and qualified. One year after, on the 4tli of January, 1803, Mr. Breckinridge introduced into the Senate a reso lution to repeal this law. Then followed one of the most remarkable and exciting debates in the annals of Congress. Many members of the Seventh Congress were men of brilliant intellect and rare culture; the importance of the measure was fully appreciated; the arguments learned, instructive and statesmanlike, and that provision of the Constitution authorizing Congress to ordain and establish inferior Courts with the incidental powers attaching thereto, was debated in, extenso, and the result was the repeal of the law. The constitutionality of this act of Congress has never been judicially disputed. In fact the acts of Congress extending and restricting the powers of District and Circuit Courts are too mi ni eritSis lof^ftation. Again, there ark now several bills before Congress remodelling the entire judi ciary of the United States. Even as early as the 22il July, 1813, (1 statute 21,) Congress instructed the courts as to the practice of attorneys. Have they not on the same principle the power to say w'lio shall be attorneys ? What becomes of the vested rights of officers, the sanctity of incorpo real hereditiments in the face ot these historical facts ? It - Congress can create an officer with a tenure for life and within one year remove the officer by abolishing his office, can it not prescribe a fortiori the qualifications of such inferior offi cers as they may empower him to appoint V Does not the greater include the less, or is there something about the intangibility of an at torney’s office which enables him to evade these legislative supervisions? It is conceded by Judges Trigg and Judge Busteed that if an attorney, li censed by the United States Court, is pro tanto a public officer, Congress can limit his tenure and prescribe his qualifications. Do not the States claim and exercise the same authority and upon the same principle ? Do not the State laws pre scribe the age, the study and the character of ap plicants for admission ? Could they not prescribe also the loyalty of the candidate for such honors, or would that be infringing upon inherent pre rogatives of the court they had themselves crea ted ? Does not Georgia say to the attorney of Ala bama, you shall not conduct a case before my courts unless by the laws of Alabama a similaj privilege is granted Georgians, thus depriving him of his vested rights pro tanto, and making him responsible for the courtesy or churlishness of a legislature over which he had no control ? Does not the code of Georgia also say to one class of applicants you must prove in open court that you have the necessary qualifications of an attorney and a good moral character as a citizen? and does it not say to another class, the felicitous recipient of a diploma from the Lumpkin Law School, be your qualification or character what they may, you are a lawyer “ to the manor bom ?” If Georgia can make distinction among attorneys for the benefit of Lumpkin, cannot Congress ex ercise the same discretion “ for the common de fense and general welfare of the United States ?” Hon. Reverdy Johnson in liis argument, while contending that the admission of an attorney is a judicial act admits that if it is a ministerial one Congress can prescribe the qualifications.— However sound this distinction may be when applied to the Supreme Court of the United States—one of the great branches of our Govern ment—it is very questionable when applied to the inferior courts, whose jurisdiction Congress can, “from time to time,” diminish or extend. But we are told that this reasoning, if correct, only applies to applicants for admission, and not to those admitted. This brings us to the second objection to the law, namely: That a license from the court to practice creates an officer; that an officer holds property in his office; that no one can be constitutionally deprived of his property without due process of law; that this law does deprive one of his property without due process of law, and is therefore null and void. It is rather a subtle division of the word pro perty, as used in the Constitution, which makes it applicable to an attorney’s license. It requires considerable metaphysical acumen to perceive how a privilege having no standard of value— often no value at all—a privilege the worth of which depends upon the owner himself, being frequently w orthless, that cannot be sold, trans ferred, assigned, mortgaged, entailed or inheri ted, can be considered property in tbe substan tial sense in which that word is evidently in tended in the Constitution of the United States. But admitting that an attorney’s office is a pro perty, let us examine how it may be forfeited. Governor Browm asks us, with the utmost solem nity and sincerity, what officer of the government stands here a3 Judge Law’s accuser, and where are the charges and specifications? Before a court martial or a military commission those inquiries might be relavent; but this court is neither. Again, the Governor asks what provi sions of the Penal Code has he violated, and when and where? What grand jury has in dicted him, and upon what charge ? The learned gentleman seems to have forgotten that these queries are only put in criminal prosecutions, and after the accused has been brought by the law before the court in personam. The most ultra opponent of the act under consideration will not claim that it is a judicial accusation. It is simply an inquiry into the legal status oi the pro-movent. A man suspected of crime may ap pear before a coroner’s jury and prove an alibi, or absence of criminal intent, or he may remain away and take thfe consequences of such infer- ences-as the law may adduce from circumstan tial evidence. A juryman or a witness may be placed on hi3 voir dire, and being questioned as to his qualification or his character, m*3y decline to answer, and be rejected for cause. In none of these cases is an indictment, ver dict or a sentence required. The principal ob jection urged against this act is, it deprives a man of his office, which is alleged to be property, without due process of law. That a man may lie deprived of his property in due process of law, without proceeding criminally, is too evi dent for argument. There is such a thing as a man’s losing his property by the mere operation of law, and I claim here that if an attorney, unable to take this oath, has a property in his former license to practice before this court, he has forfeited that property by operation of law, and that no other evidence is necessary than his inability to take the required oath ot qualification. A man may forfeit his office not only by “ trea son, felony or misdemeanor,” but he may forfeit it in a much more reputable manner, by non-user or abuser, a lapse, or by acceptance ot another office incompatible with the duties of the former. In none of these latter cases is an impeachment or an indictment required to enable t lie court to declare the officer functus officio. As repeated reference lias been made to Bacon by learned counsel, it may be well to examine him upon this point: “ It is laid down in general that if an of ficer acts contrary to the nature and duty of his office, or if he refuse to act at all, that in these cases the office be forfeited.” Bacon’s Abridge ment, vol Y, chapter M. There are, says Coke, three causes ot forfeiture or seizure of office by matter in deed: 1st, by abuser ; 2d, by non-user ; 3d, refusal. In speak ing of non-user, he says : “ When the office con cernsthe administration of justice or the com monwealtli, the officer ex-officio ought to attend without any demand or request; then, by non user or non-attendance the office is forfeited Again, if the conditions in law which arc annex ed to officers be not observed and fulfilled, the office is lost forever.” Bacon’s Abridgement vol. V, chapter M. Again, a filares ot C. B. 13, being absent tw years, and being out of his office from 3 r ear to year without license of the court, was diseharg ed b3' the Chief Justice ex assensu socioru m suorum by words spoken openly’ in court; and though there was no record made of the discharge, nor any legal accusation, yet the discharge was held good. Bacon, Ibid. In the case of Milauro vs. Thatcher, 1 Ter. Rep. 81, Ashurst, Justice, sa3's: In the case of tw T o offices, I think the acceptance ot the latter does absolutely, and ipso facto, avoid the former, although the superior office, if they are incom patible. Buller, Justice, ex presses t tie same opin ion. Williams’ Abridgement, vol. V, 550. In the case ot the King vs. Sir Trealawney Lord Mansfield expressly said that if the two of fices were incompatible the acceptance of the lat ter would imply a surrender of the former.—Ibid. Franchises may be forfeited by breach ot the trust upon which they are granted, and a perver sion of the end of their grant. So franchises may be forfeited by misuser or abuser, or other misdemeanor in him to whom they are granted Comyn’s Digest, vol. IV, 500. So an office shall be lost by forfeiture, if he break the conditions annexed to it by law, by non-user or abuser. Conan’s Digest, vol. V., 151 So if any within the realm having office, a fee by the King’s grant, attend not on him when the King goes to his wars, he shall forfeit his office. Same, p. 151. So a man shall lose his office if he accept an other office incompatible. It is evident, your Honor, from these citations that a man may forfeit by his own act his fran chise, without being proceeded against, in per sonam, and without ever having been indicted or tried and convicted of any offense. The forfeit ure is worked instanter by mere operation of law And when a man attempts to resume the func tions so forfeited, it is only necessaty that the fact be brought to the notice of the court to ena ble it to take judicial cognizance ot all the disa bilities flowing therefrom. It will not be denied, I presume, that to for swear one’s allegiance to the Government under wiiose laws he held an office, or to acknowledge allegiance to another Government at war with his own, is such an abuser as ipso facto vacates the office. It will not either be denied that to accept another office ot any kind—such as a li cense to practice in the court of a Government hostile to the United States, is such an acceptance as implies the surrender of any office he may have held under the law's of the United States. And this forfeiture takes effect, not from the date of an}- record of investigation into the act. but from the commission of tbe act itself. But we are told 3 T eu must present some evidence of the commission of the act ot forfeiture, and that you shall not pluck that evidence from the mouth of the officer himself, for to do so is to violate that section of the Constitution which provides that no one in a criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the first place, I den3 r that the proffer of this oath can by any ingenuity be tortured into “criminal case” within the meaning of those words as used in the Constitution. It is simply a judicial inquiry into the eligibility of the pro movent for the office which he seeks. But waiving that point for the present, I main tain that n+> proof ^.necessary, or by law inquired, to establish this forfeiture of office than is tobe found in the public laws—the public records and public history ot w hich the court must take judi cial notice. That the State of Georgia was in insurrection against the United States; that for four 3 r ears her citizens,with all the machinery of her State Gov ernment, resisted with arms the lawful author ity of the United States, is a fact in history of which this court must take judicial notice. That the legal status of every citizen resident within that State during the insurrection lias been changed, is a conclusion of law of which this court must take judicial notice. That every such resident citizen aided and abetted, directly or indirectly, the enemies of the United States, is a fact of public notoriety, of which this court must take judicial notice, and which throws the onus probandi upon every sucli resident wlio comes voluntarily into the United States Court to claim a franchise from the gov ernment. This doctrine is distinctly and strongly laid dow r n by Chief Justice Chase in the case of Mrs. Alexander’s cotton. 2Wal.,416. The Chief Jus tice in delivering the judgment of thecourt, says : “The court cannot inquire into the personal character and disposition of individual inhabi tants of enemy territory. We must be governed by the principle of public law so often announc ed from this bench as applicable alike to civil and international wars, that all the people of each State or district in insurreection against the United States must he regarded as enemies until, by the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and per manently changed.” It requires more charity than justice to perceive how any one holding an office under the laws of the United States whether by license of a United States Court or by com mission from a department, who has assumed the status of an enemy, can claim a vested right in that office and call upon the courts of the United States to recognize him as such officer.— We will be told, however, that the proclamation of amnesty, the proclamation of peace, and the special Presidential pardons have permanently changed this relation. Admitted. Amnesty or pardon relieves the community or the individual from all the pains and penalties incurred by the offense pardoned, and restores him to the peace ful possession of such property as he may have had, against which no proceedings have been taken, or against which proceedings are pending. But I deny that any number ol pardons or pro clamations can restore property already con demned, or revive an office terminated by opera tion of law or destroyed by previous forfeiture. If I am correct in the position, that forfeiture of an office dates from the commission of the act forfeiting its existence, and not from the record showing the act, then it follows that no exercise of mere executive clemency can subsequently re store it. The consequences of such forfeiture can only be avoided by creating a new office ab initio— conferring a commission or a new license, and Congress says these shall not be bestowed upon any one who has not the essential qualification of loyalty. Are we to be told that when the United States Judge who holds an office for life accepts a Judgeship under a government in arms against the United States does not ipso facto forfeit his office, but still holds a vested right therein, enti tling him to the privileges and emoluments there of, and of which he can only be deprived on conviction by impeachment ? Is it possible that all the Postmasters and United States Marshals in insurrectionary district whose successors have not been appointed are still holding over under their former commissions—or have long since forfeited their office by non-user or abuser?— Will it be claimed that the President’s pardon would restore them to the position of officers, or would a new appointment be required ? What divinity is there that hedges a lawyer that he escape these disagreeable results ? The truth is that there Ls a presumption of law necessaril3’ deducted from the public history of the late re bellion—a presumption inevitable under Chief Justice Chase’s decision, that every resident at torney in an insurrectionary district has forfeited his franchise as an officer ot the United States Courts. Without the act of Congress, he could not have resumed his position except by taking out a new license. If this chain of reasoning is correct, it follows that the act of 1865 is nor a penal act, but a declaratory act of qualification. It does not work a forfeiture of an attorney’s of fice, for that office was already forfeited, and we shall have little difficulty in disposing of all the remaining objections so elaborately urged against its constitutionality. Although retrospec tive, it cannot be an ex postfacto law, for it does not adopt any criminal procedure, and inflicts no pain and penalty on the person. The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto law is ably elucidated in the case of Cal- der vs. Bull, by Judge Chase, in that portion of his opinion which Governor Brown did not read, the purport of which opinion is, that the prohibi tion as to the ex post facto laws was intended to protect the person in [criminal {prosecutions and not to secure the citizen in his private rights of property or contract. 2 Dallis, 401. How any court can construe ad act to be ex post facto which only inquires into the character and antecedents of an applicant for office, and provides no sanc tion except a refusal tw confer future honors and emoluments, passes my comprehension. Neither can it be said the act is unconstitu tional, in this, that it deprives a citizen of his property without-due process of law; for if, as I have endeavored to show,'the office (the property in controversy) has been already determined by operation of law, how can the proffer of the oath in the act deprive one of what he does not pos sess, or work a forfeiture of property already forfeited ? Nor is the objection that it violates tbe clause ot the Constitution which provides that every one shall have the privilege of a hear ing by counsel any more tenable. It is in reality a petilio pnncipii, in this, that the question is not: shall the accused have counsel ? but, who shall be entitled to act as counsel ? Nor does presenta tion of a Presidential pardon obviate these diffi culties. It is really a plea in confession and avoidance, and it follows that if a man can only resume his office by virtue ot a pardon, that without that pardon he possesses no office. It onty requires a guarantee of future good faith. 1 think I have demonstrated that no pardon can restore a forfeited office, however much it may quality a man for a new one. The office has reverted back to the grantor. All that a pardon could do, at best, would be to place the recipient in statu quo ante helium ; to put him before the law just where he would have beep had lie not committed the offense, and yet, even- then he would be required to quality under this act before he could obtain a license to practice. The law is general, applicable to loyal as well as disloyal citizens, to the innocent as well as to the guilty. A pardon certainly can confer no special privileges not possessed by those requiring no pardon; yet if this law is constitutional, certainly a pardon which exempts a man from an obliga tion binding upon another who had never offend ed, would confer a very important special privi lege. In fact, the only serious argument advanced against this act, assuming what learned counsel assert that an Attorney hold property in his office, is predicated upon the assertion that it de prives^ citizen of his property without due course of law. Upon this hangs every other objection. If this is unsound the others fall for want of a major permises. It is not penal for it inflicts no pains and penalties on the person. It cannot be ex post facto unless it is penal. It does not violate constitutional provision in compelling a man to be a witness against himself, unless it is a crimi nal proceeding, and there can be no criminal proceedings except under a penal statute. It cannot be said to deprive an accused of his right of counsel, for its very purport is to provide a wa3 r for the admission of counsel A citizen is not permitted to introduce whon lie pleases as counsel; he is only guaranteed the” troduee one licensed to practice. It cannot be said that it defines offenses unknown to the Con stitution, for treason; aiding and abetting treason, felonies and misdemeanors certainly include any offenses set forth in this act. It does not pre scribe a different and greater punishment than the Constitution allowed, for surely a denial of an attorney’s license (however important learned counsel may consider it) is more endurable than death, confiscation or imprisonment. Therefore, J maintain, 1st. That if the pro movent’s former license constituted him an officer, and that office was property, it has been forfeited by operation of law. 2d. Of that forfeiture, resulting as it does from facts of public record, the court must take judi cial notice. 3d. That being forfeited, this motion simply is an application for admission under a new license. 4th. Being sueli an application, the act of 1S65 only prescribes a qualification. 5tli. That the qualification prescribed is per fectly constitutional. There is another phase of this question to which I wish to call attention, which, although it does not bear upon tbe constitutionality of this law, has a very important bearing upon this mo tion, and is worthy of serious consideration. By the act of 1789 it is provided that the Supreme Court may make such rules and regulations as to practice of the inferior courts—the Circuit and District—as it may deem proper, and it is well settled that whenever a rule of the inferior court conflicts with any rule of the Supreme Court it is invalid, and that whenever the Supreme Court adopts a rule affecting the practice of the Inferior Courts, it is obligatory as a decision until re scinded. This point has been even recently reiterated. 2 Black, 509. . The Supreme Court, on March 10,1865, amend ed the second rule by embodying therein the oath contained in this act, and ordered that all officers of the court shall subscribe to the oatli contained in the said act. Now, although this order is nj5t in terms ili- * reefed to the interior courts, there can be no doubt that it is in intent, anil should be by them respected as such. It expresses, also, indirectly the opinion of the Supreme Court upon the con stitutionality of the act, for it would be unallow able to suppose the highest court of the land would embody in their own rules a law they be lieved or suspected of being in violation ;>f the Constitution. Much has been said about the hardship of this law. It is a mere extravaganza to sa3 r that it deprives a man of his profession. It only denies his privilege to exercise that profession in the Courts of the United States unless he can sub scribe to their rules. It is hardly necessary, in conclusion, to men tion the oppressive responsibility attaching to any court that proclaims a statute, passed by the highest Legislative body known to our Govern ment, to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States. It has been judicially conceded from Chief Justice Marshall down to Judge Busteed. It must he palpably void, unquestion ably repugnant to some provision of that instru ment before even the Supreme Court would be justified in pronouncing it invalid. - If there is a doubt, the Legislature of the Na tion, forming as they do, a co-ordinate branch of the Government, should have the benefit of that doubt. But where a great people, struggling in the agony of a terrible civil conflict, say to their servants in tones not to be misunderstood: “ jDarent opernm consules, nequid republica detri ments caperet." See to it, ye Senators and Repre sentatives, that no like harm comes to this re public—there is a sanctity and a sovereigntj r in th« edict that no court should treat lightly. Confederates in Mexico.—A correspon dent of the Liberal Strife, thus alludes to the Con federates in Mexico: The Confedrates whose history since the re bellion has been identical with Mexico, as Maury, Magruder, Wilcox, Watkins, Shelby, Price, Har ris, Hindman, Bee, Slaughter, Dunn, and many lesser stars of the Confederacy, are strangely scat tering after a strange connection with the bogus empire. Maury and Magruder, lately dismissed from office, as Chiefs of Bureau of Emigration and Surveying Generals, know not what to do. Mauiy is in Europe. Tom Rejmolds, of Mis souri, has been with Magruder as assistant in his surveying department. Broadwell, also, has been with Magruder. Young Col. Maury has been as sistant to his father, and will now join his father in Europe. Henry W. Allen, ex-Brigadier Gene ral of the Confederates States arm3 r , and ex- Governor of Louisiana, laterly editor and pro prietor of the Mexican Times, was buried on Mon day, the 23d ult., in the burying ground belong ing to the United States Government, in full uni form of the Confederate States army. Jubal Early Igft for Havana a few weeks since. Quan- trell is esconced at Cordova, along with Shelby, Price, Harris and others, who are waiting for Max to fulfill his promise of land, purchased some and named their cabins Carlota. Judge Perkins is also at Cordova. Hindman, Wilcox and Ledbetter are gone. Slaughter is running a steam saw-mill near Orizava, and Col. Green, and all others not mentioned, have left the capital—we think, for Texas and their homes. Said that eminent patriot, B. F. Wade, in a speech made not quite six years ago: “ I am not one of those who would ask them to continue iu such a Union. It would be doing violence to the platform of the party to which I belong. We have adopted the old declaration of independence as the basis of our political movements, which declares that men, when their government ceases to protect their rights, when it is so subverted from the true purposes of gov ernment as to oppose them, Have the right to re cur to fundamental principles, and, if'need be to destroy the government under which they live, and to erect on its ruins another more con ducive to their welfare. I hold that they have this right whenever thC3' think the contingency has come. * * You cannot forcibly hold mert in this Union, for the attempt to do so, it seems to me, would subvert the first principles of the government under which we live ” Thus spoke Mr. Wade in I860.' In 1866 Mr. >Y ade favors the hanging of some thousands of people for doing just what he asserted they had a perfect right to do .—Philadelphia Age 2 5th Owing to the almost total absence of frost in , ranee during the wintercthe Paris icte houses have been unable to obtain supplies from their usual sources. Twenty trucks, each carrying five tons, arrived in the city lately from Basle Switzerland, and steamers come to Havre every week from Norway with cargoes of ice in blocks. The little boys and girls of Richmond Virgi- nia, ha\e, within a few da3’s past, raised a sum of money sufficient to erect a neat monument over tho remains ot little Joseph Davis, a son op Jett. Davis, who was accidentally killed a few months before the evacuation of Richmond