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[COSAM EMIR BARTfcETT— EDITOR] THE DEMOCRAT, will be published 'every week in Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia, at Three Dollars per annum if paid in advance! or Four Dollars at the end of the year It is expected that ail application for subscription from a distance will be accompanied with titc money, Advertisements will be inserted at reasonable fates. Sales of land and negroes, by adminis trators, executors or guardians, are requited by law to be held on the first Tuesday in the month, between the hours of ten o’clock in the forenoon £ three in the afternoon, at the court house of the County in which the property is situated: .Notice of these sales must be given in a public Gazette sixty days previous to the day of sale. Notice of the sale of personal property must fee giver- in a like manner forty days p. evious to the day of sale Notice to debtors and creditors of an estate, mast be published forty days. Notice that all application will be made 10 the court of orduiary for leave to sell land must be published four months. PROSPECTUS, For publ thing >/£ Columbus , Gu a Political and Alts rel, a nevus A'cicspaper, t> be entitled th DEMOCRAi. In presuming iu the pu it :ns Pros pectus f«r anew paper at Coiunurus, thu subscriber dues uot deem it uecess.tiy or expedient to gu iato a minute detail of his political doctrines, or of his particular views in regard to the various topics which now engage public attention. He pre sumes that his character as an editor is 100 well known in Georgia to allow him to gain credit among any parts, with meie professions and empty promises. The public will be apt to look to thu past in tor ming their estimate of the futuie, and by that ordeal is he willing to bn tried. In the numerous political discussions, which the eveuls of the day have called forth,' Ins opinions of men and things have been free ly expressed, and are doubtless familiar to many of those to whom he now looks lor patronage and support. Those who have hitherto approved of his sentiments and been satisfied with the u,aimer iu which he has urged them, will, lie trusts, still con tinue their confidence, without the reuew nl of pledges, or a formal confession of faith. 1 In reference however to tho present State of parties, he begs leave to remark, that he trusts tho absence of all political excitement, will prove propitious to the cause of truth; and that now all par tics, by whatever names they mey have been dis tinguished, will be permitted to labor tor the general welfare, unobstiucied b> ilie jealousy, or tbe rancor of by-gone feuds. The undersigned will endeavor to extend still further this cordiality ot feeling, ami to allay the occasional symptoms of ex .cerb otioj to which a warmly contested election may give rise; and in this, and whatever else tie may undertake for the purpose of Bdvanciug tho prosperity of the stale, lie bill count on the cordial co-operation of Ivory good citizen, however they may rave previously differed on points of polit cal faith. Attached to the doctrines of the Revolu tion, and holding iu high veneration the memory of those heroes aud sages by whom our liberties were achieved, and our pr°sent adninable form of government es tablished, the subscriber will endeavor to manifest the sincerity of his professions, by exciting a feeling of attachment to tho Union, aud encouraging an entire coiifi deuce in the institutions of our country. llu will inculcate the doctrins that it is better to bear a slight and temporary evil, against which we have a constitutional remedy, than to hazard all for which our fathers (ought and so many martyrs labor ed and bled. He will not in any respect, overlook or disregard the righis or the in terests of his own state; yet he must always view particular rights and interests, as re latively connected with others, uid he will never cousent Cos the sacrifice of a greater for a lesser good. The subscriber will endeavor to make The Democrat a vehicle of general intelli gence, aud an interesting per.o lit I to the gentleman of literature, the aei tin? merchant and the mechanic. C. E. liartlctt. A NEW MAI* OF GEORGIA. fBIHE subscribers have now m ;er the -E h link of the engraver in Now Y >rk, a complete ami splendid map of die state of Georgia, the grout* r part compiled from actu.il survey, with all the districts careful ly laid down ami numbered, tilt' whole com pleted with meat labor and exactness r :om khn latest an I most authentic information, in i style not inferior to any thing \*t pre sented to the public, with a table » f distan ces from the seat of government to eveiy c*>unty site, or place of importance til ttie State. The districts in the new pu'chase and lower counties are all numb* red in the corners so as to enable a person to ascer tain the exact situation of any lot of land and will be painted and finished oft’ in the neatest manner, a part of them canvassed varnished and put on rollers, the balance on thin paper nicely folded in u“> r oceo covers and will be for sale in Milledgeville by the Ist of October. Those on rollers at fivp dollars, and the pocket map of the same siee, at four dollars. Persons resid ing at a distance wishing to procure the map can do so by sending by the members as a sufli* ient number of them will be kept in Milledgeville during the session. Carlton Welbom, Orange Clrcen. oct. 1830 AN APPRENTICE, WILL be taken at this oA •mint active lad of good moral cha racter. Nunc other need apply. P OLITIC A L. Mr. MADISON'S LETTER. To the Editor of the North American Review. Montpelier, Aug. 1330. Dear Sir; —l have duly received your I in which you iefer to the “ nullify tng c oc-rine,’ advocated as a constitutional right, by some «*f our distinguished fellow citizens; and to the proceedings of the Vir ginia L-gisluture , u 98 and ’99. as appeal ed to m behalf of that doctrine: and you ex pi ess a wish for my ideas on theso sub |ects. I am aware of the delicacy of the task in some respects, and the difficulty in every tespect, of doing full justice to it -Bui, having, iu more than one in slace, complied with a like request fiom oilier tiu udly quarters, I do not decline a sketch of the views winch I have been led to take of the doctrine iu question, as well a» some others connected with them ; aud of the grounds from w hich it appears that the- proceedings of Virginia have been mis conceived by tnose who have appealed to them. In oid* tto understand the true cha tacter ol the Coostiuiiion of the U. Slates, the ei ro not u common, must he avoided, of vi-winy it ihi o’the medium, either of a con solidated Government, or of a confedera ted Government, whilst it isueither the one nor the other; but a mixture of both. And having, in no model, the similitude and ana logies applicable to other system of Govern moui it must mote than any other, be its own interpieter according to its text, and ttn facts of the case. Fiom these it will be seen that the cha racteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are, Is., tbe mode of its formation; 2, tbe divisiou • f ihe supremo powers of Govern ment between the Slabs in their united ca pacities, and the Slates in their individual capa< dies. 1. I was formed, not by the G vern- ; men - ol the component Suites, as the Fed eral Government for which it was substitu. ' ted was formed. Nor was it formed by a majority .of the people of the United States, as a single community, in tile manner of a confederated Government. Ii was formed by tho Slates, that is by the people in each of me States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity ; and for med consequent!'' by me same auibon y which formed tiie Site costitution. Biiug thus derived from the same source as the constitutions of the Stales, it has, within each S ate, the same authority as tbe j constitution ut the state ; and is as much a consiiiutiou, iu the strict sense of the term, within its prescribed sphere, as tho consti tutions of the states are, wiiliiu their re spective sphere'; but with this obvious aud essential difference, that being a compact a mong tbe stales in their Highest sovereign ca pacity, and constituting tuo people thereof one people foi certain purposes, it canaot be altered or annulled at the will of the states individually, as tho constitution of a state may bo at its individual will. 2. And that it divides the supreme pow ers u!’the government, between the govern ment of the United States, and the govern ment of the mdivioual states, is slampted on the face of the instrument; the power of wir and enumerated powers vested iu the governmeni of the United States, being of as high and sovereign character as any of the powers reserved to the state govern ments. N »r is the government of the U. States, created by the constitution, less a govern ment in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers thau the govern ments created by the constitution of tne states are, within their several spheres. It is like them organic and into Legislative, Ex ecutive and Judicial Departments. It ope- \ rates, like tuent, directly, on persous and J things. ‘And, like them, it nas at command a p ysic.it force for txecuin g the powers committed to it Too concurrent opera tion in certain cases, is one ot the fuatmes making the peculiarity of the system. Between these constitutional governments, the one operating in all the states, thte others operating separately in each, with the ag g eg ite powers of government divided be tween them, n could not escape attention that controversies would aiiso concerning the boundaries of jui isuictron, and that some pmvisioti ought to bo made for such uccur t uces. A political system that uoes not provide for a peaceable and authuritive ter mination of occuring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of govern ment ; the object nud end of a real govern- ! iHuut being me substitution ot law and order for uncertainty, confusion, and violence That to have left a final decision, in such cas* s to eacti of the states, then thirteen, and already tweiity-foui, could not fail to in tke tin- constitution *y laws of the United St ties different in different states, ‘.vas obvi ous; and not less obvious that tins diversi ty ot independent decisions must altogether distract the government ol the Union itself. A uniform authority of the most important laws is iu itself a vital piiuciple. Some of the most important laws could not be par tially executed. They must be executed in all tim states, or they c uld be duly executed iri none An impel', or an excise, for ex ample, if not in force in some states, would ' e defeated in others. It is well known that this was among tho lessons of experi ence, which had a primary influence in bringing about the existing constitution. A loss of its general authority would moreover revive tho exasperating questions between the.states holding polls for fmeign com merce, and the adjoining slates without COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 13, 1?30. them; to which are uow added, all u>« in md stales, necessaiily carrying on their foreign commerce through other states. To have made the decisions under the authority of the individual states, co-ordi nate, in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would una voidably produce c.dlisMons incompatible w ith the peace *>f society, and w ith that re . ular and efficient administration, winch is of the essence ot free government. Scenes could not be avoided, in which a ministerial officer of the United Slates, and the cor responding officer of an individual state, would have rencounters in executing con flicting decrees, the result of which would depend on the comparative force of the lo cal posses attending them ; and that, a cas- j uaiiy depending on the political opinions and party feelings in different stales. To have referred every clashing decision under the two authorities, for a final decis ion to the states, as parties to the constitu tion, would be attended with delays, w.th inconveniences, &, wiih expences, amount-! mg to a prohibition of the expedient; not to meution its tendency to impair the salu-! tary veneration for a system requiring such frequent interpositions, nor the delicate questions which might present themselves, as to the form of s'atiug the appeal, and as | to the quorum for deciding it. To have trusted to negociation for adjust, it"-' bp,t ’ PPn «he government of tlm I United Slates and she state governments, as j between indr pendent and separate sever- j eignties, would hive lost sight altogeih a constitution and g. v rtunent for the Un ion; and opened a direct road fmpi . f j are of that resort trt the ultima ratio be- j t«cen nations wholly independent of and alien to each other. If the id.-» hid iis oiigin in the procr-s< of adjusting, between separate branches .f Hie same government, ihe analogy entirely fails I„ tbe raso of disputes between tbe independent parts of the same government, neither part being a ble to consummate its will, nor the govern, meet to proceed without the concurrence of the parts, necessity brings about an ac. commodation. In disputes between ast oe government and the government of the U States, the case is practically as we'l as the. oreticrlly diff rent; each parly pressing all tho departments of an organ z and govern, meet. Legislative, Executive and Judicial; and having each a physical force to soppon its. pretentions. Although the issue of nr. gotiation might some times avoid their ex. tremity, how* often would if happen, nmoj, so many slates, that an nnaccommodaline spirit in some would render that source unavailing? A contrary supposition would not accord w'ith a knowledge of human ua ture, or the evidence of our own political historv. “ The constitution, not relying on anv of the preceding modifications, for its s.f and successful operation, his expressly de dared on the one hand - Fust—“ Thai the constitution, and the laws made in pur suance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land: 2. That tho Judges of every state shall be bound there bv, any thing to the contrary notwithstand ing : 3. Tbit the Judicial power of the U. States shail extend to all cases in law and equity arisine under the constitution, the laws of th* United States, and treaties made under their authority, &c.” Ou the other hand, as a security of the rights and powers of the states, iu their indi vidual capacities, igainst an undue prepon derance of tli 9 powers granted to the Gov ernment over them in their united rapacity, the constitution has relied on 1. file re sponsibility of th>- S unitors and Represen tatives in th* Legislature of the U. States,' to the L’gi-I ure* and the people of the! states. 21. Tho responsibility of the Pre. sident to the people of tin United States. j And 3. Toe liability of the Executive and j judicial functionaries of the United States ! to impeachment by the Representatives of the people of tho states, in one branch of, the Legislature of the United States and j i trial by the Representative* of the states ini the other branch ; the state functionaries, : legislative, executive aud judicial, being at j the same time, iu llmir appointment and re* ' spousibility, altogether independent of tho agency or authori’y of tho United States. How fir this structure of the govern ment of the United S'stes is adequate and safe for its object, timo alone can absolute. Iv determioo Experience seems to have show n, that whatever may grow out of fu ture stages of *>ur national career, there is as yet, a Sufficient control, in the popular will, over the Executive, and Legislative department of the government. When the alien and sedition laws were pissed, in cot:, travention to the opinions and feelings of the community, the first elections that ensued put an end to them. And whatev cr may have been tho character of other acts, in the judgment of many of us, it is hut j true, that they havo generally accorded with the view of a majority of the states, ; and of the people. At the present day it ' seems well understood, that the laws which It tvu created most disatisfaction, have had a like sanction within doors; and that whe ther continued, varied, or repealed, a like proof will be given of tire sympathy and re sponsibility of the representative body, to the constituent body. Indeed, the great complaint now is, against the resmts of this sympathy and responsibility in the Legisla live policy of the nation. But it is perfectly consistent with the con cession of this power to the Supremo Court, in cases falling within the course of its fine ti*>ns, to maintain that the power has not »l ways been rightly exercised. Tu J■; notb.ng of the period, happily a short one, when judges iu their sea s did „ot abstain i irom intemperate and party liarrangees, e q'tally at variance with tiu-ir duty and their dignity ; there have been occasional decis siuns from the bench, which luce incurred serious and extensive disapprobation ; still it woulJ seem, that, with but few excep tions, the course of the judiciary has been Lit her to sustained by the predominant sense of the naliou. I Those who have denied or doubted the supremacy ol the judicial power of the U States, am. dcuouuce at the same time a nullifying power in a State, seem not to have sufficiently adverted to the utter inef ficiency of a supremacy in a law of the laud, without a supremacy in the exposition and execution of the law ; nor lo the des'ruc lion of all equipoise between the Federal Government and the Statu Governments, if the functionaries of the Federal Gov ernment are directly or indirectly el. cted by and responsible to the States, and the functionaries of the States are, iu their ap pointment and responsibility, wholly inde pendent of the U. Suites, no constitutional control of any sort belonged to the United Slates over the Stales. Under such an or ganization, it is evident that it would be in the power of the States individually, to pass unauthorised laws, aud to carry them into Complete effect, and any thing in the Con stitution aud laws of the U. States to the contrary notwithstanding. Tiiis would bo power iu its plenary charactei; and whether it It <d its final effect, through the Legislature, Executive, or Judiciary organ of tho State, would be equally fatal to the constituted relation between the two Governments. Should the provision of the Constitution a* here reviewed* be found not to secure the government and rights of the St iles, against usurpations and abuses on the part of tho U. States, the final resort within the purview of the Constitution, lies in an a mendmeut of the Constitution, according to a process applicable by tile States, Aud in the eveut of a failure of every constitutional resort, and an accumulation of usurpati ms and abuses, rendering pas sive obedience and non resistance u great er evil than resistance and revolution, tliere c m remain but one resort, the last ol'all— 'it appeal from the cancelled obligations of the,constitutional compact, to original rights and the law of self-preservation This is 'he ultima ratio under nil governments, whether consolidated, confererated, or a compound of both ; and it cannot he doubl ed, that a single member of the Uni n, in the extremity supposed, but in that only would have a right, to matte the appeal. This brings us to th< (expedient lately idvaced, which claims for a single State a light lo appeal against an excerctse of pow er by the Government of the U. States de cided by the State to bo unconstitutional, 'o the parties to the constitutional compact; the derision of the StatP tu have tho effect of nullifying tho act of tho government of the U. States unless the decision of the State be reversed by threo-fourths of the parties. The distinguished name and high author ities which appear to have asserted and given a practical scope lo this doctrine, en title it to a respect which it might bodifficult otherwise to feel for it. If the doctrines were to bo understand as requiring tjie three-fourths of the Stales to sustain, instead of that proportion to re verse the decision of the appealing state, the decision to he without effect during the appeal, it would be sufficient to remark, that this extra constitutional course might well give way to that marked out" by the Constitution which authorises two-thirds of tho Slates to institute, and three-fourths to effectuate, an amendment to the Con stitution, establishing a permanent itiie of the highest authority, iu place of au irieg tilar precedent of construction only ; but it is understood that tho nullifying doctrine imports that the decision of the State is to be presumed valid, and , that it overrules the law of the U Slates unless overruled by three-fourths of the States, Can more he necessary to demonstrate the inadmissibility of such a doctrine, than that it puts in the power of tin smallest fraction, over one-fourth of the United States, that is of seven States out of twen y four, to give tire law and even the constitution to seventeen States, each of the seventeen having, as parties to the constitution, an equal right with each of the seveu, to ex pound it, and to insist on the exposition ? That tho seven bte righlfPlnd the seventeen wrong is more than possible. But to establish a positive and permanent rule giving such a power, to such a miuctr ity over such a majority, would overturn the first principles of free Government, and in practice necessarriy ovetturn the Gov ernment itself. It is to be recollected that tho constitu tion was proposed to the people of the States as aufhole, and unanimously adopted hy-this Stiiei as a whole, it being a part of the Constitution that no less than three fourths of the Stati s should bo competent to make any alteration in what had been unan imously agreed to. So great is the caution on this point, that in two cases where pe culiar interests wore at slake, a proportion even of three-fourths is distrusted, and u naniniity required to make an alteratii n. When the Constitution v as adopted as a whole, it is certain that there were many nartsf which if separately proposed, w ould ihvo been promptly rejected. It is tar rum imposible, that every part of a Conrti uttui; might bo rejected by a mujoiity, and el ijkco together us a whole, be utuoiui- VOLUME FIRST—NUMBER 5 otis y accepted. I 1 ree constitutions will cutely, if ever; be formed, without recip i concessions; without articles coudi* | t'oned on and balancing each oilier, Is t here a constitution of a single Slate out if tae twenty four, lint would bear the experi ment of having its component parts stibmit j tod to the people and separately decided i ou \ kr \V hat the fate of the constitution of tlis j United Stales would be, »fa small propor tion of tho States could expunge parts of if, particularly valued by a large tujorily, can have but one answer. Tiie difficulty is not removed by limiting tho doctrines to cases of construction. How many cases of that sort, involving cardinal provisions of the Constitution, have occur red? How many now exisi? Hpw many may hereafter spring up? How many might be ingeniously created, if entitled lo a de cision iu the mode proposed? Is it certain that the principle of that mode would not reach further than is con templated? If a single State can of right »< quire tin ee-f.urllis of its co States lo over, rule its exposition of the Constitution, be cause that proportion is authorised to amend it, would the plea be Ibss plausible that, U3 the Constitution was unanimously establish ed, it ought to bo unanimously expounded? The reply to all such suggestions seems to be unavoidable and irresistable, that the Constitution is a compact; that its text is to be expounded accotding to the provisions for expounding it, making a part«f the com pact and that none of the purtics can right fully renounce the expounding provision more than any other part. When such a right accrues, as may accrue it must grow out of abuses of the compact releasing the sufferers from their fealty lo it. In favor of the nullifying claim for the states individually, it appears, as you ob serve, that the procedings of the Legislature ol Virginia, in ’9B and ’99, against the Al ien and Sedition Acts are much dwelt upon. It may often happen, as experience proves, that erroneous constructions not an ticipated may not be sufficiently guarded a gainst, in the language used; and it is due to the distinguished individuals, who have nii seonceived the intentions of those pro ceeding, to suppose that the meaning of tlie Legislature, though well comprehended at >hc time may not now be obvious to those unacquainted with the cotemporary indi cations and'impiessions. But it is believed, that by keeping id view the distinction between the Govern ments of the States, and the States in fits sense in which they were parties to the con stitution; between the rights of the parties iu the eoucurrent and in their individual ca pacities; between tbe several modes and objects of interposition against the abuses of power, and especially between interpo sitions wtthiu the purview of the constitu tion and interpositions appealing from the Constitution to the rights of nature para mount to all Constitutions, with an atten tion always of explanrtory use, to the views and arguments which were combatted, the Resolutions of Virginia, as vindicated in the Report on then), will be found entitled to an exposition, showing a consistency in their parts, and an inconsistency of tbe whole with the doctrine uuder considera tion. That the Legislature could not have in tended to sanction such a doctrine is to be inferred from the debates in the house of Delegates, and from the uddress of the two houses o their eonstittueuts, on the subject of the resolutions. The tenor of the de« bates, which wore ab/y conducted, and are understood to have been revised for tho press by most, if not all, of the speakers, discloses no reference whatever to a con stitutional right in an individual State to ar rest by force the operate nos a law of tha United 3'ites. Concert among the Sute* for redress against the Alien and Sedition Liws, as acts of usurped pewer was a lead ing sentiment; and tho attainment of a con cert, the immediate object of the tourse a dopted by the Legislature, which was that of invitng the other Statos “to concur in de claring the acts to be unconstitutional, and to co-operate in the necessary & proper measures in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights and liberties reservrd to the States respectively, and to the peoplt.* That by the necessaiy and proper measures to be concurrently and co operatively taken, were meant measures known to the C'*nsti* tutiou, particularly the ordinary control of the people and Legislatures of the States over the Government of the United States, cannot be doubled, and the interposition of this control, as the evPnt showed, was equal ,to the occasion. It is worthy of remark and explanatory of the intentions of the Legislature, that the words, “not law, but utterly null, and void, and of no force or eff et,"’ which had fol lowed in one,of the res* lotions, the word “unconstitutional 1 * was struck out by com mon consent, though tin* words wert, m fact, synonymous with “unconstitutional,'* yet to guard against a misunderstanding of this phrase as more than declaratory of opin ion, the word “unconstitutional*’ alone was retained, as not liable it* that and nger The published Address of th* Legislature to the people, their constituents, affords a nother conclusive evidence of its views. The address warns them against the eu crouching spirit of the General G vern meuf. argues the unconstitutionally of the Alien and Sedition Acts points to other in stances iu which the cons iiution i limits had been overleaped; dwells upon the dan gerous mode of deriving power by implica tion; und in general pi esses the necessity of watching over the consolidating tendency ot