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■mm i i ■■■■» ygg THE CONSTITUTIONAXIST. f£ i* OMJMKU 4* UIWCJE. lii 'I TERMS —For the semi-weekly paper, published a rverj' Tuesday and Friday morning, s"> jv*r mmum p and for the weekly §3, ail payable in advance. a t . ADVERTISEMENTS arc *in«erfi 1 weekly for 62 r 1-2 cents per ftpi.m ; semi-weekly G 2 1-2 cen- far the first, and 43 3-1 cents for each insertion r Mid monthly fer SI, 00 p' f s.-juarc fur each ins« man. i For yearly advertise meats private arrangements r.re.-a ta be made. A deduction is made on the adverii-c- .c meats of public officers. ■ f j'/* Postage lawst be paid en k **:■: r? of business. i r MESSAiJE FROM THE runs IDE ST OF THE V. ST A TES, lit turning tlie Bank Biil, with his oEectioas, JULY 10, 1832. i ! Ji- ad, and ordered to be printed, an I that 6,000 add- jt tional copies be e'nt to the Senate. ■- To the Semite : —The billto modify and con-'; i t ime” the act enti led “An act to incorporate < *!ic subscribers to the Bank of the U. States.’’' : was presented tome on the 4th July instant. 1 I laving considered it with that solemn regard to the principles of the constitution which the day was calculated to inspire, and come to the con ronclusion that it oay lit not to become a law, I | herewith return it to the Senate, in v. inch it ori ginated, with my objections. A Bank of the United Stabs is, in many rc r-pec's, convenient for the Government, and use. fil to the people. Enter'aining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that s ana ol the [rowers and privileges possessed by the ex isting bank arc unauthorized by the constim tion, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I Lb it my duty, at an early period of my administra tion, to cal! the attention of Congress to tlie practicability of organizing an institution com bining all its advantages, and obviating these objections. I sincere ly regret, that, in the act b dure me, 1 can perceive none of those modifi cations of ih ; bank charter which are necessary, in mv opinion, to make it compatible with jus tice, With sound policy, or with the constitution of our country. The present corporate hotly, denominated the President, Directors, and Company of the Hank of the United States, will have existed, al the Time this act is intended to take effect, twenty years. It oajoys'an exclusive privilege of bank ing, under the autli vily of the General (jrovern mon‘, a monopoly of its favor and support, and, as a necessary consequence, almost a monopoly of the foreign and domestic exchange. The, powers, privileges, and favors host owed upon it in the original charter, by increasing the value of the slock far above its par value, operated as u gratuity of many millions to the stockholders. An apology may be found for the failure to guard against this result, in tlio consideration that the ellect of the original act of incorpora tion could not ho certainly foreseen at the time of i’s passage. The act before mo proposes an other gratui'y to the holders of the same stock,' and, in many cases, to the same men, of at least seven millions more. This donation finds no a pology in any uncertainty as to tin* effect of the act." On all hands it is conceded that its pas sage will increase, at least twenty or thirty per cent, more, the market price of the stock, sub ject to the payment of the annuity of ><200,000 per year, secured try the act ; thus adding, in a moment, one-fourth to its par value. It is not our own citizens only who are to receive the bounty of our Government. More than eight millions of the stock of tins hank arc h Id by foreign *rs. By this act, the American Repub lic proposes virtually to make them a present of some millions of dollars. Tor these gratuities to lorchmevs, and to some of our own opulent citi zens, the act secures no equivalent whatever. They are the certain gains of the present stock holders under the operation of this act, after making full allowance for the payment of the bonus. Every monopoly, and all exclusive privileges, are grunted al the expense of the public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bes'ow on the stockholders of the existing bank, must come directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American people. It is due to them, therefore, if their Government sell monopolies and exclu sive privileges, that they should at least exact lor them as much as they are worth in open mar ket. The value of the monopoly in this case may be correctly ascertained. The twenty eight millions of stock would probably he at an advance of fifty per cent,, and command in mar ket al least forty-two millions of dollars, subject to the paymeiv of the present bonus. The pro sent value of the monopoly, therefore, is seven, teen m.llions of dollars, and this the act propost s to sell for three millions, payable in fifteen an nual ins ulmeuts ot 8200,000 each. It is not conceivable how the present stock holders can have any claim to the special favor of the Government. The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stip ulated in the original contract. If we must; have such a corpora'ion, why should not the Government s 11 out the whole stock, and thus' secure to the people the full market value of the privileges granted ? Wny should not Congress create" and sell twenty-eight millions of stack, incorporating the purchasers with all the powers and privileges secured in this act, and putting the premium upon die sales into the Treasury ? But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of the monopoly. It seems to he pre dicated on the erroneous idea, that the present stockholders have a prescriptive riglu not only to the favor, but to the bourny of Government. It appears that more than a fourth part of tlie stock is hold by foreigners, and ihe residue is held bv a few hundred of our own citizens, chief ly of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly, and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth. This seems the less excusable, because same of oar citizens, now stockholders, peti tinned that the door of competition might be o nened, and offered to taken charter on terms much more favorable to the Government and country. But this proposition, although made by men whose aggregate wealth is believed to be equal to all the private stock in the existing bank, has been sot aside, and the bounty of our Govern- ' meat is proposed to be again bestowed on the few who have been fortunate enough to secure ' the stock, and at this moment wield the power ; of the existing institution. I cannot perceive ; the justice or policy of this course. If our Go- i yernment must sell monopolies, it would seem to 1 be its duty to take nothing less than their full 1 value; and if gratuities must be made once in i fifteen or twenty years, let them not be bestow- L >1 on the subjects of u foreign governm *nt, nor'jU jpon a designated and favored class of men in .s >ur own country. It is but justice and good po- |o icy, as far ns the nature of the case will admit,'; p to confine our favors to our own fidiow-citiz ns. t< and let each in his turn enjoy an opportunity to !■ profit by our bounty. In the bearings of the;/ act before rue, upon these points, I find ampl reasons why it should no : become a law. It lias been urged a--, an argument in favor ol.t rcchar ering the [ r sent bank, that the calling i iu its loans will produce great embarrassment J and iisTcss. The lime allowed to close! scon- t corns is ample; and it it has been well manag-.jr ed, its pressure w;ll he light, and heavy on:y in ,' ease its management has been bad. It, t:;e;v.S{ fore, it shall produce 'distress, tho fault wilt be i its own: and it would furnish a reason against newinga power which has been so obviously ;! abused/ Bat will there ever boa time when < "his reason will he Iss powerful ! io acknovv- > ledge its force, is to admit that the bank ought d to be perpetual; and, a§ a consequence, the pro- ■: sent stockholders, and those inheriting their , rights us successors, be es abashed a privilegcu ; 1 order, clothed both with great political -power, , and enjoying immens * pecuniary advantages, from their connection wih the Government. The modifications of the existing charffr, pro- . pos-d hv this ac‘, are not such, iu my view, as make it consistent with the rights of the States I i>p the liberties of the people. The qualifica tio.a ot the right ol the bunk to hold real estate, the limitation of its pow r to establish branches ■ and the power reserved to Congress to forbid , the circulation of small notes, arc restrictions j comparatively of little value or importance. All the objectionable principles of the exis ing cor poration, and most of its odious features, are retained without alleviation. The fourth section provides “ that the notes . or bills of the said corporation, abhough the ~ same be on the faces thereof, respectively, made jj payable at one [dace only, shall, nevertheless, j be received by tb»- said corporation at t:ie bank, I j ur at any of the offices <>i discount and deposite thereof, if tendered in liquidation or payment oi any balance or balances duo to said corpora!ion, 1 l or to such office of discount and deposite, from anv oilier incorp irated bank. ’ 1 liis provision | secures to the State banks a legal privilege in :lie Bank of the United States, which is with-; held from all private cnizens. It a State bank iu Philadelphia owe the Bank of the L . Slates, and have notes issued by the St. Louis branch, it can pay the debt with those notes; but b a ;merchant, mechanic, or other private ebizen be lin like circumstances, he cannot, by law, pay his debt with those notes, but must sell them at a| discount, or send them to St. Louis to be cashed, j This boon conceded to tho State banks, though not unjust in itself, is most odious; because it J 1 docs not measure out equal justice to the high | land the low, the rich and the poor. To theex-j 1 tent of i‘s practical effect, it is a bond ot union: among the banking establishments of the na-j tiuu, erecting them iiLo an interest separate i from that of tho people : and its necessary ten- j deucy is to unite the Bank of the United States, and the State banks in any measure which may j 1 be thought conducive to their common interest.. The ninth section of tho act recognizes prin-j ciplosof worse tendency than any provision of: the present charter. it enacts that “ the cashier of the bank shall j annually report to the Secretary of the Trea-j sury the names of all stockholders who are notj resident citizens of the United States ; and, on, jthe application of the Treasurer of any Stale,j ■ (.shall make out and transmit to such Treasurer a ‘ list of stockholders residing in, or citizens of such State, with the amount of stock owned by j each.” Although this provision, taken in con-1 nection with a decision of the Supreme Court,! ■ surrenders, by bs silence, the right of the States; to tax the banking institutions created by this cor poration, under the name cf branches, through out the Union, it is evidently intended to bo con strued as a concession of their right to tax that portion of the stock which may be held by their own citizens and residents. In this light, if they act becomes a law, it, will be understood by the) States, who will probably proceed to levy a tax equal to that paid upon tjic stock of banks in-! cor orated bv themselves. In some States that i 1 * # , tax is now one per cent., cither on the capital or on the shares, and that may ho assumed as tho amount which al! efizen or resident sTck- 1 holders would be taxed under the operation of; this act. As it is only the stock he/d in the States, and not that employed within them, which I would be subject to taxation, and ns the names' of foreign stockholders are not to be reported ‘o the Treasurers of the States, it is obvious that the stock held by them will he exempt Lorn this; burden. Their annual profits will, therefore,! be one per cent, more than the citizen stock-; ■ holders; and, as the annual dividends of the! j bank may be safely estimated at seven per cent.,! the stock will be worth ton or fifteen per cent, more to foreigners than to citizens of the Uui ' ted States. To appreciate the effects which this state of things will produce, we must take a brief review of the operations and present con. dition of tho Bank of the United States. By documents, submitted to Congress at the present session, it appears that, on Ist of Janua ry, 1832, «f the twenty-eight millions of pri * vat * stock in the corporation, $‘8,405,500 were hclii by foreigners, mostly of Great Britain.; The amount of stock held in the nine western and southwestern States, is $140,200, and in the ! four southern States, is $5,623,100, and in the middle and eastern States, is about $13,522,000. j The profits of the bank in 1831, as shown in a statement to Congress, were about $3,455,598 :1 of this there accrued, in the nine western States. ’; about $1,640,048 ; in the lour southern States, ab mt 8352.507 : and in the middle and eastern States, about $1,463,041. As little stock is| held in the west, it is obvious that the debt of the, people, in that section, to the bank, is principal. ' ly a debt to the eastern and foreign stock hoi- i tiers; that the interest they pay upon it. is car- : ried into the eastern State’s, and into Europe ;'j an<! that it is a burden upon their industry, and I a drain of their currency, which no country | can boar without inconvenience and occasional distress. To meet this burden, and equalize the | exchange operations of the bank,the amount of specie drawn from those States, through its branches, within the last two years, as shown by its otficial reports, was about $6,000,006. More than half a million of this amount does no; stop in the eastern States, but passes on *o Europe s o pay the dividends of the foreign stockholders. In | the principle of taxation recognized by this acb the western States find no adequate compensa tion for this perpetual burden on their industry, and drain of their currency. The branch bank at Mobile made last year 95,140 dollars : yet, under the provisions of this act, the State of A labaraacan raise no revenue from these profita ble operations, because not a share of the stock j is held by any of her citizens. Mississippi and 1 Missouri are in tl*c same condition in relation 1 i 0 tliu branches at Nutchtz and St. Louis ; aad,i ti such, in a greater or less degree, is the condition;, ti >f every v. :stern State. The tendency o. tne; a dan of'taxation which this act proposes, will bee u ;o place the whole United States in the same re-, r at ion to foreign countries which the western | c State-snow bear to the eastern. When, by a; i tax on resident stockholders, the stock of this’ c bank is made worth ten or fifteen percent, more jt to foroirmers than to residents, most ot it "ilijjC inevitably leave the country. r lj 1 Thus will this provision, ini's practical Ci-ij L feet, deprive the eastern as well as the southern.js and western States of the means of raising a re-ljl venue from the extension of business and great,;? profits of this instilntion. It will make the A-;' > me lie an people debtors to aliens, in near!}' tne j whole amount due to this bank, and send across ,< the Atlantic from two to five millions of specie \ \ every year to • ay the bank dividenns. In another of i s bearings this provision ig'jj' fraught with danger. Os the twenty-five di-jj< rectors of thus bank, live are chosen bv the bo- ■ vemment, and twenty by the citizen stockhol-|j' dors. From all voice in these elections, the fo-||< reign stockholders are excluded by the charter, In proportion, therefore, rs the stock is trears- j| ferred to foreign holders, the extent of sullragejj in the choice of directors is curtailed. Already l !, Its almost a third of the stock in foreign hands,! ( land no* represented in elections. It is cons*ant-! liy passing out of the count A* ; and tins act \\ f accelerate i s departure. The entire control oft ithe institution wogld necessarily lad into thejj | hands of a few citizen stockholders; and the : lease with which the object would be accomplish- j ed, would be a temptation to designing men to , isecure that coutroul in their own hands, by mo- 1 inopolizing the remaining stock. 1 hero is dan jger that a president and directors would then be ‘able to elect themselves from year to year, and, [without responsibility or control, manage the I whole concerns of the bank during the exist-j | cnee of i s charier. It is easy to conceive that i great evils to our country and its institutions | might flow from such a concentration of power j in the hands of ale-w men, irresponsible to the ; people. | Is there no danger to our liberty and indepen- j idonee in bank, that, in its nature, has so fitdeij ; to bind it to our country 1 The President of the I bank has told us that most ot the State banks ex-. |ist by its forbearance. Should its influence be jcome concentred, as it may under the operation. i of such an act as this, in the hands of a self-elec-1 ted directory, whose interests are indentifiedi wi h those of the foreign stockholder, will there j not be cause to tremble for the purity of our e-J i lections in peace, and for the independence op | our country in war ? Their power would be| ! great whenever they might choose to exert it; 1 but if this monopoly wore regularly renewed: | every fifteen or twenty years, on terms proposed! i by themselves, they might seldom in peace put forth their strength to influence elections, or 1 control the affairs of the nation. But it any pri | vate citizen or public functionary should inter | pose to curtail its powers, or prevent a renewal j of its privileges, it cannot be doubted that he I would be made to feci its influence. Should the stock of the bank principally pass | into the hands of the subjects of a foreign conn i trv, and we should unfortunately become in i volved in a war with that country, what would jbe our condition ? Os the course which would be j! pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the i | subjects of a foreign power, and managed by ■[those whose interns s, if not affections, would run ;| in the same direction, there can be no doubt. All; ji s operations within, would be in aid ot thehos-j tile fleets and armies without. Controlling ourj i currency, receiving our public moneys, and! i holding thousands of our citizens in dependancc, jit would be more formidable and dangerous than the naval and military power of the enemy. If we must have a bank with private stock - holders, every consideration of sound policy, and; every impulse of American feeling, admonishes that it should be purely American. Its stock-j holders should be composed exclusively of ouif own citizens, who, at least, ought to be friendly j j to our Government, and willing to support it in j times of difficulty and danger. So abundant is j i domestic capital, that competition in subscribing j [ for the stock of local banks has recently led al most to riots. To a bank exclusively of Arne- j rican stockholders, possessing the powers and; ! privileges granted by this act, subscriptions forj two hundred millions of dollars could be readily! obtained. Instead of sending abroad the stock 1 <—a j jof the bank in which the Government must dc- j jtposite its funds, and on which it must rely to j sustain its credit in times of emergency, it would rather seem to be expedient to prohibit its sale to aliens under penalty of absolute forfeiture. It is maintained by the advocates of the bank, i that its constitutionality in all its features ougiit ijto be considered as settled by precedent, and by; !j the decision of the Supreme Court. '1 o this con-j i elusion 1 cannot ass-nt. Mere precedent is a, j dangerous source of authority, and should not be; regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power, except where the acquiescence of the| people and the States can be* considered as well; j settled. t>o far from this being the case on tins 1 subject, an argument againsi the bank might ben based on precedent. One Congress, in decided in favor of a bank; another, in 1811, |j *! decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, de-j [cidcd against a bank ; another, in 1616, decided:] iin its favor. Prior to the present Congress, i! thcrefi-re, the precedents drawn from that source I were equal. If we resort to the States, the ex pressions of legislative, judicial, and executive opinions against the bank, have been, probably, ;to those ini’s favor, as four to one. There is : nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if i s au thority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor | of the act before me. If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered, the whole ground of this act, it ought not to con-| troi the co-ordinate authorities of this Govern [ment. The Congress, the Executive, and the! [Court, must each for itself be guided by i s own! {opinion of the constitution. Each public officer.; I who takes an oath to support the constitution, j !swears that he will support it as he understands; j it, and not as it is understood by others. It is !as much the duty of the House of Representa tives, of the Senate, and of the President, to dc-j cide upon the constitutionality of any bill or re-| solution which may be presented to them for passage or approval, as it is of the Supreme' Judges when it may be brought before them for' judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has ino more author: y over Congress, than the opin-j ion of Congress has over the judges; and, on| ; that point, the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, herefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legisla tive capaci.ies, but to have only such influence as the three of their reasoning rnav deserve. But, in the case relied upon, the Supreme! Court have not decided that all the features of this corporation are compatible with the consti-' rrmn. Lis true that the court have said that .c he law incorporating the bank is a constitution- e il exercise of power by Congress. But, taking n’o view the whole opinion of the court, and the t reasoning by which they have come to that con- .« illusion, 1 understand them to have decided that, ji inasmuch as a bank is an appropriate means for j ■ carrying into effect the enumerated powers ot 1 the General Government, therefore the law in- |< corpora ting it is in accordance with that pro vis- a ion of the cons itution which declares that Con- p urtss shall have power “to make all laws which | shall be necessary and proper far carrying these j: j towers into execution.” Having satisfied them- p Si Ives that the word “ necessary ” in the cons’it u- j tion, means “nce-djid, “ requisite , essential , | “conducive to and that “a bank” is a coaveni- j ent, a useful, and essential instrument, in the I prosecution of the Government’s “fiscal opeia- : tions,” they conclude, that to “use one must be | within the discretion of Congress,” and that “the act to incorporate the Bank of tile I uitod States is a law made in pursuance of the constitution :” | “but” say they, “where the hue is not prohibited, ! and is really calculated to effect any oj the oh- . jeets entrusted to the Government, to undertake \ 'here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, j would he to pass the hue which circuit',semes tnc , indicia I d eparimetit, and to tread on legislative ■ ground.'' | The principle here affirmed is, tnat tlie “dc- | grec of its necessity,” involving all details ot a j banking instiiu’ion, is a question exclusively for ; legislative consideration. A bank is constitu- j itional; but it is the province of the Legislature ho determine whether this or that particular ' power, privilege, or exemption, is “ necessary j ! and proper” to enable the bank to discharge i’s i duties to the Government; and, from their de cision, there is no appeal to tire courts of jus tice. Under the decision of the Supreme Court, j therefore, it is die exclusive province of Con- j gress and the President to decide whether the ! particular features of this act are necessary and j proper in order to enable the bank to perform ; conveniently and efficiently the public duties as- I signed to it as a fiscal agent, ami therefore con- 1 j stitutional; or unnecessary and improper, and j therefore unconstitutional. Witliout comment j ing on tire general principle affirmed by the Su preme Court, let us examine the details of this act in accordance with the rule of legislative ac tion which they have laid down. It will be found that many of the powers and privileges conferred on it cannot be supposed necessary for the purpose for which it is proposed to be cre ated, and are not, therefore, means necessary to attain the end in view, and consequently not jusiified by the constitution. The original act of incorporation, section 21, i enacts “that no other bank shall be established, by any future law of the United States, during ! the continuance of the corporation hereby ere. ated, for which the faith of the United States is hereby pledged: Provided, Congress may re new existing charters for banks widiin the Dis trict of Columbia, not increasing the capital thereof; and may also establish any other bank or banks in said dis’rict, with capitals not ex ceeding in the whole six millions of dollars, if they shall deem it expedient.” This provision is continued in force, by the act before me, fifteen years from the 3d of March, 1836. If Congress possessed the power to establish one bank, they had power to establish more than one, if, in their opinion, two or more banks had been “necessary” to facilitate the execution of the powers delegated to them in the constitu : tion. If they possessed the power to establish a I second bank, it was a power derived from the i constitution, to be exercised from time to time, and at any time when the interests of the coun try or the emergencies of the Government might | make it expedient. It was possessed by one Congress as well as another, and by all Con gresses alike, and alike at every session. But the Congress of 181 C have taken it away from their successors for twenty years, and the Con | gross of 1832 proposes to abolish it for fifteen I years more. It cannot bo “ necessary or “pro | per ” for Congress to barter away, or divest | themselves, of any of the powers vested in them 'j by the constitution to be exercised for the public ! good. It is not “ necessary ” to the efficiency of the bank, nor is it “ proper” in 'elation to them ! selves and their successors. They may pro ; perly use the discretion vested in them; but they j may not limit the discretion of their successors. : This restriction on themselves, and grant of a » ■ monopoly to the bank, is, therefore, unconstitu j tional. | In another point of view, this provision is a ! palpable attempt to amend the constitution by an act of legislation. The constitution declares that “the Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever,” over the District of Columbia. Its constitution al power, therefore, to establish banks in the j Dis riot of Columbia, and increase their capital ; at will, is unlimited and uncontrolable by any I other power than that which gave authority to the constitution. Yet this act declares that !- Congress shall not increase tho capital ofexist ; ing banks, nor create other banks with capitals ! exceeding, in the whole, six millions of dollars. | ij The constitution declares that Congress shall I “ II have power to exercise exclusive legislation over j this District “in all cases whatsoever;” and this' |( act declares they shall not. Which is the su j! preme law of the land ? This provision cannot be “ necessary ,” or “proper,” or constitutional, un less the absurdity be admitted, that, whatever it be “necessary and proper,” in the opinion of; Congress, they have a right to barter away one! portion ot the powers vested in them by the conJ stiiution, as a means of executing the rest. On two subjects only does the constitution recognize in Congress the power to grant ex clusive privileges or monopolies. It declares that “Congress shall have power to promote the! progress of science and useful arts by securing,' tor limited times, to authors and inventors, the 1 exclusive right to their respective writings and: dicoverirts.” Out of this express delegation of,i power, have grown our laws of patents and co py-rights. As the constitution expressly dele-j: gates to Congress the power to grant exclusive; privileges, in these cases, as the means of execu-!' tuig the substantive power “to promote the pro-' 1 gress of science and useful arts,” it is consistent: with the fair rules of construction, to conclude! that such ft power was not intended to be grant -I>. O ; j ed as a means of accomplishing any other end. I On every other subject which comes within the!' scope of Congressional power, there is an ever living discretion in the use of proper means,|| which cannot bo restricted or abolished without an amendment of the constitution. Every act ot Congress, therefore, which attempts, by grants ol monopolies, or sale of exclusive privi leges for a limited tim -, or a time without limit, to restrict or extinguish its own discretion in the choice of means to execute its delegated powers, is equivalent to a legislative amendment of the! constitution, and palpably unconstitutional. This act authorizes and encourages transfers 1 of its stock to foreigners, and grants them an exemption from ali State and national taxation. So far from being “necessary and proper that the bank should possess this power, to make it a . safe and efficient agent of the Government in itsh fiscal operations, it is calculated to convert the L Bank of the United States into a foreign bank,|. to impoverish our people in time of peace, to disseminate a foreign influence tlnouga even section of the Republic, and, in war, to endanger j our independence. . j The several States reserved tbc power,at the h formation of the constitution, to regulate and) ( control titles and transfers of real property: and ; most, if not all of them, have laws disqualifying j taliens from acquiring or holding hinds within ; 1 their limits. But this act, in disregard of the,; ! undoubted right of the States to prescribe such | disqualifications, gives to aliens, stock holuers m ;, this hank, an interest and title, as members of t.iej j corporation, to ali the real property it may ac- j 1 quire within any of the States of tins I mon. 1 his |, privilege gran ed to aliens is not “ necessary ito enable the bank to perform its public duties, nor in any sense “proper,” because it is vitally | subversive of the fights of the States, j * The Government of the United States have ;no constitutional power to purchase lands with in the Siates, except “forthe erection of forts, i magazines, arsenals, dock yards, andotboi nceu- I ful buildings;” and even for these objects only by the consent of ti*. 3 Legislature of the State iin which the same shall be.” By making fiicm !selves stockholders in the bans, and granting to I the corporation the power to purchase lands for j other purposes, they assume a power not grant led in the constitution, and grant to others what : ihey do not tliems Ives possess. It is not rteces \sary to the receiving, safe keeping, or transnns i sion of the funds of the Government, that the ; hank should possess this power; and it is not ! proper that Congress should thus enlarge the j powers delegated to them in the constitution, jj The old Bank of the United States possessed l! a capital of only eleven millions of dollars, I which was found fully sufficient to enable it, with : despatch and safety, to perform all the functions; j required of it by the Government. ihe capital |of the present bank is thirty-five millions of dol liars, at least twenty-four more than experience has proved to be necessary to enable a hank to perform its public functions. The public debt i which existed during the period ot the old bank, and on the establishment of the new, has been nearly paid off, and our revenue will soon be ! reduced. This increase ot capital is therefore | not for public, but for private purposes, j The Government is the only “ proper’’' judge where its agents should reside and keep their ot- Jices, because it host knows where their presence will he “ necessary .” It cannot, therefore, be “ necessary ” or “ proper” to authorize the hank to locate branches where it pleases to perform the public Service, without consulting the Go vernment, and contrary to its will. The prin ciple laid down by the Supreme Court, concedes that Congress cannot establish a hank for purpo ses of private speculation and gain, but only as ! a means of executing the delegated powers of; the General Government. By the same prin ciple, a branch bank cannot constitutionally he established for other than public purposes. The ! power which this act gives to establish two j branches in any State, without the injunction or | request of the Government, and for Other than j 1 public purposes, is not “ necessary” to the due : I execution of the powers delegated to Congress, j The bonus which is exacted from the bank is j a confession, upon the face of the act, that the j powers granted by it are greater than “ necessa- , ry ”to its character of a fiscal agent. The Go- j vernment does not tax its officers hr agents for the j I privilege of serving it. The bonus of a million i and a half required by the original charter, and! that of three millions proposed by this act, are not exacted for the privilege of giving “ the ne cessary facilities for transferring the public funds ; from place to place, within the United States or |(ihe Territories thereof, and for distributing the i same in payment of the public creditors, with ' out charging commission or claiming allowance !cm account of the difference of exchange,” as I required by the act of incorporation, hut for I something more beneficial to the sockholders. i The original act declares, that it (the bonus) is igranted “in consideration of the exclusive pri-! vileges and benefits conferred by this act on said jj O •' , bank,” and the act before me declares it to bed , “in consideration of the exclusive benefits and. privileges continued by this act to the said cor-|| jporation for fifteen years as aforesaid.” It is,!! I therefore, for “exclusive privileges and bene fits” conferred lor their own use and emolu- I ment, and not for the advantage of the govern ment, that a bonus is exacted. These surplus powers, for which the bank is required to pay, cannot surely be “ necessary ” to make it the fis cal agent of the Treasury. If they were, the exaction of a bonus for them would not ho “pro per.” It is maintained by some that the bank is a I means of executing the constitutional power “ to j coin money, and regulate the value thereof.” 1 i •' ' . ' I Congress have established a Mint to coin money, |; and passed laws to regulate the value thereof. I! The money so coined, with its value so regula |: ted, and such foreign coins as Congress may a !| dopt, are the only currency known to the consti jitution. But if they have other power to regu ; late the currency, it was conferred to be exer l . •/ 7 icised by themselves, and not to be transferred to a corporation. If the bank be established for ;| that purpose, with a charter unalterable without II its consent, Congress have parted with their pow- Ij er for a term of years, during which the consti tution is a dead letter. It is neither necessary nor proper to transfer its legislative power to I such a bank, and therefore unconstitutional. By its silence, considered in connexion with ! I the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of j ! McCulloch against the State of Maryland, this act takes from the States the power to tax u por tion of the banking business carried on within i their limits, in subversion of one of the stroug hest harriers which secured them against federal I encroachments. Banking, like fanning, man- ' , 1 ‘-'ii - utacturmg, or any other occupation or proles- • sion, is a business, the right to follow which is |j not originally derived from the laws. Every I! ■ citizen, and every company of citizens, in all I of our States, possessed the right, mnii the State i Legislatures deemed it good noliev to prohibit) • . cD I J I | private banking, by law. If the prohibitory h State laws were now repealed, every citizen would again possess the right. The State banks :are a qualified restoration of the right which has been taken away by the laws against hank ing, guarded by such provisions and limitations as, in, the opinion of the State Legislatures, the i public interest requires. These corporations, i unless there he an exemption in their charter, are, like private bankers and banking compa-i nies, subject to State taxation. The manner inj which these taxes shall bo laid, depends wholly ion legislative discretion. It may he upon the bank, upon the stock, upon the profits, or in any ■ other mode which the sovereign power ' y will. Upon the formation of the constitution, States guarded their taxing power with pecnl 1 I jealousy. They surrendered It only as it, ! thirds imports and exports. In relation to cvr i I other object within their jurisdiction, wh-.p.,, ' j persons, property, business, or professions, ' I was secured in ns ample a manner as it w: iS \ j j fore possessed. All persons, though U. Hy ; 'officers, are liable to a poll tax by the .Sty [ | within which they reside. The lands of the I States art' liable to the usual land tax, txce; | the new States, from whom agrcemeiVs that:; | will not tax unsold lands, are exacted \vUn: : : | are admitted into the Union: horses, wago-i y I I any beasts or vehicles, tools or property, bcl. !in g to private citizens, though employed in i service of the United States, are subject to Sty j I taxation. Every private business, wh .Ter c ■ dried on bv an officer of the General Gov. : ijment or not, whether it be mixed with pab| ;> 1 concerns or not, even if it. he carried on by t 'Government ol the I mted States its If, s-pai-- Iv or in partnership, falls within the scope oft 1 taxing power oft he State. Wothing comes ni I fully within it than banks, and the business Tanking, by whomsoever instituted and carr ion. Over this whole subject matter, it is f l!as absolute, unlimited, and uncontrolablo, :>,s 11lie consti.ntion had never been adopted, 1 ■cause, in the formation of that instrument, it Vl !reserved without qualification. ii The principle is conceded that the Statesc;,; not rightfully tax the operations of the (den jal Government. They cannot tax tlie mors •of the Government deposited in the State 1 a,,, nor the a gene v of those banks in renii knur O •> ! but will any man maintain, that their mere ;lection to perform this public service fori, j General Government would exempt the St ,; 'banks, and (heir ordinary business, ironiStv taxation ? Had the United States, instead ■cs ablishing a Bank at Philadelphia, empj.v, a private banker to keep and transmit th-; ifunds, would it have deprived Pennsylvania ■ i the right to tax Ins bank, and his usual bank!: 11operations ? It will not be protended. 1 . I what principle, then, are the banking e.s*al;!v ments of the Bank of the United States, and \h , usual hanking operations, to he exempted fro 'taxation? It is not their public agencyor ti deposit es of the Government which the St in. claim a right to tax, hut their banks and th I banking powers, instituted and exercised with, jin State jurisdiction for'their private cmk ■ment; those powers and privileges for \vh; j they pay a bonus, and which the Stales tax;:, ! their own banks. The exercise of those pi v, jers within a State, no matter by whom on; ‘■dor what authority, whether by private citi zens in their original right, by corporate borii.- created by the States, by foreigners or the agn; ■ of foreign Governments located within th : limits, forms a legitimate object of State .ox;., lion. From this and like sources, from the* pr. j sons, property, and business that are found r |siding, located, or carried off under their jnr. I i diction, must the States, since the surrender ■ j their right to raise a revenue from imports nik .'exports, draw all flic money necessary for A •[support of their Governments and the mc.nta jancc of their independence. There is no mon [appropriate subject of taxation than banks j hanking, and hank stocks, and none to which, the States ought more pertinaciously to cling. ( It cannot he necessary to the character oft:, [hank, us a fiscal agent of the Government,t jits private business should he exempted fi'.c [that taxation to which till die Stare hanks an. 'liable; nor can 1 conceive it “ proper ’’ that tk j substantive and most essential powers reserve, i by the States shall he thus attacked and uunilul ated as a means of executing the powers dcK ted to the General Government. It may k salely assumed that none of those sages who he. an agency in forming or adopting our const!v tion, ever imagined that any portion of the tax ing power of the States, not prohibited to th nor delegated to Congress, was to he swept • way and annihilated as a means of executing certain powers not delegated to Congress. If our power over means is so absolute hw! the Supreme Court will not call in question the constitutionality of an act of Congress, t!- subject of which “ is not prohibited, and is roe j!y calculated to effect any of the objects en. [trusted to the Government,” although, as in tie case before me, it takes away powers expres y j! granted to Congress, and rights scrupulously re j I served to the States, it becomes us to procr |in our legislation with the utmost caution, j Though not directly, our own powers and tli: ! rights of the States may ho indirectly legislate away in the use of means to execute suhstautiv' I powers, Wc may not enact that Congress shm not have the power of exclusive legislation ovc the District of Columbia, hut we may pledge the faith of the United States, that, as a means . of executing other powers, it shall not he oxer cised for twenty years or forever. M e nia; not pass an act prohibiting the States to lax the banking business carried on within their lim- • jits, but we may, as a means of executing our powers over other subjects, place that businvs? in the hands of our agents, and then declare it exempt from State taxation in their hands. 1 lip may our own powers and the rights ot th States, which we cannot directly curtail or in vade, be frittered away and extinguished in fn use of means employed by us to execute oth powers. That a Bank of the United State? . competent to all the duties which may be r quired by the Government, might be so organiz ed as not to infringe on our own delegated p 0' v ! ers, or the reserved rights of the States, 1 ! inot entertain a doubt. Had the Executive h rs I called upon to furnish the project of such an ; . stitution, the duty would have been chcerf performed. In the absence of such a call, i obviously proper that he should confine him> to pointing out those prominent features in ’ act presented, which, in his opinion, make it i compatible with the constitution and sound po cy. A general discussion will now take pla A ' [eliciting new light, and settling important pm I ciples ; and a new Congress, elected in the mid iof such discussion, and furnishing an equal to : presentation of the people according to the Ia : [census, will hoar to the Capitol the verdict c | public opinion, and, i doubt not, bring tins n Iportant question to a satisfactory result. ■ Under such circumstances, the Bank com? I forward and asks a renewal of its cliai’ter for [term offifoeen years, upon conditions which n [only operate as a gratuity to the stockhoide'-’|| ijof many millions of dollars, but will sanctio-1 '[any abuse and legalize any encroachments. ; Suspicions are entertained, and charges at 'made, of gross abuse and violation ot itscha ; j ter. An investigation unwillingly conceded, a"- t ■so restricted in time as necessarily to max? ) incomplete and unsatisfactory, discloses enou£ to excite suspicion and alarm. In the practic ijof the principal bank partially unveiled, in r II absence of important witnesses and in nwm e, '|