Newspaper Page Text
BY P. C. GIiKV. AZTGI 7,S2VI, («?«•) TUESOAY', .JEMIUSi 11, 1834. VOL. XI. NO. 76.
THE CONSTITUTION A LIST.
Published every Tuesday and Friday,
IN MACINTOSH STREET,
Third door from the north-west corner of Broad-Street.
Sales of LAND, by Administrators, Executors, or Guardians, arc
required, by law, to be held on the first Tuesday in the month,
between the hours of ten in the forenoon and three in the after
noon, at the Court-House in which the properly is situate. —No-
tice of these sales must he given in a public Gazette SIX'! \
DAYS previous to the day of sale.
Bales of NEGROES must be at public auction, on the first Tues
* rf*T of the mouth, between the usual hours of gale, at lue place
' of'public sales in the county where the letters Testamentary, of
Administration or Guardianship, may have been granted, first
giving SIXTY DAYS notice thereof, in one of the public Ga
zettes of this State, and at the door of the Court House, where
such sales are to be held.
Notice for the sale of Personal Property must be gi-ven in like man
ner, FORTY days previous to the day of sale.
Notice to the Debtors and Creditors of ah Estate must be published
for FORTY DAYS.
Notice that application will be made to the Cbnrt of Ordinary for
leave to sell LAND, must be published for FOUR MON'l US.
Notice for leave to sell NEGROES, mast be published for f Ol R
" • before any order absolute shall be made by the Court.
Removal of tlie I>epo*»ites.
SPEECH OF MR. FORSYTH. OF GEORGIA ,
In the Senate of the United States, January, 1834,
’On the subject of the Removal of the Depo
sites from the Rank of the United States.
I hold it fortunate, Mr. President, that it was
toot necessary for me to enter upon the cold and
temperate examination that I propose to make of
this subject, at the close of the very impassion
ed address of the Senator from South Carolina,
(Mr. Preston.) 1 can now scarcely hope to se
cure so much of the attention of the Senate as
shall be necessary for my purpose —then it would
have been impracticable. Long a member to
'Congress, I have witnessed frequently scenes
like the present when difficulties and dangers
were said to hover over us; have open heard
■animated appeals to popular feeling ; fervid de
nunciations of abuse of power ; awful antici
pations of forth-coming evil. The country has
survived, nevertheless —the lapse of a few
months, or weeks, or days, have dissipated the
apprehensions of the timid, and falsified the pro
phecies of the bold. The crises have, in suc
cession, passed away, and the frightful pictures
that have been exhibited here, have proved to
be but “ fancy sketches.” To those who have
not been long members of the Legislative body,
I will recall an incident brought to mind by an
•allusion in this discussion, that may serve to sus
tain them under the gloomy forebodings of the
Senators from Kentucky and South Carolina.
The establishment of the independence of the
U. States was followed by trials of the virtue
and fortitude of the people-, equal, if not greater
than those of war. Out of these trials arose
the Federal Convention 5 the result of their la
bors was the constitution of our Government,
which was presented to the people of the States
for th eir ratification or rejection. To every
State, as the question of adoption was submitted,
anxious eyes were turned; hut to none with
such deep and solemn earnestness as to the State j
of Virginia, then the leading Slate in popula- ]
tion, revolutionary services, and intellectual |
power. Among her celebrated sons who were <
assembled to discuss and decide that vital topic, 5
appeared a man endowed by nature with the «
rarest gifts of eloquence, cultivated assiduously r
through a long life at the forum, and in the ,
Halls of legislation. Patrick Henry—who was, ,
1 understand, connected with the Senator Irom (
South Carolina ; and it is not difficult to believe ,
that blood from the same source runs in his veins, ,
since the exhibition of his powers here —was 1
opposed to the adoption of the proposed Consti- .
tution—that voice which, like the trumpet call,
had animated the hopes arid fortified the cour- :
age of his country in the hours of her severest .
suffering, was raised to warn her against the ,
new and dangerous system prepared for her fu
ture government. He persuaded, he threaten- ■
ed, he argued, he prophesied —public liberty ,
was to be lost—property, life, and honor were (
to he unsafe. But all was vain. The purse .
and the sword were entrusted to an alien go- 1
vernment, and peace, prosperity, liberty, and ,
glory, were secured to the people and to the
States. That illustrious man lived long to en
]ov the glorious spectacle ot his country s hap
piness—to rejoice that the dulcet and harmoni
ous sounds he had poured into the ears of his
entranced auditors ; the images of tearful por
tent he had created in their inflamed imagina- .
lions, were powerless to produce convictions on
their judgment, or to make abiding impressions
on their hearts.
Both the resolutions of the Senator from Ken- ,
lucky arc objectionable, in form and substance. 1
They are censorial, not corrective; vindictive, j
not legislative. They strike at a supposed of. j
fender —-they offer no redress for the asserted 1
injury. They are justly exposed to all the re
prehension of the Senator from Missouri. The
first resolution can be defended on but one (
ground—the right of the Senate to the eXpies
sion of its opinions, to appeal to the people, to
control the exercise of power by the elective
franchise—a call upon the people to awaken
from a false security, and rescue their endanger
ed prosperity from the hands of a corrupt, im- j
provident, or unwise administration. Icca- ]
sions for such expressions of opinion are ol rare
occurrence. They cannot bo made wit any i
show of justification when the legislative power ,
of Congress is not ample to redress this irnput- 1
ed wrong? If the act done is corrupt in the ,
Chief Magistrate or Secretary, impeach and s
punish—if they have acted unwisely, but not ,
corruptly, legislate and control them. ]
The deposites have been removed from the ]
United States Bank. The Secretary ol the (
Treasury has told us that in the exercise ol the j
power given to him by the charter, le ias e- (
cided that time and circumstances required him -
to perform the act. The President approves ,
the act He has done more, he urged the tor- ,
mcr Secretary of the Treasury to perform it. ,
In my judgment the disposition of the deposites ,
is neither the primary nor preliminary, but a de- ,
pendent question. Changing the place o co- 1
lecting eight or nine millions of dollars tan e
of no great consequence in its effects lO the hi- 1
siness or the currency of the country. The 1
most enlightened of the friends ot the bank ad- (
mil, that, of iiself, the order ot the Secretary ,
has not produced or ought to have produced se- <
nous embarrassment in the systems of credit or
exchange. The derangement, the pressure in ]
the moneyed transactions of the commercial ci- <
lies, proceed from the act of the bank, which 1
wants to ascertain what is to be its fate. Is the
charter to expire in 1836, or to be renewed 1
If the charter is not to be renewed, a change
• in the place of deposites was a thing of course,
and certainly there can be no ground for cla
morous complaints at the performance of an act
now, which must be performed at no distant day.
On this preliminary question, I have no de
sire to conceal my opinions. Under :he stern
necessities of the year 1814, I advocated with
zeal the establishment of a National Bank as
the best if not the only certain mode of procur
ing funds for carrying on the war. Jn 1816 I
voted to charter the present bank, not as a mea,
sure of necessity, but of convenience, to aid in,
the restoration of a sound currency. 1 bo!ie*4;
it has done good. lam sure it has attempted
to do much evil. I will not consent to the re
newal of the present charter; but for a bank
properly controlled, with salutary restrictions
upon its power, I stand ready to vote to-morr'ow,
without regard to the wishes of the existing or
expected administrations. My opinions of the
constitutionality or the expediency of public
measures are not regulated by the probable ef
fects of those measures on the fortunes of ad
ministrations or of men. Recharter the bank,
with or without modifications, establish another
to be the immediate successor of the present,
and the clamor and the question about the de
posites is at an end. Let those who believe it
practicable to create an institution which will
reconcile conflicting opinions, make the experi
ment at once. Ido not. To me the question
seems virtually decided. The people are against
the bank. For expressing and acting upon this
conviction, the President and the Secretary of
the Treasury have been severely arraigned by
the Senator Irom Kentucky.
He has examined at large the messages of the
President, to prove that he made no issue with
the bank at the late election. The opinions of
the Chief Magistrate are clearly and explicitly
expressed in all his messages. The veto of the
hill for re-chartering the bank could nqj be mis
taken ; admitting, however, that the senator is
correct, that the President did not present the
issue of bank or no bank to the people. The is
sue, the senator well knows, is made by the two
parties and not by one of them; that was done
by his opponents, by the bank itself, and all the
parties who were connected with it in the strug
gle for power—they made the issue—they pre
sented the question distinctly and intelligibly to
the people. After the bank had, contrary to
the earnest remonstrances of its friends, who
were also the friends of the administration,
urged its pretensions successfully to congress,
and had been foiled by the President; did they
not Appeal to the people through all their organs
of the press—what said the senator from Massa
chusetts in his examination of the veto message :
“ there is no longer doubt of the President’s opin
ions”—“the bank has fallen, or is to fall.” —
The only hope of escaping the impending ruin,
is “ a change in the councils of the nation.” By
the right of self-defence which it claims, the
bank poured out its money to the owners of pres
ses to spread abroad this and other similar
speeches, all of them burthened with the same
song, “the councils of the nation must be
Changed or the bank must go down.” Os this
right of self-defence to which the bank makes
claim, I shall say nothing. Unfortunately it
committed the mistake 100 common to us all —it
confounded recrimination and defence. The
strongest efforts were made to poison the public
mind against the President —especially in Penn
sylvania, the strong hold of the bank, whose
legislature had by unanimous vote recommended
a re-charter; more than 100,000 copies of the
speeches of the honorable senator from Massa
chusetts, (Mr. Webster,) had been distributed
in Pennsylvania alone. True to her early love
and early hate, Pennsylvania preferred General
Jackson and no bank, to a bank and any other
candidate; and now, amidst all the fury of the
storm raised by the recontact of the administra
tion, he rests triumphantly secure upon that
great key-stone of the federal arch. Shall we
be told, sir, that the people had no right to set
tle this question? I had not supposed it possible
for any man who had ever held an office from
the people, to deny the power, the right of the
people thus to decide all questions of govern
ment policy. Can we, acting on the broad as
sertion of the senator from South Carolina, (Mr.
Preston,) control, or even embarrass for any
length of time, the exercise of the power of the
people ? Remember, sir, this is not a question
of repealing but re-enacting laws. The will ot
the people of the United States—the bare major
ity of the people of the United States, residing
in the great Stales, only, can and will decide, if
they have not already pronounced their decree.
A majority of the other branch of Congress, se
lected bv a majority of the whole people, can
control the fate of the bank against the united
force of this body, and of the Executive, and ol
the governments of all the states. How power
less are we, when the Executive and the popu
lar branch combine against us, and the State so
vereignties direct their representatives here, to
follow in their train. Os the decision which has
been or will be made, 1 shall speak with the
respect due to those who have made, or will
make it. The second experiment of abandon
ing a national bank, will indeed be tried under
the happiest auspices. Specie is abundant —
the government is free from debt—the people
are prosperous —the state institutions in the best
credit—the government deposites, and the de
posites of individuals in the banks, are unusually
large—foreign exchange is, and promises to
continue in onr favor—large and constantly
increasing supplies of the precious metals
drawn from recently discovered sources, ot
whose existence no one dreamed. While peace
and prosperous days are ours, the aid ot a bank
will not be required—but when the hour of dan
ger and difficulty comes, when large and un
restrained emissions of paper, necessary for the
government itself, drives the precious metals
f rom our shores, the want of the great balance
wheel will, I fear, be felt, and we may be driven,
under circumstances adverse to sa.utary precau
tion, to force it again into the machine. I sin
cerely hope that in this opinion 1 am great!}
deceived, that the hard-money days may indeed
come, and speedily come, and always contmufe.
All the measures appropriate to hasten that period,
I shall freely support, having learned the neces
sity, and indeed the duty, of cheerful obedienoe
to the will of the people.
e The time chosen for changing the place of
? the government deposites, has been a subject of
e reprehension ; it was done, senators say, but
i, two months before congress met. Had 1 been
- an adviser of the President, I should have rs
t commended delay. I should have said to him,
. 1 believe that the people have decided against a
- bank; that the majority of the representatives
o of the people, elected under the new census,
0 bringing with them the popular sentiment, will
s record that judgment; but I advise you not to
- take it for granted that you understand the opin
-1 ions of the House of Representatives.
j It is possible that the people may have con
i tinued you in place, and yet desire the continu
i ance of the institution ; wait until a vote of the
1 House of Representatives renders their opinion
- not a matter of argument, but of undisputed and
: indisputable fact. The President has chosen to
s act upon the strong presumption afforded by the
, result of his own, and of the other popular elec
■ lions. His justification depends upon the estnb
i lishment of the fact presumed. But what right
: have we to complain? The course of the sen
• ate was not misunderstood. Bad it been, would
• it have been criminal in the President, or in the
, Secretary o r the Treasury, to believe, and to
• act on the belief, that changes ofopinion regard
i ing the bank had been wrought here by chan
ges in the State Governments. Ca.n it be matter
of supposition what are the wishes of the Slate
Sovereignties ? Do they not co rrespond with
the wishes of their respective sovereigns, with
the wishes ofthe sovereigns of the U. States?
Rut, sir, the President is arraigned for the ex
■ ercise of an usurped authority over the public
treasure. In the language of the senator from
Kentucky, he has laid an unhallowed hand upon
the public purse. Is this fact, or groundless as
sumption? By changing the places of collect
ing and depositing the revenue, has he increased
his power .over the money of the people? Can
he now touch it without polluting his hands?—
Can the Secretary of the Treasury use one dol
lar of the public money in the .State banks, more
than he could before, when it -was in the bank
of the United States and its branches? The
same guarantees for the safety of our treasure
now exist that formerly existed. The power of
the President is neither increased nor diminished.
If corrupt, the public money wa.s equally within
his reach in the Bank ofthe United States as in
the State Banks. But gentlemen assert that he
has assumed the same power over the purse that
he has over the sword. True, sir, he has exer
cised the same power over the purse and the
sword. He has rightfully the srllne power over
the sword and purse. He cannot bse, and never
has used either, without legislative authority,
given according to the provisions of the consti
tution. Can he unsheath the sword to strike
abroad or at home ? Can he lift, his hand against
foreign violence or domestic treason without our
leave ? So is it with the purse, he cannot, he
dare not, touch one mill without legislative per
mission. A suggestion has been made, Mr.
President, which 1 heard with regret, that the
public money has been placed in favorite parti
san banks, where it is likely to be used for all
purposes of speculation and peculation. This
means, I presume, that the deposites being
changed to the State banks, a new and unwor
thy class of persons will receive loans who could
not have obtained them from the bank of the U.
States. This sweeping denunciation of the res
pectable and irreproachable directors of all the
Slate institutions trusted by the Secretary o! the
Treasury, is without the shadow of foundation.
For skill and integrity they stand as fair as the
directors ofthe bank of the United States or any
ofits branches. The phrases of favorite parti
san banks show how idle the suggestion is. Of’
banks now the depositories of the public money,
the great mass are managed by persons deci
dedly opposed to the administration—who, on the.
question of rechartering the bank of the United
States, differ with the Executive—whose influ -
eilce and whose votes were against the present
Chief Magistrate at the last election.
The honorable Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
Clay) denies that the President has any conn ol
over the Treasury Department, and that his in
terference in the exercise of the discretion ves
ted in that officer is an usurpation of authority,
if not for corrupt purposes, leading to dangerous
results. He admits that the control of the Ex
ecutive* over the other Cabinet Ministers is cc m
plete. The Secretary of the Treasury is assor,
ted to be exempt from this controlling power,
and is responsible to Congress and to Congress
only for the wisdom or purity with which his
discretion is exercised. This distinction seems
tome to be fancied, not resting upon any suffi*
cicnt basis in the Constitution of the United
States, or in the laws organizing the Depart
ments. In truth, sir, it is really founded upon a
difference in the title ofthe acts establishing the
Treasury, and the other ExecufiveDepartments.
The tides are “ An act to establish the Treasu
ry Department—An act to establish an Execu
tive Department, called the Department of War,”
&c. Bow this difference of title arose is not
apparent from the Journals of the Congress of
1789. All the bills for establishing the Depart,
ments, \Vere reported under a resolution of the
House of Representatives, “that it was expedi
ent to establish Executive Department- of War,
Navy and Treasury,” the bills had the same ti
tles; yet, when the hills passed and it was no
cessary to give titles to the acts, the title of the
bill respecting the Treasury Department was
not given to the act. The words “to establish
an Executive Department, to be called the
Treasury Department,” were changed, and he
came, to establish the Treasury Department.
Is it not obvious to the most superficial ohserva
tion, that the alteration was made to avoid tau
tologv? A design to make a distinction between
the responsibilities of the head of the Treasury
Department, and the other Executive Depart
ments, cannot be even plausibly inferred from
this cause.
It is further alleged that the terms of the act
establishing the Treasury Department prove
that the Secretary was not to be under the con
trol of the Executive. It is made his duty “to
prepare and report plans for the improvement
and management of the public revenue, and for
the support of public credit ;” and “ to report to
either house of Congress upon any subject refer
red to him,” &c. The Secretary being bound
to report to Congress, and not to the Executive,
! it is gravely urged that the responsibility of the
| Secretary must he to Congress, and not to the
l Executive. These clauses in the act of 1789
i were not admitted without dispute and animad
l version. The construction now put upc n them
i would be truly surprising to the disputants of that
■ day. Then it was urged by the objectors to
, the introduction of them, that it gave power to
i the Secretary over Congress ; not power to Con
i gross over the Secretary. [See Marshall’s
, Life of Washington—pages 200 to 205.] They
were defended and retained on the simple ground
• that they were intended merely to procure, di
rectly and conveniently, information in detail
from the best and most practical source. No
one maintained or imagined that any change in
the responsibility of the Secretary was to result
from them. Gentlemen seem to be entirely un
conscious of the effect of their hypothesis. If
they are right, the responsibility of a Secretary
of the Treasury for a wise administration of his
department, is nominal—it has no sanction.
According to true theory, all the Executive offi
cers of Government are responsible for the pu
rity and wisdom of their conduct in the execu
tion of the duties devolved upon them; to the
Executive and to Congress, for their purity—to
the Executive alone for their wisdom; The
hypothesis of Senators does not touch the res
ponsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury
through an impeachment; but in this he is in no
respect different from the other heads of depart,
ments —it destroys all responsibility for the wis
dom of his acts. He reports to Congress, and
proves his folly or improvidence. What reme
dy has Congress to apply ? It can apply none.
The two branches of the Legislature may indeed
decide that the removal of the officer would be
proper. But this act must be performed by the
Executive. We have here, then, a nominal re
sponsibility to Congress, resting for its efficacy
on the only constitutional sanction, the Execu
live power of removal.
There is another strange consequence to
which I would call the attention of honorable
Senators, springing from their hypotuesis. If
the obligation lo report to a particular part of
the government establishes the exclusive res
ponsibility of theofficei to the authority to which
his report is made, then the Secretary of the
Treasury is responsible to the whole Legislature
for his general reports on the revenue and for
his plans for supporting public credit, and res
ponsible to that branch ofCongress only to which
his reports on referred subjects are made. Here
we have established another and still more loose
responsibility in that officer. Supposing him
to betray gross ignorance or consummate folly,
what can either Bouse do to rescue the adminis
tration of the Treasury from his hands? Must
there he a supplication to the President to re
move him? a supplication from Congress to the
President to remove the officer for acts, for the
faithful or wise performance of which he is not
responsible to the Executive ? What a whim
sical spectacle would be exhibited if this thing
was practically applied, and the President
should, as he justly might, replies to us or to the
House of Representatives, Gentlemen, the Se
ere.ary is bound by law to make report to you,
atid to you alone, therefore, is he responsible.
It is ho part of ray duty to control or to punish
the honest exercise of a conscientious discretion
vested by yourselves. Thus, sir, honorable Se
nators, in seekihg to withdraw the Secretary of
the Treasury from his constitutional responsibil
ity to the Chief Magistrate, are proving that he
is above all control, while his conduct cannot be
connected by proof with criminal intention.
The contradictory language to which the honor
able Senator has been driven in describing the
character of this department should have shaken
his faith in the accuracy of his theory. He
does not pretend that it is legislative or judicial.
■Not being executive, what is it ? We are told
that its duties are administrative. Indeed ; and
what are administrative duties but executive du
ties! Administrative, relates to administration,
that which administers is administrative. As
applied to government, the chief executive ma
gistrate, a President, or holding any other title,
administers. His duties are administrative.
The honorable Senator is thus driven in soekihg
to find a distinctive, descriptive word, to use one
equivalent to executive, in his attempt to prove
that the Treasury duties are not executive in
their character.
It is alleged, Mr President, that the charter of
the bank vests an authority over the Govern
ment deposites in the Secretary of the Treasury
independent of the Chief Magistrate, because
the reasons for removing the deposites must be
reported to Congress. I have already shown
that the obligation to report to Congress did not
change the responsibility of the Secretary, or if
it did it, renders him in effect an irresponsible
agent, beyond all control, while his errors pro
ceed from no criminal intent. I have not at.
tempted to show* that Congress can have no
power to weaken the authority ofthe President
by creating a new and diminishing the ordinary
responsibility of a subordinate to the Chief Exe
cutive M agist rate. Congress nev r intended to
give a personal discretion to the officer at the
head ot the R reasury. The discretion given is
official, and subject, like all other discretionary
power to inferior officers, to the controlling
authority of the Executive. The discretion
was given with the well-understood qualification,
that it was to be exercised in subordination to
the duty of the President, who is bound hv the
most solemn of all obligations to see the laws
faithfully executed—who is responsible to his
country and to his God for the purity and wis
dom of all the officers under his executive con
trol in the discharge of their respective trusts.
I like not the phrase, “I take the responsibility,”
which has been so harshly condemned. I like
it not, because it would seem to imply that the
President could have avoided the responsibility
ot the removal of the deposites. He could not
escape his just share ofihe public ordium or ap
probation of this measure. What would have
been the language of those who have condemn,
ed the President, if the removal had been made
under the Secretary’s discretionary power, con
trary to his declared judgment of the injustice
and impolicy of the act? ~He would have es
caped the odious appellations of usurper and
tyrant, bestowed so ireely upon him, but he
would have been saluted with the not less vile
epitnets of driveller and dotard. Be would have
been called a miserable old woman, fit onlv to
hatch chickens at the Hermitage, since he was
incapable, by the exercise of his constitutional
authority, cf preventing the ruin brought down
1 upon us by the folly or madness of a perverse
subordinate.
In utter forgetfulness ofthe express provision
of the Constitution empowering the President to
require the opinion of the heads of departments
in writing, oh their respective duties, the Sena,
tor from Kentucky said, in a tone of triumph,
“the President had no right either by tlx con
stitution or law to go to the other Secretaries to
ask them how a service should be performed,
which was confided exclusively to the judgment
ofthe Secretary of the Treasury; he might as
well have asked the Secretary ofthe Treasury
ho\V a movement of the army should be made
by the Secretary of War,” Ac. Ac. Well, sir,
is it not in the experience of that Senator that
Secretaries ofthe Treasury have been consult
ed about the plans of campaigns and the move
ments ofthe military and naval force ofthe Uni
ted States? Is it not every day’s practice to
call upon him for opinions relating to the duties
ot all the bther Secretaries? If any doubt could
exist ol the power of the President to see that
every discretion vested in the heads of depart
ments was faithfully and wisely exercised, the
clause in the constitution to which 1 haveallud
ed would remove it. Why should the Presi
dent be authorized lo require the opinions ofone
Secretary about the duties of another, hut to
enlighten his judgment as to the proper mode of
having those duties performed? Why should he
form a deliberate judgment, if the power is not
given him to control the Secretary, to see that
the laws prescribing that Secretary’s duties are
faithfully executed ? Under the constitution,
Congress cannot divest the Executive of control
over those who are his eyes and hands to per
form the appropriate function. Congress haVe
by no previous enactments made such preten
sion.
It has been justly urged, Mr. President, that
under this view of the Executive power over sub
ordinate officers ofthe Treasury, he might inter:
sere directly in the settlement bf accounts by the
Auditors and Comptrollers—could say, ‘‘pass
this account,” or “ refuse that account,” under
penalty ot ejection from office. Thepersonal in
terference of the Chief Magistrate in the settle
ment of accounts certainly never Was contem
plated—that he libs the power to interfere is un
doubted—that it would be his duty, under pro
bable circumstances, cannot be fairly question,
ed. Suppose a corrupt understanding, or an
erroneous judgment of an Auditor and Comp
troller operating with uniform injustice to a par
ticular class of persons, or injuriously to the pub
lie; the duty of the Executive is apparent —the
instant expulsion ofthe officers, if corrupt —the
correction of their judgments, if erroneous. If
the error was persisted in; a removal from office,
and the substitution of those who would be just
to individuals and to the public. That a Presi
dent might interfere corruptly is certainly true
—this possibility does not prove the want of pow
er or the propriety of withholding it. No Pre- I
sident can, in this regard, act corruptly without
certain detection, immediate exposure, and pro
bable punishment by impeachment. Sad indeed,
sir, would be the condition of the country if the
rights of individuals and of the public were in
the irresponsible hands of every subordinate
officer who settles accounts in the Treasury or
other Departments ofthe Government.
The President of the United States and the
late Secretary of the Treasury seem, sir, to have
well understood their respective powers and ob
ligations. When the question ofthe removal of
the deposites was first agitated, Mr. Duane,with
the frankness and firmness entitled to public re
spect, opposed the measure —it was one he could
not sanction, but if resolved upon by the Presi
dent, he would give way for another, who coin,
ciding with the President, could act without
scruple or hesitation. After a thorough inves
tigation oftiie various arguments submitted to
him, the President made his decision, and then,
unfortunately, Mr. Duane declined fulfilling his
voluntary engagement. The cause assigned,
was still more unfortunate. Me conceived that
he was insulted. This did not absolve him from
his engagement; indeed it should have furnished
a new motive for withdrawing. If treated cour
teously, his resignation should have been tender
ed out of respect to the President; if rudely, he
should have thrown back upon the President his
commission from respect to himself. Honorable
Senators censure without measure the paper
read to the cabinet by the President. The ex
ercise of ordinary chajity would place the sub
ject in a very different light from that thrown
upon it here. Is it not apparent from the docu
ment itself, recollecting the preceding and alien
dant circumstances, that the sole object of the
President was to shield Mr. Duane from the re
sponsibility of the act which he seemed to dread?
The President desired to take the whole, to re
concile his Secretary to the course resolved on.
Entertaining a conscientious conviction that the
course was fraught with injurious consequences
to the public, the Secretary would have been
faithless had he accepted the offered shelter.—
He was only wrong in shifting the ground upon
which he stood. No honest Secretary will ev.
or put his hand to a work which, in his judgment,
will bring ruin or distress upon his country. No
public officer is bound to suffer even uncourte
ous treatment from the chief magistrate ; the
only honorable step in either case, is resigna
tion of office, and submission of his conduct to
the judgment of that great tribunal, public opin
ion, to which all must yield a cheerful or forced
obedience. If little charity has been shown to
the President, by what term shall I describe the
treatment of the present Secretary ofthe Troa
sury, distinguished through a long life as a poli
tician, and as a man, by his urbanity and cour-*
tesy and viriue? Po call it harsh would not
convey an adequate idea of its extreme injustice.
An officer, who, previous to his appointment to
the Treasury Department, had urged upon the
President by tact and argument the propriety ol
the removal ofthe deposites, is accused of being
made the supple tool of the executive, for the
performance of that act; is represented rs stan
ding by, the cold spectator of tlie struggles of
his colleague, in the contest between his con.
science and his attachment to the chiet magis
trate ; as witnessing the contemptuous expul
sion of that colleague from office, and then cool
ly entering the vacant place, without sympathy
or the smallest emotion tor the man who prefer
red the loss of honors and emoluments to a be
trayal of the interests of the people.' The pre
sent Secretary leit a place of honor for another
not more honorable; a place of great responsi
bility for one ofgrfeater responsibility; a place,
uniting honor and profit, which’ the condition of
a large family impelled him to regard, for an
honorable place, the profits of which areinsnffi
d’ent to defray his necessarily increased expen
ditures. These circumstancbsalone should pro
tect him from the slightest censure ; but ho
stood t ommitted to the President by his previous
ly given advice, and when called upon to per
form a task he had urged upon his colleague, he
could not; without dishonor, have disobeyed the
call. He stood pledged lo the Chief Magistrate
and to the country, and he has not shrunk from
his duty. He abides with unshaken confidence
in the justice of his country, all the consequences
of the act he recommended to another and per
lorrbeu himself. And how is he represented here
by the Senators from Kentucky (Clay) and So.
Carolina (Calhoun) ?as claiming all power to*
himself, and denying all power to Congress ; as
claiming to himseit and the Executive ad autho
ritative controul over the whole,treasure of the
nation, and denying the right of Congress to in
terfere. This is a terrible position to an officer
whose duties are prescribed by Congress, who
is now dependant upon Congress for his contin
uance in an office which he is accused of hav
ing earned, regardless of the feelings and honor
of a colleague, by base subserviency to the
mandates df a ruthless master.
Let us examine, it in tact the Secretary claims
this extensive, exclusive power. The Secret
ary holds that the charter of the bank is a con
tract between the Government of the United
States and the stockholders—is this denied?—
The Secretary holds, that by that contract the
power to remove the deposites is expressly giv
en to the Secretary ofthe Treasury, and to him
alone. Is this denied? In the execution of that
contract, the Secretary holds that he must be the
agent to exercise that potter, and that it cannot
be exercised by any other Agent without a viola
tion of the obligation ofthe Government. Is this
denied? The Secretary holds that the removal
ot thedmxisiles by himself is in conformity with
the conmict, and prostrates the only obstacle
to the exertion ot the power of Congress over
the whole subject, and all the interests connected
with it. So far from claiming, therefore, power
to the prejudice ofCongress; so far from deny
ing orsattempting to resist their authdrity, he has
loosened thh bonds imposed by Congress on their
own hands; Supposing him to have been mista
taken in hiS construction ofthe charter of the
bank, admitting that Congress had the same
power as the Secretary, or unlimited power over
the deposites, there is now no pfetext for accu
sing the Secretary ofthe Treasury of setting up
claims to an authority above the power of Con
gress.
The honorable censurers ofthe Secretary ac
cuse him of a misconstruction of the 16th sec.
lion of the bank charter. The power given to
4|he Secretary “lo order and direct” the govern
ment deposites to be “otherwise” made than in
the bank ofthe United Stares, is alleged to have
been given for a single object, the safety of the
public mohey. This construction, in glaring con.,
tradiction ofthe broad and unqualified terms of
the section, is founded upon an assumption that
the discretion of the department is necessarily
limited by the nature bf its duties, these being
fiscal, his reasons for exercising the discretion
must be fiscal reasons. Hence it is concluded,
tiiat the deposites must be in danger before he :
can properly act. The premises and the conclu
sion are not very closely connected. If the
premises are true ; if the discretion is limited by
the fiscal character of the department, there
might exist many and various fiscal reasons for
changing the place df deposite, perfectly consis
tent with theirsafety in the bonk. I will men
tion but one. Suppose the bank systematically
refused accommodations to the merchants in
debted to the government, with or without re
gard to their political opinions, the safety of the
deposites would not be endangered, yet I cant
scarcely conceive that it will be denied, that the
fact being certain, it did not afford a sufficient
fiscal reason for the exercise of the Secretary’s!
discretionary power. This construction of the
16th section has, however, Mr. President, one
great and uncommon merit—it is perfectly new.
It may be correct, hut I will proceed to show;
that from the establishment of the bank to the
late order of Mr. Taney, all the opinions expres
sed by individuals or committees in Congress,’
sustain the opposite construction ; opinions per
fectly in accordance with the actions and con
victions of every head ofthe Treasury Depart,
ment from that hour until the present. Without
referring lo the general doctrines of those who
advocated the hank of the United States, I con
fine myself to the period succeeding to the incor
poration ofthe present bank. The subscription
to the capital stock ofthe bank was in due time
filled, the first instalment paid, the first board of
directors appointed. Prior to any preparation
of notes for circulation, the hoard of diiectorA
at their first meeting, very shortly preceding the
time fixed for the payment ofthe second instal.
ment due by the stockholders, adopted a rcso
lution by which the subscribers could, by the use
of stock notes, secured by transfers of their
bank stock or public stock, at 90 per cent, on
nominal value, evade the payment ofthe specie
required by the charter. A resolution was pas
sed hv the House of Representatives, directing
the committee on the currency—ihe Senator
from South Carolina (.Mr.Calhoun) was its chair
man—to inquire info the facts, and into the ex
pediency of adopting measures to enforce the
payment of the specie part of the capital withiri
a limited time. The committee addressed them
selves to Mr. Lloyd, of Massachusetts, a direc
tor of the bank. The fact was admitted, the
convenience of the resolution alloyed, And an ar
gument offered to prove that it was not incon
sistent with the obligations of the charter. The
committee, convinced by Mr. Lloyd, asked to be
discharged from the further consideration ofthe
resolution. Not satisfied with ihe letter of Mr.
Lloyd, or the opinion ofthe Committee, I had
the honor to propose two resolutions to the house
to correct the proceedings of the board, and to
compel ft future observance of the charter. The
Senate will not understand me as quoting my
own resolutions as authority. I read them to
show the opinion then entertained of the use
which might be properly made of the deposites
as an instrument to correct or restrain the usur
pations Or irregularities of the bank.
[Continued on fourth page.]