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BY I*. C. GLTEI.
THE CONSTITUTIONALIST.
OFFICE IN McINTOS 11-STREET,
Third door frum the \orth- UV*f corner of liroad-tt.
Sal<t* of LAND by Administrators, Executor*, or
Guardians, are required, by law, to 1>« held on the
first Tuesday m the month, between the hours of
ten in the forenoon and three in the afternoon, at
the Court House in which the properly in situate.
Notice of these sales must be pivrn in a public
Gazette sixty days previous to the day of sale.
Sales of NEGROES must be at public auction, on
the first Tuesday of the month, between the usual
hours of sale, at the place of public sales in the
county where the Letters Testamentary, or Ad
ministration, or Guardianship, may have been
granted, first giving sixty days’ notice thereof,
in one of the public Gazettes of this State, and at
the door of the Court House where such sales are
to be held.
Notice fur the sale of Personal Property must l>c
given in like-manner forty days j*re\ iouslo day
of sale.
Notice to the Debtors and Creditors of an Estate,
must be published for forty days.
Notice that application will he made to the Court of
Ordinary for leave to sell LAND, must be pub
lished for FOUR MONTHS. -
Notice for leave to sell NEGROES, must bo pub
lished focr months before any order absolute
can be given by the Court.
LETTER OF THE HON. A 11. CHAPPELL.
[concluded.]
Let not any man suppose that, if the
|>ol icy of distribution is begun, it would
soon stop of itsedf, by the exhaustion of the
public lands; and that, therefore, no' limi
tation of time need he enacted against it.
The amount of the public lands still re
inaining is immense, and sales must con
tinue to be made of them for an indefinite
ly long time—even though we look not to
Oregon, which is already ours, unless we
shall determine to cower and retire
from our own vast domain there, under
the growlings of the audacious British lion;
or although wo should lose sight of Texas,
which is certainly destined to our embrace
and possession, unless the inestimable ac
quisition is rejected by the dominant sec
tional majority of this Union, in deference
again to Great Britain, in hatred of south
ern institutions and grandeur, and in or
der to perpetuate the supremacy of the
non-slaveholding portion of the confedera
cy over all the rest. For these, it cannot
he doubted, are the considerations that
mainly control all the whig party, and a
great many democrats, against annexa
tion every where north of Mason and Dix
on’s line.
The distribution policy, as compared
with the system of internal improvement
and a protretive tariff, undoubtedly pos
sesses one great merit —that of greater
equality of operation. But, at the same
time, it is a policy, than which nothing
can tend more strongly to emasculate, de
grade, and denationalize, us it were, the
States; for no Government can lay claim
to dignity, strength, or independence,
which, instead of relying on itself and its
own laws and action for income, leans on
another Government for its supplies. Pe
cuniary dependence, either in individuals
or States, is, when it comes to be a sys
tem, or habit oflife, a most debasing and
enslaving influence.
But there is another objectionable as
pect in which distribution forces itself on
our examination. all the grounds
of objection against it (deep and impres
sive as they are) at which I have glanced,
a party, nevertheless, urges it on the coun
try ns a party measure—as a measure to
bo adopted and kept up permanently, at
all events, without reference to the fiscal
wants of the Union or the Stales. What
docs such a measure mean, when thus
made a party question to this length?—
What else can it mean, than a direct and
open offer of distributions of the public
money in return for popular suffrages and
support? The language of such a party
is, "If you trill put the Government hi my
hands, I will make perpetual distributions
of money among you as long as the public
prpoerty lasts.’’ So the great dema
gogues of ancient Rome, in their strug
gles for power, were wont to lay the hea
vy hand of taxation and extortion on the
provinces, in order to fill the public gra
naries with corn, for distribution among
the voters of the imperial city. A good
deal of this old Roman spirit is yet extant
in republics, and has shown itself not a
little, 1 have thought, among some of our
statesmen, in their schemes for the gra
gratuitous distribution of the public lands.
I leave it to the people, gentlemen, to de
cide bow far I am right in calling it a
money-lure and money-engine in the
hands of those who insist on it as a party
question, and as a reason why their party
should be brought into power.
The three leading measures of whig
policy which I have now noticed —namely,
a protective tariff, internal improvements
by the General Government, and a distri
bution by that Government of the proceeds
of the sales of the public lands among the
States—are all, palpably, measures hav
ing their origin in pecuniary motives of
the coarser sort; measures appealing,
barefacedly and powerfully, in different
forms, to that love of money, and of the
advantages it can bring, which is, beyond
question, “the root of all evil” in tlie work
ing of our federal system.
The next measure to which I shall
advert is also one exclusively pecuniary
in its avowed aims and character—l mean
a national bank; which you evidently
treat, in your letter so me, a? being still
a leading and cherished object with the
Whig party; though I confess my own ob
servations have caused- me to doubt whe
ther there is not, among the more enlight
ened and judicious of the party, now
that the country has got a sound and
uniform currency without the help of
j Congress, a strong disposition to let
the subject alone. What was the great
charge against General Jackson, in con
nexion with this matter? Why, that
when, under the auspices of a national and
Stale banks, everything was sound and
doing well, he commenced warring up
| on the bank, and experimenting on the
' currrcncv. and kept up his war and ex
| pertinents until everything was thrown in
jto deragement and confusion. Such was
i the “head and front” of General Jackson’s
I offending, as I thought and said on all
I occasions, from the first faint, forewarn
! ing sound of his hostile bugle, in 1829 and
1830, down to the time when, in 1832,
, amidst the exulting shouts of ninety-nine
hundredths of the then States rights (now
whig) party of Georgia, he crushed what
! they delighted to call the “monster” with
one Herculean blow of the veto power. —
And for years afterwards, my political
friends (with a few scattering exceptions)
continued to laud the old hero for the deed,
I and to think the better of themselves for
having backed and sustained him in it.—
During nil this time, rny views and lan
guage were in a very different tone. I
held that General Jaekson, and all who
co-operated with him in that part of his
career, had taken on themselves a foartul
and culpable responsibility; tliat stability,
above all other things, was indispensable
j to a sound system of money and currency;
| that it was a subject, in reference to which
I it was impossible to calculate or control
i the consequences which any great shock
! or revolution might, and probably would,
I engender—consequences carrying disas
ter and dismay into all the walks of busi
ness, into all “the lanes and alleys of life,”
the humblest as well as the proudest.—
From considerations of this kind, gentle
men, 1 have always regarded all party
tampering and experimenting with the
currency, when it is already in a sound
state, as little short of a crime against the
purses and property of the people.
Is not the currency now in a sound
state? Are not exchanges, also, between
different commercial points, sound and
right? In answer to these questions, the
actual state of things will fully justify me
in making a remark, which I used to con
sider applicable to the demand for a “bet
ter currency,” in the days of the success
ful operation of the late national bank, to
wit: that politicians who are not willing
to put up with a good state of the curren
cy as existed then, and now exists again,
but who insist on changing and revolu
tionizing the whole system, and incurring
the great and ruinous hazards incident to
such change, for the mere chance of an
infinitely small improvement, deserve not
themselves the blessing of good money,
and ought to be held bound to indemnify
the people for all the losses they sustain
by bad money.
So strong and self evident is this view,
J that it would he strange if the northern
j whig party, which so unsparingly censur-
I cd General Jackson for refusing to let
alone a currency that was already good
enough, should now be found “following
in bis footsteps,” as schemers and experi
menters for a “better currency,” when a
sound and good one actually exists.
J Mr. Webster, thegreat exponent of whig
; principles at the north, lias, you know, in
j a speech made a year or two ago, pro
i nounced a national bank “an obsolete
; idea;” and in his late speech at Trenton,
j in which he extols the southern wings
j so highly for having taken so manly a
j stand for the protective system, he goes
; into a most statesmanlike examination of
; the subject of the currency, and handles
| it in a manner clearly showing that, in his
| opinion, it needs not the help of a national
j bank. It is rny confident belief that the
j mass of the intelligence of the whig party
' at the north is with Mr. Webster in this
! opinion, however they may remain silent,
! or even give color for the benefit of the
j
; party in those sections of the country
; where the bank question can still be made
| available as a political stalking-horse.—
j Nor does the manner in which the wings
j in the House voted on Saturday last, on cer
tain resolutions unexpectedly sprung on the
House from the Committee of Elections,
weaken or alter my belief. Those reso
lutions are so framed, that, to vote against
them, amounts not even to an intimation
in favor of the establishment of a bank;
though, to vote for them, is a very strong
expression against such a institution.
These resolutions were unexpectedly
j introduced at the opening of the session in
the morning; and it so happened that I
was absent from my seat, having remained
in my room an hour or two, engaged in
writing this letter. lam therefore parti
cularly rejoiced at the opportunity your
call gives me to express my views more
i explicitly than could have been done by a
! vote on those resolutions.
Gentlemen, with the profound con vie
j tion f entertain of the want of even the
semblance of necessity for the creation of
; a national bank, on account of the present
or probable state of the currency; believ
ing also that such is thcsenlimrrrf cf most
considerate and enlightened men, even
among the whigs, who are not willing to
make suck a qiu*stiofl a party foot-ball, —I
j am satisfied that, if a bank shall be estab-
I lished during the coming administration, k
| will be done as a mere party measure;
{ and the fierceness of the party war of which
it will be the object throughout its exis
tence, will be without example. If the
General-Government desire* to provoke
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, TUESDAY MORNING, JULY 9, 1844.
the States of this Union to nullification
and every species of dangerous extremity, j
let it, as now projxjsed, establish a nation- j
al bank as a mere party measure—a par- ■
ty engine—as a vast-money jiower for
strengthening the hands of the Govern- |
ment. For, gentlemen, if this thing shall i
be done, is it not clear that it must be done |
with these views—at least Avith this effect? ;
For to ask for a bank for the sake of a
sound currency, after the currency has
worked itself sound, is quite as preposter- ,
ous as it would be to subject a man to a
strong course of medicine after lie had re- j
covered from a severe malady by the I
mere powers of nature, without the belp
of medicine. Surely, a constitution that j
can get well without the aid of physic, |
may be properly trusted to keep well with- I
out its aid. At all events, it is certainly I
entitled to a respite from the doctor's hands ■
until it shall begin to show some symp
toms of returning disease. 1 tell you,
gentlemen, that for any party to lay its ,
strong hand on this now healthy country,
and force a national bank down its throat
as a mere party measure, will bo the most
fearful currency experiment that ever
was practised in the tide of times. I trust
that that portion of the whigs of the south '
who signalized themselves by being against
a bank ala time when they should have
been for it, will weigh the matter well be
fore they signalize themselves again by
being for it when they should be against
it. For, in connexion with the arguments
against such an institution, founded outlie
absence of any necessity for it in the slate
of the currency, present or prospective,
southern men arc bound to look at it in
another view, which ought to be decisive
with them against it. Such an institution
if established, will add another, and the
most powerful of all, to that list of money
engines which 1 have enumerated as con
stituting a policy going to the strengthen
the Government unduly, and to secure and
consolidate its powers and management
in the hands of the northern sectional ma
jority. For, in regard to a bank, no man
can doubt that the control over it will lie
where the commerce and moneyed capital
of the country arc mainly found—and that
is in the north. Well, the weight of pop
ulation and of control over the Govern
ment lies, and will forever lie, there also;
hence the bank and the Government v. ill
both be extremely certain to imbibe the
spirit and obey the influence and impulse
of the interest and views of that quarter of
the country. This, alone, would natural
ly lead to a general alliance and co-ope
ration between them. But when we bear
in mind that the Government is not only
to be tbo creator, but also the largest
stockholder and customer of this bank,
and that the bank will come into exis
tence forewarned by the fate of its prede
cessor not to be guilty of the futile mad
ness of setting itself in opposition to the
Government, can we doubt that the rela
tions between them will be those of entire
subserviency of the bank to the Govern
ment, or rather to that powerful sectional
majority in the Government, which is its
natural ally and supporter?
Gentlemen, when I survey the four
great positive measures of whig policy,
which 1 have now brought in review, and
ponder upon their tendency to strengthen
and aggrandize the Federal Government
to the most fearful extent; and when I re
member that ibis Government, thus fear
fully strengthened and aggrandized, will
always be a machine controlled by a sec
tion of the confederacy distant from that
in which our lot is cast, and more widely
distinct from us in views, interests, and
policy, than even in local position, —1 con
fess rny heart sinks oppressed with des
pondent forebodings. And when I see the
south herself co-operating headlong in all
these things, and raising, in addition, her
suicidal hand to aid the stronger section
in tearing from the constitution the only
check it has interposed between the rights
and interests of the weaker section, and
the overmastering legislative power of the
stronger, I am ready to bow my head to
the dust, and lift up my voice and weep
aloud at the heavy and dismal doom which
obviously overhangs the land of my birth
and of my soul’s deep and undying alle
giance. For, gentlemen, you have but to
succeed in one other measure, which you
indicate to me as a leading point of whig
policy—the destruction of the v eto power
—and the will of the sectional majority of
the north, animated and guided by north
ern interests, views, and prejudices, will i
reign, unchecked and unembarrassed, at !
all times, over the whole legislation of the !
country, and the condition of Ireland at ;
this day, as a minor member of the British 1
Empire represented in me Imperial Par- I
liament, will be a trulTthough a faint, j
picture of what will be permanently the j
condition of the south, as represented in, i
and governed by, the Federal Congress. *
Take notice, I pray you, that it is the sec- j
tional legislative majority in Congress, j
which we have no hand in electing, from i
which we have everything to fear. Then
remember, further, that the veto power is !
but a negative—a restraint on the will of j
that majority; and you will perceive at j
once the sectional bearing against the
south, of the proposition to destroy the
power. Arto it will be destroyed with equal
certainty by allowing the majority of the
two Houses to overrule the veto, whether
it be required to be done at the same ses
sion at which a bill is passed, or at a sub- '
sequent one—the only propositions, I be-
lieve. which have been made on the sub
ject.
Take notice, also, that the same sec
tional majority which frets under the pre
sidential veto, and demands its removal
from the constitution, does, at the same
lime, deny and scout that right of State
veto, or State interposition, for which we
have been wont so strongly to contend in
Georgia. Bear in mind, moreover, that, as
part and parcel of the same system of poli
tics, supremacy is asserted for the Gener
al Government and its departments, over
the State Governments and their depart
ments.
Gentlemen, we are solemnly bound—
as southern men and southern patriots,
charged bv a favoring Heaven with the
care of the fairest and feeblest portion of
this great confederacy—to look at all
these things together, explore the sources
from which they have sprung, and scruti
nize their concatenation and tendency.—
And if any man who will do so, shall fail
to perceive that the inevitable effect of this
whole system of politics is to unbridle the
majority of the northern or non-slavehold
ing section of the Union, and to give it full
sweep and unobstructed sway over all the
interests and affairs of the country, ofeve
ry sort and character, there must, it seems
to me, be something very unfortunate in
the intellectual medium through which
such a man looks at things, But this is
not all. Nothing can ho more evident
than that the possession of such power by
the northern or stronger section, is subju
gation and enslavement to the southern or
weaker section. And what they desire to
hold us tn subjugation for, is glaringly dis
covered by the character of the objects for
which they are so eager to exercise the tax
ing power, and. by the region of country in
which they have ever taken care to concen
trate an overwhelming proportion of the
public expenditures. Why, gentlemen,
despots want provinces mainly for the
sake of the tribute they may be made to
pay to the riches and grandeur of the
governing country. And what greater
subserviency to these objects could even
a despot ask of his provinces, than to sub
mit patiently to be taxed to the extent of
bis pleasure, for the benefit of such
branches of industry as he may choose to
favor, and such objects of expenditure as
it may please him to select? And it is on
just such a control of the taxing power
! and the public expenditures, that the rna
! jority despotism of the north lias set its
| hear* and laid its hand in this country.
: And that it is the profound study and anx
i iety of that majority to maintain and
j strengthen its hold on power, is manifest
ed us well by the war it is waging against
the annexation of Texas, as by the hostili
ty it shows to the veto power.
Gentlemen, the question of the annexa
! tion of Texas is the last battlefield of the
south against the majority despotism of the
north. If it be lost, it will be the field of
Waterloo to us. All hope of that equali
ty and balance of power in the Legislature
of the Union, which is indispensable to
| our safety and self-protection, will be cx
| tinguished; and w'c must thenceforth ap-
S ply ourselves to the task of reconcilement
Ito our chains forever. If you want proof
i of this, beyond what the case carries on
I its face, you have but to look to the Icad
i ing ground on which opposition to annex
| ation is based at the north. That ground
I is, that annexation would extend the
slaveholding region o*t the south, and aug
ment its power, and consequently endan
ger or lessen the future preponderance of
the north. Yes; sooner than put that
preponderance in hazard—sooner than
i risk the loss of the power of ruling and
I taxing us forever, according to their own
: will and interests—the whole whig, and
part of the democratic party of the north,
have taken an immovable stand, not
against immediate annexatian merely—
not against annexation under existing cir
cumstances merely—but against annexa
tion now and forever, under all and any
circumstances. The hostility to the re
ception of Texas into the Union, springing
from this main and leading ground, is
heightened bv a religious sentiment very
O y o *
prevalent at the north agauist slavery,
and by an apprehension of an armed in
terference from Great Britain. Aou will
at once perceive that these are not in their
nature transient and controlable, but per
manent and irremovable objections to the
measure in that portion of the northern
mind by which they are entertained. And
it was with a full knowledge of the un
yielding character of the feeling to which
they had given rise, and with a politic eye
to it, that Mr. Clay penned his letter
against annexation, and put the following
sentence in it: “1 do not think that Texas
ought to be admitted into the Union as an
integral part of it, in decided opposition to
the wishes of a considerable and respecta
ble portion of the confederacy.”
He knew, when he penned these lines,
two things: Ist. That there was a consi
derable and respectable portion of the con
federacy, embracing the body of whig
party, and a fraction of the democracy of
the north, that never would consent to
Texas coming into the Union as an inte
gral part of it; and, 2d. He knew, fur- I
ther, that Texas never would consent to j
annexation on any other terms. I invite |
vou, gentlemen, to review Mr. Clay’s let- !
ter. "You will perceive that it amounts I
to an unequivocal declaration that there i
ought to be no attempt to acquire Texas—
at least for a longtime to come, if even
or rather the construction which forces it
self on my mind is, that the attempt ought
never to be made at all.
i What a spectacle have we here? A
| man illustrious by the long celebrity of
i his talents, by the high stations he has fill.
; ed, and by the brilliant figure he has
made in bis country’s eye for the full
third of a century —a man ambitious of
I glory in the service of his country, and
occupying a most commanding and influ
ential position—such a man, in the very
| act of aspiring to the pre-eminently high
est post in the public service, with mil-
I lions backing Ids pretensions and laboring
j for his elevation—such a man, under such
■ circumstances, has consented to do what ?
M by, to lie up his own hands, in advance,
against even making an effort, no matter
how honorably or successfully it might be
made, for the recovery of what he himself
admits to have been the formerly owned,
! and most unwisely alienated, territory of
j the republic. Yes! Henry Clay binds
I himself in advance, and in view of his
election to the presidency, to make no ef
fort, to embrace no opportunity, of rein
stating his country in the possession of the
boundaries which the immortal Jefferson
gave it. One would have thought that
the rich blaze of glory, which the splendid
acquisition would shed around his name
! and administration through future ages,
rivalling that of Mr. Jefferson him
self, would have been irresistible to such
a mind as Mr. Clay’s. Why did that,
and every other consideration, fail of ef
fect upon him? Has it come to light, in
the slowly-made revelation of time, that
Mr. Jefferson was guilty of a blunder—of
a mis-step—in the purchase of Louisiana,
and Texas as a part of it? Nobody thought
so at the time, or lias thought so since—
except that intensely selfish and sectional
party at the north, with which now, as
| then, northern ascendency in the councils
of the nation was, and is, the uppermost
and all-absorbing object. They well
knew that, witli the Rio Grande for our
boundary the equilibrium of the Union
would be indestructible, and the south for
ever safe against northern domination.—
Hence the tears they shed, and the consti
tutional scruples they muttered, over Mr.
Jefferson’s vast acquisition of territory in
the west and south. The feeble, compro
mising, short-sighted administration of
Mr, Monroe, was a God send to this band
of politicians. It sidled firmly upon
the country their darling system of a pro
tective tariff and internal improvements.
It involved us, by a treaty with Great
Britain for joint occupation, in difficulties
about the Oregon Territory, which every
body now secs are likely to force upon
us war, or the surrender of our rights to a
vast domain. Would to God this had
been all! But, no? A deadly blow must
be let fall most bunglingly on the equili
brium of the comfederacy, and on the self
protecting capabilities of the south in all
future time. At a moment when Mexico,
and all the continental American domin
ions of Old Spain in that quarter, were
dropping from her hands, by the irresisti
ble process of war and revolution —when,
consequently, our relinquishment of our
; undoubted right to Texas in favor of
Spain’s mere shred of a claim, was tanta
mount to making her merely the conduit
of passing the tide from us to the then re
volted, and soon-to-be-independent, Go
vernment of Mexico—at that moment it
was, when it had become broadly apparent
that within a few years at most, Spain
would bo as glad to quit-claim Texas to
us, in order to thwart her rebel Mexican
dependency, as France bad been, in 1803.
to sell us Louisiana, lest the British should
conquer it from her; —such a moment it
was, Isay, that Mr. Monroe’s administra
tion selected for the swapping of Texas for
Florida. Is it not manifested, by the after
course of events, that a little of that wis
dom which Avails upon time to Avork out
her design in our faA r or, Avould have ena
ble us to get clear of the Spanish claim to
Texas, by only giving a very small ad
ditional price for Florida? But the ad
ministration lacked that kind of wisdom;
or, in its eagerness to put an end to difficul
ties with Spain growing out of our Indian
enemies and their instigators finding a re*
fuge in Florida, did not exercise it. The
result Avas, that Avegot Florida, and threAv
away Texas.
The deed was no sooner done, than it was
! denounced by ilenry Cla} T . Opposed as he
i then was to the severance of Texas from our
j country, is it not strange that he should now
j be unqualifiedly opposed to a re-union? What
| things have changed since, to produce such a
i change in him? No such change had come
j over him as late as 1827; for in that year, he
himself tells us he made an effort, as Secreta
ry of State, to open a negotiation with Mexico
for its retrocession to its. Ay, with Mexico!
j —although Spain did not, for years afterward,
j give up her claim, or recognize the indepen
| denceof Mexico. What things, I ask again,
; have changed since that time, to make Mr
; Clay’s views so different notv from Avhat they
i were then?
! The answer to this question presents mat
j ter of the most solemn import to the south.—
i I have already adverted to the hostility which
existed at the north against Mr. Jefferson’s i
purchase of Louisiana —an hostility emana- !
ting from the first statesmen of that quar- :
i tertof the country, and passed exclusively on !
j the fear of the effect of the measure in caus- |
i ing the eventual and perpetual loss of north- j
! ern ascendency in the Union. They were !
not willing that there should be an equili
i briam—a happily adjusted balance of power
; between the north and south. What they
wanted was preponderance and supremacy
permanentlv secured their side. This <
VOL. XXII.—NO. 8.
object they saw was defeated by the acquisi
tion of such a vast and fertile southern terrl®
lory as that which stretched from the Perdido
to the Rio Grande del Norte. But they took
heart, and became reassured after the cession
of Texas to Spain by us in 1819. They sur*
vcyed the wide expanse of all the States and
remaining national domains of the Union,
and were satisfied that the decrees of Nature
had placed the north in a perjietual suprema
cy, provided the prohibition of slavery could
be effected.witliin a certain line oflatitude.—
Hence the Missouri compromise, and the
tearful struggle between the north and south
by which it was preceded. It was a struggle
for political power purely. Abolition had not
then reared her snaky crest in the land.
W ell, gentlemen, that compromise was ft
great thing; and even greater as a sign than
us an event. It proved, beyond all posni
bilit\ r ot doubt, that both in the north and
south, slavery, or the slaveholding institution,
was felt as the great political tie, paramount
to all others, among those Stales in which
it existed. It proved that it was r. lie, bo
strong as to band together the States in which
it existed, on one side, and those in which it
did not exist, on the other; and to array them
as two great sections of country in an
attitude of permanent opposition and contest
for power in the confederacy. And if any
man will just take up the map, and compare
the number of the States and the extent and
character of the territory on the north side of
the line of the compromise, with the same
things on the south side, a still further truth
will burst upon him, with overwhelming self
evidence, to wit: that from the moment of the
loss of Texas by Mr. Monroe’s treaty, in Feb
ruary, 1819, the doom of the south, as the
weaker subject section of the confederacy,
became as tirmly hxed us the boundaries of
the country themselves.
The map will also show him how widely
different her fate and relative strength would
have permanently been, but for the loss of
Texas. h es; it will tell him that, but for that
loss,the south, in the federal legislature, would
always have been strong enough—not, indeed,
to be an oppressor, but full strung enough for
self-protection against the wrongful and op
pressive legislation of the north.
C3O far, then, as the balance of power be
tween the two great sections is involved in
the question of Texan annexation, all that the
; south asks is, that the Government shall not
i let slip the present transitory opportunity of
i reinstating us in those boundaries which Jef
| ferson gave, which Monroe lost, and which
; Adams and Clay sought to restore. To this
; most reasonable and just demand of the south*
1 the north—particularly the whig party of the
; north—has answered peremptorily, No! And
i so peremptory was the temper in which the
answer was given, that Mr. Clay, who had
j thrown himself into the arms of that party for
j his election, found himself obliged to echo tbo
! response, or compromise all his prospects fbf
i the presidency; for, bear in mind, Mr. Clay
i laid no hand in forming or directing northern
| whig sentiment on the subject of annexation.
It was perfectly formed, and inexorably set
' tied, as it now stands, a Jong time in advance
; of the publication of his sentiments.
Now, gentlemen, I appeal to you to say
whether there is any circumstance, in the pre
sent situation of our country, to render the
possession ol Texas less politic or desirable
than in 1820 and 1827? Mr. Clay has not
! attempted to point out any such circumstance.
! No man can point out any such. What, then/
; lias changed the opinions and course of Mr.
; Clay? What has caused him to declare him
! self against the policy of annexation, present
j or future? The cause is to be found in the
j necessity under which he lay, of bowing to
; the behests of the northern whig party, in or
| der to retain their favor and receive their suf
j frages. In no other way can we account for
! the gross contradiction between his late anti
| annexation bulletin, and his opinions of the
; policy and importance of our possessing Tcx-
I as, as expressed in 1820, and afterwards still
; more solemnly repeated and acted on in 1827.
| In no other way can we explain the extraordi
; nary fact that such a man as Henry Clay
' should sue lor the presidency by assurances
i and declarations, which, in the event of his
; election, will completely tie up his hands from
| ever endeavoring to render his country vastly
the most valuable and glorious service that
any chief magistrate has had the opportunity
■ of attempting, with probability of success,
: since the purchase of Louisiana by Mr. Jef
i ferson. And, gentlemen, it does seem to me
! that, by so tying up his hands, he has disquali
! fied himself for the high office to which he as
-1 pires. At all events, it deserves to be so
: viewed and treated by all but those sectional
j ists of the north, who, with words of liberal
I and enlarged Americanism continually on
: their lips, reject a noble acquisition of territo
| ry, lest its incorporation into the Union might
: make a permanent southern counterpoise to
j their present northern preponderance.-
Gentlemen, I have detained you longer than
j I intended on the Texan question. My apo
| logy you will find in the fact, that it is not
| only the most important, but a new element,
in the great political contests of the country
—one in regard ro which Mr. Clay has tsken,
since my late address to the people of Geor
gia, a most decided and thoroughgoing stand
against us; and which stand constitutes one
most strong ground on which, as a southern
man and as an American patriot, I feel bound
to withhold from him my support for the presi
dencj'.
The loss of Texas to the country is abso
lutely certain if Mr. Clay is elected, unless we
suppose he will depart from the views an
nounced in his late publication. Should his
competitor be elected, the acquisition is cer
tain, so far as it can be rendered certain by
the action and exertions of our federal Execu
tive. But, gentlemen, were the Texan ques
tion out of the way, 1 should still think Mr.
Clay not entitled to southern suffrages. I
have already announced to the people of Geor
gia my dislike of the position he seemed tc
occupy on the subject of the tariff, fie had
been taken up as a candidate by us, on ac
count ot his authorship of the compromises
and his pledged adherence to its principles;
and at the time of my making the announce
ment just adverted to,there were but too many
reasons to fear that the compromise was no
longer a sacred and respected thing with him,
bat that he had renounced it, and gone back
to the full indulgence of his early Jove for
cld American system, ae it was called. For a
f Set fourth pogeJ]