Below is the OCR text representation for this newspapers page.

N, S: -MORSE. HIGHLY IMIN'UTAVr ♦ ORiUifcBONDK.YCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND . GOVERNOR BIOWN, Hr wing out of a It Made I pon the Governor for the RESERVE MILITIA 01< GEOIiiiJA, TO BE TURNED ( JO COM I DERATE CONTROL. oi America, ) War Department, - Richmond, Vu, , August 30, 1801. .) • his Excellency J. E. linen, Governor of Georgia, Mdledgedlle, Ga : Sir— The conditffm of vour fie, subjected to formidable inv. ion 4111! in -wu-d wi ■» in structive raids in n,u- -ru < : ~ ■in ihS en emy, require* the command of ail the forces that can be nummot.p 1 for dr! • t .in re cent official correspond nee 0 torn i ltd to the* Department, it appears, on your statement that you have organ zed ten Uiotieiud or more of the militia of yourSi tk, and 1 am instructed by the President to make rap isition ou you for that number, and'such further force of militia, to repel invasion, an you may be able to organize, for Confederate service. Those within the limits of Gen. Mood’s Diprulrnent will report to him: those outside, to Use Corn man lant of the Depart ment of Mouth Carolina and Georgia Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, James A. Seddon, (Secretary o! vYar. Executive Department, | Millsdoevillh, Ga., beet. 12,1864. j Mon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War: Sir —Your letter of the 30th of last month only reached me by last mail. You refer to the fact that J have organized ten thousand of the mil'.! a of this State, and say you are instructed by Urn President, to make requisition upon me for that number •ml such other foice of militia to repel inva sioE as I may be able, to 01 gun an. You preface this requisition by the remark that the condition of my B.la to subjected to formidable invasion and menaced with de - structive raids ' a different directions by the •netny, requires thoconimand of all the forces that can be summoned for defence In common with the people of Georgia, I bare abundant reason to regret that the Presi dent has been so late in making this discovery. This “formidable invasion” commenced in May last and has steadily forced jts way, by reason of overwhelming numbers, through iiie*moßt fertile section oi UeOi; ia, till its leader is now in possession of the city of Atlanta, menacing the centre of the State, threatening, by Ids winter campaign, to cut the last line of rail road that connects Virginia and the Carol inns, with Alabama and Mississippi. The-President during most of tiie time since the campaign •gainst Atlanta began, has had at his com mand a large fore'' *-*>*r! I *>> !..■■• • . 1 000 men, in Texas and L «ui..ina V. Since tiie brilliant victories achieved by our armies in the lattor State early in the season; tins large force ha? bad no oveuv- to >r.i, except the troops of a few garrisons, who were in no erudition to penetrate the interior ol the coun fry. or do any serious damage, lie has, also, if correctly reported, had about 20,000 men under Gen. Early, invading Maryland and Pennsylvania, thereby uuUiug Northern senti ment against us, and aiding President Lincoln to rally nis people to reinforce Ins armies.— About the same time Gen Al 01 gau was raid ing in Kentucky, and Gen. Fonost,. the great •avalry leader, had Iren kept iu Northern Mississippi to repel the raid? utter the country had b«en so often overrun as to leave but lit tle public property for them to destroy. Thus reversing the rule upon which most great Generals, who have been* successful have acted, of rapid concentration of his force *t vital points to destroy the 'invading army, the President has scattered his forces from Texas to Pennsylvania, while a severe Mow was being struck at the heart of. the Confed eracy; and Atlanta has been sacrificed and the interior of Georgia thrown open to further id vasion for waut of reinforcement to the Aimy of Tennessee. Probably few intelligent men iu the country, except tin* Pre-Men! and his advisers, have failed to see that it Geu. Forrest, and Morgan had bceu sent to destroy the rail roads over which Gen. Sherman's supplies have been transported for three hundred miles through an enemy's country, and to keep the roads cut for a few weeks, and at the same time the forces of Gen. E Knby .Smith and Major Gen. Early, or even half ol them,! ~and b, <m sent to reinforce Gan. John* Rn, or alter be w is su perceded, Geu. liood, the irrny of invasion might not only have beten repulsed aud driv en back, but routed aud destroyed. This would instantly have relieved Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee from in vasion and raids, aud have thrown open the green fields of Kentucky' for the support of our gallant troops. As the army ol Gen. Sher man is the ouly protection provided by the Lincoln Government for the Western States, and as the battle for the posei-sion o! a large portion of the Mississippi Valley, as well as of the Gulf States, was to be fought in Georgia, justice, not only to the people of Georgia, but the people of ail the States, required that all the troops which wore not actuary necessary t« the defense ot Richmond, aud to hold the enemy in check at the most viml points ou the eoast, should have been concentrated for the destruction of the Federal army iu Georgia, which wouild, in all probability, have brought the war to la speedy teiruination. I have the President to send rein forcement to the army for the defense of At lanta ever since the enemy were at Etowah.— Rut mvery small number have been sent, aud If I am correctly informed, part of the troops under General Hood s command have been •rdered from this to other States * While we have been sorely pressed bv the •aeiuy. a «omp of 30.000 Federal prisoners has been kept in the rear of our army, which has added greatly to our embarrassments, and has it leerns required all the small force of Con federate reserves, organized by Major Geu. Cobb, with other occasional reiulorcenients to guard them. The reserved force organized \ under the lajte conscript act for Srate defense. I has been thus employed. 1 presume, by order : •1 the President, and in the hour of her j peril, Georgia has not had a single on of them ' at the fro .it with a musket in bis In , \ to aid ' in her defense. Had the militia been at his ! •ommand for such service as he might have I ordered, and at such place as he nbght desig nate, the presumption is that the same remark night have been applicable to them, as other employment could, as in case of the local com- Kies under the President’s command, have n found for them at other places while the enemy were besieging Atlanta. Another remat k ible fact deserves attention. During the whole march of the enemy upon Atlanta, and for "more than a 'idiepjt waa «lo*«ly invested and shelled by the euemy. it never seems to have occurred tot he Presi dent _t® make requisition upon me for the nallltia of .Georgia to aid in repelling this •'formidable invasion' 1 or these “destructive iwids, 1 ' and it is only when, he is Informed that I have an organization of, gallant, fear leM men ready to defend the State against oaurpations of power as well as invasions by th*) enemy, that he makes requisition upon rue for this force and all others i can organize, J must express my astonishments, however, that you and the President should seem to be tpuraal ht «b« fact that this force was organ AUGUSTA, GA., WEDNESDAY MORNING, MARCH 22, 1865. ized by me to aid in repelling the army of in vasion, that it was placed by me under the command of General Johnston aud afterwards for General Hood of the defense of Atlanta, and that the brave men of which it-is com posed under the command of the General ap pointed by the President for the defense of the city, have taken their full share in the dan gers, fatigues and sufferings of the campaign, and have acted with distinguished valor both upon the battle field and for over forty days in the* trenches around the city of Atlanta, and that they formed the rear guard when At lanta was evacuated, aud brought off with them safe and in good, order the reserve ar tillery of the army which was especially en trusted to them by the Commander in-Chief. For all this no word of thanks or praise c6tneS from the President to encourage them. Th*y were militia. Their Geuerais aud other olii cers were- not appointed by the President and their services aie ignored by him. In making this requisition it is quite clear that it was no part of tire President’s object to get these brave men into.service. They were there at the time, in tllfe trenches, among those who were nearest to the enemy, where they never faltered in a single instance. It was not done to produce harmony in the com mand, for the most perfect harmony has exist ed between me and both the Gene.als who have commanded the army since the miFi-ix were called out, and it is well known that I placed them in for the time under tire absolute control of the Confederate General command ing. It was not done to increase the number in service at the front, for the President is too familiar with the obstacles thrown in my way t»y Confederate officers when I have attempted to compel men to go to the trenches, to have committed this mistake. It was certainly not done to cause Georgia to furnish her quota o f troops required in like proportion of other States, for she has already furnished more than her just quota, and to every call responded with more than were required; while sue has boyie the rigors of conscription executed with as much severity as iu any other State. I hear ot no similar rquisition having been made up on any other Slate. While Georgia has more than filled every requisition made up on her in common with her sister States, and* has borne her full share of conscription, and has tor months had her reserved militia under arms from sixteen to fifty-fiye years of age, I am informed *tiat even the Confederate reserves of other States from seventeen aud from forty live to fifty, have till lately been permitted by the President to spend their time at home attending to their ordinary business. Without departing from legitimate inquiry ns to the cause of this requisition, I might ask why this dffitinction is made against the good people of this State, and why her Confederate reset ves are kept constantly iu service, and why req uisition i3 made for her whole militia, when Me same is not required f any other State. It is quite clear that it was not made either to compel the State to do her just part which she lias always don«, or to put mure of her sons into active service for her defense, for every man called for by the requisition was in service before it was ma le. The President must then have had some other motive in making the requisition, and I think it not'un charitable under all the circumslames to con clude that the object was to grasp into his own hands the entire control of the whole re aped militia of the State, which would ena ble him to disband its present organizations, and place in power over it his own partizans nid favorites as Major General, Brigadier Gen erals, etc., etc, in place of the distinguished of licers who were appointed to command in con formity to lfce Constitution of the country aud the laws of the State, and who have command ed the organization with so much honor to themselves, satisfaction to the troops, and ad vantage to the public service. Again, it is worthy ot remark that the re quisition is made upon me for the whole mili tia of the State—all I have organized and all I can organize— without limitation of time or place-of service. If I comply with it, the mi litia of Georgia, after the. President has ob tained absolute control ever them, may be tak eu for the war from their State, as tens of thousands of their brave fellow citizens now are, whrie Georgia and their home- are being overrun. If lam asked to trust the sound judgment and good faith of the President for their discharge aud return to their homes at such times as their services are not indispen sable in the military field, I cannot forget the laith that was violated last fail to thousands of Georgians who were organized under a requisition from the President to be “employed in the local defense of important cities, and iu repelling in emergencies the sudden or tran sient iucursious of the enemy,” to be employed “only when ana so long' as they might be needed,’’“with the privilege of remaining at home iu the pursuit of their ordiaary avoca tions, unless when called for a temporary exi gency to active duty.’ ’ Thousands of these men organized for six months’ service with the guarantees above mentioned, were called out early in .September lust, aud were kept constantly in service till the expiration of their term in March- Da ring most ot the time they were guarding no important city. There was no sudden eater- j goncy or transient incursion of the enemy, no j exigency for the last four months of the time, j and still they were kept iu service in violation of the faith that had been pledged to them, and were denied th.e privilege of goiug home or attending to the ‘ pursuit of any of their ordinary avocations,” and this, too, after the contract under which they had entered the service had been pressed upon the considera tion of the President. It is imposible for the agricultu al and other industrial pursuits of the people to be I saved from ruin if the whole reserve military i of the State, from sixteen to fifty five, ars pul j permanently iato the service as regular troops. ■ Judging from the past. I cannot place them at i .the command of the President tor the war, ! without gieat apprehension that such would - be their tate. ludeed, not even the Presi- I dent's promise to the contrary is found in the | requisition you now make.' lam not, there- I fore, willing to expose the whole reserve mili- i tia of Georgia to this injustice, aud our ] agricultural and other,interests to ruin, when ! no other State is required to make auy such j sacrifice or fill any such requisition. The Conititution of the Confederate States : authorizes the States, as welljas the Confeder cy, to keep troops iu time of war when ae- : tualiy invaded, as Georgia now is. Her j military have Been organized and called into ; active service under her own laws for her own defense; aud I do not'feel that I am authorized \ to destroy her military organization at the j behest of the President, or to surrender to j him the command of the troops organized and retained by her by virtue of the reserved . power for her own defense, wheu greatly j needed for that purpose, and which are her j only remaining protection against the en croachments of centralized power. I there fore decline to comply with or fill this extra ordinary requisition. While I refuse te gratify the President’s ..ambition iu this particular, “M-Up last vestige of the sover- of the State by placing the remainder i her militia under his control for the war, I beg to assume you that I shall not hesitate to 1 outer .fhem tothe front, and they will not I '■nun the. thickest of the fight, when the enemv ; is to be met upon the soil of tlwir beloved j Mate. Nor will I withhold them from the 1 temporary command of the Confederate Gene ral who controls the armyr during great emer gencies wheu he needs-their aid. I shall, however, retain the , power to with draw them and to furlough or disband them for a time, to look to their agricultural and otner vital mterestw-which would otherwise be ruined by neglect, whenever I see they can bo spared from the military field without endang ering the safety of the State. Os this the Gov ernor w the State, at MiiicdgeviUs, where he is near the field of operations and can fre quent interviews with the Commanding Gen eral, ought to be as competent to judge as the President of the Confederacy, some hundreds of miles from the scene of action, charged with the defense of Richmond, and all the other responsibilities which requires his attention and divides his Time. Georgia now has upon the soil of Virginia nearly fifty regiments of as brave troops as ever met the enemy in deadly* conflict, not one ol which ever faltered in tiie hour ot trial. She has many others equally gallant aiding in the defense of other States. In deed the blood of her sons lias crimsoned al most every battle-field east of the Mississippi, from the first Manassas to, the fall of Atlanta. Ter gallant sons, who still survive, are kept by the Pr< sident’s orders from her soil, while their homes are being ouerruu : their wives and children driven out before the enemy and reduced to beggary aud want, and their almost idolized State exposed to temporarv subjuga tion aud ruin. Experience having shown tiiat the Army of Tennessee, with the aid of ♦he militia force of the State, is not able to withstand and drive back the overwhelming numbers of the army of invasion, as the Ex ecutive of Georgia, in behalf of her brave sous now absent in other States, as well as of her whole people at tome, I demand as an act of justice that such reinforcements, be sent as arc necessary to enable the army upon her soil to stop the progress of the enemy, and dis lodge and drive him back. 111 view of the fact that the permanent pos session of Georgia by the enemy, not only ruins her people, but cuts the Confederacy east of the Mississippi in two, and strikes a death blow at the Confederate Government it self, I trust this most reasonable request will be granted. It, however, I should be inform ed that the President will send no reinforce ments, and make no further effort to strength en our defenses, I then demand that he permit all the sons of Georgia to return to their own State, aud within her own limits, to rally around her glorious flag ; and as it flutteis in the breeze in defiance Os (he foe, to strike for their wives and their children, their homes and their altars and the “green graves” of their kindred and their sires ; and I as their Execu tive promise that whoever else may be with drawn from her defense, they wilt drive the enemy back to her borders, or overwhelmed and stricken down, they will nobly perish in one last grand and glorious effort to wrest the standard of her liberties and independence from the grasp of the oppressor and plant it immovably upon hersacred soil I am very respectfully, Your obedient seivant, Joseph E. Brown. Confederate States of America, ( War Department, •] Richmond, Ya., October 8, 1864. ( Mis Excellency J. E. Brown, Governor of Georgia, MiUedgevUli. Qa : Sir—Your letter of the 12th inst. reached me some days since. Its tenor and spirit have caused painful surprise. It requires forbear ance in reply to maintain the respect I would pay your station, and observe the official propriety you have so transcended. I shall seek to notice only such portions, as appropri ately pertain to an official communication. The Department on the 30th of August, un der the direction of the President, made a re quisition upon you for the entire miiitia, which had been or should be organized by you, that they might be employed to?repel the “formid able invasion” of Georgia by the enemy, and to secure her from “destructive raids ” The requisition was for militia Tet a -state of organization, ihe appointment of the officers of militia is secured by the Constitution to the State from which they are drawn, and propos ing to accept organized militia, the officers legally appointed would necessarily accom pany their commands. The inducements to this call were several. You had in official communication stated that you had ten thousand militia organized and you were known to be apparently busy in organizing others 1 Os these, a portion it was known were with the Army of Tennessee in some auxiliary relation, and had rendered valuable service with that army in the dt* sense of Georgia. Only a limited number, however, not believed to constitute half the number reported oy you to be actually organ ized, were so empJoyed, and were, as has been announced by you, held there only at your pleasure, and for such time and during such operations as you might approve. The ser vices of these gallant defenders of their State were so appreciated, as to render it desirable that the full number organized, or to be or ganized, should be secured, to repel the for midable invasion threatening to overrun the State; and both to impart greater unity and efficiency to the command of them, and enable the General Commanding to rely on the period and tenure of their services, it was necessary they should be in Confederate service, and subjeot not to your judgment or disposal, hut to the control of the constitutional Command er-in Chief. It is easy to see how uncertainty as to their oontrol or retention, must -impair relianoe by the Commander on these troops, and embarrass ail calculations for their em ployment aa l efficiency in combined opera tions. Aa additional ground of the call was that some of those troops had been detailed for objects not admitted by the enrolling offi cers in the State to be authorized by Confede rate law, aud others were claimed as primarily liable, or previously subjected to Confederate This had engendered controversy and endangered collision between the local Confederate wad State authorities, which it, was most desirable to anticipate and preclude.. Besides, these militia, as far as they were serving with the Confederate army, had to be subsisted from the commissary stores of the Confederacy, and might equitably expect pay from the Treasury; but if held as Stale troops only, both subsistence and pay constituted a charge on the State alone. Serious embarrassments had already arisen on these very points, and departure had been necessary from the regular obligati ms of the Confederate Government, which were act just to either that Government or its disbursing officers. The powers o£ tbs Confederate Gov ernment to provide for the common defense, are exercised according to laws, through agen cies adopted by Congress. None of these laws contemplated the fulfillment of this duty, by troops organized and held by the* State in its own service, and under officers responsible on ly to it. * The C (institution of the Confederate States does not confer on the State power to keep troops iu time of war. The States are prohib ited trout ‘ keeping troops or sh ps of war in ♦ ime ot peace, entering into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engaging in war, unless actually in vaded, or in sneh imminent danger as will not admit of delay.’’ The power of keeping troops i u time of war, is thus reserved, and naturally i ncluues is necessary to accomplish the object ol reservation, and is limited in its scope and operation only bv the Constitution cf the Confederate States, ‘ and the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof/’ not imply any withdrawal from the Confeder ate Gevernment of those instrumentalities and agencies rim the -*(mstftdtTßnras¥sufided to the Government of the Confederacy f or the fui lillment of the obligations it has imposed up on, it. The powers to declare war, to raise armies, to maintain a navy, to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces, te make rules concerning captures en land and water, to protect each of the States against invasion, which are deposited with Congress, manifest the purpose of the States in farming their Constitution, to charge the Confederate ] Government with the burden of providing for j the common defence. The clause in the Con i stitutiou relative to the Militia, wa j framed in harmony with the same purpose. The Consti tution changes Congr with the organization, equipment and discip’ r-e of the Militia, and designates the President as Commander In- Chief of those that m v be called into service- It was evidently the design of the Constitu tion. aud of tip- laws -i Congress in pursuance thereof, which aie tae supreme law of the laud, that the President should have the <Vis cretion and th powet of calling this M'lUqi into service, and 1-wing personally, or through Confederate o immanders, the dispo sition aud command J them. In a crisis of great peril, aud in a- e A plain invasion of jur State, he bus ext.oised this power, aud made the coust-rtutim-vi. oquuoment on you. You have met if v’i'.nrtinct refusal. This is the fir.-' insfae-m 1 . the annul? of the Confederacy of the suggestion of a doubt on the right of.the Pr'-.-Mont to make such a call, aud the obligation ->f compliance by the State Executive. Daring the lasi- war with Great Britain, 'a question of the kind was made hv the Govern ors of Massachusetts and Connecticut with the President ot the then United States. They claimed to decide whether the exigencies ex feted which authorized the President to make a requisition for militia to repel invasions, and denied his power to associate them with other troops under a Federal officer. They affected to believe t-h exercise of such a power imper iled State R glits ana pi. ipot-ed personal ambi tion The judicial tiibuals determined ad versely to the pretentions of the-e Governors, and the country did not !aii to discover lurk ing undev their specious pruecce.-, hostiliity scarcely less criminal to the Constituted au thoritie? of the Union, nn unlicensed ambition in themselves and a dangerous purpose in the midst of war to cripple patriotic efforts for the public defense. The impression was not wanting, either then or since, that they were in commu nication with the enemy, or at least purposed to give them encouragement and moral sup port. Without imputing to you such designs, I cannot repress apprehensions of similar effects from your analogous course under she present more trying circumstances, as indeed it must be admitted in aif paititulars; aud especially on the main point of the existence of invasion there was piore plausibility in their case than yours, on the grounds assigned for refusal. On anal} zing your Excellency’s letter, it is apparent that the prominent and influencing reasons of your action spring from a spirit of opposition to the Government of the Confede rate States, aud animosity to the Chief Magis trate whom the people of the Confederacy have honored bv their choice and confidence. Your reasons may reduced to the following: 1. That the campaign in Georgia, noi having been controlled by the President according to your conceptions, or with the means you ad vised, you will not permit any force you can control to be subject to his disposition, but will yourself retain thqjr control, and mete out your assistance according to your views of policy and State int resi. 2. That you suspect the President-of a de sign, after the reception of these Militia, to disorganize or disband them that he may dis place the officers commanding them aqd sub stitute his f vidv.us v 1 .av/bau-s. 3- You apprehend tba'tafbcse Militia, under the Presiciont ’s'dTintioiw/li be employed for such length of time, a .d/under such condition, as will be deleterious tb/the interest of them selves and the State, ahtl ’ esteem yourself a better judge oil these points, especially to when and where they shall be employed,' lurloughed or discharged, etc. 4. That these troops, besides being necessa ry as a defence against mvesion, are also ne cessary to defend the State against usurpations ol flower, and as “a protection against the en croachments of centralized power,” and that the knowledge of the President of their ability and disposition to do this was the motive for the call on you. Iu reference to the first, it might not bo safo as it would not We expedient now to expose, the circumstances of the present campaign, the counsels that guided, or the resources that have been or could be commanded for its ope rations. , None should have known more certainly than your Excellency the zeal and energy with which the President aud this Department, un der life auspices, have striven to command re sources and means-for the defense of Geoigia and the overthrow of the invader, nor the im pediments and difficulties often unfortunately resulting from the obstruction of the local au thorities which they had to encounter. Aware early of the danger that menaced tiie State,.be sides conceutrati :g troops from other Depart ments for its defense, this Department strained all the powers vested in it too. recruiting the army within the limits of Georgia, and accu mulating supplies lor its support The legis lation oi the Congress that ended its session in February last had seen comprehensive and vigorous. Your Excellency cannot have forgotten how that legislation was denounced and the efforts of the Department- impaired by the counter vailing action of the Executive and local au thorities of your State*. ■To department it cannot be imputed as fau-f# tliat Georgia was invaded by “overwhelming* ’numbers.” The ten thousand ml-litia you-fodast to have organ ized, without adding-to-f-bbffiount toose you are proceeding to organize* with the vetefau regiment'? i*im*tT> the Ist of May, would be an- invttluabf i e>-«*aequisi?ion to the Army of Tennessee,, and-in*#improbably have hurled back the-invaderdfcbAr'the threshold of your State. U: c *!-«■ That they, ot a large-proportion of them at least, were not reedy thv-’that service and oth er auxiliary mean*, to its Operations were not afforded. I am bound to ijfink was due to the oostacles and embarrassTfietits interposed by your Excellency and the ideal authorities with your countenance, to the enforcement of the acts of Congress for the recruitment and main tainance of the armies. Tour Excellency may not have foreseen and realized the extent and import of tne approaching invasion, but to whom, then, with most safety and wisdom (aqart even from constitutional obligation) can the disposition and. command of the troeps in question be committed ? In your second reason it is difficult to find anything but the ascription to the President of an unworthy design—a design that cannot be accomplished without disappointing the objects which I have explained as ihe cause of the re quisition. The disbanding of the militia or ganizations, after their call into service, would result in the discharge of such men as are not liable to service under the act of Congress of February last, and those who are liable, in such an event, woul 1 be placed in those veter an regiments raised for Confederate service in the State of Georgia prior to April, 18t>2, whose diminished numbers atrest the fidelity, valor and suffering with which they have performed . their duty. Whether, therefore, the militia be retained in their militia organisations, as is contemplated, or be disbanded, as you appra hend may be done, in neither event can new organizations be made or new officers appoint ed. Y our suspicions as to the motives and de signs of th« President are simply chimeri cal. . i,. In your third retoQU. your Excellency h»3 apparently forgotten the trueAnquiry. where, constitutionally and legally, in ail such mat ters, the discretion of tkcision.is lodged, -and further, that a provision adaqnate. iu the View of Congress, against-abuse has . been provided in the limitation ol tune-dor which 'the militia may be Mailed out ,Ao six aoßths, ; ..i Q trating the danger of undue detention in Con federate service, your ftsoeiien*-. refers to the couise p»Mp«ffe|o#ard3 the local service enlisted by you last Fall, under $ call from the Department. Dutfegffihe last wiidarC your addroafld. to this Department an acrimonious letter on this subject, which was replied to in a spirit of forbearance, at and with a careful abstinence from-the use of re criminating language. Justice to myself demauds that I should place upon the records of the department the t icks to which you have asrain alluded in the same language of acrimonious reproach. It had been designed to. raise troops for special defense and local service, as 'the general rule throughout the State, to constitute a part of i the Provisional Army, and to be subject to the call of the President when needed. You asked to supervise and control the whole matter, aud unfortunately the privilege was ganted. Y’ou abused It to form noudescript, organ izations, not conforming to the regulations of the Provisional Army, scant in men and absouurling iu officers, with every variety of ob ligati- oi fo r local service, of the most restricted ehar.cter, and for the brief period of only six m ut!:s. thus it was that you were enabled to indu'ge the vain boast of raising some sixteen thousand men tor the defense of the State, while in faot, source a decent division of four thousand men could be mustered for. the field aud those o-ily for six mouths service. From the time they were passed to Confederate service, there was pressing necessity for their presence in the field, tor Georgia was not only menaced, but actually invadeu, aud the num ber was too limited to allow substitution or furlough. Apart from this you persistently claimed that they should be heldaud regarded as Militia. In that view, they could not, if dismissed, be recalled on emergency as local troops, and this naturally induced their deten tion for the full period of their limited term of service. io your last reason I refrain from replying as its character would justify. I cannot think tae signiflcancy of the language quoted has been duly appreciated by your Excellency. I prefer to consider them as in 00 ns id -rate ut terances rather than the foreshadowing of a guilty purpose to array your State in aimed antagonism against the Confederacy, and so to betray the cause of herself 1 and sister States Such purpose ITtnow would be horned and rebuked by her heroic and loyal pto - pie, aud it will not, while it be posTbie to avoid it, be ascribad by me to one whose offi cial station makes him tbeir recognized organ. I must, however, gravely regret that the spirit, of your Excellency’s past action aud public expressions, has caused grievous misconcep tions ia relation to the feelings and purposes of yourself , and perhaps of others of influence in your State, in the convictions of our ene mies to their encouragement, and to mortifi cation of many patrioiio citizens of the Con federacy. Our enemies appear to have conceived you were even prepared to entertain overtures of separate accommodation, and that your State, so justly proud of its laith, valor and renown, cold be seduced or be'raycd to treachery and desertion. So painful a maniiestation of the hopes inspired by your indulgence of resent ments and suspicions against the Confederate Administration will, it is honed, awaken to con Bideration and a change of tutor, action. To the Department it would be fur more grateful, instead ot being engaged in remiu iing you of constitutional ouiigations and repelling unjust imputations, to be co-operating with ypur Kv ceueticjr, in a spirit oi Unity aim biinuaencf', fa the defense of your State and the overthrow of the invader. . Very ypur obd’t serv’t, James A. Seddon, Secretary of War. Executive Department, l Milledgvillk, Deo. k Novemoer i 4th, 18(14. j Ron. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War : Sm : Official engagements have prevented earlier attention to your letter of Bth ult,, which reached me on the 20th. You are pleased to characterize a portion of my letter as acrimonious, and claim that I have transcended the bounds of official propriety, and seem to desire me to understand that you labor under difficulties in restraining yourself within the bounds of forbearance in your reply. As the acrimony of my letter consisted in a simple narrative of tiuths, communicated in a plain, straight forward manner, oading things by their right name, 1 feel that am I due you no apology. Os course no personal disrespect was intended. lam dealing, not with indivi duals, but with great principles, and with the conduct of an administration of the Govern ment, of which your. Department is but one branch. And if yon will not consider the re mark acrimonious, I will add that the people of mv State, not beffig dependent and never intending to be, upon tha f Government for the privilege of exercising their Constitutional rights, nor the Executive of the State lor his official existence, I shall on ad occasions feel at liberty to exercise perfect independence in the discharge of my official obligations, with no other restraints than those thrown around me by and sense of duty, and tlib Constitution of my country, and the iaws of my State You remark that this is the first instance in the annals of the Confederacy of the suggestion or a doubt on the right of the President to make such a call, and the obligation of eomplanee by the State Executive. Doubtless you are right, as this is unquestionably the first instance in the annals of either the old or new Confederacy of such a call, made by the president. It presents the isolated case ©t an attempt, by the Presi dent, to single out a particular State, and, by grasping into his own hands its whole military strengtn, to divest it of its last vestige of pow er to maintain its sovereignty; not only deny ing to it the right plainly reserved in tin Con stitution, to keep troops in time of wa . when actually invaded, but claiming the power to deprive it of ita whole militia and leave it not a man to aid in the execution of its laws, or to suppress servile insurrection in its midst. Ihe President demands that Georgia shall turn over to him, and relinquish her command and control over every militiaman now organ ized by her Executive, and ail he may be able to organize, The militia is composed mainly of a class of men and boys, between ages not subject by the laws of Congress of the State to serve in the Confederate armies. The Preai dent calls for all the State has of the above ascription. As no such requisition was ever before made upon any State, and it probably never entered into the mind of any statesman that such a call ever would be made, it never became necessarv to question the right to make it. You cite the case of the refusal of the Gover nors of Massachusetts and Connecticut, during the last war with Great Britain, to furnish troops for the common defense upon the re quisition of the President of the United States, and say it must be admitted that mj course is analogous to theirs “in all particulars,” and that there was more plausibility in their case than m mine, in the grounds assigned for re fusal. Let us test this 'statement by the stand ard of truth. You say the cases are anologous “in all particulars.’ 7 I deny that they are analogous in any particular. To show the character of the call, I quote the language of Jrirahjkleßl:&fc»nrae; ft * ■‘ltjviil l*recollected that when a call was Otftde q& the Militia of that State, for service ia*tbe.late war, under an arrangement which was aliha applicable to the Militia of all the States, an<l in. conformity with the acts of Con gress, the Executive of Massachusetts refused to comply with the call.’ 7 That, then, was a fall uuder-aA-arrangement alike applicable to the Militia of all the States. This is not a call made under aaArraogement alike applicable to the Militia of all the States, or indeed of any of. the other States. This is a c* ll f ;° r all tbe Militia which the Executive of Georgia has or ganized or may be able to organize, call was made by the President upon the Mi l tia of any other States. The analogy fails then at the very first step. But let us trace it & lit tle further. That wag a * or 1080 VOL. LXXIV. —NEW SERIES VOL. XXIV NO. 12~ the age required to do military service in the armies of the Uqited States, This is a call for men who are exempt by act of Congress from all service in the Conlederate armies, aud ot whom it is expressly declared oy act of the Legislature of Georgia, that they sfiall not bo liable to any draft or other compulsory pro cess to fill any requisition for troops ui on the Governor of the State by the President of the Confederate Stiies.” That was a call which the t resident could! legally make, and which the_ Governors had lawful authority to lilt— ims is a call which the President had no law tu right to make, and which the Gov.erno could not fill without violating a positive sta tute of his state. That was a call lor active Militia who were not in service, but, were at home attending to their ordinary puisuils. lhis is a call for reserve Militia, who. at the* time it was made and were, for months pas;, had been in actual service—most of the time in the trenches around Atlanta, under the cuii rtaaf fire of the guns of the enemy. In that case, the Governors of Massachusetts aud Con necticut refused to place the Militia of those States under the command of a Federal Gen eral. In this case the Militia had already been placed by the Governor of Georgia under the command of a Confederate General, where they were on the very day the call was made, aud had been tor some mouths previous. Ia that case, the Governors of those States adjudged that no emergency existed to justify the call tor the Militia, after the President had decided that it did, and they lefused to order them into the field, to this cast*, the Governor of Georgia admitted that the emergency did exist, aud had ordered them in months before the President saw the emergency, and called for the services of the Militia In that , case + he President was making up honest effort, to get the Militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut, into service to aid in repelling any assaults that might bo made by the enemy. In this case, the Presidenf, after the reserve Militia of Gem gin had teen called out by the Governor and nut into active service, was using his official iuliu ence, as -flown by General Orders Nos. 03 ..mi and 67,' issued by life Adjutant General, to get the Militia of • Georgia out of service, where they were confronting the enemy and shedding their blood in defence of their St .te When they were the trenches under the fire of tiie enemy, the President held out, as a reward lor their delinquincy .in case of their desertion from the State Milin -and return, home, a guaranty of the privilege oi remaining there in local companies, to be called out only in emergencies, to defend their own counties and vicinage. 1 append to this letter paragraph i, Ge .er.il Oorders No 63, and a paragraph of General Order No. H 7, by reference to" which it, be seen that ail detailed men were required, and all exempts from Confederate service invited to euroli themselves in local companies at home with promise that they should be called otu only ia oyieigeucies. to’defend the counties oi their residence and contiguous comities. The present Militia of Geoigia aie coin posed of exempts from service and such detailed toen as are riot in the military sen ice of the Confederate State’s. L’ho Militia of the State, then at the front, was composed, of men' of these classes oniy. The order was addr. i ed to all men of both classes. The Preside A dapfeti thn.right of ihaHinEt-.g-ii;. of jG*.. T to call out ths detailed men for service, .7 ; would, if consistent, stand ready to protect. them in case they would desert the Militia service and return home aud join his local oompunie3 Thus the strong temptation ol re maining at home was held out by the Pie.fi dent to these men, if they would ingloriously abandon Atlanta, when beleaguered by the enemy, and, after desertion from the Militia, enlist in Confederate service, which would give the Ptesideut the entire command of them and enable him to destroy the Militia organization of the Slate. Fortunately the temptation sue cceded in seducing but a small portion ot the Militia to desert and return home. They were generally true men and stood gallantly by their color®, knowing that their country needed then services at the front an 1 not in local compa nies in the rear. General Order No. 63 Evas is sued on the Cth of August and was followed by General Older No. 67 on the 16th same month The President then waited two weeks, and as the Militia still remained in the trenches around Atlanta, he found itj necessary to chaugt his policy and resort to a requisition upon me for the whole militia of the Btate, as the only means left of accomplishing his ob jects. President Madison offered no such induce ments to, and made ao such requisition upon the Miiitia of Massachusetts and ,Connecticut So much for the analogy oi the two cases. But you. are as unfortunate in your facts as in your analogy, as will be further seen by your state meat that the “judical tribunals, determined adversely to the pretensions of the Governors.” By reference to the Stir volume Massachusetts Reports, Supplement, page 549, you will find that the judges of the Supreme Court of that State had the case before them, and determined every point made by Governor Strong in his favor, and “adversely to the pretensions” ol the President. But you remind me, that the 10,000 Militia, which you say I had organized, with -those 1 was proceeding to organise, if incorporated with the veteran regiments, prior to the first of May, would have been an invaluable acquisition to the Army of Tennessee and not improbably have hurled back the invaders from the thres hold of my State. If this were true aud the movements and strength of the enemy were so much better understood by the President than by myself, as you w'ould have the coun try believe, why was it that the President made no call for the Militia in May, when ttie armies were above Dalton ‘i Why was the call delayed till the 30th oLAugust, two days be fore Atlanta fell, and then mailed to mo too late to reach Miiledgeville till afeer-the fall ? If the control of the whole Militia of the Stale, by the President was so essential to the de fence of Atlanta, how do you account for the neglect of the. President to call lor them till after the campaign had ended, in tha surren der of the city to the enemy ? Seeing that the President did not seem to appreciate th 9 emergency, and the danger to Atlanta, upon consultation with that tar-see ing General and distinguished soldier Joseph E Johnston, I had ordered the Militia to report to him and aid the gallant army of Tennessee. I first ordered out the civil aud military officers of the State, when the armies were near Dal ton, and afterwards called out the i£je£ vet ‘ Militia, including all between sixteen‘£na*.uuv five years of age, when they were at ft mines aw. During all this time, and for nearly tW-> months afterward, no call wa3 made by the President for their services. If tbe statements you how make are correct, surely such neglect, by the President in so critical an emergency, involves little less than criminality. , Again you state, as one of the inducemen » to the call, that I had stated in official cor "pondsDce that I had ten thousand 1 ganized—that a portion of to be with the army of e ° mi , ed nilM f je r, auxiliary relktioo--on!y tute half the however- not belmre* aCt ually organ number reported by me iZ You are again incorrect in your facts and Tvrtunaoelv^ignorant of the strengtn ot the mrce that S under your command. In the official correspondence to v* inch I sup nose vou allude, I did not state that 1 had or- Luiaed ten thousand Mil’tia. Ihe language u«ed, was, “nearly ten thousand armed men. 7 At that time the two regiments ot tne state Line, who are regular troops tor the war, num bered nearly fifteen hundred They, too, were placed under the Coniederate Commander, and nearly five hundred of them, while under hri command, nave been disabled or Lost upon the battle field. But if I hail made the statement as you incorrectly charge it would been true. The f l ri I m ,'? thl >’ report, fi>i war led bv Maior General G. VV. Smith, who commands the Oi - vteion of State Militia, to General Hood du• , i 10th September, lStil, bat a few d.? alter, tail of Atlanta, showed upon the muster ro ts Oi bis Division, nine ttousund one .hundred and seventy men. This report did not in - elude the regiment of Fulton County Mditia i which had been e'e'a- lied tor local service in I lh o city,nuder the command of Brig Gen M. | ' ’ .Vnghlot <lm Omiied rate army : now. : i regiment oi Troup County Militia, -which was i stationed, by the Conmi lading General at West , lyi,K ’ unt,er G a : yier, ot the Conte,t j uai • army. Nor did i> mciu.hr the two regi ments of the State Line, which had been order Si HwfdM ? lv ""°® sos the ■ " Oi fences rfilo? » ,d “ .' U P. iIUk ‘ ;i ‘‘ iiv.tauon of cadets Ot the Georgia Military last rule, who ,I H I gal lant serviec ni tfeu Men „t V- „,-i v. did it embrace the nam-. . .... ... ~J ,L, °L this Division, who uev tiune i' tiieir" b icT" to the enemy, bnl tell upon the bai:h.-ueld •; dmd in the hospital. These ha i lend ~vd rl).» i.ui Service in the pen r of tin- patriot u» then country beloro the .'resident saw the n<* Csssitv which induced him to call for th«m, au.l as ihey slept at the dace of Ins cull in the sol • uier s giave, they were uuiortuuafcely. unable to respond. But ii you say that tue whole ten thousand were r.,n in the trenches with muskets m their In. , . i reply, tt.,u while many weie sics, and so n. - absent without leave, a .avgei proportion oi tba number upon the muster toils were mere than of probably any. othri Division m Gen Hood’s army. And judging from the late speech oi the President in Macon, a much larger immbor than the usua I average in the armies of the (Jortiederacy. As I understand your •i. iUr, you d-uy that it was the purpose or Uie Pit-.'.ieiif o disband or disorganize the Militia, and save he iutended to take Hie organization, with id: its officers, and main fain it, i do not protend quote your language, but state what I understand to oe the substance. Uniomir,a.ely, your own re.onl contrailiclh you. fn the requisition made by you, occurs this sentence: ‘•Those within ihe limits ot Gen. Hood’s Department, will rep or: to him ; I host; outside to the Goni - manduut ol the Depart men oi South Carolina,* and Georgia. The line between these De pirtments cuts in two Gen. Smith’s Division, and probably three of die four brigades of which it is composed, and the requisition oi * • deis.that part of th r. D. vision, autt thoseJui gades on one side ot it, to report-to General Good, then at Atlanta, and that part on the oilier side to the Commandant vyuose head quarters were at Ch irk con. Bui tins was not ad, it amounted to an order m advance, if 1 responded to the call, 1 i a largo proportion of lire Militia then under arms to leave Atlanta hi the very crisis of her lata, and return home and report to Genera* .Jones whose headquar ievs were at Charleston Thij would not only nave peimanemly divided and disbanded the mnitia organization, as it existed under th<j laws of the State, bur, would have aided the Frosideat in carrying out his policy already re. terred' to, oi withdrawing the Militia from At lauta before its fall, and compelling armed mm, then aiding iu ils def<t* : avean.i, report to a Command ~ ; . • coat-;, vvhe..- there was uo ahva -it a-•. .• v ... ... m : U.G o. - may. ;iy ni nw was th Fv^e^t A..... ■ . | P .•eieo.i •.••>! ted it into the requisition itself' • Past expe.k*? trnas amjs&OiVh that the Pres i • dent will surmount ali obstacles to secure L. himself iho appointment of ,ue officers win are to command troops under ms control. Soon alter the commencement of the war, Georgia tendered to iiiinau exce-ieut • :-j ;- Uo of her most gallauLsous, sully armed, accoutred, and equipped, with two mouths training in cam i ol instruction, lie refused to accept it as . i was, but disbanded it, aud lef’usmg toreco" inzu the Commanding General (though every officei, I believe, in the brigsiue, from the highest to ihe lowest, petitioned to have him retained,) scattered the regiments into other ii (glides. Ihe tweive mourns men entered the service with officers elected by them, and ac accepted them with their officeis. The Con stitution oi the Confederate (Suites, as 1 have heretofore most conclusively. shown, and as the Legislature of the -.me lias resolved, as well as the laws ol the State, authorize them to elect their officers to fib. vacancies mat occur. Ihe President has disregarded t his rigat, and claims and exercises the right to appoint all ouch officers for them. Jim past course, as wed as tbe plain language of the requisition, shows that you misrepresent ihe President vvuen you deny that it was his* purpose in making the requisition to disband the militia; and I am satisfied that I do him no injustice in supposing that it was his intention, after they were disbanded, lo appoint bis own par tisaus and favorites to command 1 ~em. lielerence is made in your letter, to the act ot Congress, to show yiac the President could only hold die militia six moulds under a call 'upon the Governor, for their services. You seem.to forget that many ol tho-e th< uin ser vice, lor wnom he called, had already served nearly lour months. Aud you seem to suppose that I will be unmindful how easy it would bd* at the cud ol bix months, lor the President sim ■ piy to renew the call for another six months , aud continue this to Iho end ot tha war, an in this way keep the o:d men and boys Geo. gia constantly in service, to the destruction o t all her agricultural aud other material inter- • ebt, while uo such requirement is made of any other State. But il mis were no! possible by these repeated ealis, what guaranty nave thsy under the act ot Congress aud tne promise oi tne President,■ tuat ruey would be disbanded at the cud of six months t The original tweive mouths men entered the service under the like protection, as they supposed, of an act of Congress, and a solemn contract with tire President that they should be dischagred at the end oi their time. But before the time exp-ued the Preside -t procured another ac: of*ot Oongroos, wu c r changed the law on that subject, and ns then reiused to be bound by bis contract, and tuose of them who survive arc yet in Service uea. me end of the lourtb year. Even tho lu-'loi.ghs promise J tin in were not allowed. *Au.i mmmters ol religion who made a contract with tin Government to serve for one year, and otaeis who agreed to erve three years in the ranks, are he.J auer the c-x --pira'ion of their time, wneu they would ue embraced in the exemption act, wn.cn protects those at home, ii the government had kept k faith and discharged them according to tne C °Lhtffis connection I must also notice your remarks in reference to the six months men of SiXin tins State. And as every material Kiateuumt you now make upon that subject - contradicted by the records ol your Depart ment—made up over your own signature, the ta-k is an unpleasant one. You say, *‘it had been designed to raise troops for special defence ami local service sot tbe war with the obligation ot service as the general rule throughout the State, to constitute a part of the provisional army, aud to be su-. jeefrto the call of the President when heeded. 1 ' If tnia statement means anything, it is in tended to mean that the call was made on me tor the troops to servo for the war, with obli gation as the general rule, to do service through out the State. 1 hat is what you now say.— \Vhat did yon then say -i quote irotn your requisition oi tith June, ISiid. -The President has tuerefore determined to . make a requisition on me Governors oi the several Stems, ♦ to furnish by an appointed time , for service wu thin theot-.te, a.ud lor the limi— i purwd oi six mon.hu, an tuber oi m—n . cto. A tr am, in tne same requisition say. ‘-I a m instructed by the President, in his name, tomaktvhfi you a requisition lor eight thou sand men, to be furnished Devour State, sot tbe perifld of six months from the firsj, day of . August next, unless m the intermediate time, - [WXCiiVhJSb ON fOt'fiTU I’AUfi }